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THE MUTINY

OF

THE BENGAL ARMY.

An Historical Narrative.



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BY ONE WHO HAS SERVED UNDER
SIR CHARLES NAPIER.

FIFTH THOUSAND.

55. d. 12

LONDON:
BOSWORTH AND HARRISON, 215 REGENT STREET.
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Extract of letter from Major Mallesson to R. E. Wingfield 7/5/6[illegible]
[illegible] that publication (this red pamphlet) there is a
very much which I would not have penned six months a[illegible]
occurrence of the events it records, it was written in all
turmoil, and tumult of the storm, and tho' I can truly d[illegible]
free from all personal feeling against any one, it was ne[illegible]
unjust, crude, and based upon a most imperfect know[illegible]
the country and its real necessities." (signed) G. A. Mallesson

TO

THE LIVING AND THE DEAD—

THE LIVING EARL OF ELLENBOROUGH

AND

THE DEAD SIR CHARLES NAPIER,

WHO BOTH KNEW

HOW TO CHECK A MUTINY,

TO SELECT EFFICIENT PUBLIC SERVANTS,

AND TO GAIN THE AFFECTIONS OF THOSE OVER WHOM T[illegible]

SWAY EXTENDED,

These Pages are Dedicated.

India, July 2, 1857.

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INTRODUCTION.

I PURPOSE to write an historical narrative of the rise, progress, and termination of the mutiny and revolt of the Bengal Army. It will be my object to expose, in the first instance, the causes of the disaffection, to state then the consequences to which that disaffection led, and to conclude by pointing out the remedies which ought to be adopted to ensure the country against a repetition of the fearful outrages that have disgraced it. As my object is simply to present to my countrymen in England a true account of this awful disaster, and of all the causes which, either directly or indirectly, have led to it, I shall be deterred by no feeling of favour or affection for any individual from speaking out as the occasion demands, awarding praise where praise has been earned, but not shrinking from denouncing those whose conduct has at all contributed to the rise and progress of the mutiny.

It will, I think, be advisable in the first instance, for the benefit of non-professional readers, to present a slight sketch of the organisation and interior economy of a Bengal Infantry Regiment, more especially as on the maintenance or entire abrogation of the existing system the future discipline and efficiency of the army will depend.

Organisation of a Bengal Regiment.—A Regiment of Infantry on the Bengal Establishment is composed of 1000 privates, 120 non-commissioned officers, and 20 native commissioned officers. It is divided into ten companies, each containing 100 privates, 2 native commissioned, and 12 non-commissioned, officers. The regiment is never quartered in barracks, but in lines—such lines consisting of ten rows of thatched huts—one being apportioned to each company. In front of each of these rows is a small circular building, in which the arms and accoutrements are stored, after having been cleaned, and the key of which is generally in the possession of the havildar (sergeant) on duty. Promotion invariably goes by seniority, and the commanding officer of a regiment has no power to pass over any man, without representing the fact to the Commander-in-Chief. A Sepoy, then, who may enter the service at the age of 16, cannot count on finding himself a naick (corporal) before he attains the age of 36, a sergeant (havildar) at 45, a jemadar (native lieutenant) at

54, and a subahdar (native captain) at 60.* By the time he has attained the age of 50, a native may generally be considered as utterly useless. The blood in his veins and the marrow in his bones have been dried up or wasted by constant exposure to the trying climate of India; his energies are relaxed, his memory impaired, and in governing and controlling the men who are especially under his surveillance in the lines, he can be of but little use to his European superior.

Caste.—But there is a principle at work, unknown to the European soldiers, which operates with tremendous force on the mind of the native, and either essentially adds to, or vitally detracts from, the authority of the native officer. This principle is *caste.* Now the predominating race in a Bengal regiment is the Hindoo; the followers of that religion, as a general rule, being to the Mahomedans in the proportion of five to one. A regiment, a thousand strong, will therefore be found to contain about eight hundred Hindoos. Of these it often happens that more than four hundred are Brahmins or priests, about two hundred Rajpoots (a high caste, but lower than the Brahminical order), and the rest of a lower caste.

The Brahmins are the most influential, as they are the most bigoted of the whole race of Hindoos. In their mythological tales the gods themselves are constantly made to do penance and propitiation to this superior order. As these tales form the only kind of literature circulated amongst the Hindoos, and as the acts they record, however absurd they may appear to the educated, are implicitly believed, it is not to be wondered at that the Brahmins are the objects of veneration to the other castes. "The feet of a holy man are like the waters of life," is a proverb which gains implicit credence from all classes, and is at the same time practically acted upon. His curse is dreaded as a fate worse than death itself, whilst his protection is earnestly sought after by means of small presents, and of what to them is more valuable, constant prostrations or salaams publicly performed, so as to show the world the extent of the belief in their mighty power. When it is considered that in each regiment of the Bengal Army there are several of these men, in many regiments from three to four hundred, the mighty influence they have in their power to exert for good or evil may be imagined.

The manner in which this influence can be brought to bear on the discipline of a regiment may be easily conceived. We will suppose that one company is composed of 20 Mahomedans, 40 Brahmins, and 40 Rajpoots and lower-caste Hindoos. The influence of the Brahmins over the 80 Hindoos is paramount, and the Mahomedans being a small minority, would not contest the palm with them. The whole company may, therefore, be said to be under Brahminical influence.

* These are the extreme ages. In the regiments engaged in the Affghanistan, Sutlej, and Punjab campaigns, promotion has been attained at much earlier ages than are here set down

If a low-caste Hindoo happened at the time to fill the responsible post of subahdar, he would be entirely under the spiritual guiding of the Brahminical clique. Were a mutiny hatching in the lines, he would not dare to divulge it, from the fear of a penalty more dreadful even than death — excommunication.

It is very evident, therefore, that by means of this pernicious system of caste, the men of a Bengal regiment, though nominally subject to the British Crown, are really under the orders and control of a Brahminical clique, formed in each regiment, constantly corresponding with one another, and acting without any sense of responsibility whatever.

European Officers.—Hitherto it has been supposed that the example of, and association with their European officers, have done more than anything else to loosen the power of caste. And it has undoubtedly been proved that on many trying occasions, especially during the Affghanistan war, when the Sepoys were exposed to more than ordinary trials, these men, generally so tenacious, have forgotten their prejudices, and have infringed many of their strictest precepts. It was in Affghanistan that the Sepoy earned the character given of him by Major D'Arcey Todd, of Herat renown, that "he would go anywhere, and do anything, if led by an officer in whom he had confidence." He earned and deserved that character in that rude country. Removed from the influences which hourly thrust themselves upon him in India, he was in Affghanistan a different and a far more useful being; but the moment he returned, he indued his prejudices at once, and became again the bigoted, relentless Brahmin. Still, even upon him then, the example of his officer had a certain influence. That is to say, he was prompt to recognise a daring, chivalrous nature, and to pay a sort of homage, not unmixed with fear, to high intellectual powers. Where an officer was at all lax in the performance of his duty, the Sepoy was certain to be lax also; and in cases where a stern strictness was unaccompanied by an occasional warmth, a good word off duty, or an inclination to patronise their sports, the officer was obeyed, but uncared for. Twenty-six officers make up the complement of a native regiment, but of these nearly half were generally absent, and there were seldom more than fifteen present at head-quarters. For the management of a regiment under Brahminical control, as all Bengal regiments are, this number is amply sufficient in times of peace. That is to say, the management is not affected by the mere number. In fact, the conduct of Irregular regiments, which possess only three officers, has always contrasted so favourably with that of Line regiments, with their fourteen or fifteen, that the natural conclusion one would arrive at is, that the latter are over-officered.

The officers live in bungalows, or thatched houses, near the lines of their regiments, but too far off to enable them to have any direct control over the movements of their men during the day; and for eight months of the year at least, the weather is too warm to allow them to ride out, except in the morning and evening. In order, however, to have the whole regiment under constant European supervision, two

sergeants are allowed to each corps, who are required to live in the lines, and to report all that goes on daily to the Adjutant.

Duties of Officers.—The duties of the officers are very similar to those performed in an English regiment. There is a Commander, generally of the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, who commands the regiment; an Aajutant, who superintends the drill, and makes daily reports to the commanding officer; an Interpreter and Quarter-Master, whose duty it is to look after the clothing of the men, and to interpret all orders: then each company is assigned to a separate officer, who is expected to settle all matters connected with his men every morning; or, should he be unable to do so, to refer them to the commanding officer.

Powers of the Commanding Officer.—The power of a commanding officer is of a very limited nature: he can make no promotions to the grade of commissioned officer; even in the ordinary rise from Sepoy to naick, should he think fit to pass over a man, his decision is liable to be upset by the Commander-in-Chief: he can make no prompt recognition of distinguished services; and, worse than all, by a recent order of Sir W. Gomm, he cannot refuse a court-martial to any Sepoy who may choose to demand it, in reference to the punishment which may have been awarded to him. The commanding officer is therefore quite powerless, and the men know it. Once it was otherwise: there was a time when the Commandant had it in his power to punish or reward, and his decision was irrevocable. But the system has been gradually changed. Commanders-in-Chief fresh from Europe, and accustomed all their lives to command Englishmen, have forgotten the inherent distinction between the European and the Asiatic, and in endeavouring to assimilate the rules for the latter to those which are suited only to the former, have broken down one of the chief barriers to Brahminical supremacy. One consequence of the present system is the gradual decline and final loss of all regard on the part of the men for their officers. As members of a Christian and converting religion they are disliked, as superiors they are no longer feared. Personal qualities may attract a short-lived admiration, but even that would shiver to atoms in the encounter with Hindoo fanaticism.

The Pension List.—But there was one resource upon which the Government relied above all others to influence their Sepoys, and this was by making it their interest to remain faithful to the British standard. The establishment of a pension list on a large and liberal scale, by the operation of which a fixed monthly stipend was secured to any soldier who might be incapacitated for further duty after a service of fifteen years, and which, moreover, provided for the heirs or nearest of kin of those who might perish in the field of battle, or from sickness whilst on foreign service, seemed well adapted to secure this end. A nobler or more liberal institution than the pension establishment for native soldiers does not exist, and it was thought by those competent to judge, that the estimation of the benefits accruing from it was fixed so firmly in the minds of the Sepoys, that that single consideration would weigh against all tempta-

tions to mutiny or revolt. The result has shown that Hindoo fanaticism, when fairly pitted against the enjoyment of present comfort, the certain prospect of rank and wealth, a sure provision for one's family, a reputation for loyalty of one hundred years' standing, will invariably carry the day in a regiment where Brahminical influence is paramount, and where the European officers do not possess absolute authority.

Yet such had been the condition of the Bengal Army for several years before the outbreak of the mutiny of which I am about to treat. The slumbering feeling first showed itself of late years during the rule of Lord Ellenborough, but the prompt and vigorous measures of that nobleman so completely repressed it, that for six years no similar symptom was anywhere apparent. A second time it rose in a still more dangerous form, and attempted to coerce the iron will of Sir Charles Napier. That gallant veteran extinguished it ere yet the spark had smouldered into a flame, and was rebuked by Lord Dalhousie for so doing. He retired, to avoid witnessing with his hands tied the catastrophe which he foresaw. A third time, in 1852, the prejudices of the Sepoys were placed in opposition to the will of Government. Lord Dalhousie requested the 38th Regiment to proceed to Burma. They refused. Lord Dalhousie succumbed. From that moment a revolt became a mere question of time and opportunity.

CHAPTER I.

THE FIRST MANIFESTATIONS OF REVOLT.

During the year 1854, the 38th Regiment Native Infantry, unpunished for their refusal to go to Burma, were located at the station of Cawnpore; there were two other regiments at the same station, the 63rd and 74th Native Infantry. At Lucknow, distant about fifty miles, were the 19th and 34th Regiments; at Allygurh, on the high road between Cawnpore and Meerut, was the 54th Regiment, which also supplied troops to the small civil stations of Etawah, Mynpoorie, and Bolundshuhr, the two former in the vicinity of Cawnpore and Agra, the latter close to Meerut. At Allahabad, about 125 miles from Cawnpore, the 11th and 48th Regiments were stationed. The native troops at Meerut consisted of the 3rd Cavalry, and the 36th and 46th Regiments. Considering the joint share which many of the regiments thus enumerated had in the late outbreak, it is reasonable to suppose that constant communications were going on between them all. No suspicion of it existed at the time in any quarter. Our native troops were as much trusted as Europeans; it was believed that they were not only completely satisfied, but that they regarded service in our ranks as preferable to any other mode of obtaining a livelihood. And certainly the authorities had grounds for this belief. No sound of disaffection was heard in any quarter. For every vacancy in the ranks there were more candidates than could possibly be enrolled, and the tone and bearing of the Sepoys towards their officers left nothing to be desired in that respect.

The relation of the Sepoys to the Province of Oudh.—An event, however, was about to occur, which, in the opinion of officers who had served long in India, would put to the severest test the feelings of the native soldiery towards their foreign masters. Of all the considerable native states with which we had come in contact, the province of Oudh was the only one which had maintained its independence intact. Immediately contiguous to our own possessions, inhabited by a mixed population of Hindoos and Mahomedans, from which our own army was principally recruited, the kingdom of Oudh had remained for upwards of half a century firm in its alliance to the British Government. During the height of our reverses in Affghanistan, that friendship had never wavered. So firm indeed was the attachment to, or the perception of the power of British arms, that

the Kings of Oudh had more than once, in the season of our distress, accommodated our Government with loans to a considerable amount, in repayment of which we, to our shame be it said, compelled them to receive accessions of territory alike useless to both parties. We were therefore under considerable obligations to the Court of Lucknow. Undoubtedly, the Kings of Oudh regarded us in the light of a protecting rather than an absorbing power. It had been their policy for years and years to give in to every demand of the British Government, and to avoid every act which, directly or indirectly, might give a claim for interference in their internal affairs. To this end the suggestion of the Resident, whom, backed by three native regiments, we maintained at the Court of Lucknow, was always considered as law, and the intrigues for his favour amongst the candidates for places in the king's council were carried on in a manner which those who have visited Constantinople may perhaps understand.

The King of Oudh, then, believed himself secure from further interference than that which I have just related, and it was generally believed, amongst the civil and military community of India, that the Government had no serious intention of annexing any portion of his country. There seemed indeed, in a political view, to be strong objections to such a course. The King of Oudh was the sole remaining independent Mahomedan sovereign in India; as such he commanded the veneration and regard of all the members of the Mussulman persuasion. To strike him down, then, would excite a general feeling of discontent amongst a very numerous and powerful class of our subjects—men of whom the Cavalry regiments were chiefly composed, and who supplied at least two hundred bayonets to each regiment of Native Infantry. From his territories, indeed, our army was almost entirely recruited. The Hindoo and Mahomedan Sepoy alike came from Oudh; he transmitted all his savings to his relatives in that country; and it is a remarkable fact, and one that fully refutes Lord Dalhousie's assertions about the mis-government of Oudh, that not a single instance has been known of a Sepoy settling down after the completion of his service in our provinces: he has invariably proceeded to Oudh, to invest his little fortune in land. Colonel Sleeman, for many years our agent at the Court of Lucknow, and one of the ablest men who ever held that appointment, was so well aware of this fact, that he lost no opportunity of impressing upon Government his conviction that the annexation of Oudh would produce disaffection in the native army, principally because it would transfer the family of the Sepoy from the operation of the regal regulations and justice of the King of Oudh to our own civil courts.

But Colonel Sleeman died, and Sir James Outram reigned in his stead. New councillors, aware of Lord Dalhousie's mania for annexation, succeeded the tried statesmen who had hitherto so successfully administered the affairs of our empire on a contrary principle, and in an evil hour Lord Dalhousie decided upon seizing Oudh. He resolved to do it, too, in a manner the most offensive, and the most irritating to the large Mahomedan population of India, and the most prejudicial to our own character for truth and honour. He

secretly collected troops, entered the kingdom of Oudh like a thief in the night, marched the British force directly upon Lucknow, and then, with the capital of Oudh virtually in his own hands, gave the first intimation to the King of his impending fate. Wajid Ali, of course, was unable to resist, and Oudh became from that moment a province of the British Empire.

It is impossible to describe the mixed feelings of indignation and hatred which pervaded the whole Mussulman population of India when they heard of this deed. Naturally treacherous themselves, they yet had an instinctive admiration for honest and truthful dealing, and they had hitherto placed implicit confidence in the word of an Englishman. When, however, they learned the story of the annexation, the juggle by which the King of Oudh had been done out of his dominions, their hearts filled with rage and a desire for revenge. Our Mahomedan Sepoys were by that act alienated at once and for ever, and the Hindoos began to reflect that the kingly power which could condescend to trick a king out of his dominions, might by a similar manœuvre cheat them out of their religion.

Such were the consequences of Lord Dalhousie's last act. He had first, in the instance of the 38th Native Infantry at Barrackpore, in 1852, sown the seed of revolt by provoking a mutiny and failing to check it. He followed this up in the early part of 1856 by the perpetration of a dark deed, calculated to raise a spirit of disaffection, dislike, and distrust throughout the native army of India, and the fruits of which I am now about to record. He did all this, I may add, in spite of, and in direct contrariety to, the warning voice of the great man whom his paltry littleness and petty jealousy had driven from the country.

Lord Dalhousie left India in the early part of 1856. So utterly ignorant was he of the real feeling of the native army, and of the effect of his ill-judged measures, that he left upon record his opinion that their position could not be improved. And yet he himself had done a great deal to affect that position most injuriously. Before Lord Dalhousie's time, the roads were free to man and beast; that nobleman imposed a tax upon all travellers. Previous to his arrival in India, a Sepoy's letters were allowed to travel free of postage all over India; under Lord Dalhousie's administration he was subjected to the same charge as his officer. These imposts were small in themselves, but they greatly restricted freedom, and told upon the pocket of the man who received only fourteen shillings monthly, with which to support his family hundreds of miles distant, and to provide himself with food and all the necessaries of life.

Lord Dalhousie left India in March 1856. It might have been supposed that the feelings of the native Indian community would have been relieved sensibly by his absence. And so, undoubtedly, they were for the moment. But it was soon found that, although he himself had quitted the country, he had left his counsellors and satellites behind him. It is a matter of necessity for a newly-arrived Governor-General, ignorant of the machinery and working of the Indian Government, to continue in office, for a time at least, the

officials whom he may find installed in the several departments. Lord Canning has, therefore, been compelled since his arrival to work with Lord Dalhousie's tools. He has since, it is reported, found out their utter inefficiency. As it is important for the right understanding of my narrative that the characters and habits of thought of these men should be known and appreciated, I do not think I can do better than present in this place a sketch of each individual member of Government, for the benefit of the reader.

Characters of the Members of the Government of India on Lord Canning's arrival.—The Supreme Council of India is composed of four members, in concert with whom the Governor-General administers the affairs of the country. At the time of Lord Canning's assumption of office these members consisted of Mr. Dorin and Mr. J. P. Grant, members of the Civil Service, General Low of the Madras Army, and Mr. Peacock of the English Bar.

There were four Secretaries to Government: Mr. Lushington for the Financial, Mr. Beadon for the Home, Colonel Birch for the Military, and Mr. Edmonstone for the Foreign Department. It will suffice for the purposes of my narrative to describe the Members of Council and the Military and Home Secretaries.

Mr. Dorin.—Mr. Dorin was a man who, in a service of thirty-three years, had never been fifty miles out of Calcutta in the direction of the interior: he was, therefore, practically ignorant of the manners, and customs, and peculiar requirements of the people of India. For all practical purposes, those three-and-thirty years might as well, or even with more advantage, have been spent in England. He was verging upon sixty years of age, and in all his habits was a very Sybarite. His experience of ruling had been principally confined to the Financial Department; but even there his budgets bore a stronger resemblance in their results to those of Sir Charles Wood, than to the more perfect calculations of Sir R. Peel or Mr. Gladstone. In 1854, during Lord Dalhousie's absence in the Neelghery Hills, he had temporarily assumed the Presidency of the Council. His tenure of that office was chiefly remarkable for the outbreak of the Santhal rebellion, and for the weak and inefficient measures pursued to check it. He was indolent, void of energy, deficient in mental culture and ability, and certainly, in no other country but India, and in no other service but the Civil Service, would have attained any but the most subordinate position.

Mr. J. P. Grant.—Mr. Grant was a very different character. In the prime of life, active, energetic, and possessed of a certain amount of ability, he might, had he been trained in any other school, have done good service on the occurrence of a crisis. Unfortunately, he laboured under a complete ignorance of the habits and customs of the natives of Upper India. Accustomed, during his service, to deal only with Bengalees, he had imbibed the extraordinary notion that they were a type of the Hindostanees generally. His vanity was so great, that he would not stoop to demand information even from practical men of his own service. With the supercilious manner which is so often the accompaniment of a confined understanding, he pooh-

pooh'd every suggestion which was at variance with his settled ideas. Of the Sepoys he had no knowledge whatever, although, with respect to them, he was always ready to offer a suggestion. Of military men in general he had a jealous dislike, which prompted him on every occasion to oppose any plans or suggestions offered by a member of that profession. He was an adept at intrigue, and, being possessed of a practical knowledge of revenue matters, a plausible manner, an easy address, and considerable influence at the India House, he had gained a seat in council at an earlier age than was customary. As a practical man he had always been a failure. It was his advice, given because Mr. Halliday proposed an opposite plan, which delayed for seven or eight months the proclamation of martial law in the Santhal districts ; and it will be seen, that on the occasion of the mutiny at Barrackpore, his pernicious influence was always opposed to those prompt and severe measures, on the execution of which the safety of the empire depended. These faults are attributable to the evil action of the school in which he was trained, on a disposition naturally haughty and supercilious. Had he never been a civilian, had he been trained to depend on his own exertions from the moment of his entrance into life, his career would have been more useful to his country and more honourable to himself.

General Low. — General Low was the only really practical member of the council. Unfortunately he was the oldest, and age and climate had already begun to tell upon his nerves. Nevertheless, he was the only man from whom the Governor-General received any real assistance. He knew, at all events, that there ought to be no trifling with mutiny, and he advised accordingly. It is to be lamented that he was wanting in the eloquence or power of language necessary to support his views. He could record a minute, but could not make a speech. And it thus happened that he was unable to defend measures, of the propriety of which he was convinced, against the legal subtleties sometimes brought to bear on them by his colleagues.

Mr. Peacock.—Mr. Peacock was the Law member of council, and as such was not expected to be able to deal with purely military questions. When such matters were debated he generally vacillated between Mr. Grant and General Low, inclining oftener to the civilian. His intentions were always pure, and when convinced of the justice of a cause, no special pleading would alter his vote. Unfortunately, his unacquaintance with soldiers prevented him from comprehending the dangers of unchecked mutiny, and he was found, on trial, ignorant of the proper moment to disregard rule and to resort to urgent measures.

Colonel Birch.—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department was a man in every way unsuited for his position. Placed early in his career in the department of the Judge-Advocate-General, his confined understanding was exerted in mastering the quirks and quibbles of the law. His intellect being essentially shallow, he was unable to take a broad view of any question; but he would argue for hours, and exhaust all his ingenuity in com-

bating some petty detail. When Sir Charles Napier assumed the command of the Indian Army, Col. Birch was Judge-Advocate. He was rather afraid of Sir Charles's downright character, and at their first interview exerted all his powers to please him. No amount of special pleading, however, would go down with the great Conqueror of Scinde.

Sir Charles's bad opinion was, however, of this service to Colonel Birch, that it obtained for him Lord Dalhousie's patronage. That nobleman, eager to show his spite towards Sir C. Napier, took the opportunity of the first vacancy to appoint Colonel Birch Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department; thus placing him, *de facto*, at the head of the army in India—giving him a position, indeed, exactly analogous to that of the Minister of War in France.

A worse appointment could not have been made. Colonel Birch was essentially a sycophant, always ready to give up his own opinion, if by so doing he could curry favour with his superior. He had tried this plan with Sir C. Napier, but Sir Charles found him out, and not only felt, but showed contempt towards him in consequence: he found it an easier task to ingratiate himself with Lord Dalhousie and his successor.

But he was also an ignoramus. He knew nothing of the Bengal Army. Many years had elapsed since he had even spoken to a Sepoy. He was ignorant of the composition of the army, as well as of its wants; whilst his previous training had so unfitted him for his post, that he could not even write an order without making it unintelligible by excessive quibbling.

Mr. Beadon.—Of Mr. Beadon, the Home Secretary, it will suffice to say that his great idea of policy, the one scheme which he kept constantly before him, was "India for the Civil Service." He looked, in fact, upon the country as the property of the members of the service, and he legislated accordingly. Indigo planters, merchants, in fact all Europeans who were not civilians or soldiers, were discouraged by him. He hated independent Englishmen; he hated the Press, because its motto was "India for the English:" he hated every one and every thing which interfered with his grand idea, and he never lost an opportunity of showing that hatred. Under his rule, India would have remained in our hands what it has been for the last hundred years: its resources would never have been developed, it would have continued almost like a burden on England; but as a compensation, it would have produced annually a certain sum of money as salaries for the family clique who governed the country.

Mr. Beadon had one recommendation: if he was narrow-minded and unscrupulous, he was honest: he could not "smile and smile and be a villain:" he spoke his thoughts freely and honestly, and people whilst they hated, could not help respecting him—a sentiment never entertained towards his colleague in the military department.

Lord Canning.—Such were the men by whom Lord Canning was surrounded on the outbreak of the mutiny. If they were, as a body, vain, ignorant, and incompetent, truth compels me to record that they could not have found a softer soil on which to exercise their

talents than that imbedded in the nature of the Governor-General. He was a man of excellent disposition, but weak and vacillating to a degree scarcely to be imagined. It was his great misfortune to be the son of an illustrious man. Qualities were therefore expected from him which he certainly did not inherit from his sire. His abilities were essentially mediocre, and, like many weak men, he almost invariably submitted his intellect to the influence of the last counsellor who had his ear.

He possessed, however, many agreeable qualities, calculated to adorn a private station. His personal courage was undeniable, but he lacked firmness and self-reliance to a degree which quite incapacitated him for his high position. Had he been surrounded by men possessing honesty and ability, he would doubtless have taken his tone from them, and under their advice and tuition would have shown himself equal to the occasion. But the slave of intriguing and incompetent advisers, the shuttlecock of Messrs. Grant, Beadon, and Birch, he gave, as I shall now proceed to show, an impetus to a mutiny which might have been crushed in the bud.

CHAPTER II.

FROM THE OUTBREAK OF THE DISAFFECTION TO THE DISBANDING OF THE 19TH NATIVE INFANTRY.

THE King of Oudh having been, as before stated, summarily deprived of his kingdom, determined to appeal to the Parliament and people of England for redress. Accordingly, in the month of April 1856, he came down to Calcutta, and took up his abode at Garden Reach, in the outskirts of Calcutta, attended by his prime minister, Ally Nucky Khan, and several followers. The Queen-mother, his brother, and one of his sons, proceeded to England, in the month of May following, in order effectually to prosecute the schemes on which he had resolved for the recovery of his kingdom. They set out, in fact, not with any hope on their part, or on the part of the King and his advisers, that their mission would be successful, but in order to convey to the people of England the impression that he had no hope but in their justice and mercy, in order to remove attention from the vast design he had formed—to upset at one blow the British rule in India.

In fact, this plan was decided upon before the King* left Luck-

* It should be borne in mind that the expression, "King of Oudh," refers here to those who carried on intrigues in his name. It is probable that the king himself, an imbecile, was not trusted with the full extent of the conspiracy; but his prime minister, Ally Nucky Khan, without doubt a man of transcendant ability, was the soul of the plot. Since his confinement in Fort William he has, in private conversation, attempted to justify himself, by declaring it was a counter-stroke for the treachery by which the seizure of Oudh was consummated.

now. He had become aware, from the reports of his agents, that the Bengal Army was disaffected, and ripe to be worked upon. The Brahminical priesthood throughout the country were impatient at the proselyting efforts of the missionaries, whilst the Mahomedans, as I have shown before, were discontented at seeing the only kingdom connected with them by faith swallowed up by the paramount Power. The King found, in fact, that there never would be a time more propitious for an attempt to overthrow the British. Acting accordingly under able advice, he at once commenced a system of tampering with the native army. Of the Mahomedans he was sure; the Hindoos, already disaffected, might be acted upon by means of their religion. The new system of administration in Oudh would, he felt satisfied, cause considerable vexation to the families of the Sepoys, and, consequently, no little discontent amongst the Sepoys themselves. His agents were accordingly directed to lay stress on this new interference of the British with the privileges of the natives. It was pointed out to them that they were the original owners of the land, the lords of the soil, but that now, gradually and insidiously, the British were depriving them of their rights, and resolved to go on until they had subverted their religion. An alliance was at the same time entered into with the King of Delhi, who entered heart and soul into the plot, and it was finally determined that throughout the Bengal Presidency, from Calcutta to Peshawur, there should be a simultaneous rising on one day, in which the life of no Christian should be spared. The month of August, 1857, by which time it was hoped the Queen-mother would have left England, was fixed upon for the outbreak.

Had the measures of the Government of India been conducted at this time with even ordinary prudence, had the Military Secretary not blundered in a manner which would have been unpardonable in an ensign of twelve months' standing, it is probable that the attempts of the King of Oudh to tamper with the native army would have altogether failed. In the absence of tangible evidence on the subject, it had been difficult to convince the Hindoo Sepoys that their religion was actually in danger, and without satisfactory proof on that point they were unwilling to rise against the Government. In fact the plot was beginning to languish, when, at this juncture, the combined ignorance and folly of Colonel Birch gave the King of Oudh the very opportunity he had been seeking for in vain.

It is well known that the chief object of a Hindoo's veneration is the cow. She is in his eyes the sacred animal, the visible presence of the Creator on earth. Her life is not only precious, but to take it the greatest crime of which man could be guilty. The slaughter of a cow in a Hindoo village would always have been the signal for a rise. So convinced, indeed, were the Governments of former days of the necessity of respecting this prejudice, that in the large towns where Europeans were stationed a paddock or compound, surrounded by high walls, was set apart for the reception of bullocks intended for their food. The Hindoos always ignored the existence of such a spot; indeed all possible means were adopted to conceal it from them.

To kill a cow openly was openly to violate their religion, and the practice was consequently forbidden throughout India.

Yet, in the face of these prejudices, of the order to respect them, and of the danger of the consequences which must result from their violation, no sooner had the Government of India resolved to introduce the Enfield rifle partially into the Indian army, than the Secretary to Government deliberately issued an order, which, by violating the caste of the Hindoo, was alone sufficient to bring about a revolt. The Enfield rifle required a particular species of cartridge, and this cartridge in England was greased with lard made from the fat either of the hog or the ox. Without reflecting, or if reflecting, ignoring the consequences of his act, Colonel Birch ordered that the cartridges for use in India should be made up similarly to the cartridges in use in England, and should be used by the native troops—that is to say, that Hindoo Sepoys should handle cartridges besmeared with the fat of their sacred animal, the cow! The knowledge of this fact was conveyed to the Hindoos in the most casual manner. These cartridges had been made up by Lascars—men of an inferior caste. It happened that one day a Lascar requested a Brahmin Sepoy to give him a drink of water from his lotah, or brass pot. The Sepoy refused on the plea of his superior caste, and that the lotah would be defiled by the touch of the Lascar. The Lascar in reply taunted him for talking of defilement, when he every day touched cartridges besmeared with cows' fat. The Hindoo, horror-stricken, rushed to his comrades and told them the story: they inquired, and found it true to the letter. Indignant, believing themselves deceived by the Government, they wrote an account to their comrades throughout India. From that moment the work of the agents of the King of Oudh was easy.

For a man occupying the position of Military Secretary to the Government of India to make so gross a blunder was unpardonable. Equally so that, when the mistake was discovered, no disavowal was made by Government for four months, and then only in consequence of the outbreak at Meerut! Well aware that the idea had taken possession of the Sepoys' minds, Colonel Birch made no attempt to counteract it, gave no intimation that the manufacture of greased cartridges had been stopped. He calmly surveyed the mischief his acts had caused, and—did nothing. Yet this man, whose blundering incapacity caused the revolt, is still Secretary to the Government of India in the military department!

The consequences of this gross mismanagement were quickly apparent. The agents of the native conspirators were not the men to allow such an opportunity to slip through their fingers. On the 24th of January, less than a week after the discovery of the greased cartridges, the telegraph office at Barrackpore was burned down. An idea seemed to pervade the minds of the Hindoos that the Government was resolved to Christianise them all; that as the plan of open conversion, pursued now for several years, had failed entirely, it had been resolved to resort to insidious and secret measures to bring about the same end; that Lord Canning had undertaken the government of India with that sole object in view, and that he had engaged to

accomplish it in three years. Hence the greasing of the cartridges: hence the changes that were talked about in their dress and equipments. They knew our skill; they witnessed the constant scientific improvements evinced in railways, electric telegraphs, &c., and they dreaded lest some morning they should awake and find themselves, owing to some unaccountable ingenuity on our part, deprived of their religion and caste. Discontent took possession of their minds; they were in perpetual dread of something undefined, supernatural: a restless desire of showing their discontent evinced itself, and resulted, after nearly a week's hesitation, in the perpetration of the act recorded above, viz. the burning of the electric telegraph office at Barrackpore.

This station, distant about sixteen miles from Calcutta, was garrisoned entirely by native troops; at this time four regiments were quartered there, the 2nd Grenadiers, the 34th Native Infantry, the 43rd Light Infantry, and the 70th Native Infantry. Between Calcutta and Dinapore, an extent of 400 miles in length and enormous breadth, there was but one European regiment, the 53d Foot. Half of this regiment garrisoned Fort William, the other half was stationed at Dumdum, about seven miles from Calcutta. In case of any disturbance, not a single man could have been spared from the wing located in the fort, whilst the other was insufficient in strength to put down a simultaneous rising of the town and of the native army.

Such an idea, at this time, never suggested itself to a single European in the country. Although after the burning of the telegraph office on the 24th, scarcely a night passed over without the perpetration of some act of incendiarism, these acts were never traced to their source. The Government were confident and callous. Although about this time* the excited state of the minds of the Sepoys, consequent upon the discovery of the nature of the grease, was reported to them, not a single explanation was offered, not an attempt made to soothe them. It is true that an order was issued, after the interval of almost a month, to serve out no more greased cartridges, but, in the absence of any accompanying explanation, the Sepoys viewed that merely as an evidence that the Government was baffled for the time, and waited only a more convenient season for the renewal of their insidious attacks on their caste.

But, although the eyes of our Government were blinded, those of the King of Oudh and his agents were wide open to the importance of the occasion. The minds of the Sepoys at Barrackpore were hourly worked upon, and with such effect, that letters were despatched in shoals to every regiment in the service, giving full details, often amplified and exaggerated, of the cartridge business. Agents were also despatched, well supplied with money, to every station in India; these men were directed to prepare the native army for an immediate rise, and to adopt every possible means to bring about the revolt without the cognizance of the authorities.

* January and February, 1857.

The King of Oudh was well served. The whole army succumbed to his influence; a very considerable portion of the large police force came into his plans, and even where his agents were unsuccessful, in not one instance were they betrayed.

By the middle of the month of February, the discontented amongst the native regiments at Barrackpore had assumed such an appearance, and had risen to such a height, that General Hearsey commanding the Presidency division found it necessary to assemble the troops, in order to point out to them the absurdity of the fears they entertained for their religion. General Hearsey was a very gallant cavalry officer, well acquainted with the native character: he spoke the language also with rare facility. It was not in his power to do more than harangue the troops and report their state of mind to the Government: the first he did well, and at the outset with some effect; but as the second measure produced no explanation or sign from the head of the military department, the Sepoys, still secretly instigated, soon returned to their former state of murmuring against their masters.

To give one instance of the apathy of the Government at this momentous period it will suffice to state, that although disaffection had been manifested, in the most marked manner, by the Sepoys at Barrackpore and Dumdum on account of the greased cartridges, towards the end of January, it was not before the middle of the following month that Colonel Birch telegraphed to the schools of musketry at Seealkote and Umballah to prohibit the use by the Sepoys at those stations of the greased cartridge. Long before the message reached Seealkote (in the heart of the Punjab) those cartridges had been distributed to, and used by, the native troops there located.

The condition of the troops at Barrackpore, towards the latter end of February, was that of men who felt themselves aggrieved, who were resolute to revenge themselves on the supposed authors of their grievances, but who were restrained, partly by fear, partly by policy, from setting about it at once. Suddenly a spark lighted on the powder: it did not, fortunately for us, at the moment ignite, but a low rumbling noise, sufficient to enable us to make some preparation, warned us of our danger. The spark was first visible at Berhampore; it fizzed subsequently at Barrackpore; but the grand explosion took place two months later at Meerut!

On the 24th February, a small guard of the 34th Regiment N.I. arrived in the station of Berhampore, distant from Calcutta about one hundred and twenty miles. As was customary in such cases, the men of the 19th Regiment N.I., then stationed at Berhampore, feasted the men of the 34th guard, and of course inquired after the doings of their comrades at Barrackpore. The 34th men made a clean breast of it; they poured all their grievances into the sympathising ears of their entertainers: not an item in the catalogue was left out—the cartridges, the beef fat, Lord Canning's supposed mission, all were enumerated; the determination of the Barrackpore brigade to mutiny on the first convenient occasion was dwelt upon;—nothing,

in short, was omitted which could possibly work upon the feelings of their listeners.

It is a remarkable fact, illustrative of the native character, that in a regiment numbering a thousand men, composed of Mahomedans and Hindoos, of high caste and low caste, not a single man after hearing the astounding stories of the 34th guard thought it worth while to go to his commanding officer or to the adjutant of the regiment and inquire into their truth. They had been associated for years with their European officers, had marched with them from station to station, had received from them the kindest treatment, and, moreover, were conscious of the pride with which they were regarded, and of the implicit confidence placed in them by all. Yet on hearing for the first time, perhaps, tales which were brought them by men of another regiment, of a vast conspiracy brewing against the state, not one of them reported the circumstance or even inquired if it were true!

The acute sensitiveness peculiar to the natives on matters affecting their caste doubtless induced them to accept all they heard as literal truth. For a whole day they brooded over it; in making the morning report to their officers on the 25th of February, their demeanour was quite respectful, there was not an outward sign of the excitement which reigned within. But their feelings had been too much worked upon to allow this passive submission a longer sway. A slight circumstance supplied the igniting spark. On the 25th February, Colonel Mitchell, commanding the 19th, ordered a parade for exercise with blank ammunition for the following morning. In the evening, the blank cartridges were served out to the men. They were of the very same description as those which for a century past had been used by the Bengal Army. These particular cartridges had, in fact, been made up before even an Enfield rifle had reached India, and had been made over to the 19th magazine by the 7th Regiment N.I., on the latter leaving the station. In ordinary circumstances no objection whatever would have been made by any Sepoy to use similar cartridges. But the passions of the men had been roused; their feelings had been so excited that they could no longer control them; they were beyond the power of reason; they felt satisfied that their caste was to be taken away by means of cartridges, and their excitement persuaded them that these were the fatal messengers. They at first refused to receive them, and it was only when their commanding officer threatened all recusants with court-martial that they took them in gloomy silence. That night they held a consultation. The "multitude of counsellors" gave new energy to their fears, and in a moment of fanatical frenzy the regiment rose as one man, and took possession of their arms shouting defiance.

Intelligence of these facts was promptly conveyed to the commanding officer, Colonel Mitchell. Two courses were open to him. The only troops at the station besides the 19th were a detachment of native cavalry and a battery of native artillery. The night was pitch dark, and no movement could be made with any certainty. He might either, therefore, have despatched the cavalry and artillery to

guard the public buildings, the treasury, &c., and await the early dawn for ulterior operations, or he might at once march down on the lines and endeavour to coerce the mutineers. The first course seemed the most prudent, and was urged upon him; however, he adopted the other, and moved as quickly as possible on his mutinous regiment. The night was so dark that he was compelled to use torches to enable him to find the way; in this manner, and with difficulty, he moved on.

In the meanwhile the 19th having seized their arms, remained drawn up in front of their lines, waiting apparently for their European officers to take the initiative. The ground near their lines was interspersed here and there with tanks, and on these, by the light of the torches, they beheld the artillery and cavalry advancing. Had they been thoroughly evil-disposed, it would have been easy for them, in darkness as they were, to have picked off their officers and the artillery-men, whilst the nature of the ground and the darkness of the night would have prevented all idea of danger from the cavalry. They were, however, more excited than ill-disposed, and with arms in their hands they waited the first movement of their officers.

On his part Colonel Mitchell could not have been insensible to the insecurity of his own position; he was marching at the head of natives against natives. Could he depend upon them? It was at all events doubtful. Were he to give the order to charge or to fire, was he certain that he would be obeyed? And if he were not obeyed, not only would there be three regiments in revolt instead of one, but the lives of the residents of that and surrounding stations would be jeopardised. Besides which he found, as had been pointed out to him, that the nature of the ground and the darkness of the night would prevent the possibility of his acting efficiently against the mutineers.

Something, however, must be done: he felt that. After deliberately weighing every circumstance of his position, he deemed it most prudent to try in the first instance the effect of conciliatory measures. He accordingly addressed the men of the 19th; he pointed out to them the absurdity of their fears and the enormity of their offence, and conjured them to give up their arms and return peaceably to their lines.

The 19th on their part were not over-anxious to push matters to extremities; their excitement was beginning to wear off, and many of them felt a little ashamed of themselves. Still they were sensible of the advantage of their position, and seemed resolved not to act under coercion. In reply, therefore, to their Colonel, they expressed their readiness to return to their lines, and to restore their arms to the proper place, provided only the artillery and cavalry were first moved away.

To this unmilitary concession Colonel Mitchell felt averse to accede. However, for the reasons above stated, he was powerless: he did not wish to provoke the 19th into a more open demonstration; he consented then to the proposal, and moved off the artillery and

cavalry. The 19th gave up their arms, returned to their lines, and the *émeute* was at an end.

Reflections on Col. Mitchell's conduct.—Colonel Mitchell's conduct on this trying occasion was much criticised at the time, and he was generally condemned for not at all risks enforcing his order to the mutineers to lay down their arms. Subsequent events have proved that had he done so—had he ordered the artillery to fire, or the cavalry to charge—he would not in all probability have been obeyed. Or, even had they endeavoured to obey him, the darkness of the night would have prevented any efficient working of the guns, whilst the Sepoys could have picked off the gunners with but little risk to themselves. Had he been worsted in the encounter, the rebellion would have been precipitated two months; the regiments at Barrackpore would have risen *en masse*, and the consequences to the metropolis would have been fearful.

The writer is of opinion that if Colonel Mitchell erred, he erred in not adopting the advice said to have been tendered to him of placing guards over the treasury and public buildings till the morning, and then acting with decision. But even then, as shown above, the result would have been doubtful; and every Englishman ought to be thankful that the matter ended as it did.

The news of this outbreak reached Calcutta about the 4th of March, and first opened the eyes of the Government to a sense of their insecurity. They had but one European regiment between Calcutta and Dinapore. It would be unsafe to punish the 19th Native Infantry without having European troops at hand to overawe them, and Government had literally none. Perhaps, after securing the fort and public buildings, about two hundred men might have been available—a mere handful amongst five native regiments deeply imbued with a spirit of fanaticism. In such a crisis there was but one course for Government to pursue; and it is but justice to say that they pursued it. No intimation was conveyed to the 19th of the sense entertained of their conduct. They were allowed to do their duty as usual; but on the morning of the 6th of March the Oriental Company's steamer "Bentinck" steamed for Rangoon, with orders to bring up H.M.'s 84th Foot to Calcutta with the utmost possible dispatch.

On the account of the disturbance at Berhampore reaching Barrackpore, great excitement was manifested by the Sepoys of the regiments at that station, more especially by those of the 2d and 34th Regiments. They did their duty, it is true, but with a sullen doggedness which it was impossible to conceal: it was known that nightly meetings took place in their lines, at which the conduct of the 19th in seizing their arms was applauded, and great sympathy expressed for them. A report of these meetings was made to Government; but not having the power to interfere with effect, they wisely abstained from noticing the matter.

Reports about this time reached Calcutta of ill-feeling and disaffection evinced at the important stations of Meerut and Lucknow. The occurrence of constant incendiarisms in the neighbourhood of the

Sepoy lines cast suspicion upon them, and served to show, not only that they were dissatisfied, but were seeking opportunities to evince their feelings.

At length, on the 20th of March, to the great satisfaction of every one in Calcutta, the "Bentinck" returned from Rangoon. H.M.'s 84th were immediately conveyed to Chinsurah, a station eight miles distant from Barrackpore; and orders were immediately transmitted to the officer commanding the 19th Regiment to march his corps to Barrackpore.

Greater excitement than ever prevailed at that station in consequence of the arrival of the 84th. The native troops, feeling themselves guilty of conspiring against the state, imagined that this move was directed against them. In the 34th especially the mutineers' whispers became louder and louder; they openly expressed their sympathy with the 19th, and scarcely concealed their intention to stand by the men of that regiment in the event of their offering any resistance.

Happily for us, these feelings found a vent before the 19th reached Barrackpore.

On the 29th March it was reported to Lieut. Baugh, Adjutant of the 34th, that several of the men of his regiment were in a very excited state; and that one of them especially, Mungul Pandy by name, was traversing the lines, armed with a loaded musket, calling upon his comrades to rise, and declaring himself that he would shoot the first European he came across. On receipt of this intelligence Lieut. Baugh put on his uniform, mounted his horse, and, with a pair of loaded pistols in his holsters, rode down to the parade-ground. It must here be mentioned, that immediately in front of the Quarter-guard of the 34th Regiment the station gun was posted, from which the morning and mid-day salutes were fired. Mungul Pandy, on hearing of Lieut. Baugh's approach, concealed himself behind this gun; and as that officer drew near, he took a deliberate aim and fired. The ball wounded the horse in the flank, and brought him with his rider to the ground. Lieut. Baugh, however, quickly disengaged himself; and snatching up one of his pistols, advanced on Mungul Pandy, who, finding himself unable to load his musket a second time, had taken up a sword which he had with him. Lieut. Baugh fired and missed. Before he could draw his sword the Sepoy was on him, with one blow brought him to the ground, and but for timely assistance would have then and there killed him.

All this took place, it must be recollected, in front of the Quarter-guard of the 34th, and not thirty yards distant from the guard of a jemadar and twenty Sepoys there located. These men not only made no effort to assist their officer, but showed evident sympathy with Mungul Pandy. The Sergeant-major of the regiment, who was a short distance behind Lieut. Baugh at the time, called out to them to assist him; but their jemadar forbad them to stir. At this juncture, just as Lieut. Baugh had been struck down wounded, the Sergeant-major came up breathless, and attempted to seize Mungul Pandy; but he, too, was wounded and struck down. Upon this the jemadar

advanced with the men of his guard; but these, instead of assisting their European officers, commenced striking their heads with the butt-ends of their muskets. To this treacherous conduct there was one exception. The Mahomedan orderly who had followed Lieut. Baugh from his house, arrived on the scene of action in sufficient time to seize Mungul Pandy just as he had succeeded in reloading his musket. He was quickly followed by General Hearsey and other officers, who had been roused by the firing; and by their joint aid the officers were rescued from their perilous situation. Mungul Pandy, on being seized, made an abortive effort to shoot himself. He was then taken off the ground and lodged in the Quarter-guard of the 70th Regiment. Affairs wore a very serious aspect when General Hearsey reached the ground.* That gallant officer, a friend and pupil of Sir Charles Napier, comprehended all in an instant. He felt that to give way now would be to incite a mutiny. Drawing a pistol from his belt, he rode up to the men of the guard, and ordered them back to their posts, declaring he would with his own hand shoot the first man who showed any symptoms of disaffection. This conduct had the desired effect; the men were for the moment overawed; and the dark cloud which appeared to be on the very point of bursting passed quietly away.

In order more effectually to convince the Sepoys that loyalty would always meet with a fitting reward from the British Government, General Hearsey then and there promoted Sheikh Pultoo, the Mahomedan orderly who had rescued Lieutenant Baugh and the Sergeant-major, to the rank of havildar. This had a most salutary effect: and yet it will scarcely be believed, that for this act a severe wigging was administered to the gallant officer by the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, Colonel Birch, whose quibbling mind and red-tape instincts could see no necessity for so grave a departure from rule!

But although the station had resumed its outward appearance of calm, within the lines all was disaffection. The jemadar and the Sepoys of the Quarter-guard, who, strange to say, had not then been, and were not for two or three days afterwards, placed in arrest, reproached their comrades for not taking advantage of so fine an opportunity of rising against and massacring the "Feringhees." The recriminations, however, were short, and the 34th, in conjunction with the 2nd Grenadiers, proceeded to mature a fresh plan, the nature of which will shortly be detailed.

On the 30th March the 19th Native Infantry arrived at Barraset, about eight miles distant from Barrackpore. It had by this time transpired that they were to march into the latter station for the purpose of being disbanded: still the behaviour of the men was respectful; and in order to avert their fancied doom, they had sent in

* The men of the regiment had turned out in undress in front of their lines, and had shown, by their gestures and other signs, that their sympathies were all with Mungul Pandy. They had even jeered at Lieutenant Baugh as he passed them wounded, and reproached them for not assisting him.

a petition to the Governor-General, offering, in case they were pardoned, to proceed at once to China, or to serve anywhere on land or sea. In short, they showed a repentant spirit, and were never less inclined to join in a conspiracy against the state. On arriving on the morning of the 30th at Barraset, they found a deputation from the 34th awaiting their arrival. It has since transpired that these men made them a proposal — the result of their deliberations of the previous night — which it was well for us that they did not accept. On that very morning, Her Majesty's 84th, from Chinsura, a wing of the 53d Foot from Dumdum, a couple of European batteries from the same place, and the Governor-General's body-guard (native) from Calcutta, had arrived at Barrackpore, and had been ordered to appear on parade with the native regiments at five o'clock on the following morning. The proposal made by the 34th to the 19th was to the following effect: that they should, on that same evening, kill all their officers, march at night into Barrackpore, where the 2nd and 34th were prepared to join them, fire the bungalows, surprise and overwhelm the European force, secure the guns, and then march on to and sack Calcutta.

Had the 19th been as excitable then as they had shown themselves on the 25th of February, these views might possibly have been entertained; but they were repentant, and ashamed of their former excess. That they were not thoroughly loyal is proved by the fact that the tempters were not reported: they were suffered to return unbetrayed, but their scheme was at once and definitively rejected.

On the following morning the 19th Regiment marched into Barrackpore. An order by the Governor-General in Council, in which their crime was recapitulated, their fears for their religion pronounced absurd, and their disbandment directed, was read out to them in the presence of the assembled troops before enumerated. On being ordered to lay down their arms, they obeyed without a murmur; many of them, indeed, showed signs of deep contrition. They were then paid up before their comrades, and were marched across the river without arms. They had ceased to belong to the Company's army.

CHAPTER III.

FROM THE DISBANDING OF THE 19TH REGIMENT TO THE REVOLT AT MEERUT.

The 19th were disbanded, and in the opinion of the Government a lesson had been thereby read to the Sepoys which they would not easily forget. They argued that Lord Ellenborough, by the disbandment of a regiment in 1844 (the 34th Native Infantry), had repressed

a mutiny; and that Sir Charles Napier, by a similar measure in 1849, had effected the same end; quite oblivious of the fact, that the entire circumstances were dissimilar, and that both those statesmen had followed up their disbanding orders by others. But the Indian statesmen who were at this time in power affected to sneer both at Lord Ellenborough and at Sir Charles: their pattern statesman was Lord Dalhousie (the real author of the mutiny), and they chuckled at the ease with which they had (to their own satisfaction) disproved the vaticinations of that nobleman's rival. Colonel Birch, in particular, was especially gleeful on this occasion. He — the man of whom Sir Charles had made a laughing-stock! — had he not by a single movement effected all that Sir Charles Napier had been able to bring about by twenty general orders? So at least he thought, or professed to think. All was confidence, superciliousness, and self-congratulation on the part of the Government officials! But although the Government was satisfied, the public was ill at ease. Symptoms were showing themselves throughout India, which the oldest Indian officers had never witnessed before. It was evident to them that some great movement was in progress, although they were not in a position either to fathom its causes or to avert its consequences. The bare hint of such an idea to Colonel Birch was sufficient to expose one to an outpouring of ridicule. That official's pluck at this epoch could not be questioned.

In the meantime, in April, the Sepoy, Mungul Pandy, had been brought to trial, and condemned to death. He made no confession, but stoically accepted his fate in the presence of all the troops at the station. The jemadar who commanded the guard of the 34th on the 29th March, and who had prevented that guard from assisting Lieutenant Baugh, had also been tried and condemned to death. The sentence, however, owing to some red-tape informalities originating with Colonel Birch, was deferred, most prejudicially to the public interests, to the 21st April. On that day the jemadar was brought to execution, and was hanged. Immediately before his death he harangued those around him, confessing the justice of his sentence, and warning others from following his example.

With this execution the Government appeared to rest satisfied. The atrocious conduct of the men composing the guard on the 29th March, evinced by their not only conniving at the attack upon their officer, but by themselves assaulting him and the Sergeant-major as they lay wounded on the ground, was quite overlooked. The Government appeared "satisfied of the loyalty of the 34th Regiment." Indeed, so convinced did they seem to be of the loyalty of every regiment in the Bengal Army, that at the end of the month of April they determined to send the 84th Foot back to Rangoon, and actually engaged transports for that purpose!

The Government came to this conclusion when in possession of reports from the commanding-officers of the different stations in India, which would have convinced any unprejudiced man that the whole army was ripe for revolt. At Agra the incendiarisms had been frequent, and the Sepoys had refused their aid to subdue the

flames; at Seealkote, letters had been discovered from the Barrackpore Sepoys, inciting their brethren at that distant station to revolt. At Umballah, the discontent had been so marked that the Commander-in-Chief himself had been compelled to assure the Sepoys that their apprehensions regarding their caste were groundless. At Lucknow, the Sepoys of the 48th, incensed at their doctor for tasting a bottle of medicine previously to making it over to the sick man, and construing that act into an attempt against their caste (although the system had been prevalent for an hundred years), had taken their revenge by burning down his bungalow. At Benares, too, a very strong feeling of disaffection had been evinced: in fact, there was scarcely a regiment in the Bengal Army which had not shown itself ripe for revolt. Still the Government professed themselves confident, and actually issued orders to the 84th to re-embark for Rangoon.

The truth is, they were in a panic, and, like weak men in that situation, they attempted to hide it from their friends by the assumption of a bullying manner, whilst they effectually showed it to their enemies by vain attempts at conciliation. Hence the wretchedly weak measure of sparing the guard of the 34th, who had beaten their officers; they actually feared to incense them, and believed they were acting the part of statesmen by saving them from condign punishment. Little did they know the native character! That very act, miscalled an act of mercy, tended more than anything else to convince the conspirators that the Government was afraid to strike, and encouraged them still further to develope their plans.

It has since transpired, that soon after the attack upon Lieut. Baugh had been reported to the Government, it had been determined to disband the 34th, and that an order was at the time drafted in which this resolution was announced. For upwards of three weeks that order was kept back. In whose possession it remained it is impossible now to state; but this fact is certain, that for upwards of a month the men of the 34th, including those who had assaulted Lieut. Baugh, were allowed to believe themselves trusted by the Government.

The fact is, that the advisers of the Governor-General, being for the most part members of the Civil Service, refused to recognise these disloyal symptoms as overt acts of mutiny; they endeavoured to persuade Lord Canning that they were mere partial and local disturbances, which should be met rather with conciliation than with severity. In truth they were unwilling to admit, even to themselves, that their own domination, extending over an hundred years, had completely failed in attaching even one section of the population to British rule. If they had previously been called upon to declare the class upon which they would most firmly rely in case of need, they would have named Jack Sepoy; they had pampered, petted, and indulged him until they thought they had made sure of him; they had, in their love of power, wrested the control over him from their military officers, by the encouragement of appeals from their decisions, and vested an overwhelming power in the Supreme Government themselves; they had witnessed his devotion to his officer when sub-

ordinated to him alone, and they imagined that the transfer of the subordination to themselves would have ensured the transfer the devotion also. They knew that the Sepoys were the mainstay of order throughout the country, that they represented the feelings of the entire population of Oudh, of Behar, of Gwalior, the Punjab, Nagpore, and Hydrabad: that so long as they were contented, the people would remain passive, if not altogether satisfied. The Sepoy, in fact, was their barometer, and they were unwilling to believe the steady indication of a cyclone. They would not even admit to themselves that their house was founded upon sand, liable to be levelled to the ground by the first storm.

And it is certainly true that they had little other surety for the tranquillity of the country than the fidelity of the Sepoy. Attached by education, training, and hereditary policy to the principle, "India for the Civil Service," they had steadily discouraged the settlement in the land of that other element which, in a crisis like that which, in spite of themselves, they felt approaching, might have formed a countervailing barrier to Mahomedan or Hindoo rebellion. Had independent Europeans been encouraged to invest their capital in the land of India; had not the terrors of subjection to a Hindoo or Mahomedan magistracy been held over their heads to prevent such a catastrophe (to the Civil Service); had they been allowed the smallest exercise of political power, or had the way to that power been open to them, an independent body of landholders would have arisen, who would have formed the connecting link between the Government and the natives, and also have been able, from their numbers and organisation, to have checked any outbreak on the part of the people of the country. But it was very evident that such a measure could not have been accomplished without invading the exclusiveness of the Civil Service. Hence it has always been (with the brilliant exception of Lord Metcalfe, who had thoroughly at heart the interests of India,) systematically opposed by the members of that body. Their policy has ever been to shut out independent Europeans from the country. To carry out this end they have encouraged the trade in opium, whilst they have neglected purposely the cultivation of cotton; they have restricted as much as possible public enterprises which necessitated settling in the land; and although this policy has resulted in a wide-spread rebellion, it will never be lost sight of so long as the rule exists that a man, were he to possess the highest administrative abilities, would be debarred from their exercise, because he did not in the first instance come out to India as a member of the Civil Service.

True to this policy they, as stated above, affected to make light of the discontent in the native army, and persuaded Lord Canning to view matters in the same light. The determination to disband the 34th was accordingly postponed, in the hope that affairs would settle down quietly, and that no further interference on the part of Government would be needed. In pursuance of this plan the 84th were ordered to re-embark for Rangoon.

In a few days they would have started, and the long-wished-for

opportunity would have been afforded to the mutineers; when, providentially, an event occurred at Lucknow which suddenly disturbed, although even that failed to rouse the Government from their apathetic attitude.

At Lucknow, the capital of Oudh, the conduct of the native troops had been for some time past in the highest degree disorderly. Nightly meetings and consequent conflagrations had been of frequent occurrence. The city had always been the hotbed of intrigue, and no efforts had been spared on the part of the agents of the King of Oudh to corrupt the native soldiery. On intelligence of the disbanding of the 19th Native Infantry reaching that city, the king's brother intimated to the native troops, that as they now saw the extent of the punishment awarded for mutiny, he was prepared to give service at a similar, or even an increased rate of pay, to all who might be discharged by the Company! The consequence was, that the troops at that station were on the verge of open revolt. Most fortunately for India, the Commissioner of Oudh, Sir Henry Lawrence, was a man who would not suffer himself to be deterred by any consideration from acting with vigour and determination. He was, without doubt, the ablest man in India. It was he who had laid the foundation of that administration in the Punjab, which had in so short a period developed the capacities of that noble province. For Oudh he was the very best ruler that India could produce. Versed in civil matters, he had to repair in the first instance the egregious errors perpetrated by his predecessor, Mr. Coverly Jackson, a red-tapist of the school of Messrs. Grant and Beadon. As a military man, he found himself suddenly called upon to check a rising mutiny. In that respect he has done marvels. At the moment of my writing (29th June), although the whole province of Oudh has risen against him,—a province larger than England,—he, with a handful of Europeans (500 men), holds Lucknow, the most disaffected city in India! He has proved himself a real man, indeed! How does his conduct contrast with that of Colonel Birch, Mr. Grant, and the other advisers of the Governor-General? It will be seen that his measures were successful, because they were totally opposed to the ideas of those who administered the Supreme Government of India.

Sir Henry Lawrence had not been an idle spectator of the movements amongst the troops at Lucknow, and he resolved to visit the first overt act of mutiny with condign punishment. An opportunity was not long wanting. On the 3d of May a letter from the 7th Oudh Irregular Infantry (formerly in the service of the ex-king) was intercepted and brought to him. This letter was addressed to the men of the 48th Regiment, and its purport was as follows:—"We are ready to obey the directions of our brothers of the 48th in the matter of the cartridges, and to resist either actively or passively." This letter was taken to a Brahmin Sepoy of the 48th. He communicated its contents to a havildar, and the latter to a subahdar. The three consulted over it, and resolved to bring the matter to the notice of the Commissioner. This was done. About the same time Sir Henry received intimation that the 7th Irregular

Infantry had proceeded to overt acts against their officers; and although none of them had been murdered, that result was more owing to their own courage than to the forbearance of the mutineers. The Adjutant, Lieut. Mecham, owed his life pre-eminently to his presence of mind. Four mutineers entered his house on the afternoon of the 3d, and told him to prepare for death; that personally they did not dislike him, but that he was a Feringhee, and must die. Lieut. Mecham was unarmed; they were armed to the teeth. Resistance was hopeless. He at once made up his mind to meet his fate with dignity and resolution. As the mutineers paused to listen to what he had to say, he replied, "It is true I am unarmed, and you can kill me; but that will do you no good. You will not ultimately prevail in this mutiny. Another Adjutant will be appointed in my place, and you will be subjected to the same treatment you have received from me." These words, delivered with coolness, without change of countenance or the movement of a muscle, seemed to strike the mutineers. They turned and left the house, leaving their Adjutant uninjured!

Tidings of these mutinous acts reached Sir Henry Lawrence on the evening of the 3d. Without a moment's delay, he ordered out Her Majesty's 32d Foot, the 13th, 48th, and 71st Native Infantry, the 7th Cavalry, and a battery of eight guns, manned by Europeans, and proceeded at once to the lines of the mutineers, distant about seven miles. Darkness had set in before he arrived there; but so prompt had been his movements, that the 7th were completely taken by surprise. They were instantly ordered to form up in front of their lines. In the presence of a force so imposing, they had no resource but to obey. The infantry and cavalry were then formed on either side of them, the guns within grape distance in front. The 7th, completely cowed, awaited their doom. They were ordered to lay down their arms: they obeyed. At this moment the artillery portfires were lighted. A sudden panic seized them, with the cry, "Do not fire! do not fire!" Mad with terror, they rushed frantically away, cowed into repentance. The ringleaders, and most of their followers, were secured that night by the native cavalry and infantry, and were confined pending trial.

Thus easily was suppressed the first mutiny at Lucknow. It has since transpired that the whole of the 71st, and very considerable portions of the 48th Native Infantry and 7th Cavalry, sympathised with the mutineers. Had Mr. Grant's and Col. Birch's plan, adopted by Lord Canning, of coquetting with mutineers, of giving in to them, of fearing to strike, of merely dismissing men for attacking their officers (an offence for which many European soldiers have suffered death); had, in fact, a delay occurred at Lucknow similar to that which occurred at Barrackpore in dealing with the 34th—a delay of three weeks—then, in all probability, that night or the following would have seen all Lucknow in revolt. It may be said that the troops subsequently did revolt. It is true; but they gave Sir Henry Lawrence nearly a month to prepare himself; and he proved that he was not the man at such a crisis to waste even an hour. When the

revolt which had long been foreseen did come, every preparation which it was possible for human foresight to devise had been made. The consequence was, that the mutineers were baffled; Sir Henry kept Lucknow, and still keeps it, though the whole of Oudh, almost the whole of India, is in arms against him. Had the revolt of the 30th of May occurred on the 3rd, there could have been but one result—our European troops would have been surprised, and every European resident murdered.

On the 4th of May the electric telegraph conveyed to the Supreme Government of India at once the account of the mutiny at Lucknow and of its suppression. A new book was in that act opened for Lord Canning's perusal, and he profited by it. The conduct of the men of the 34th at Barrackpore had been characterised by a sullen doggedness which could not be misconstrued: they were evidently watching their opportunity. When called upon to name the men of the guard who had attacked Lieut. Baugh and the Sergeant-major, they had steadily refused. Their officers, with one, or, perhaps, two exceptions, had declared before a Court of Inquiry that they had lost all confidence in their men. Some, unconnected with the regiment, attributed their conduct to the ill-judged zeal for proselytism evinced by their commanding officer, Colonel Wheler; but this, although it may have acted as an additional item in the balance against us, was scarcely the main cause of their ill-feeling. They were, in fact, thoroughly corrupted—more influenced even by the agents of the King of Oudh than by fears for their religion. A bad feeling at this time prevailed amongst all the regiments at Barrackpore. A jemadar of the 70th had been caught in the lines urging his men to revolt. He was tried and sentenced by a Court, composed of native officers like himself, to simple dismissal. This sentence was approved and confirmed by the Commander-in-Chief in India. To the jemadar himself it was no punishment at all. He owed four hundred rupees; and this dismissal eased him at once of his commission and his debt! But the effect upon the Sepoys is indescribable. "This," they said, "the only punishment for mutiny! They are afraid of us—we can do what we like."

There can be no doubt that the men of the 34th and of other regiments at Barrackpore only waited the departure of Her Majesty's 48th Foot from Chinsurah. They knew that that regiment had come up from Burmah, lightly equipped; that it would, in all probability, return thither soon; the rumour of their immediate departure was prevalent amongst them: they therefore waited, and would have waited with good purpose, but for the providential occurrence of the meeting of the 7th Irregular Infantry at Lucknow.

That mutiny, and the mode in which it was quelled by Sir Henry Lawrence, excited the admiration of Lord Canning. It also spurred him on to follow an example so nobly set. The account of the mutiny reached him by electric telegraph. It was not yet known in Calcutta or Barrackpore; the news would, however, be widely spread by the 8th or 9th. It was most desirable to act before that time; it was, indeed, essential. A blow must be struck. Upon the

34th, as the most guilty parties, it was resolved that it should fall. The order for the 84th to re-embark for Rangoon was at once rescinded; they were directed to proceed to Barrackpore on the 5th of May; the wing of the 53rd and two batteries of Artillery were also ordered there, and a message was despatched the same evening to the officer commanding at that station, directing him to parade all the troops at the station on the following morning, to read to them an order by the Governor-General therewith enclosed, and to conclude by paying up and disbanding the whole of the 34th Native Infantry who had been present in the lines during the outrage of the 29th of March.

On the morning of the 6th of May, accordingly, the troops were paraded, the order was read, the men were paid up and disbanded. None who were on the ground that morning and heard that order read—none who, in Calcutta, read that order at the same moment that they learned the fate of the mutineers, can ever forget the lamentable effect it produced, the universal impression it infused amongst all ranks, that the Government was absolutely afraid to punish. In this order the infamous conduct of the 34th was detailed at full length; their outrage upon their officer, the sullen apathy of the whole regiment on that occasion, their unconcealed sympathy with the murderer, were all dwelt upon in forcible language; but the punishment, the retribution for mutiny and connivance at murder, what was that?—simple disbandment! Even on the men of the guard, who looked on the attack with sympathy, and even followed it up by striking the wounded men as they lay on the ground, no severer punishment was inflicted. Punishment!—it was no punishment at all. The Kings of Delhi and Oudh had offered them a national service and a higher rate of pay, and the road to these was opened to them by their disbandment.

But the Governor-General was not content even with such a demonstration of weakness. Judging him from his written proclamations, he appeared desirous to impress upon the minds of the native army that the 34th had been guilty of a very venial offence; for he wound up his order—an order which he desired to be read at the head of every regiment, troop, and company in the service—by informing the army, that if they still refused to trust in their officers and the Government, and still allowed suspicions to take root in their minds, and to grow into disaffection, insubordination, and mutiny, their punishment, too, would be "sharp and certain." Sharp and certain as what?—as the punishment awarded to the 34th? The Bengal Army proved, by their after-conduct, that they wished for nothing better!

However, the order was read, and the men was disbanded. Did they express the least contrition for their offence? Did they show the smallest regret at leaving their officers and their colours? One incident, slight but significant will suffice to show. They were allowed to keep their Kilmarnock caps, as they had paid for them. Before crossing the river, after having been paid up, many of them were seen to take off their caps, dash them on the ground, and

trample them in the mud; they would not carry away with them the smallest reminiscence of their service to the Company!

The 19th and 34th, the only two regiments of the Bengal Army who, up to this moment, had been guilty of overt acts of mutiny, had now been disbanded, and the Government fondly imagined that disaffection had been dismissed with them. Two orders of the Governor-General had distinctly intimated to the native troops, that the Governor-General had neither the desire nor the intention to interfere with their religion or their caste, and it was believed that these orders, coupled with the disbandment of the 19th and 34th, would have the best possible effect.

The men of the 34th had assaulted their officer on the 29th of March; punishment was meted out to them on the 6th of May. This interval of five weeks was not lost on the men of the Bengal Army. Throughout India every eye had been turned towards Barrackpore, to ascertain what fate would befall that regiment which had encouraged a murderous attack on one of its officers. For five weeks they looked, and looked in vain. It is true that the murderer himself and one of his sympathisers had been hanged, but less than that the Government could not do, without entirely abdicating its functions; otherwise all was quiet; the regiment had not even been rebuked for its share in the crime. The universal impression consequently prevailed amongst the Sepoys that the Government could not do without, and feared to punish them.

That these feelings would not have become modified by listening to the order published by the Governor-General, on the disbandment of the 34th, may be imagined from the fact, that when it reached Lucknow, Sir Henry Lawrence, one of the best judges of native character in India, refused to allow it to be read to the native troops, being of opinion that it would hasten rather than repress an outbreak.

At Meerut, disaffection had been more plainly manifested than in any other station in the North-western provinces. A rumour had been spread amongst the troops by means, it cannot be doubted, of the agents of the King of Oudh, that the Government had plotted to take away their caste, by mixing the grounded bones of bullocks with the flour sold in the market; that thus the Hindoo, partaking inadvertently of the substance of the deified animal, would find himself compelled to embrace Christianity. It was in vain that General Hewitt and the commanding officers of regiments attempted to combat these ideas; it was fruitless that they pointed out to the Sepoys, that during a century's occupation of India no interference with caste had ever been tried. Left to themselves, the Hindoos might possibly have been pacified by these assurances; but they were urged on by the Mahomedans, who pretended similar fears for their own religion. The disbandment of the 19th, did nothing to allay the discontent, whilst the impolitic delay which intervened between the crime of the men of the 34th and their punishment served greatly to increase it. During the latter end of April this discontent showed itself in the usual manner. Houses were burned down, officers were not saluted

as usual, and whispers were heard that a resolution had been arrived at in the lines not to touch a single cartridge.

To such a height were these manifestations carried, that it appeared advisable to bring them to the test. If the presence at the station of two European regiments, the 60th Rifles and the 6th Carabineers, besides two troops of Horse Artillery and a light field battery, General Hewitt had, or thought he had, a sufficient force to repress on the instant any act of open mutiny. He was resolved, therefore, that the Sepoys should see that he was there to give orders, they to obey them. A parade of the 3d Cavalry was accordingly ordered for the morning of the 6th of May. On the evening of the 5th, cartridges, the old cartridges of the kind which they and their fathers had always used, were served out to them. Eighty-five men in the regiment at once stepped out and refused to take them. They were subsequently offered, and again indignantly refused. But one course remained to the Brigadier. The men were confined, brought to a court-martial composed of native officers, and by those native officers condemned to periods of imprisonment with hard labour, varying from six to ten years.

In the meanwhile, impressed by the consequences resulting from Sir H. Lawrence's vigour and promptitude, the Government had sent instructions by telegraph to the commandants of the principal stations in India, directing that sentences pronounced on mutineers, whatever might be their nature, should be carried out at once, that no delay might be caused by a reference to army head-quarters. General Hewitt, therefore, prepared to carry out the sentences pronounced on the mutineers of the 3d Cavalry at the earliest possible moment. The condemned mutineers were placed under an European guard, composed of two companies of the 60th Rifles and twenty-five men of the Carabineers, and a general parade was ordered for the morning of the 9th. At day-break on that morning,* all the troops in the station, leaving the guards standing, paraded on the 60th Rifle parade-ground; the Carabineers, the 60th Rifles, the 3d Light Cavalry, the 11th and 20th Regiments of Native Infantry, a light field battery, and a troop of Horse Artillery. The Carabineers and the Rifles were then ordered to load and be ready, and the Horse Artillery the same. This done, the mutineers were marched on to the ground; the European troops and Artillery guns being so placed, that the least movement of disaffection or insurrection would have been followed by instant slaughter. The mutineers were in uniform when marched on to the ground; they were then stripped of their clothes and accoutrements; and the armourers' and smiths' departments of the Horse Artillery being in readiness, every man was ironed and shackled for ten years' imprisonment on the hard roads, with the exception of five, whose period of bondage was only six years. These unfortunate wretches looked miserably crest-fallen and depressed, and many of them, putting up their hands, appealed to the General for mercy. None, of course, was

* I am indebted to the talented correspondent of the Calcutta *Englishman* for the graphic account of this morning's proceedings.

vouchsafed, and the work went steadily on until all had been heavily ironed. The 3d Cavalry looked very much humbled, mounted with their swords drawn and sloped, silent spectators of the doom of their comrades. When the ironing had been completed, the prisoners reproached their comrades for allowing the punishment to be carried out. It is now evident, that an understanding existed between the culprits and the native soldiery, both infantry and cavalry, at Meerut; that these latter had sworn not to allow the sentence to be carried into effect. The sight, however, of the loaded guns and the two European regiments was sufficient to chill their ardour; at all events, the prisoners were carried away, and they made no sign.

Had it been deemed advisable still to keep the prisoners under an European guard, the natives might have been overawed, and all yet have gone well; but apparently the necessity for such a deviation from the usual course of procedure did not suggest itself to the authorities, and the mutineers were made over manacled to the civil authorities. By these they were lodged in the jail—a building some two miles distant from the cantonment, and guarded entirely by native burkundazes.

Meanwhile the native troops returned to their lines, furious with pent-up indignation. There can be no doubt that on that afternoon they matured their plans for a rise; messengers were dispatched to Delhi, to inform the regiments there of the projected move, and to warn them to be ready to receive them on the 11th or 12th. They resolved to rise on the evening of the following day (Sunday), whilst the Europeans should be in church, to release their imprisoned comrades, fire the station, and to slaughter every man, woman, or child, pertaining to the Christian community. The originators of this plan were the men of the 3d Cavalry; but they found the men of the 20th Regiment as eager as themselves to join in any insurrection. Not so, however, with the 11th Native Infantry. This regiment had but recently arrived in the station, and whether sufficient opportunity had not been afforded for corrupting them, or for some other unexplained reason, they hung back, and expressed a decided disinclination to join in any attack on their officers. They did not, however, betray the secret.

All this time the authorities were unsuspicious: the havildars made the morning report to their officers; the men of the European Regiment attended morning service as usual, and there was no sign of the coming storm. The day passed away as Sundays generally pass in India, and not even the sergeants, who live in the native lines, had noticed anything to call for report, or even for remark. Evening church-time was approaching: the 60th Rifles were turning out with their side-arms to proceed thither; officers, too, were dressing either for church or for an evening ride. Sepoys! restrain your impatience for half-an-hour longer, and Meerut is your own. Providentially they cannot restrain it. Suddenly the alarm of fire is given; then there is loud shouting, as if the Sepoys were turning out to quench the flames. But, then, that volley of musketry, followed by another and another! those discordant yells! that clattering of cavalry! the bugle sound of the alarm! It is not fire only that

has caused this direful outcry—it is mutiny!—insurrection!—THE BENGAL ARMY HAS REVOLTED!*

It was nearing five o'clock on that memorable afternoon when, at a given signal, the 3rd Light Cavalry and the 20th Native Infantry rushed out of their lines, armed and furious. A detachment of the former regiment at once galloped in the direction of the jail. On reaching it, its gates were opened to them without resistance, and they at once liberated all its inmates, including their imprisoned comrades: a native smith was at hand to strike off their irons. These men, infuriated by their disgrace, ran with all possible speed to their lines, armed themselves, and mounted; they then rushed to the scene of action, yelling fearfully, and denouncing death to every European. Meanwhile the remaining portion of the 3rd Cavalry and the 20th Native Infantry had proceeded to the lines of the 11th with all possible speed. Thither also the officers of that regiment, alarmed by the shouting and noise, had gone before them. They found Col. Finnis haranguing his men, and endeavouring to keep them firm to their colours. The men were wavering when the 20th arrived. The men of this regiment, whose hands were already red with the blood of several of their own officers, seeing this hesitation and its cause, at once fired at Col. Finnis. The first shot took effect on his horse only, but almost immediately afterwards he was riddled with balls. All discipline, all better feelings, now vanished. It is true that the Sepoys of the 11th permitted their officers to escape with their lives; but having done this, the greater portion of them followed the example of the 20th. And now ensued a scene of disorder, rapine, and murder which pen cannot describe. Every house and building near the lines, except the hospital, had been fired; and the smoking and blazing barracks and houses, the yells of the mutineers, and the shouts and shrieks of the multitude gathered there, numbers of whom fell from the shots of the mutineers, made on that dark night a scene than which one cannot be imagined more horrible.* Officers galloping about, carrying orders to the European troops, were fired at, not only by the mutineers, but by the native guards placed over the public buildings for security. Ladies driving in their carriages, gentlemen in their buggies, who had left their houses unsuspicious of evil, were assaulted, and if not murdered, treated with a brutality to which death would have been a relief. Not only the Sepoys, but the released jail-birds, fifteen hundred in number—the population also, that "vile rabble" which is always available for plunder or murder, had joined the movement, and spread terror and desolation all around them. Nor were houses or public offices safe places of refuge from these assaults. Most of the houses in Meerut—all of those in the military lines—are thatched with straw, and easily inflammable: the plan of the insurgents was to set fire to the roof, and to murder the frightened residents as they quitted the burning dwelling. Many met their deaths in this way; more, providentially, escaped: yet not one of those in the latter category owed their safety to the mercy of their as-

* Correspondent *Bengal Hurkaru.*

sailants. In some instances outrages were perpetrated which the pen refuses to record. These men, whom we had pampered for a century, who had always professed the utmost devotion to us, seemed suddenly converted into demons. Nor was this a solitary example; other stations were destined to witness atrocities fouler, more brutal, and more treacherous than even those of Meerut.

Meanwhile unaccountable delay occurred in turning out the European troops, and night had set in before the Carabineers arrived on the parade-ground of the 11th Native Infantry. They found there the 60th Rifles and Artillery waiting for them. Their arrival was the signal for a move against the rebels. They found, however, that by this time their work of destruction within the station had been completed, and that they had betaken themselves to the Delhi road. Thither they followed them. The night, however, was too dark, and the movements of the insurgents too uncertain, to permit our troops to act with vigour. A portion of the rebels were, it is true, found in a wood, and shots were exchanged between them and the 60th Rifles. The Artillery, too, fired upon and dispersed them; but it was considered that nothing more effective could be done; that fifteen hundred jail-birds, maddened with the taste of blood, were at large, and might still inflict incalculable damage on the station; and that, at such a crisis, the presence of the troops was absolutely required there. These, at least, are all the reasons that can be imagined (for none have hitherto been assigned) for the languid pursuit of that evening. One fact is clear, that the rebels were not followed up with any vigour, and that, after seeing them clear of the station, the troops returned to the scene of the outbreak of the mutiny, and there bivouacked. The night was spent "in taking precautions against attack, and in measures preliminary to strengthening the place, so as to secure it, if the troops should be compelled to leave it."*

The horrors of that fearful night could scarcely have been surpassed. The rebels, it is true, had been driven away, but the liberated prisoners and the rabble continued their fearful work. It is true that European sentries were posted, with all possible celerity, in the different parts of Meerut; and the constant fire of their rifles showed that their presence was necessary. Still, in spite of all precautions, foul deeds were even then perpetrated. To every one it was a night of agonising suspense. Husbands had missed their wives, and wives their husbands; infants had been separated from their mothers, and mothers from their children. Many passed the night, depending entirely on the fidelity of their native servants; and it is gratifying to state that, in more than one instance, that fidelity was proof. To this source Mr. Greathed, the commissioner, and his wife, owed their safety. Their house—a flat-roofed one, fortunately—was one of the first attacked by the Sepoys. On the first alarm they fled to the roof; thither, on the least intimation from the servants, the Sepoys would have followed them: but these persisted in

* Correspondent *Bengal Hurkaru.*

the story that they had left the house; and the mutineers, after searching every room, at last believed them and went away. The courageous action of the ayah, or female servant, in the service of Captain and Mrs. Macdonald of the 20th Regiment, must here be recorded. She had heard the alarm, and had perceived the blood-stained mutineers advancing towards her master's house. Unable to save him or her mistress, she seized their two children, and concealing them as well as possible, carried them to a place of safety. They never saw their parents again. Subsequent experience has shown that the "brave and loyal Sepoy" does not disdain treating children of one and two years of age with the most cruel barbarity.

How that night passed with those poor sufferers, they alone can tell. The day at length dawned, and the sun shone on dismantled Meerut. Their worst sufferings were over; the houseless were sheltered, and order was in some degree restored. Thenceforth they were safe from further attack, and could watch the progress of the avalanche by which they had been almost overwhelmed.

As soon as it was ascertained that the mutineers had taken the road to Delhi, only forty miles distant from Meerut, messengers were despatched to intimate the fact to Brigadier Graves, commanding at that station. The situation of this officer was full of peril. Besides the officers and sergeants of the native corps, he had not a single European under his command. The garrison consisted of the 38th, 54th, and 74th Regiments, Native Infantry, and a battery of Native Artillery. The men of these regiments had hitherto shown no symptoms of disaffection; but the 38th was the corps which had so successfully defied Lord Dalhousie in 1852, and the men of it had ever since been impressed with the idea that the Government was afraid of them. The British rule in India seemed to be staked on their fidelity, and Brigadier Graves must have felt that the issue would at least be doubtful. But he was not the man to give way to despair under any circumstances; and he at once resolved to make the most of the means at his disposal.

The approach to Delhi from Meerut is defended by the little river Hindun, which is traversed by a small bridge. On receiving intimation of the movements of the rebels, the Brigadier's first idea was to cut away the bridge and defend the river. But there were two objections to this plan. The first was, that at the season of the year, the height of the hot weather, the river was easily fordable, and his position on the other bank might be turned. The second, that in case of their attempting that manœuvre, he would be compelled to fight (even if his men continued stanch) with the rebels on his front and flank, and the most disaffected city in India, the residence of the descendant of the Mogul, in his rear. This plan, therefore, was abandoned almost as soon as conceived, and he determined to content himself with defending the city and cantonments as best he could. As this might endanger the lives of the non-military residents, intimation was conveyed to them to repair to the Flagstaff Tower, a round building of solid brickwork, well capable of defence, and at some distance from the city. In many

instances that intimation never reached those for whom it was intended, by some it was received too late, but by none was it wilfully disregarded.

Meanwhile the regiments were ordered out, the guns loaded, and every possible preparation made. The Brigadier harangued the troops in a manly style; told them that now was the opportunity to show their fidelity to the Company to whom they had sworn fidelity, and by whom they had never been deceived. His brief, pithy address, was received with cheers. The 54th, especially, seemed eager to exterminate the mutineers, and loudly demanded to be led against them.* The Brigadier, responding to their seeming enthusiasm, put himself at their head, and led them out of the Cashmere Gate to meet the rebels, whose near approach had been announced. As they marched out in gallant order, to all appearance proud and confident, a tumultuous array appeared advancing from the Hindun. In front, and in full uniform, with medals on their breasts gained in fighting for British supremacy, confidence in their manner, and fury in their gestures, galloped on about two hundred and fifty troopers of the 3rd Calvary: behind them, at no great distance, and almost running in their efforts to reach the golden minarets of Delhi, appeared a vast mass of Infantry, their red coats soiled with dust, and their bayonets glittering in the sun. No hesitation was visible in all that advancing mass; they came on, as if confident of the result. Now the Cavalry approach nearer and nearer! At this headlong pace they will soon be on the bayonets of the 54th. These latter are ordered to fire; the fate of India hangs on their reply. They do fire, but alas! into the air; not one saddle is emptied by that vain discharge. And now the Cavalry are amongst them; they fraternise with them; they leave the officers to their fate; and these are remorselessly cut down wherever they can be found!

It was too true, indeed! The bold and confident bearing of the rebels was thus accounted for; the Delhi troops, too, had been corrupted. In shouting to be led against the mutineers, they had acted a part which to Asiatics is familiar from their youth, but which Englishmen accustomed to them all their lives have never been able to comprehend. All was now over with Delhi. The enraged troopers, accompanied by the greater part of the 54th, the other arrivals from Meerut, and gaining fresh recruits at every step from the 38th and 74th, dashed into the city, shooting in their progress all the Europeans they met with. Many of them pointed to the marks eft by the manacles on their legs, as if to justify their atrocities. Not a Christian whom they could lay hold of was spared, and on the women death was the smallest of the barbarities inflicted. The Governor-General's agent, Mr. Simon Frazer, and Captain Douglas commanding the palace guards of the titular King of Delhi, were cut down in the very precincts of the palace. Mr. Jennings, the chaplain, and his daughter, were seized when making their way to

* Private account.

the king for his protection. They were brought before the monarch—a man the descendant of the house of Timour, born our pensioner and ever treated by the English Government with marked liberality. "What shall we do with them?" inquired the enraged troopers of the king. "What you like; I give them to you!" was the reply. This man and the King of Oudh were at the bottom of the conspiracy: it was thus that the former repaid British generosity.

Meanwhile Brigadier Graves, rallying a few men who had remained faithful, retreated to the Flagstaff Tower. Here he found a vast assemblage of ladies and gentlemen—all, in fact, who had received or who had been able to comply with his intimation. Here also were stationed a company of the 38th and two guns; and so great was the strength of the tower that it was imagined that these men, if they remained faithful, might hold it against the enemy. But when the Brigadier addressed them, it became evident that their hearts were with the rebels, and that they only waited an opportunity to join them.

A remarkable occurrence, a feat of gallant devotion, unsurpassed in any age or country, brought the matter quickly to a crisis.

The Delhi magazine, situated in the very heart of the city, contained at this time immense stores of ammunition;* it was in charge of Lieut. Willoughby, a young Artillery officer. Of him, as the writer had the pleasure of a slight acquaintance with him, he may be allowed to say a few words. He was a young man of modest unpretending worth; his mother, if I may be pardoned for mentioning her, (for she still lives), is a lady possessing very superior accomplishments, a refined taste, and a generous disposition. All these young Willoughby had inherited. Those who met him in society might pronounce him shy and reserved, for so he appeared to strangers; to appreciate him, it was necessary that he should be known intimately; and by those to whom that gratification was extended, his generous sentiments and steadfast principles were rated at their real value. There was nothing showy about him, all was sterling gold. He sought on every occasion the path of duty, and he followed it careless of the consequences. I am fully sensible of the feebleness of my pen when endeavouring to render homage to his merits; the deed I am about to chronicle speaks for itself, and will, I am certain, ensure for him at least the enthusiastic recollection of his countrymen to never-ending time.

Young Willoughby, in common with others, had heard of the approach of the rebels, of the insurrection of the troops sent out to check them, and of their rush upon the city. In the heart of the city was the magazine, and that building contained stores which would enable their possessors to arm all the extent of the wall of Delhi against an enemy. This consideration decided him; his duty was clear—that magazine should not fall into the hands of the

* The official account of the blowing of the Delhi magazine differs somewhat from that given above, which was necessarily compiled from accounts written by people who were in another part of the station when the event happened. It is given in this edition in an Appendix.

rebels. The consequences to himself he little recked; they would most likely be fatal. There was, it is true, a subterranean passage, of which he might avail himself; but even there the effects of an explosion would probably be felt. He was convinced, that after the first desire for blood was glutted, there would be a rush to secure the stores in the magazine; there he could await the insurgents, and there should they find their doom.

It turned out as he predicted: on they came, red with gore, infuriated with slaughter: in the meanwhile he had laid the train and stood ready to fire it. Not for an instant did his coolness desert him; not for a second, when he placed in the balance his own life against theirs, did he hesitate; he thought only of the consequences to the rebels and to his countrymen hereafter. Gradually the place was filling, and yet the portfire was not applied. Now, now it is full—they are struggling for admittance, it will contain no more; and now he stoops, the steady hand is applied, the slow-match burns,—a few seconds, then a puff of white smoke,—an immense cloud of red dust—an explosion—and the bodies of two thousand* rebels are hurled into the air!

And he! where was he, the gallant author of the deed? Scorched, maimed, bruised, almost insensible, he still had life. How he escaped, how he afterwards got away, I cannot tell; but I read in the paper of this morning (1st July) that he had died of his injuries at Meerut. Let us hope that his death,—the death of one so young,—so gallant, so devoted to his country, will be still more terribly avenged. Will it be so? I cannot say. The proclamation of Mr. John Colvin, the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-west Provinces, offering pardon to these villains, is yet unrepealed!

To those assembled at the Flagstaff Tower this explosion could have but one meaning: it plainly told, or seemed to tell, that the rebels had penetrated into the heart of the city, and would be upon them before long: it had, at all events, the effect of deciding the movements of the company of the 38th. The men, previously hesitating, now became actually hostile, and, taking possession of two guns which had been sent up to increase the defences of that position, they prepared to point them against the tower. It was now evident that nothing more could be effected: the troops, almost to a man, had revolted; the jail-birds, as at Meerut, had been released; the Delhi population, composed principally of ignorant and bigoted Mahomedans, were up in arms: this intelligence would shortly be conveyed to the surrounding inhabitants, who were chiefly Googiers, a race of savage marauders, and by them escape would be cut off. Not an instant was to be lost. Brigadier Graves perceived this, and advised every one to escape as best he could: his own conscience was clear: he had done his duty, and now that the inevitable hour of departure had arrived, he remained, the last to leave the ancient capital of the Mogul. Some on foot, others crowded in carriages, a few riding, the remnants of the Europeans left Delhi: their fate has yet

* The numbers are variously stated from 1500 to 3000.

to be related: some who were for six weeks afterwards despaired of have since turned up living; their adventures have to be told: the great proportion of them, we know, met with all but insurmountable difficulties and dangers, and the escapes of many remind one of the supernatural. Up to the date of writing but few authentic accounts have been received, but sufficient is known to make us long for the time when the story of each individual's adventures can be published.

Meanwhile the rebels reigned supreme in Delhi. Undismayed by the loss incurred at the magazine, perhaps thereby rendered more furious, they ruthlessly pursued every Christian. The officers' bungalows were all entered and searched: they were not, in a single instance, pillaged *by the Sepoys:* they significantly remarked that they wanted only life. Their deeds, too, have yet to be recorded and revenged. Language cannot describe the bitter animosity or the savage cruelty evinced by those who, up to a recent period, had been the chief pillar of British supremacy!

It will be sufficient to add, that from the first moment the King of Delhi showed sympathy with the revolters: the Europeans, who fled to him for refuge, he handed over to their tender mercies: their several regiments he called after the names of his sons; he proclaimed himself Emperor of India; and, after the first few days of disorder he appointed Lall Khan, a subahdar of the 3d Cavalry, commander-in-chief of his army. He threw for a great stake, and has more than once been within an ace of winning it.

To show how the revolt at Meerut gave the signal for a general rise over India; how successively the troops at Ferozpore, at Benares, at Allahabad, and at Cawnpore, in the provinces of Oudh and Rohilcund, rose against us, and for a time achieved success; how the atrocities of Meerut and Delhi were surpassed by those of Oudh and Allahabad, will be my task on a future occasion. I shall then be able to prove, if indeed proof be required, (for I hope and believe that the people of England will have already judged and decided), how, up to the very last moment, the members of the Government, true to their principle of "India for the Civil Service," refused to open their eyes to the magnitude of the danger, and endeavoured as much as possible to conceal its extent from Lord Canning; how, in pursuance of this policy, they rudely declined to take precautions against a rising of the troops at Barrackpore, until an accident disclosed a plan which was to have been executed on the following day for murdering every European; how, in spite of their miserable policy, Calcutta has three times been providentially preserved when on the very brink apparently of destruction; how, notwithstanding their assumed blindness to the public danger, the principal civil servants of Government took most extensive precautions for their own security. I shall also show how precisely the same policy was pursued in the North-west provinces; how Mr. John Colvin, when the massacres of Meerut and Delhi were fresh in the recollection of all, offered free pardon to the rebels on the sole condition of their laying down their arms; how, up to this hour, no official proclamation has been published disavowing that act; how by its operation many

mutineers, laden with plunder and red with the blood of our countrymen, have found their way to their homes.

I shall then ask if the people of England will permit this policy to be further carried out; whether they will allow India still to remain an appanage of the Civil Service? This noble country has been under the rule of that service for a century: the present insurrection is the inevitable result of that domination. They have had no root in the land; their interests have not been the interests of the people of India. We have lately seen how, in many parts of the country, the Indigo planters, men like Mr. Venables, Mr. Saunders, Mr. Chapman, have actually not only held their own factories, but have rescued the magistrates and others from the insurgents: in some instances the Commissioners have been compelled to invest them with magisterial powers. Whence was their authority derived? In what lay the secret of their immunity from outrage? The answer is plain: they are owners of the soil; their interests are the same as those of the population. These, then, are the men who ought to be made magistrates, in place of unfledged boys, ignorant of the people and imperfectly acquainted with the language of the country.

The last act of the Government has, as much as any other, exposed the "courage and capacity" of our civil administrators. So long as there was real danger they pretended to ignore it; but no sooner had the crisis passed away, than, looking back at it, appalled at its magnitude, they fell into a panic. They determined on a vigorous demonstration, one which should strike terror into the hearts of all. The question was, Whom they should attack? The rebels, unfortunately, were beyond their reach; Barrackpore was quiet. But a demonstration was necessary. They could not attack the national enemy, so they resolved to assault the declared antagonists of the principle, "India for the Civil Service;" and in pursuance of this plan, they actually persuaded Lord Canning to go down to the Legislative Council, suspend all the standing orders, and in the course of forty minutes to abolish the freedom of the Press!!!

Take the present members of the Government of India, the Members of Council, and the Secretaries; try their powers, analyse their abilities, and with the single exception of Mr. Edmonstone, there is not one of them whose capacity can be rated higher than that of an average lawyer's clerk; had their lot not been cast in "the pleasant places" of an exclusive service, few of them would have been able to earn an independent livelihood!

It is easy, therefore, to imagine why they should have been jealous of a Press which did not recognise their pretensions to an exclusive possession of intellect, but that such men should have subordinated Lord Canning to their views appertains to the marvellous. Lord Ellenborough would have used them to his own purposes; they have moulded Lord Canning to theirs!

With terrible anxiety do the independent Europeans wait the decision of the people of England regarding the future government of India. It is a most momentous question, fraught with all-important results for good or evil, not only to the independent Europeans, but

to the millions of native inhabitants! For the good of all, it is *essential* that the exclusive Civil Service should be abolished!

I cannot, however, conclude this part of my narrative without paying the homage which is due to those civil and military servants who have in every respect deserved well of their country. Sir Henry Lawrence at Lucknow, and his brother Sir John Lawrence in the Punjab, have, in this crisis, not only nobly sustained their great reputation, but have risen to a height in public estimation beyond which it is impossible to ascend. Sir Henry especially has, with the smallest means at his disposal, effected the greatest marvels. With five hundred Europeans he has held the most disaffected city in Asia, and kept at bay the inhabitants of a province larger than England! Sir Hugh Massey Wheeler, at Cawnpore, has successfully defended a barrack containing two hundred Europeans against thousands of natives thirsting for their blood. Messrs. Gubbins and Lind, and Colonel Neil, at Benares, have done all that men could do in their circumstances. I mention the names of these illustrious men in this place, not with the vain hope of doing them justice here, but to show that my pen is not entirely dipped in gall—that I wish to speak impartially of all, irrespective of the service to which they belong.

At a future and not very distant occasion I hope to produce a fully detailed narrative of their deeds.

One word on the subject of Army Reform. That subject is now under the consideration of the Government of India, but as their plans must be primarily submitted to the Court of Directors and the Board of Control, they will doubtless be subjected to alteration according to the expressed sentiments of the people of England. I will only say on this occasion, that the Brahmins have proved that they cannot be trusted with arms: the Mahomedans, too, have shown that they cherish in their hearts the proselyting doctrines of their religion, and that as Christians they will ever detest, and take advantage of every opportunity of destroying Europeans.

We shall therefore be compelled to adopt an entirely new system; of this, one necessary feature must be a large increase to the purely European force: this is indispensable. Then the whole of the Bengal Army—at least the regiments which have not mutinied—should be disbanded, and re-organised on a new footing: the rank of native officer should be abolished; promotion by merit directed; the pension establishment, which has failed in its purpose, should be done away with.

Those regiments which, few in number, have not mutinied or been disarmed, might be allowed to retain their arms; their numbers be reduced to 800 men, and they should always be quartered with Europeans. The practice of living in lines should be forbidden, but barracks similar to those of the European troops should be provided. To each company, in lieu of native officers, who have proved themselves either mutinous or incompetent, two steady European non-commissioned officers should be attached. They should live in the barracks with the men, though separated from them, and should keep the keys of the bells of arms.

Supposing twenty more European regiments to be added to Bengal, there might be twenty native regiments of the nature I describe. Not a Brahmin should be admitted; they should be composed chiefly of low-caste Hindoos and Sikhs. The Goorkhas should remain as they are, unmixed.

The men of the regiments thus re-formed should never be sent on escort duty; they should remain cantoned with Europeans, and should be constantly brigaded and exercised with them.

To carry on other duties, mere police duties, such as escorting treasure and commissariat stores, other regiments should be raised, under the denomination of Police Corps. To these fire-arms should not be entrusted. A short sword and an iron-bound club should be their weapons; they should be paid at a lower rate than the others, and should not be allowed to rank as soldiers.

As a preliminary measure it will be necessary, merciless as it may sound to English ears, to hunt down every mutineer. India will not be secure so long as a single man remains alive. Since I commenced this page, details have been received of the merciless slaughter of upwards of an hundred unarmed ladies—women and children flying for a place of refuge. These are our sisters and your sisters, people of England! And ought their murderers to be spared, perhaps pensioned? Yet, canvass Calcutta at this moment—inquire from civilians, merchants, and military men, and the all but universal answer will arise, that at the hands of our Government—a Government comprehending such men as Messrs. Dorin, J. P. Grant, Beadon, and Birch, there will be the same shrinking from severe punishment, the same paltering with mutineers, the same truckling to rebels, by which their measures, up to the present moment, have been fatally marked.

DII AVERTANT OMEN!

END OF PART I.

APPENDIX.

From LIEUTENANT G. FORREST, *Assistant-Commissary of Ordnance, to* COLONEL A. ABBOTT, C.B., *Inspector-General of Ordnance and Magazines, Fort William.*

SIR,—I have the honour to report for the information of Government, and in the absence of my commanding officer, Lieutenant Willoughby, Artillery, supposed to be killed on his retreat from Delhi to this station, the following facts as regards the capture of the Delhi magazine by the mutineers and insurgents on the 11th instant. On the morning of that date, between seven and eight A.M., Sir Theophilus Metcalfe came to my house, and requested that I would accompany him to the magazine for the purpose of having two guns placed on the bridge, so as to prevent the mutineers from passing over. On our arrival at the magazine we found present Lieutenants Willoughby and Raynor, with Conductors Buckley, Shaw, Scully, and Acting Sub-conductor Crow, and Serjeants Edwards and Stewart, with the Native Establishment. On Sir Theophilus Metcalfe alighting from his buggy, Lieutenant Willoughby and I accompanied him to the small bastion on the river face, which commanded a full view of the bridge, from which we could distinctly see the mutineers marching in open column, headed by the cavalry; and the Delhi side of the bridge was already in the possession of a body of Cavalry. On Sir Theophilus Metcalfe observing this, he proceeded with Lieutenant Willoughby to see if the city gate was closed against the mutineers. However, this step was needless, as the mutineers were admitted directly to the Palace, through which they passed cheering. On Lieutenant Willoughby's return to the magazine, the gates of the magazine were closed and barricaded, and every possible arrangement that could be made was at once commenced on. Inside the gate leading to the Park were placed two six-pounders, double-charged with grape, one under Acting Sub-conductor Crow and Serjeant Stewart, with the lighted matches in their hands, and with orders that if any attempt was made to force that gate, both guns were to be fired at once, and they were to fall back on that part of the magazine in which Lieutenant Willoughby and I were posted. The principal gate of the magazine was similarly defended by two guns, with the chevaux-de-frise laid down on the inside. For the further defence of this gate and the magazine in its vicinity, there were two six-pounders so placed as either to command the gate and a small bastion in its vicinity. Within sixty yards of the gate and in front of the office, and commanding two cross-roads, were three six-pounders and one twenty-four pounder howitzer, which could be so managed as to act upon any part of the magazine in that neighbourhood. After all these guns and howitzers had been placed in the several positions above-named, they were loaded with double charges of grape. The next step taken was to place arms in the hands of the Native Establishment, which they most reluctantly received, and appeared to be in a state not only of excitement, but also of insubordination, as they refused to obey any orders issued by the Europeans, particularly the Mussulman portion of the establishment. After the above arrangements had been made, a train was laid by Conductors Buckley, Scully, and Serjeant Stewart, ready to be fired by a preconcerted signal, which was that of Conductor Buckley raising his hat from his head, on the order being given by Lieutenant Willoughby. The train was fired by Conductor Scully, but not until such time as the last

round from the howitzers had been fired. So soon as the above arrangements had been made, guards from the Palace came and demanded the possession of the magazine in the name of the King of Delhi, to which no reply was given.

Immediately after this the subadar of the guard on duty at the magazine informed Lieutenant Willoughby and me, that the King of Delhi had sent down word to the mutineers that he would without delay send scaling-ladders from the Palace for the purpose of scaling the walls, and which shortly after arrived. On the ladders being erected against the wall, the whole of our Native Establishment deserted us by climbing up the sloped sheds on the inside of the magazine, and descending the ladders on the outside, after which the enemy appeared in great number on the top of the walls, and on whom we kept up an incessant fire of grape, every round of which told well, as long as a single round remained. Previous to the natives deserting us they hid the priming pouches; and one man in particular, Kurreembuksh, a durwan, appeared to keep up a constant communication with the enemy on the outside, and to keep them informed of our situation. Lieutenant Willoughby was so annoyed at this man's conduct, that he gave me an order to shoot him, should he again approach the gate.

Lieutenant Raynor, with the other Europeans, did everything that possibly could be done for the defence of the magazine; and where all have behaved so bravely, it is almost impossible for me to point out any particular individual. However, I am in duty bound to bring to the notice of Government the gallantry of Conductors Buckley and Scully on this trying occasion. The former, assisted only by myself, loaded and fired in rapid succession the several guns above detailed, firing at least four rounds from each gun, and with the same steadiness as if standing on parade, although the enemy were then some hundreds in number, and kept up a continual fire of musketry on us, within forty or fifty yards. After firing the last round, Conductor Buckley received a musket-ball in his arm, above the elbow, which has since been extracted here. I, at the same time, was struck in the left hand by two musket-balls, which disabled me for the time. It was at this critical moment that Lieutenant Willoughby gave the order for firing the magazine, which was at once responded to by Conductor Scully firing the several trains. Indeed, from the very commencement, he evinced his gallantry by volunteering his services for blowing up the magazine, and remained true to his trust to the last moment. As soon as the explosion took place, such as escaped from beneath the ruins, and none escaped unhurt, retreated through the sallyport on the river face. Lieutenant Willoughby and I succeeded in reaching the Cashmere Gate. What became of the other parties it is impossible for me to say. Lieutenant Raynor and Conductor Buckley have escaped to this station. Severe indisposition prevented my sending in this Report sooner.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. Forrest, Lieut.
Asst. Commy. of Ordnance.

Meerut, May 27th, 1857.

N. B.—After crossing the river, on the night of the 11th, I observed the whole of the magazine to be on fire, so that I am in hopes that little of the property fell into the hands of the enemy. Park-Serjeant Hoyle was shot about 11 A.M., by the mutineers, in attempting to reach the magazine to aid in its defence.

(True Copy) A. Abbott, Colonel,
Inspector-General of Ordnance and Magazines.

THE MUTINY

OF

THE BENGAL ARMY.

An Historical Narrative.

BY ONE WHO HAS SERVED UNDER
SIR CHARLES NAPIER.

PART II.

J.J i 12

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TO

THE LIVING AND THE DEAD;—

TO

THE STATESMAN

WHOSE PRESCIENT POLICY SAVED A MIGHTY EMPIRE FROM RUIN,—

TO

THE HERO,

WHOSE VOICE EVEN FROM THE TOMB FORETOLD THE ADVENT

OF THE

NEMESIS OF MISRULE;—

TO

THE LIVING EARL OF ELLENBOROUGH,

AND

THE DEAD SIR CHARLES NAPIER,

These Pages are Dedicated.

ADVERTISEMENT.

In presenting the second part of his narrative of the great national insurrection in India to the public, the writer is anxious to avow the reasons which primarily induced him to adopt a step so foreign to his previous habits, as that involved in publication.

Having, in India, been precluded from offering warning or advice, the writer, in common with many others, foresaw at an early stage that the system adopted by the Supreme Council of Calcutta, so far back as March 1857, of coquetting with mutiny and with mutineers, would inevitably lead to disaster. There was not an officer in Bengal, living out of the charmed circle of official red-tapeism, that did not scent from afar the stormy blast; and although the revolt in all its magnitude was anticipated, probably, by none, still there was a deep conviction on the minds of many, that something dangerous was impending.

The crisis came. At first, apparently, a mere military mutiny, it speedily changed its character, and became a national insurrection. The Rajpoot villages in Behar, those in the districts of Benares, Azimgurh, Goruckpore, in the entire Doab, comprising the divisions of Allahabad, Cawnpore, Meerut, and Agra, in the provinces of Rohilcund and Oudh, shook off our rule and declared against us. But the men who administered the affairs of India refused to admit the existence of events which were clear to all around them; they persisted in governing as though there were no disorder in the civil districts, and feigned to believe that the cultivators of the soil — the class from which the Sepoys are selected — were, to a man, in our favour. Their tactics were at once detected; but no sooner had their exposure been threatened by the local press, than the fourth estate was summarily silenced by the authoritative application of a Press Act.

In the midst of the unparalleled disaster by which the country had at this period been overwhelmed, with a Government whose measures, always tardy, were often ill-advised, whose policy was a hand-to-mouth policy, in whose eyes the suppression of the mutiny seemed to be of less importance than the maintenance of an exclusive service,

and with the ordinary vehicles of information virtually suppressed, it appeared to the writer to be the duty of every Englishman, to the best of his abilities, to enlighten his countrymen on the rise and progress of an insurrection which, if not misunderstood, had certainly been mismanaged.

The first part of the narrative, therefore, was the offspring of the Gagging Act.

In the second part, now offered to the public, the writer has endeavoured, still maintaining the narrative form, to trace the consequences of a still-existing adherence to principles inaugurated upwards of a century ago. The natural tendency of those principles has been, to place all the power and patronage of the country in the hands of a class who have no stake in its prosperity beyond the salary they draw, who have been educated in an implicit belief in Leadenhall Street, who are jealous of every other class of Europeans, and who therefore cast every obstacle in the way of their settling in the country — a policy advocated by Lord Metcalfe, Mr. Shore, and others of the Civil Service, whose combined integrity and capacity had elevated them above the prejudices of their education.

These civilians, thus forming an oligarchy and possessing power so great that by their means one Governor-General, who saw through and defeated their designs, was recalled, are now intrusted with the task of re-organising a system on the ruins of that internal administration which has broken down under their misrule. They have already commenced their work in a manner that plainly indicates the mere re-erection of the ancient edifice.

It is because the writer is convinced that the selfish nature of their policy needs only exposure to meet with the indignant reprobation of the people of England, that he has ventured in the course of this narrative to exemplify some of its results. He would humbly suggest to his countrymen, that in any future scheme for the government of India the "exclusiveness" which has been the bane of the present system be abolished, and that it be made lawful for the supreme power to appoint any man of talent and ability, beyond the pale of the Civil Service, to the highest places of trust and confidence under the Government.

It would appear also most essential that the Legislative Council be either remodelled, or abolished altogether. Constituted as it now is, of paid nominees, it commands neither respect nor consideration.

This work is dedicated to Lord Ellenborough, and to the lamented Sir Charles Napier, partly because those two great men, each in his turn, suppressed mutinies which, in their development, only became

less dangerous than the present one because, instead of wasting their time in discussing milk-and-water theories, in writing minutes on abstruse legal technicalities, or in debating the distinction between treachery and treason, they acted not to excite, but to crush them, and succeeded accordingly;—because also they not only detected the sore spot in the Indian system, but likewise applied to it "the incision-knife and the caustic;"—because they adopted justice as the basis of their systems of government; and because, finally, their wise policy in Scinde, on one side, and in Gwalior, on the other, have assured the safety of India in this as in preceding crises.

Of personal admiration, shared in as it is by all around them, this is not the place to speak.

It had been the intention of the writer to have included a notice of the able administration of the Punjab in the narrative now submitted to the public; but its insertion would have increased the bulk, and have delayed the publication of the present part, already too long postponed: it shall assume a prominent position in the third part.

With respect to the facts which are adduced in this work, there is not one which is not based upon authority. To those kind friends who have sympathised with his undertaking, and who share his sentiments, the best acknowledgments of the writer are offered; something more is due to those who have aided him by their assistance and advice.

The writer cannot but be sensible that he has rendered but scant justice to many of the gallant officers and soldiers who have fought so nobly for their country. In common with his countrymen, he is at a loss to pronounce whether the daring energy of Havelock's soldiers, the patient and determined fortitude of those who for four months sat before Delhi, or the undaunted resolution of the heroes who defended Lucknow, is most worthy of admiration. Should this work reach a second edition, it will be his pleasing duty to endeavour to portray at greater length the deeds of those who have the greatest claims on the gratitude of England.

To that portion of the English press which noticed so favourably the first instalment of this narrative, the writer desires to convey his warmest acknowledgments. Composed without access to a single official document, its details have been found singularly correct; but one or two trivial errors occur. The whole part is now under revision, and will, it is hoped, be shortly again presented to the public in a slightly enlarged form.

India: 10th Dec. 1857.

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PART II.

CHAPTER I.

THE EFFECTS OF THE REVOLT AT DELHI IN CALCUTTA AND AGRA. — THE MUTINIES AT FEROZPORE, ALLYGURH, ELAWAH AND MYNPOOREE. — MR. COLVIN'S PROCLAMATION.

WHILST the terrible events recorded in the last chapter were being enacted at Meerut and Delhi, Lord Canning and the Supreme Council were congratulating themselves on the success and facility with which they had eradicated the spirit of mutiny from the Bengal Army. It is true that a written report from Sir Henry Lawrence of the *émeute* at Lucknow on the 3rd of May, a telegraphic notification of which had been received on the 4th, arrived on the 9th of May, but it caused the members of Government no uneasiness whatever. Sir H. Lawrence's vigorous measures had suppressed the mutiny, and to the majority of the Council there appeared no necessity for any precautions for the future. Mr. Grant, indeed, who was considered to carry the brains of the Council, in a minute which he recorded on that date, expressed his marked approval of the dilatory policy which had been pursued with reference to the 34th Native Infantry, and hoped that the Government would not depart from it on this or on any future occasion. He, therefore, advised that the punishment of the 7th Oudh Infantry should neither be prompt nor sudden, and that it should be prepared by all those tedious forms under shelter of which the guilty parties in the 34th Native Infantry escaped punishment. Both he and Mr. Dorin were evidently desirous to make the European officers the scapegoats: the latter recorded his opinion that no regiment which was properly commanded would mutiny, and both expressed a desire that before punishment should be meted out to those men who had mutinied with arms in their hands, a strict and searching investigation should be made into the conduct of the European officers, and a proportionate punishment awarded to them — to those very men who were at the time risking their lives and the lives of their wives and children by remaining at their solitary posts, and by endeavouring to preserve order and discipline — many of whom, not long after, paid for their zeal and confidence in their men by a lingering and cruel death.

The Governor-General himself was apparently quite satisfied with the aspect of affairs; on the 12th of May, whilst our countrywomen

at Delhi were being massacred, he recorded his belief that the measures taken with reference to the mutineers had not been "too mild," and he was evidently of opinion that the spark of mutiny, though it might glow for a time, was fast dying out.

It was in consequence of these feelings that he and his Council at this period acted a part which very nearly, for a time, lost to England the possession of India — to which many of the horrors which were afterwards perpetrated may be traced.

The long agitation about the cartridges, the mutiny of the 19th, the continued smouldering of the native regiments at Barrackpore, the murderous attack on Lieut. Baugh, the incendiarisms committed at all the principal stations in India, and lastly, this outbreak in the heart of Oudh, a newly annexed country, had made a very deep impression on the minds of all thinking men in India. The want of decision on the part of Government, the long interval of five weeks which had been suffered to intervene between the crime of the 34th Native Infantry and its punishment, if punishment it can be called, had too evidently impressed the natives with the idea that we were afraid of them; and it was apparent to a vast number of our military commandants, that unless our policy underwent a total change, unless a system of repression of mutiny were substituted for the existing plan of coquetting with and succumbing to it, it would be impossible to maintain the discipline of the army. The Sepoy now felt that his commanding officer was a cypher; the Government, his real master, was at a distance, and, moreover, had showed that it feared him. What was there to deter him from making himself master of the situation? All who had studied the Asiatic character, who from constant intercourse had become acquainted with its peculiarities, felt assured that a further system of conciliation would but impress the Sepoys with an idea of their own power; that instead of becoming more reconciled to us by our constant and slavish acknowledgment of their religion, and by our system of entirely ignoring our own, they would the rather despise us. Already in their eyes we were on a par with their lowest caste: A Christian was one who drank brandy and eat pork and beef. Was not the idea that we wished to reduce them by trick to the same degrading position sufficient to excite every deep-seated prejudice against us? Yet we knew that they entertained that idea. We knew, or we ought to have known, that such an idea once imbibed by an Asiatic, once thoroughly taking possession of his prejudiced and uneducated mind, was ineradicable, that every attempt to remove would only confirm it, and be regarded as a part of the process by which he was to be suddenly converted.

But the men who ruled India in 1857 knew little of Asiatic character. The two civilians had seen only that specimen of it of which the educated Bengalee is a type: the legal member and Lord Canning had seen no more, and General Low was a Madras officer. How could a Council so constituted comprehend the crisis through which they were passing, — a crisis the result of which depended on their treatment of a proud, bigoted, relentless race, of whose national character and peculiarities they were one and all ignorant? The

manner in which they did treat it, in which they are now treating it, proves that up to the present moment even they have not comprehended it.

The many signs and warnings which had been given them from the end of January up to the beginning of May, might have convinced even intellects of no extraordinary power that an occasion might arise for the employment of an European force, larger than that at the time of their disposal. The measure therefore adopted by Lord Canning of ordering up the 84th from Rangoon so early as March, met with universal approval. It was fondly believed that he foresaw the danger, that he was providing against it by anticipation. Alas! for the imputation of good motives! No sooner had the 34th Native Infantry been disbanded than, in the face of all that had passed, of the smothered mutinies at Barrackpore, of the *émeute* at Lucknow, he resolved to send back the 84th Foot to Rangoon. This was decided upon on the 8th May, 1857. Had that measure been carried out, there would have been but one weak European regiment to guard the arsenal of Fort William, and the entire country between Calcutta and Dinapore. What would have been the consequences if the 84th had left before the insurrection at Meerut had become known? Lord Canning, at least, would have paid dearly for his incapacity, and India would have been temporarily lost to us. Providentially the account of that insurrection arrived on the 14th, before the arrangements for the departure of the 84th had been completed, and the order was recalled.

If Lord Canning, finding that, notwithstanding his conciliatory policy towards the 19th and 34th Native Infantry, the bad feeling was gaining ground, was showing itself by incendiarisms at Agra, Meerut, Umballa, and throughout the North-west, by actual mutiny at Lucknow, had acted on the 4th May as he acted subsequently to the 16th May, and, instead of resolving to send away one regiment, had written to Madras, Ceylon, Rangoon and Moulmein for three or four others, what should we not have escaped? The fearful massacres of Cawnpore, Futtehgurh, and Allahabad would not have occurred: Oudh and Rohilcund would have been preserved from the contagion, and Delhi might have fallen in a fortnight. When he did send for them, it was "too late;" the plague had spread throughout India, and there required, not staying, but extirpation.

But up to the 14th of May, the Government believed that their "not too mild" measures had overcome the spirit of mutiny. From the enjoyment of that pleasing dream they were somewhat rudely disturbed by receiving an account of the Meerut outbreak. The telegraph had flashed it to them on the 11th, but it was not till the 14th that they became acquainted with the main fact, that our troops were in open revolt and had murdered their officers. On that date, then, a Council assembled. Its first measure was to countermand the departure of the 84th; its second showed how little our statesmen were able to appreciate the crisis, to comprehend the scene that was acting before their eyes.

The system which allowed to each native regiment a certain

number of native officers, about twenty-two to every corps, also granted to these native officers the privilege of sitting on courts-martial. By them alone could a Sepoy be tried; the verdict at which they might arrive could be disturbed by no superior power. The Commander-in-Chief might return their "finding" and "sentence" for revision, but they possessed the power, and not unfrequently exercised it, of adhering to their original decisions. Their sentences in general courts-martial, whatever they might be, were invariably sent for the approval of the Commander-in-Chief; no lesser power could confirm, and even he had no power to increase, the punishment awarded: he might indeed withhold his approval and confirmation, but in that case the prisoner would escape scot-free. It will be evident then to all, that in this important matter of courts-martial, the discipline of the army was in the hands of the native officers, and they had it in their power, so long as this system might be upheld, to abet treason by inflicting only a nominal punishment on traitors.

A notable instance of this had but lately occurred at Barrackpore, where a native officer brought to trial for trying to incite the men of his own regiment to mutiny, by going about the lines and imploring them in the name and for the sake of their religion to rise, was sentenced only to dismissal from the service, which to him was no punishment at all.

This circumstance of the discipline of the army being, in its most important particular, in the hands of native officers, could not have escaped the notice of the members of Council or of the Military Secretary, for the court-martial above alluded to had only recently been published, and the subject had been commented upon by the Press. It is not surprising, therefore, that it was the second subject to which the members of the Government turned their attention at the meeting of Council on the 14th of May. But how did they treat it? With the Bengal Army "drifting" into revolt, how did they meet together to strike a deadly blow at mutiny?—how did they settle this question? They actually feared to touch it; they still left that part of the order existing in which it was laid down that native soldiers must be tried by native officers, that is, mutineers by mutineers, and their solitary remedial measure was to transfer the appointing confirming and approving power from the Commander-in-Chief to commanding officers of divisions and stations!*

This was on the 14th; on the 15th or 16th, the news of the Delhi massacre arrived. Still assuming it to be a mere affair of greased cartridges, regarding the instrument as the cause of the revolt, the Government on the latter date issued a proclamation in which the native army and the native population were assured that the Government never had and never would interfere with their religion; at the same time the mischief having been completed, the anomaly regarding courts-martial was rectified, and it was left optional with commanding officers to appoint either European or native officers

* Vide Calcutta Gazette Extraordinary, 14th May, 1857.

upon them. On the same day Lord Canning telegraphed to Bombay for the troops of the Persian expedition, whom the treaty with the Shah would place at the disposal of that Government.* It may fairly be presumed that to Sir Henry Lawrence belongs the credit of this measure; his critical eye had discerned the coming storm, and on the 16th he telegraphed to Lord Canning to send for troops from China, Ceylon, and elsewhere, wherever they might be available. That message reached Calcutta the same day, and was acted upon at once both in letter and spirit, for expresses were sent to Moulmein and Madras, and not long after to Ceylon and Singapore for every available man.

It has been the fashion to bestow all the credit of this measure upon Lord Canning, but the Blue Book abounds with proofs that it is a credit which must be shared with many others; not only Sir Henry Lawrence, but his brother Sir John, General Anson, Sir P. Grant, and Mr. Colvin made it the subject of their earliest messages. It was, in fact, an idea which must have struck every one; to have neglected it, would have shown the grossest incompetency. It was indeed our only hope of safety—the sheet anchor which was left us wherewith to ride out the storm. In acting upon it Lord Canning was animated by the instinct of self-preservation. It was the rope at which he clutched when overset by this mutiny: none but a madman, or one utterly careless of life, would have neglected it. The fault which posterity will find with Lord Canning is, that he did not avail himself of these resources earlier. During the month of April, whilst all India was fermenting, a prudent statesman would have employed himself in strengthening his hands; he might without risk or danger to any part of our Indian possessions, have brought up one regiment from Moulmein, in addition to the 84th from Rangoon, and another from Madras. When the mutiny broke out, these two regiments might have been at Cawnpore; they would have preserved that most important station, and probably Oudh, from outbreak; they would have kept up our communications with the North-west, and the revolt would probably have been confined to the very district of Delhi.

In acting after the event as it would have been prudent to act before, Lord Canning earned but small claims to our admiration; especially if it be remembered that on the 8th May he was actually contemplating the return of the 84th to Rangoon. It is but justice to him, however, to state, that on the 16th May, when the full force of the storm became apparent, he took all ordinary precautions to meet it. He sent everywhere for troops, he telegraphed to the Commander-in-Chief "to make short work of Delhi," he gave full powers to Sir John Lawrence in the Punjab, and on the 19th he issued an order promising rewards to all who might distinguish themselves by conspicuous acts of gallantry and devotion to the state. All these arrangements were excellent as far as they went, but they did not go far enough. The Governor of Bombay, Lord Elphinstone, with a

* Blue Book.

keener instinct of the danger, offered to despatch an extra steamer to Suez on the 17th May, which would forestall by a fortnight the ordinary Calcutta mail, and have enabled the authorities in England to make prompt arrangements for sending out reinforcements. But Lord Canning, full of hope that we should gain some countervailing advantage before the next ensuing mail should leave Bombay, would not avail himself of the offer. He was, at this time, probably, the only * man in Calcutta who looked for a speedy issue to the revolt. He alone would not believe that the whole army was pledged to insurrection. He ignored the fact that even in Calcutta we were a handful of Christians living in the midst of a fierce, bigoted, intractable race, who knew no law but that inspired by fear, and on whom the intelligence of the revolt of Delhi was likely to have the worst possible effect. Yet so keen was the sense of this amongst the merchants, the shopkeepers, and others, whom long residence and constant intercourse had made well acquainted with the temper of the natives, that although the use of arms was foreign to their habits, they came forward between the 20th and 31st May, and tendered their services to Government in any manner in which they could be most usefully employed for the preservation of the peace. An enrolment on a large scale at this time, would have enabled the Governor-General to dispense with the services of one European regiment at least; but so bent was he on ignoring the danger, that he not only declined the offers of the Trades' Association, the Masonic Fraternity, the Native Converts, the Americans, the French inhabitants and others, but he declined them in terms calculated to deaden rather than to excite a spirit of loyalty, for whilst he seemed to refer the cause of their petitions to a "passing and groundless panic"† on their part, he snubbed them for supposing for an instant that the whole Army of Bengal was infected with the spirit of revolt! At the same time, as if in mockery, he invited those who wished to enrol themselves to apply to the Commissioner of Police, to whom, it transpired, orders had been issued to furnish applicants with clubs!

On the 23rd May the Madras Fusiliers, under their gallant commanding officer, Colonel Neill, arrived in Calcutta, and were at once despatched in the most expeditious manner possible to the North-west. Up to this moment, no account of any fresh mutiny had been received, and Mr. Colvin, Governor of the North-west Provinces, was beginning to believe that "the worst of the storm was passed, and that the aspect of affairs was brightening."‡ Neither Sir Henry Lawrence nor Sir Hugh Wheeler was so confident; but Mr. Colvin, being a civilian, was supposed to be far better acquainted with the character of the people, and to possess better opportunities for judging them than were open to military men. He was not only of opinion that severity in dealing with mutineers was a mistake§, but he was anxious to fetter the Commander-in-Chief by placing a civilian at his elbow. This principle, introduced by Lord Auckland, when Mr.

* The members of Council of course excepted.
† Vide letters to the French inhabitants.
‡ 16th May. § 19th May.

Colvin was his private secretary, had been wisely abolished by Lord Ellenborough. Like many of that great nobleman's alterations, it had been effaced immediately by his successors, and the application of the system was now, not unnaturally, advocated by one who had all along been its warmest supporter. Up to this moment, indeed, the opinions of Mr. Colvin had been entirely in accord with those of the Governor-General.

Thus did matters progress up to the 25th May — the day on which Her Majesty's birthday was celebrated. The Governor-General and the Lieutenant-Governor very confident in the future; Sir Henry Lawrence and Sir Hugh Wheeler, at Lucknow and Cawnpore, making every preparation to meet the coming storm; the European society, military men and civilians throughout India, anxious, yet not desponding. The crisis was about to take a turn.

The 25th May must be ranked as one of the memorable days connected with the mutiny. In the morning, the 70th Native Infantry, one of the regiments stationed at Barrackpore, volunteered to a man to march against their countrymen in Delhi; Mr. Colvin issued his famous proclamation, in which he announced that "soldiers engaged in the late disturbances," *i. e.*, in the massacres of Delhi and Meerut, who might give up their arms at the nearest Government post, should be "permitted to go to their homes unmolested," and in the evening intelligence arrived of the mutiny of the native troops at Ferozpore, on the border of the Punjab, on the 13th and 14th of the month.

Before commenting upon the two first-named occurrences, it may be as well to give a detailed account of that ill-managed affair. On the 12th May, an account of the occurrences at Meerut reached Ferozpore. The troops in that station consisted of Her Majesty's 61st Foot, the 45th and 57th Native Infantry, the 10th Light Cavalry (Native) and about 150 European Artillery; they were commanded by Brigadier Innes*, certainly an active, and up to that time considered an intelligent officer. He had arrived only the day before, and had had but little opportunity of testing the temper of the native troops. The value of Ferozpore must be estimated not only from its having been, up to the period of the Sutlej campaign, the frontier station in the North-west, and of its consequent importance with reference to the Punjaub, but from its possessing an entrenched magazine of the largest class, and containing military stores almost equal in amount to those in the arsenal at Fort William. Ferozpore is only seventy-three miles from Delhi, and it may be easily imagined that the rebels, already possessed of the Delhi Arsenal, and aware alike of the contiguity and importance of that at Ferozpore, would spare no efforts to make themselves masters of it also. Had they been capable of acting in concert with their brethren at Meerut, they might have succeeded; but the sound of that explosion was sufficient to put the commanding officers all over India on the alert.

* Not James, as erroneously named in the Blue Book.

On the 12th, the report of it reached Ferozpore. On the following day, the Brigadier ordered out the troops to judge of their disposition. Trained amongst natives himself, he might have been supposed to be a competent authority on such a point. He looked at them, and believed their bearing, especially that of the 57th, to be "haughty:" the 10th Cavalry he considered loyal. The commanding officers of all three regiments pronounced the state of their corps to be satisfactory.

At noon on the same day information of the occurrences at Delhi reached the station. At that time the entrenched magazine, the most important position in Ferozpore, was held by a company of the 57th Native Infantry. Immediate arrangements were made for relieving them by a company of Her Majesty's 61st, and one of European Artillery. This was not done completely, for the company of the 57th was allowed to remain in the magazine. At the same time the 10th Cavalry, in whom every confidence was placed, were stationed under the walls of the new arsenal, and the 61st, under Colonel Jones, were held in readiness to move on any point. These arrangements having been completed, the 45th and 57th were ordered to parade at 5 P. M. with the view of being marched out of cantonments. The Brigadier went at that hour to the parade ground, formed them up in quarter-distance columns, and addressed them. They were then ordered to move off in opposite directions. They obeyed unhesitatingly. The road by which the 45th were ordered to march took them close to the entrenched magazine. Arriving there they halted and refused to advance a step. They then loaded their muskets, and, heedless of the entreaties of their officers, ran to the north-west bastion of the magazine, and stood there, apparently hesitating what to do next. At this moment scaling ladders were thrown out to them by the Sepoys who had been allowed to remain inside. They immediately commenced climbing over the parapet, and three hundred of their number having succeeded in finding their way inside, made an attack on the company of the 61st, who were hurriedly drawn up to receive them. They were repulsed with the loss of about half a dozen of their number, but not despairing of success, made a detour and attempted to take our men in the rear, but were again unsuccessful. At this moment two more companies of the 61st arrived, and the mutineers fled in all directions — many of them being killed. The company of the 57th, which had not apparently joined actively in the *émeute*, was disarmed and turned out of the magazine. So far the arrangements of the Brigadier had been apparently defective: he had suffered the entrenchment to be escaladed to the great peril of the arsenal, and he had no troops at hand to keep the mutineers in check. Still he had been successful in repelling their attack: the movements that followed proved that success to have resulted rather from accident than from skilful organisation on his part.

It must be remembered that in Ferozpore there were the 61st regiment and about 150 artillerymen supplied with all the munitions of war, to combat against two native infantry regiments. They could

have beaten a dozen of them, deprived as these were of their European officers. There was also a regiment of cavalry, which was supposed to be, and which proved loyal. But admitting that the Brigadier was justified in looking upon these as doubtful, or even as hostile, he still should not have feared the issue with the force at his disposal. It was his duty to have attacked and followed up the 45th immediately he heard of their outbreak. What did he do? Believing, he says in his report, that the 57th would follow the example of the 45th, he determined to maintain the barrack and the entrenchment. Fatal policy! to shrink before Asiatics! The movement of two companies of the 61st, with the horse-battery of artillery, would have completely dispersed the 45th, and in all probability have deterred the 57th from following their example. He remained, however, on the defensive; the consequence was that the 45th took the initiative against him!

The men of that regiment, on being repulsed from the entrenchment, retreated towards the ice-pits, carrying their dead with them. These they left in the Mahomedan burial-ground, and, returning in small bodies to the cantonment, set fire to and burned the church, Roman Catholic chapel, two vacant hospitals, the 61st mess-house, and several bungalows. In doing this, strange to record, they were not even molested except at the chapel, where one of them was shot. They even made several fresh attempts upon the entrenchment, but were foiled on every occasion. Hitherto, panic had reigned throughout Ferozpore: one part of the 61st remained in the barracks, the other part in the entrenchments: not a single man was brought to act against the mutineers. To such an extent was the defensive principle carried, that hearing that the mutineers intended seizing their own regimental magazine on the following morning, instead of choosing that moment for attacking and dispersing them, the Brigadier actually preferred as it were abandoning his position by causing the magazines of the 45th and 57th to be blown up. The great body of the former regiment, having done all the mischief they could, then set off for Delhi. On this intelligence reaching the Brigadier, he, for the first time, began to act with vigour, for he despatched three troops of cavalry and two guns in pursuit of them, whilst he caused at the same time the 57th to be disarmed. Both these measures were fairly successful. The 45th the moment the initiative was taken against them were panic-stricken, and fled in confusion; they lost a number of men, and several of those who escaped threw away their arms to accelerate their flight. The greater part of the 57th were disarmed quietly, a few only preferring to follow the fortunes of the 45th. The 10th Cavalry throughout the affair behaved with the most perfect loyalty and emulated the conduct of the Europeans.

Such was the mutiny of Ferozpore,—a mutiny which affords painful evidence of the evil action of the government of India on characters not more than ordinarily distinguished by firmness. It has been noticeable throughout the insurrection that only on rare occasions, and when a Lawrence, a Neill, or a Wilson have been invested with supreme authority, have commanding officers dared to cast regulations to the winds and act on their own responsibility.

Men of average capacity even have felt the conviction that, act as they might, they would be judged only by the result, and they have therefore felt compelled, in self-defence, to adhere as much as possible to the letter of the regulations. The burden of red tape has weighed them down. It was so with Colonel Mitchell at Berhampore, with General Hewitt at Meerut, and on this occasion with Brigadier Innes at Ferozpore. That officer, on hearing of the sad events at Meerut and Delhi, must have felt that all middle courses were insecure; that there was but one road to be pursued consistently with safety. If he had, for instance, especially after noticing the "haughty" bearing of the Native Infantry, ordered a general parade of all the troops, taking care by previous arrangement and skilful disposition to place the guns, manned as they were by Europeans, on both flanks of the Native Infantry, the 61st in their front between them and the entrenched magazine,—if he had at the same time directed the actual, not the nominal, relief of the company of the 57th inside the magazine;—if he had then ordered the native regiments to lay down their arms, and, on their failure to do so, had been prepared to open out on them with grape and small arms,—all would have been well: there would have been no attempt on the magazine, no burning of churches and houses, no panic, no loss of property. Why did he not do it then? He feared the responsibility of disarming them in the first place, of mowing them down in case of refusal in the second. But had he no reason for his fear? Had he not seen the Government of India allow itself to be insulted for three months with all but impunity by its native troops? Had he not read in the public prints the uncontradicted statement that Lord Canning had affirmed that if Colonel Mitchell at Berhampore had opened fire on the 19th the Government would not have supported him? Was he justified, he probably asked himself, in taking this responsibility upon himself,—in doing more than the Government, with all its appliances and means at hand, had thought it necessary to do? The truth is, Brigadier Innes was neither a Neill nor a Lawrence: he could not see that to succeed in such times as were coming, he must be ready to brave every responsibility. He could not look beyond the Book of Regulations, and to it he adhered with a zeal worthy of a better cause.

Had his measures been successful, identical as they were in spirit with those of the Government of India, he would doubtless have been held up as a pattern Brigadier. Unfortunately for himself, the regulations led him to failure, and his failure cost him his command. He failed,—and was summarily removed from the list of brigadiers.

The account of the Ferozpore mutiny reached Calcutta simultaneously with Mr. Colvin's proclamation and the report of the volunteering of the 70th Native Infantry. Lord Canning dealt promptly with both. He telegraphed to the Lieutenant-Governor his disapproval of the spirit and wording of his proclamation, and he rode down on the following morning to Barrackpore, personally accepted the services of the 70th, and promised them that they should start for Delhi as soon as arrangements could be made for sending them up-country. This promise was never fulfilled, and it seems a pity that it was ever made. Subsequent events convinced even the

Governor-General that the whole army was tainted; and the 70th were eventually disarmed along with the other regiments of the Barrackpore Brigade, on the 14th June. Still the fact of their having volunteered, and of their example in that respect being followed by many other regiments stationed at or near Calcutta (of whom those which have not mutinied have been since disarmed), made a deep impression at the time on the minds of Lord Canning and the members of his Council, and probably induced them to reply so discourteously to the patriotic offers of the Trades' Association and others. They perhaps acted in his mind as incidents counterbalancing the disaster of Ferozpore and the proclamation of Agra.

This latter document was yet unrepealed. Up to the hour I am writing * it has never been recalled from circulation, and it is even supposed to have influenced our authorities at Delhi in sparing the life of the blood-steeped king, of his youngest and favourite son, and of many of those chiefs who were most forward in the rebellion against us. On the 26th May Lord Canning expressed his disapproval of it, and begged that it might be recalled. Mr. Colvin replied that it was too late to recall it, that it had been circulated all over the country (in the interval between the 25th and 27th), that it was perfectly understood by all, and that it was hoped and believed that it would have the best possible effect. He concluded by pleading earnestly that it might stand.

But Lord Canning had not, at this epoch, entirely enslaved himself to the policy of "India for the Civil Service." On the same day (the 27th), he replied to Mr. Colvin, pointed out the necessary inference which the mutineers must draw from the terms of his proclamation, and requested that, as it could not be withdrawn, another which he forwarded, extraordinarily mild, but not open to the objections which were fatal to Mr. Colvin's, might be substituted for it, and sent up forthwith to the Commander-in-Chief. Still the Lieutenant-Governor hesitated: he felt disinclined to stultify himself; and instead of obeying the orders of his superior, he ventured (the 28th May) on another remonstrance. This was too much for a nobleman wielding the authority of Governor-General of India. Every moment that this miserable document was allowed to circulate was big with ruin to our interests: it betrayed weakness in every line, it was conveying to mutineers the fact that we feared them, that they might murder our women and children and go to their homes unpunished. And yet, although issued on the 25th of May, up to the 29th it had not only been cancelled, but the Lieutenant-Governor was still pleading for it, and in substance refusing to obey the instructions of the Governor-General. The latter had submitted to this treatment for four days, but when he saw this continued trifling with his instructions, he could bear it no longer. He forthwith sent a copy of his own proclamation to Major-General Sir Hugh Wheeler, commanding at Cawnpore, with instructions that it might be forwarded *viâ* Futtehgurh to the Commander-in-Chief. Sir Hugh, with a

* 21st November.

soldier's promptitude, obeyed at once, but the message never reached General Anson, and it is the prevailing belief that Mr. Colvin's proclamation is still in force. That gentleman certainly made another, and a final attempt (31st May) to retain his own ideas, and to be spared the pain of transmitting to the Commander-in-Chief the opinion of the Governor-General, that he had offered life to the murderers of his countrymen; but Lord Canning was obdurate, and on the same day transmitted very peremptory instructions that his own proclamation should be sent on, uncurtailed, to the Commander-in-Chief.

This was all very well, but, like so many of Lord Canning's acts, it was only a half-measure. Mr. Colvin's proclamation had been published in the Agra Government Gazette, marked with all the official emblems of authority. Lord Canning's counter-stroke was smuggled into the North-west, was circulated perhaps by the Commander-in-Chief, but necessarily in a very limited degree, and never appeared in the Agra Gazette at all. The Commander-in-Chief has no civil power whatever: the people therefore who read one proclamation published under authority — the authority under which they were placed, that of the Lieutenant-Governor — would naturally pay more obedience to it than to a written document, circulated by a military man of whose connexion with themselves they had never heard. So indeed it has proved. Every letter from the north-west induces the belief that Mr. Colvin's proclamation of the 25th May, securing pardon to bloody-handed mutineers, is still considered by the authorities, as well as by the people, to be the law of the land!

In reflecting upon this ill-advised proclamation, the first thing that strikes us is, the fact of its having been promulgated at Agra, without previous reference to the Governor-General. The telegraph line between Agra and Calcutta was complete. From the Meerut outbreak up to the 4th June daily messages passed between the two high functionaries. If Mr. Colvin had telegraphed the proclamation for approval on the morning of the 25th, he would have obtained a reply the same day. Up to that moment he had received the cordial support of the Governor-General: he had done well: he had shown nerve in addressing the native regiments at Agra, in maintaining a bold front, and his position outside the Fort. All his previous intentions had been communicated to Calcutta; why was not this one? It is a point which, if Mr. Colvin were living, might be worth investigating: but Mr. Colvin is no more, and it is now far more pleasurable to dwell on the fact that to the last he never left his post, than on the causes of that important error which cost him the confidence of his countrymen.

Meanwhile affairs were not progressing favourably in the North-west. On the 20th of May four companies of the 9th Regiment Native Infantry, considered the pattern regiment of the Bengal army, mutinied: two companies of the same regiment, stationed at Mynpoorie followed their example on the 22nd; two more at Etawah on the 23rd; and the remainder at Bolandshuhr on the 24th. About the same time information reached Calcutta that a company of Sappers which had

been ordered from Roorkee to Meerut after the outbreak, had mutinied at that station on the 16th, and, after killing their forming officer, Captain Fraser, had set out for Delhi. Our men were, however, fortunately on the alert, and followed them up so quickly, that fifty-six of their number were killed. About two hundred and eighty managed to reach Delhi with their arms. A hundred and fifty of them, who had been on duty when the main body mutinied, were promptly disarmed.

The mutiny of the 9th Regiment at Allygurh was caused by a circumstance which places in a strong light the bigotry of the Hindoos, and demonstrates most clearly the ease with which they can be acted upon by the lever of their religion. Allygurh lies about eighty miles south of Meerut on the Grand Trunk Road. It possesses a bastioned fort, well capable of defence, and memorable in Anglo-Indian history as having been stormed by Lord Lake in 1803. In May 1857 it was garrisoned only by four companies of the 9th Native Infantry. This detachment had not apparently been shaken by the events at Meerut and Delhi. The corps had always been a good one, well behaved and well drilled. The officers felt the utmost confidence in their men, and this feeling was apparently reciprocated. Up to the morning of the 20th, their behaviour had been most exemplary, and the men had made over to their officers several spies who had entered their lines with the avowed object of seducing them from their allegiance. One of these villains, caught in the very act, had been condemned to suffer death that morning. Accordingly he was brought out, the Sepoys were drawn up, and his sentence was read to him in their presence. He had in fact been convicted by a court-martial composed of native officers. He was then led to the gallows, the rope was adjusted, the drop taken away. In a few minutes he had ceased to breathe. All this time the Sepoys were looking on in silent approbation. But just as they were about to be moved off the ground, a small detachment of their own corps, which had been absent on command, marched in. They too beheld the dangling corpse, and they too seemed to think that the miscreant had received his deserts. At this critical moment, one of their number more bigoted than the rest stepped forth from their ranks, and pointing to the gallows exclaimed, "Behold a martyr to our religion." By that simple exclamation he touched a chord which had till then lain dormant. Instantly these men, who had passed the sentence and assisted at the execution, overcome by a sudden frenzy, broke out into open mutiny. They did not, it is true, assault their officers, they simply dismissed them: but they plundered the treasury, opened the jail doors, and then went off bodily to Delhi. The detachments of the same regiment at Bolundshuhr *, Etawah †, and Mynpoorie ‡, followed the example of their comrades. The outbreak at Bolandshuhr was accompanied by no violence: that at Mynpoorie was principally remarkable for the

* Forty miles from Allygurh. † Seventy-three miles from Agra.
‡ Seventy-one miles from Agra.

courage, coolness, and presence of mind displayed, under trying and most perilous circumstances, by Lieutenant De Kantzow of the 9th Native Infantry.

The mutiny broke out very suddenly on the morning of the 22nd, by the men of the 9th rising upon their officers.* Lieutenant De Kantzow, instead of leaving them, as he might have done, stood up before them, urged them to reflect on the lawlessness of their acts, and evinced the utmost indifference of his own life in his zeal to make them return to their duty. But the Sepoys would not listen; many muskets were levelled at him, and his life was in the greatest danger: they commenced plundering in every direction; and finally, dragging their officers with them, proceeded to the treasury, and endeavoured to force open the iron gates. A fearful scene here ensued: the jail-guard, about thirty in number, and some of the jail officials, rallied round the Lieutenant. He did not desist a moment from his efforts to quiet his men: though jostled and buffeted by them, he stood up manfully, and for three dreary hours in turns threatened and implored them to return to their duty.

His efforts were not altogether in vain: aided latterly by a trustworthy native, who had been sent down by the magistrate, he at length persuaded the Sepoys to retire from the treasury. They returned to their lines, and, after plundering the regimental treasure chest, took the road to Delhi. It must in justice be added that the conduct of Mr. Power, the collector, and his brother, in remaining at their posts, is worthy of praise.

This victory—for that surely is a victory in which one European officer, standing alone against 200 armed native soldiery, causes them finally to quit the station, leaving the treasury unplundered—had the effect of restoring confidence in the city and district of Mynpoorie. The gallantry of Lieutenant De Kantzow was acknowledged in the most handsome manner by Lord Canning, and he was at once placed in command of a special body of police. On the following day (the 23rd) the mutiny broke out at Etawah: this too was a bloodless affair, but the Sepoys succeeded in plundering the treasury and private houses. Mr. Hume, the magistrate, escaped in the dress of a native woman. On the 25th the station was re-occupied by a Gwalior regiment, and British authority was temporarily re-established. The news of these events reached the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-west Provinces at Agra before he had issued his famous proclamation. Up to this time Mr. Colvin had been very successful in maintaining tranquillity in his neighbourhood. As soon as possible after the Meerut and Delhi massacres he had paraded the two native regiments, which with one English corps (the Company's 3rd Europeans) and some artillery formed the garrison of Agra, and had succeeded apparently in pacifying them. He felt confident that "all would be put to rights in a few days," if a "simple proclamation were issued to quiet the minds of the troops." He evidently had no conception of the magnitude of the crisis, and on the 20th May, two

* Magistrates' report.

days before the outbreaks at Mynpoorie and Etawah in his own immediate neighbourhood, he telegraphed to the Governor-General that "a very few days would see the end of this daring mutiny." He had previously, with the assent of the Supreme Government, proclaimed martial law throughout the districts under his rule.

On the 21st May the intelligence of the disaster at Allygurh reached him. He immediately organised an expedition for its recapture: this expedition consisted of about 230 cavalry under Lieutenant Cockburn of the Gwalior Contingent and fifty volunteers. This small party reached Allygurh on the 26th, and effected its recapture without difficulty. Six or seven Europeans who were besieged in a neighbouring factory were released, a large amount of treasure recovered, and the whole brought back to Hattrass, a walled town about twenty-two miles from Allygurh on the Agra road. Here a portion of Lieutenant Cockburn's cavalry, about 100 in number, who had up to this moment performed excellent service, suddenly rebelled. After vainly attempting to seduce their comrades, who were mostly Mahomedans, the rebels rode off to plunder the country. But Lieutenant Cockburn was resolved to pay them out, if possible, for their treachery. Hearing that, increased in number to 500, they were plundering and murdering in the vicinity of Hattrass, he resolved to attack them. And, to do so with the more certainty as to the result, he hit upon a stratagem. He procured a covered cart of the description in which native women were in the habit of travelling, and, placing in it four of his troopers with loaded carbines, he followed himself with the main body at a distance of about fifty paces, under the shade of some trees. The rebels, attracted by the cart, rushed out to seize the supposed inmates, but the foremost of them was saluted by a bullet, and at this signal Lieutenant Cockburn's party dashed amongst them, and not only defeated and dispersed them, but killed forty-eight of their number.

The history of the mutiny abounds with similar instances of individual tact and courage.

But the recapture of Allygurh, the preservation of Mynpoorie, the re-occupation of Etawah, and the gallantry of individuals, could not check the progress of the mutiny. From this moment, indeed, it began to assume a popular character. The zumindars and the ryots joined in it. From Agra to Delhi, to Meerut, to Cawnpore, to Allahabad, from Allahabad downwards, and throughout Central India, the entire country made a tremendous effort to shake off our sway. On the 30th of May two companies, both belonging to the regiments stationed at Agra, but themselves located at Muttra, thirty-five miles to the north of that station, mutinied, plundered the treasury, committed a few murders, and went off to Delhi. In the face of this, and of the disorganisation prevailing all around him, Mr. Colvin could no longer hesitate. On the following morning (31st), the two native regiments, the 44th and 67th, were disarmed, and allowed two months' leave to visit their homes.

The atmosphere was indeed thickening, and it was impossible even to guess the quarters in which the storm would next break out.

CHAPTER II.

CALCUTTA TO 31ST MAY. — OUDH TO 2ND JUNE.

ACCOUNTS of the occurrences detailed in the last chapter were all promptly conveyed by the electric wire to Calcutta, in the order in which they became known to the Lieutenant-Governor at Agra. Darker and more unfavourable reports reached the Governor-General about the same time from Cawnpore and Lucknow, and so impressed was he with the danger that he actually telegraphed to General Anson his opinion (31st May), that "his force of artillery would enable him to dispose of Delhi with certainty;" he therefore begged that he would "detach European infantry and cavalry to the south of Delhi." The movements of General Anson, and of the force which undertook the siege of Delhi, will be recorded in a separate chapter. It may suffice here to state that the measure proposed by the Governor-General — like all his measures, a half-measure — was impracticable. It might have been a question whether the Commander-in-Chief's force should not have been concentrated on the lower provinces, leaving Delhi for a time to its fate. This plan would have had the advantage of securing Cawnpore, Oudh, Agra, Goruckpore, and the country south-east of these places; but, on the other hand, it would have permitted the conspirators to raise the semblance of an empire at the imperial seat of Government: it would have allowed an unchecked communication with Central India and with the armies of Madras and Bombay. It would have been in the highest degree unwise to have allowed treason and treachery to remain unchecked or unmenaced. Our retirement on the Lower Provinces would have been attributed to fear. It is even possible that the Punjaubees, a warlike race, seeing rebellion raising its victorious head so near their frontier, would have been tempted to endeavour to shake off our yoke also. It cannot then be doubted that General Anson and his successors in command acted wisely in going to Delhi, in preferring to risk everything rather than forego the capture of the stronghold of the murderers. They persevered in this undertaking, despite of difficulties hardly surmountable, and they well deserved that glorious success which was finally vouchsafed to their arms.

If Delhi had been the defenceless place, which some represented it to be, there would even then have been little force in the Governor-General's suggestion: for we knew it to possess a large arsenal, and at least ten thousand insurgent troops. Had we despatched our infantry and cavalry to the southward, the result would have been, that the enemy would have captured our siege train!

About this time (May 29th), when the mutinies at Meerut, Delhi, Allygurh, Mynpoorie, and Etawah, were known to the Governor-General, when it must have been perceived that the insurrection must

now be put down, not by words, but by bayonets; the military secretary, Colonel Birch, issued the first and only proclamation to the army on the subject of the greased cartridges. Before this circular reached the upper provinces, the whole of Oudh, the important districts of Benares, Allahabad, and Cawnpore, were in open insurrection. It therefore fell to the ground, a blunted weapon. Far different, in all probability, would have been its effect had it been issued in the month of January, when suspicion regarding greased cartridges was first mooted. But Colonel Birch and the Government were dumb at that time. The Sepoys murmured, yet no explanation was offered. They were suffered then to "drift" into the belief that the Government was endeavouring to impose upon them. But now, when the time for explanations had passed away, when every word falling from Government was liable to be misconstrued, a full and complete explanation was offered regarding the substitution of the Enfield rifle for Brown Bess, and the whole question of greased cartridges! Alas for that terrible "Too late" which attaches itself as the motto of statesmen without prescience or genius,—of little men in great positions!

Meanwhile fearful events were enacting at Lucknow. As it was that city which set the example to the surrounding districts, it may be as well to give a *résumé* of the doings of Sir Henry Lawrence, subsequent to the revolt of the 7th Infantry *, so promptly quelled on the 3rd of May.

Lucknow.—It has been already mentioned † that on the 3rd May a treasonable letter had been sent by the Sepoys of the 7th Native Infantry to the 48th Native Infantry, but that it had fortunately fallen into the hands of a faithful Sepoy, who, after consulting with the havildar and subadar of his company, in conjunction with them, reported the matter to Sir Henry Lawrence. This able officer having already struck terror into the minds of all by his prompt and vigorous treatment of the mutineers, was justly of opinion that to openly reward these men, who, in spite of the temptations of caste, had done their duty, would impress upon the minds of the natives that the British Government was equally prompt to reward as to punish, and that whilst it had no mercy for mutineers, it had honours and emoluments for those who did their duty faithfully and honestly. With this view he summoned all the civil and military residents, the officers and men of the native regiments, and other native officials, to a grand durbar on the evening of the 12th May. The lawn in front of the Residency was carpeted, and chairs were arranged forming three sides of a square. At 6 P.M. Sir Henry Lawrence entered, followed by his staff and a large body of officers, and took his seat at the head of the assembly. Beside him were deposited in trays the presents intended for the native soldiers. Before, however, he distributed them, he addressed the assembled company in the Hindustani language. He commenced by alluding to the fear of the Hindoos for their religion: he pointed out how, under the rule of the Mahomedan emperors of Delhi, that religion had never been respected: how Hindoos were

* Recorded in Part I. † Part I.

forcibly converted by having the flesh of the cow forced down their throats. To the Mahomedans he showed how Runjeet Singh would never tolerate their religion at Lahore. Then turning to the assembled crowd, he asked them to reflect on the toleration which the Government of India had for a century always afforded to both religions. He next noticed our power, our exploits in the Russian war, our ships, our resources, how in a few months the British Government could, if necessary, concentrate a large army on that very spot. Finally, he alluded to the inseparable connexion between the Sepoys and their officers; he dwelt long and eloquently on this subject, on the dangers they had shared, on the services they had performed together; on the feeling instinctive in the breast of every officer that the regiment was his home, that the glory of the regiment was his glory, its disgrace his shame. He then impressed upon his listeners to think upon what he had told them, to place firm reliance on the assurances of Government, warning them that if, the dupes of fools and knaves, any of them were to attempt to follow in the footsteps of the 19th and 34th, the Government would inflict such a punishment as would not easily pass away from the memory of man. Sir Henry then called forward the Subadar and the Sepoys, and shaking hands with them bestowed upon them, in the name of the government of India, substantial testimonials of its appreciation of their fidelity.

The speech of Sir Henry Lawrence, truthful, solemn, and striking, had an immense effect. The entire scene was particularly calculated to impress those to whom it was addressed. The vast assemblage of all the representatives of British authority, the congregated natives, and this simple-minded Christian addressing them in their own language, and swaying them not less by the eloquence than by the truthful force of his harangue, presented indeed a picture which could only have been realised in the East. Bigoted as were those men, prejudiced against us, the dupes of vile intriguers, they left that durbar the most loyal subjects of the British Government, anxious only to have an opportunity of showing their zeal. But Sir Henry was not deceived by transient impressions: he felt that the time could not be far distant, unless Delhi should unexpectedly fall, before these loyal soldiers would become bloodthirsty mutineers, and he commenced taking every precaution in anticipation of an outbreak.

On the 16th of May, he became fully acquainted with the events of Meerut and Delhi. Precluded as he was by his situation from forcing advice upon a Governor-General with whom he had no personal acquaintance, he at once felt that the present was not a time for ceremony, and he telegraphed a strong recommendation to send for Europeans from China, Ceylon, and elsewhere, as well as for Goorkhas from the hills. Feeling also the anomaly of his own position, a military man invested with the chief civil authority, and yet subordinate in a military capacity to many of those who were about him, he applied for plenary military power in Oudh. On the 19th, he received a notification of his appointment as Brigadier-General. Assuming command at once, he without delay made an entirely new disposition

of the troops. Before entering upon this subject, it may be convenient to give an outline of the city and cantonment of Lucknow.

The city of Lucknow, built on the right of the river Goomtee, and extending for four miles along its banks, lies about fifty miles to the north-east of Cawnpore. All the principal buildings, including the Imambarrah, the King's palace, and the adjoining gardens, are between the city and the river bank. Here also is the Residency, a large walled enclosure, comprising not only the palace of the Resident, but other houses and outhouses, as well as underground buildings, or vaults on a large scale. It is situated on higher ground than the rest of the town, which it may be said to command. Near this, and higher up the river, almost on its bank, is a strong, turreted, castellated building, called the Muchee Bawun, very well adapted for defence against native troops. To the south, and covering an immense space, lies the town, intersected by a canal, which falls into the Goomtee close to the Martinière, about three miles south-east of the Residency. A little to the south of this is the Dilkoosha, a hunting-box, or palace, within an enclosed park. To the north-east of the Residency and on the left bank of the Goomtee is the cantonment, communicating with the right bank by means of two bridges, one of stone near the Muchee Bawun, the other of iron close to the Residency. Recrossing by these to the right bank, we come to the space between the Residency and the Martinière. This is filled up principally by native palaces, amongst which the Motee Mahal, Shah-munzil, Secundrabagh, and Furrahbuksh-ke-kotee, are the most conspicuous. To the south of the town, about four miles from the Residency on the Cawnpore road, is the Alum-bagh, a very strong, defensible position. The troops at Lucknow, in the month of May, 1857, consisted of H. M.'s 32nd Foot, about 570 strong, between fifty and sixty European Artillerymen, a native battery of artillery, the 13th, 48th, and 71st Regiments, and the 7th Light Cavalry. They had previously been disposed in the ordinary manner, the Europeans being preserved as much as possible from exposure, and the natives entrusted with the charge of several important buildings.

Sir Henry's first object was to remedy this error. He commenced by reducing the number of posts from eight to four; three of these he greatly strengthened, and so arranged their composition that none of the natives on duty could effect anything against the buildings, of which, conjointly with the Europeans, they were in charge. All the magazine stores hitherto under the charge of Sepoys, he caused to be removed into the Muchee Bawun, and entrusted that building to a company of Europeans: thirty guns were also placed in position there, and supplies for European troops rapidly stored in. At the Treasury, within the Residency Compound, he stationed 200 Sepoys, 130 Europeans, and six guns; the Treasury tent was actually under the charge of the Sepoys, but the guns were so disposed that at the first alarm they could be brought to bear upon them.

In the centre, and between these two positions, was a strong post of four hundred men with twenty guns, some of them eighteen-pounders, commanding the two bridges leading to cantonments.

The fourth post was at the dâk bungalow, between the cantonment and the Residency, and consisted of six guns and two squadrons of the 2nd Oudh Cavalry.

In the cantonment, on the left bank of the Goomtee, were the head quarters of the three native regiments, 340 of the 32nd Foot, fifty artillerymen (European), and six guns, and a battery of native artillery.

In consequence of a pressing requisition from Sir H. Wheeler, on the 21st May, the European force in cantonments was reduced by about fifty men. The 7th Cavalry were stationed at Moodkeepore, seven miles distant from the infantry cantonment.

That the precautions above detailed were necessary was proved by the fact, that during the night, papers were constantly posted up in prominent positions in the town, in which all good Mahomedans were called upon to rise *en masse*, and massacre the Frank infidels. The city police, from their inability to discover the perpetrators of these insurrectionary invitations, showed either that they connived at them, or that they were incapable. From their subsequent conduct, it may be assumed that they were at this time in league with the conspirators.

About the 24th, in consequence of a report that the Regiments would rise that night between 8 and 9 o'clock, all the ladies were moved into the Residency Compound; here also the sick and families of the 32nd were placed, and it was appointed the general rendezvous in the event of a rise. At the same time, the uncovenanted assistants, comprising clerks, copyists, section-writers, &c., were embodied as special constables, and took night duty. One great source of strength was the entire confidence which Sir Henry Lawrence inspired in all around him. He never for a moment underrated the danger, but, beholding its approach, he did not fear to look it in the face. Every precaution that man could take, he adopted. He improvised a fortress in the Muchee Bawun, seized and held the bridges, strengthened the Residency, conveyed into it all the ladies and invalids, and then, having his European force well in hand, prepared for any alternative. All this time, so far from betraying any of the anxieties which he felt, he went freely amongst the people, rode constantly about the city, endeavoured to calm men's minds, to reason with them, to show them their folly, their fool-hardiness. The designs of the men who were duping them he laid bare. But all was in vain. There was the same servility of manner on the part of the natives; but their hearts were shut to reason and argument. They thought they had caught us in a trap, and should find us isolated and unable to afford assistance to one another. They felt, in fact, sure of their game, and no persuasions or reasoning would, at that hour, have induced them to forego the attempt to win it.

At length, after nightly alarms, on the night of the 30th May, at 9 o'clock, the insurrection broke out. At that hour, suddenly a few shots were heard from the lines of the 71st Native Infantry; the men of this Regiment had been told off in parties, to fire the bungalows and murder their officers, and these shots were the signal. They were

joined at first by only a few of the 13th and 48th; but, nothing daunted, they commenced at once their murderous work. Brigadier Handscombe, a meritorious and much respected officer, who commanded under Sir Henry, and who lived in the cantonment close to them, had hastened to their lines on the first sound of the firing: he was received with a volley, and shot dead. Lieut. Grant, who was out on picket duty, was wounded by a random shot. Unable to stir, the subadar of his guard concealed him under a charpoy*, and told the mutineers that he had escaped. But a havildar of the same guard, merciless in his intense bigotry, pointed to the charpoy, whence Lieut. Grant was at once dragged, and brutally murdered. All this, and the firing of every bungalow they came near, lasted only a few seconds,—less time than I have taken to describe it. Sir Henry Lawrence had, on the first sound, ridden to the scene of action. It was his great object to prevent all communication between the insurgents and the mutinously disposed in the city. Accordingly, he at once moved off two guns and a company of Europeans to the corner of the only road by which the mutineers could approach the bridges, and disposed the rest to meet the attack of the enemy. This was not long waited for: the insurgents came on, infuriated with bang, and excited by their own deeds; but, as they neared the guns, they were received with such a volley of grape, that they at once retreated into their lines, whence they continued for a short time to carry on a desultory fire. As, however, the Europeans and the guns moved on, although only for a few hundred yards, they abandoned even these defences, and as they moved off, the Irregular Cavalry were sent in to cut them up. But their hearts were not in the contest, and although they followed their gallant commandant, Lieut. Hardinge, who greatly distinguished himself, it was but with little effect. Still pursuing their retreat, the insurgents reached the cavalry lines at Moodkepore, about 4 A.M. on the 31st. Finding they were not pursued, they determined to return, persuaded that they would be joined by others of their creed and colour. Firing the cavalry lines to encourage themselves, they started back for Lucknow. But Sir Henry was ready to meet them. Having secured the safety of the Residency, he marched forward with two hundred Europeans, two guns, the 7th Light Cavalry, and a handful of Daly's, Gall's, and Hardinge's Irregular regiments. As he passed the native lines, he was joined by the men of the three native regiments who had not joined the insurgents, about five hundred in number. The 7th Light Cavalry were sent in advance; but, on nearing the enemy, two troops went bodily over and joined them. Seeing our force still advancing, the enemy then turned and fled, although still about a thousand yards distant. Our artillery at once opened upon them, and quickened their flight; they were pursued by the Europeans as far as Moodkepore, and by the Native Cavalry for twenty miles further, in the direction of Seetapore. Their loss in killed, however, was only two or three; but sixty were taken prisoners. At Moodkepore was found the body

* A low native bedstead, with four legs.

of a young officer, Raleigh, quite a boy, who had but lately arrived. Left from ill-health at Moodkepore, he had been surprised and murdered by these assassins.

Unable, with a city full of men plotting our destruction, to pursue the mutineers further with his Europeans, Sir Henry returned to cantonments, and leaving there two hundred of the 32nd Foot, and four guns, he moved the remainder of his force into the Muchee Bawun and the Residency, distributing two of the battery guns to each. He at once proclaimed martial law. The city guards he strengthened with a hundred Europeans and four guns. The city, indeed, was surging with excitement; an insurrection was threatened that night, and but for the bold attitude assumed by Sir Henry (who, with Colonel Inglis, H. M.'s 33rd, slept in the town), and the hold which his character had obtained on the minds of all with whom he had been brought much in contact, it would have undoubtedly broken out. As it was, a good deal of firing took place between the more riotous of the city people and our police. The latter, however, aided by the Europeans, beat them off on each occasion. It is gratifying to add that the havildar who so basely betrayed the place of Lieut. Grant's concealment was caught and hanged; six or seven of the mutineers shared the same fate. Amid the all but universal disaffection, it is also pleasing to record that the officers of the 48th owed their lives to the fidelity of their men. They were at mess when the insurrection broke out, and were consequently in very great risk from detached parties of the mutineers. But about an hundred of their own men rallied round them, and escorted them in safety to the Muchee Bawun. Of the three thousand five hundred comprising the four native regiments, less than one fourth remained true to their colours, and these gradually dropped off as the rebellion progressed.

The spark which on the 30th May was fired at Lucknow, lit up the whole of Oudh. But before carrying the reader in the steps of the mutineers, it will be as well to trace the proceedings of a party of cavalry, which had left Lucknow for a specific purpose before the mutiny broke out.

Towards the end of May, in consequence of communications between Mr. Colvin, Sir Hugh Wheeler, and Sir H. Lawrence, it was resolved that a party of Gall's horse, upon whom it was believed every reliance could be placed, should be detached to clear the road between Cawnpore and Mynpoorie, and thence re-open communications with Allygurh. As this was a service of an important and delicate nature, Sir Henry Lawrence selected his military secretary, Captain Fletcher Hayes, an officer of great abilities, to perform it. He took with him two troops of Irregular Cavalry, and was accompanied by Lieut. Barbor, Adjutant of the regiment, Captain Carey, and Mr. Fayrer. The party reached Cawnpore safely, and on the evening of the 31st of May, had progressed by forced marches as far as Bowgong, about a hundred miles north of Cawnpore. Here they heard that Mynpoorie had been re-occupied by our troops, but that a Rajah in the neighbourhood had set our rule at defiance. As Mynpoorie was only eight miles distant, Captains Hayes and Carey cantered in

to consult the magistrate about attacking this miscreant. They remained there the entire day (1st June), the cavalry being halted at Bowgong. Orders, however, were transmitted to them to march on the following morning to Kurrowlie, sixteen miles on the road to Allygurh, at which place Captain Hayes would join them by a cross road. On the evening of the 1st, one of the native officials came in from Bowgong with the intelligence that the men were bent on mutiny. But as the small detachment which formed Captain Hayes' escort, and which arrived very soon after, merely complained regarding the length of the marches, no importance was attached to the previous information. In the morning, the two officers started by the cross-road, and after riding eleven miles, came in sight of their men proceeding in an orderly manner towards Kurrowlie. They crossed the plain to meet them, but as they approached, a native officer rode up and bade them fly for their lives. The words were scarcely out of his mouth before the two troops, yelling like demons and discharging their carbines, made at them. They had nothing for it but to wheel their horses round and make off. Captain Carey was fortunately untouched, but Captain Hayes, who was riding next the troopers, had not gone many yards before a native officer rode up to his side and cut him down. They then made after the other, but by judicious riding and being a light weight, he escaped after a two miles' chase, and eventually arrived safely at Mynpoorie.

It subsequently transpired that Lieutenant Barbor and Mr. Fayrer had been murdered about ten minutes before Captain Hayes came up. Mr. Fayrer was drinking at a well, when a dastardly sowar came up behind him and nearly cut off his head. Lieutenant Barbor seeing this, fled up the road, pursued by the whole body; he shot one horse and two of the sowars, when he was himself hit; the mutineers almost immediately afterwards came up with him and cut him down. The sowars, after plundering the property of their officers and securing all that they wore on their persons, went off to Delhi.*

Meanwhile the Lucknow rebels, baffled by the vigilance and promptitude shown by Sir Henry Lawrence, had taken the road to Delhi, viâ Seetapore. At this station were the head-quarters of the 41st regiment Native Infantry commanded by Lieut. Colonel Birch, a brother of the Military Secretary, and two regiments of Oudh Local Infantry. This officer, hearing of the approach of the mutineers, and justly feeling that in such times as the present boldness was the greatest safety, drew up his regiment to oppose their passage. As they approached, Colonel Birch gave the order to fire and was obeyed. The mutineers were so much discouraged by this reception, that they desisted from the attack, and continued their route to Delhi.

It must not be supposed that the conduct of the 41st, gratifying as it might appear on a mere superficial examination, was to be attributed in any degree to a spirit of loyalty. It was indeed supposed so at the time, and the "loyal 41st" was held up as a pattern to the

* Captain Carey's Letter, published in the "Times."

Bengal Army. But their conduct is capable of another and a more facile solution. There was a treasury at Seetapore. The 41st felt that if they delayed their revolt until the other regiments had passed away, the treasure would be theirs and theirs only. There would be none to share it with their brigade. Hence their apparent "loyalty" in repulsing the Lucknow mutineers. On the following morning, the 4th June, this regiment rose in revolt, murdered Colonel Birch, and many, if not all of the officers present, civil and military, and plundered the treasury.* It did not then, like so many of the other regiments, take the road to Delhi, but proceeded, committing fearful atrocities on the road, as will be recounted hereafter, to Futtehgurh, and aided in the capture of that place.

The whole country was now in flames. Not only the province of Oudh, but our own districts, had felt the force of the contagion and had risen on every side. On the 3rd, 4th, and 5th, the troops at the stations of Azimgurh, Benares, Allahabad, and Cawnpore rose in revolt. The entire province of Rohilcund, on the north-west frontier of Oudh, had even previously pronounced against our rule. In few of these districts did our countrymen escape massacre; in some they were put to death with every exaggeration of torture. But before detailing these events it will be necessary to follow the progress of the revolt throughout Oudh.

Sultanpore, ninety miles to the south-east, and Fyzabad, about the same distance to the eastward of Lucknow, felt the shock of the insurrection about the same time. At the former place were the 15th Irregular Cavalry and the 8th Oudh Locals. The cavalry regiment had been raised eleven years before by Colonel S. Fisher, an officer of H.M.'s service, a first-rate soldier, and the kindest-hearted man in existence. He was very proud of his men, felt entire confidence in them, always associated with them as much as possible, and being a great sportsman, was in the habit of taking his native officers with him to share his sport. He had felt the insecurity of his position, but he did not doubt his own men. In order, however, to remove one great incentive to revolt, the desire of plunder, from their minds, he resolved on the 8th June on emptying the treasury. He ascertained that this process might be effected by issuing three months' pay in advance to officers and men. This plan was accordingly carried out on the same evening. The following morning, as he was riding down to his regiment, he was shot in the back by a native policeman; his men — the men he had commanded for so many years — saw it but did not stir: the adjutant, Lieut. Tucker, however, went up to them and persuaded some of them to get a dooly†; in this he was placed; Lieut. Tucker then took out the ball and gave him some water; but he felt he was dying. Just at this moment, and as the second in command, Captain Gibbings, was coming up, a party of men, headed by a favourite orderly of Colonel Fisher's — a man who had accompanied him throughout that shooting season, rode up, first speared and then cut

* Account of a Bengalee, who escaped in the disguise of a Fakir.

† A covered conveyance for sick people.

him down. Lieutenant Tucker, finding it was all over, rode off, and, although pursued for three miles, escaped.

Fyzabad was the head-quarters of the 22nd Regiment Native Infantry, a local regiment, a detachment of Irregular Cavalry, and a battery of Native Artillery. Intelligence was received early in June that the 17th Native Infantry, who had mutinied at Azimgurh on the 3rd, would pass through Fyzabad *en route* to Delhi. The native officers and men of the 22nd were at once sounded; they swore that they were loyal and "of one heart" with their European officers. On the morning of the 8th it was ascertained that the 17th were within one march of the place. Colonel Lennox, commanding the 22nd, proposed moving out to give them battle; but the native officers of his regiment seemed much averse to it, as they said their families were with them, and they would prefer fighting on the spot for the lives of those dear to them. Whether the Colonel saw the force of this reasoning or not, he was compelled to succumb to it; but from that moment he must have felt that the game was up with them. But no distrust was shown. On the evening of the same day the troops were ordered to be drawn up against the anticipated attack, the guns being placed in the centre, supported by infantry on both flanks. Thus they remained till 11 P.M., when, on a signal from the lines of the local regiment, the artillerymen loaded their guns with grape. At this moment the two companies of the 22nd rushed amongst them, followed by the main body from the lines and the detachment of cavalry, and formally appointing Dhuleep Singh, a Subadar of the 22nd, as their colonel, and a Repaldar of the cavalry their general, took possession of the guns. In his new capacity the Subadar procured boats for the officers and let them go off uninjured: information of their departure was, however, conveyed to the 17th Native Infantry, who were encamped lower down the banks of the Gogra, and many of them were intercepted and massacred; those who escaped were wonderfully preserved through all but insurmountable dangers. The conduct of the 22nd, in sparing the lives of their officers, was much lauded at the time; but there appears to be but little real difference between men who actually commit murder and those who invite others to perpetrate the deed.

The regiments at Secrora, Pertahgurh, Pershadipore, Durriabad, Baraitch, and Gouda mutinied about the same time. Everywhere the treatment was the same, death to the "Feringhee" was the war-cry; and those who escaped that fate, escaped in the face of dangers and difficulties which few of them would care to encounter again.

There was one case showing so strongly the fickleness of the native character, that it will well bear insertion in this place.

In the months of February and March, a rebel chieftain, Fuzl Alli, had made himself notorious by the murder of Mr. Boileau, a civilian, and the commission of other atrocities. In pursuit of him a detachment of the 3rd Oudh Infantry, under Lieutenant Clarke, had been especially active, and that officer had finally succeeded in executing justice upon him. His own men were the instruments of British

vengeance; they had followed him unhesitatingly, unmurmuringly, and had striven equally with their commander in pursuit of the murderer: but in the month of June they revolted. Lieutenant Clarke, their former leader, and another officer, were powerless in their hands. The 17th Regiment Native Infantry were close at hand. To them these men, the accomplices of Lieutenant Clarke in the pursuit and death of Fuzl Alli, sent this message: "We have the murderer of Fuzl Alli; what shall we do with him?" "Behead him," was the reply. The injunction was at once executed upon the unfortunate officer and his companion.

From that day to the present all Oudh has been up in arms against us. Not only the regular troops whom we poured into that province, but the sixty thousand men who formed the army of the ex-king, the zumindars with their retainers, the two hundred and fifty forts, most of them heavily armed with guns, have been working against us. Here and there a petty raja has been found ready to spare the lives of our fugitives, and even in his heart wishing us success; but these exceptions have been very rare. The great body of the land-owners, the mass of the people, have declared against us: they have balanced the rule of the Company and the sovereignty of their own kings, and have pronounced almost unanimously in favour of the latter. The very pensioners who had served in the ranks of our army, and who now derive their support solely from our bounty, have declared definitively against us; not only have they to a man joined in the insurrection, but it is a well-authenticated fact that they have been foremost in the commission of atrocities.*

Such is the political aspect of the question. In a military point of view, Oudh has been the great stumbling-block in our course, the ulcer that has swallowed up and paralysed all our resources. Granting that we should have had the rebellion, if Oudh had not been annexed, there would still have been one European regiment available for Cawnpore. There would have been no occasion to keep all our reinforcements between that place and Calcutta, or to pour them into Oudh in long-fruitless attempts to succour our countrymen. In all probability, Oudh would have remained to us what it was in the Mahratta, Sikh, and Burman wars, not only a harmless but a friendly country. Our troops would have been able to reinforce the army before Delhi and to re-conquer Rohilcund. As it is, they have been reduced by exposure, by disease, and by the sword, in the endeavour to rescue from the clutches of the enemy those of our countrymen who had been sent, in defiance of the most solemn treaties, to usurp the place and dignity of the native sovereigns of the country.

Seldom indeed has retribution so quickly followed crime as in the case of Oudh. The nearest approach to it in history is the seizure of Spain by Napoleon, under circumstances infinitely less revolting than those which accompanied the spoliation of Oudh. And yet Spain was Napoleon's ruin. In the agony of his mighty heart he

* I am unwilling to publish my authority for this statement; but my publishers will receive, privately, the name of my informant.

exclaimed, "This great Spanish ulcer has ruined me!" It swallowed up his armies as Oudh swallowed up our reinforcements, and his power from that moment received a death-blow not inferior to that which the immoral and illegal annexation of Oudh has dealt to the Court of Directors. In both cases justice was violated: in the first, happening long ago, she was speedily, in the second we will hope she will be as quickly, avenged. Already the accents of despair, significant of the death-bed of the unrighteous, have been heard from Leadenhall Street. It is fit that man should be taught that there are certain fixed laws which cannot be violated without bringing upon the head of the violator, even in this life, dishonour, confusion, and disgrace.

CHAPTER III.

INSURRECTIONS AT AZIMGURH, JUANPORE, BENARES, AND ALLAHABAD.

THE little stations of Azimgurh and Juanpore, forty miles apart, constituted our advanced posts on the south frontier of Oudh. With the larger towns of Benares and Ghazeepore, they formed a square based upon the Ganges. Thus the natural action of a detachment beaten at Juanpore would be to retreat on its main station, Benares, of a force overwhelmed at Azimgurh to retire on Ghazeepore. This latter station and Benares, likewise forty miles apart, and based on the Ganges, constituted thus the heart on which the smaller arteries of Juanpore and Azimgurh depended for a constant supply of vitality.

To the north again of Azimgurh, sixty miles from it, and abutting on the Oudh and Nepal frontiers at the extreme front of our territory, was the station of Goruckpore: this was held merely by two companies of the 17th Native Infantry, and a small party of Irregular Horse. The remainder of the 17th Native Infantry, and a detail of Native Artillery guarded Azimgurh. Juanpore was defended by a detachment of Sikhs.

As soon as the events of Meerut and Delhi became known at Azimgurh, the demeanour of the Sepoys of the 17th assumed a form not to be mistaken. They had always been a most indifferent regiment, and it was now their misfortune to be commanded by a man totally unfit to have charge even of a company. The consequence was that disorder reigned rampant; the Sepoys behaved exactly as they chose, and became the terror, instead of being the safeguard, of the European inhabitants.

Such was the state of affairs at the end of May. It was known that every station in India was "shaky" that no native troops could be depended upon. Yet at this epoch, the Accountant of the North-West Provinces, a civilian, wiser in his own conceit than his neighbours', issued an order for the removal of ten lakhs of treasure from

Goruckpore and seven from Azimgurh to Allahabad: that is to say, at a time that native troops were known to be disaffected, he placed the entire treasure of the Azimgurh and Goruckpore districts under their charge, directed them to march with it through a country surging as it were against us, and to convey it to another station where only native troops were posted. It was, in fact, to give the insurgents the very opportunity they were seeking for, of plundering the whole.

However, the orders of the Accountant must be obeyed. The ten lakhs of treasure were therefore brought from Goruckpore to Azimgurh by an escort, under the command of Lieutenant Palisser of the Irregular Cavalry: here they took charge of the seven lakhs. But the 17th Native Infantry were not going to lose this money without a struggle. On the 2nd of June they made a desperate effort to prevent the party leaving Azimgurh; but the tact and coolness of Lieutenant Palisser, and the staunchness of the troopers of the cavalry, quite paralysed them, and they were compelled for the moment to forego their intentions. But, though baffled, they were not defeated. On the night of the 3rd the treasure party started: it consisted of two companies of the 17th and Palisser's Horse. They had scarcely marched three hours when the six companies left behind rose in revolt, killed Lieutenant Hutchinson, their quarter-master, and, letting loose the prisoners from the jail, accompanied by them and by all the police, set off after the treasure.

It had been Lieutenant Palisser's intention to disarm the two companies of the 17th with him; but on his intimating his resolve, they went down upon their knees and swore that they would stand by him to the last. At that time we were not so well acquainted with the value of native oaths and with the estimation to be placed on native honour as experience has subsequently made us, and Palisser believed them. They were, therefore, not disarmed. The consequence was that when the excited crowd, pouring out from the station, came near him, all armed to the teeth and thirsting for blood, Palisser was helpless. His troopers stood by him so far as to defend him and the officers with him (Lieutenant Simpson and Mr. Turner), but no more. They would not act against their countrymen. He was compelled, therefore, to draw off, and abandon the treasure: his troopers retired with him.

But it did not suit the object of the mutineers to permit these officers to retire unmolested. Their avarice was even surpassed by their desire for blood. They therefore did all in their power to persuade the sowars to give up their officers; they appealed to religion, nationality, love of money; even offered 5000*l.* for each head: but all in vain. The sowars were negatively faithful: they would neither act for us or against us, and, resisting all temptation, safely escorted their officers into Benares. The very next day they deserted. Sensible perhaps that they had done but half their duty, and secretly sympathising with the rebels, they had gone, probably after having seen their officers safely disposed of, to swell their forces.

On the mutiny breaking out at Azimgurh, the lives of the residents

were in great danger, and had it not been that the Sepoys were primarily intent on securing the treasure, but few of them would have escaped. As it was, one only who went amongst them was killed; the others barricaded themselves till the mutineers had started after the treasure party, and then set out for Ghazeepore,—Mr. Astell, the judge, leading the way in his carriage, most of the others following as best they might. However, all who started reached in safety. On arriving at Ghazeepore it was discovered that some of the indigo-planters and the poorer class of Christians had been left behind. As it was known that the 17th Native Infantry would return to plunder the place, great anxiety was felt on their behalf by one, at least, of those who had escaped. This was Mr. Venables, an indigo-planter residing in the neighbourhood of Azimgurh, a gentleman of large property and of a very high character. Fearing for the unfortunates who had been left behind, Mr. Venables endeavoured to persuade Mr. Astell, Mr. Horne, and others, to return with him. They were most unwilling, and pleaded fear of the Commissioner's anger, if they should return without his sanction. A message was instantly despatched for that sanction. But the Commissioner, Mr. Tucker, comprehending in an instant the feelings of his subordinates, sent back a reply to the effect that "he had no objection to Mr. Venables' going, but the civilians were on no account to risk their lives."

Thus privately and officially left to himself, this noble-hearted man determined to go alone. He started the next day, went direct to his estate at Doorie Ghat, some two and twenty miles on the Goruckpore side of Azimgurh, assembled his ryots*, armed them, marched at their head, and recovered Azimgurh. He did more; he held it; and whilst the apathetic civilians had retired into Benares, and were allowed to continue to draw their immense salaries — Mr. Astell alone 250*l.* per mensem — Mr. Venables, the indigo-planter, remained at their proper station, did all their work, even collected the revenue which they ought to have collected, restored order where all was chaos: and whilst these men were whining over the loss of their own private property, he employed himself in restoring the power and re-asserting the prestige of Government.

And yet he was one of those "adventurers" whom the Government of India takes every opportunity of insulting. Mr. Venables held this district, reinforced only by a small detachment of native troops, for about six weeks. At the end of that time the civilians were most unwillingly compelled to return. The events which subsequently happened will be related in their proper place. It is time now to notice the effect which the events at Azimgurh produced on Benares and its out-stations.

The city of Benares, distant four hundred and twenty miles north-west of Calcutta, and nearly eighty east of Allahabad, is on the left bank of the river Ganges. It is the metropolis of Hinduism, sacred to the votaries of that religion. Thither do they proceed, that, by

* Tenantry.

presents to the Brahmins and bathing in the holy water of the Ganges, they may be purified from their sins. Thither they are taken to die, convinced that the departure of the soul in the stronghold of Brahminism ensures a certainty of eternal bliss. The population may be estimated at 300,000, of whom four-fifths are Hindoos. These, it may easily be imagined, are almost entirely under the influence of the priests: by them the poorer class are kept in rigid subjection, whilst the richer are permitted to atone for defalcations and indulgences by offerings of no mean value in the various temples. The cantonment of Benares, denominated Jeccole, is three miles inland. Here were stationed in May, 1857, the 37th Regiment Native Infantry, the Sikh Regiment of Loodhiana, an irregular Cavalry regiment, and half a company of European Artillery, or about thirty men. Thus, notwithstanding the warnings that had been given, the Government of India, in the early part of May, considered that thirty European gunners were sufficient to hold in check three native regiments, and a city — the hot-bed of Brahminism — containing 300,000 inhabitants.

There were other considerations which ought to have inspired a far different arrangement.

Benares, in addition to its sacred character, might be styled the city of dethroned monarchs. Hither came the despoiled princes of Sattara, the ex-royal family of Nepal, a branch of the royal family of Delhi, boorg rajahs and Sikh chieftains, to seek an asylum in their misfortunes. All these were elements of mischief. Some of them were princes whom we had dethroned, or grand seigneurs whom we had deprived of their estates. Intrigue was their delight, they could not live without it; treachery had been familiar to them from their childhood, and it might have been surmised, without any great stretch of imagination, that no opportunity would be lost by them of exercising their talents with effect against us.

The inhabitants of Benares were a proud turbulent race, fond of ancient ways, and very impatient of innovation. Previous to 1851 they had successfully resisted all attempts to trench upon any of their customs. Thus they would prefer that filth should lie in their streets rather than that the novel system of draining should be introduced; that the highways should remain unlighted at nights, their roads encroached upon by filthy huts, than that a clear thoroughfare should be made. Many magistrates had endeavoured to remedy these evils; but, after several trials, the population, or rather the bourgeoisie backed up by the priests, who looked upon improvement as the first step to undermine their religion, were too much for them: the magistrates were baffled, and receded from their orders.

But in 1851 a gentleman was appointed to the post of magistrate, who did not like to be baffled. He too ordered improvements after the manner of his predecessors: unlike them, he carried them out. This was Frederic Gubbins of the Civil Service.

His first attempt had been unpromising: the inhabitants, according to custom, resisted his innovations, and, finding that he did not succumb, the very next time he came into the city, they pelted him out

of it. He had in fact to fly for his life. But he still persisted in his plan. The bourgeoisie, not to be beaten, resolved to starve him out; they shut all their shops and sent to stop their supplies of grain from all quarters. As the troops were dependent upon their regimental bazars, and these again dependent on the city of Benares for grain, it was supposed that, on the failure of the three or four days' supply laid up in the bazars, the magistrate would be glad to give in. But Mr. Gubbins resolved to fight them with their own weapons: he sent to Mirzapore and other places for grain; and finally, hearing that the leading members of the insurrection were about to hold a meeting to concoct a further scheme of opposition, he sent down two companies of Sepoys, caught them in the act, and lodged them in jail.*

The next morning he rode through the city and opened all the shops. From that moment, not only was the insurrection at an end, but Mr. Gubbins was lord of Benares. He had inspired a conviction of his power, his earnestness, his energy, such as if a native once imbibes he exaggerates,—he never loses the feeling. From that time forth, the idea reigned supreme in the minds of the people of Benares that it was impossible to organise a successful opposition against Mr. Gubbins.

It is necessary to mention this, because in every phase of the insurrection at Benares, this influence is visible, not only preventing the townsmen from joining the insurgent troops, but overawing them subsequently, when all the surrounding districts had risen. At the time of which I am writing, Mr. Gubbins was judge, Mr. Lind, an able active zealous officer, was magistrate; the troops were temporarily commanded by Brevet Lieut.-Colonel Gordon of the Sikhs corps, a very steady capable commandant; the commissioner or civil ruler of the district was Mr. H. C. Tucker, a most amiable good man, but ill adapted to rule in the emergency which was now approaching. Very soon after the news of Delhi and Meerut reached Benares, it became visible that, of the troops, the 37th were "gone;" the Sikhs mostly faithful, but some of them even wavering; the Irregular Cavalry doubtful. How to maintain order amongst these, and in the city, with the aid and by the sole means of thirty European artillerymen with three guns, was a problem which required solution.† With this view, a meeting of the principal members of the society was held. There one gentleman proposed to abandon the station, and to retreat upon Chunar, a fortress thirteen miles distant, and on the opposite bank of the river: he was supported at first by two others; but the idea was so strongly combated by Messrs. Gubbins and Lind, to whom it appeared in the light of a shameful abandonment of the most important city between Calcutta and Lucknow, that it was given up, and a resolution adopted to make a stand where they were, taking every precaution against an emergency.

* I received all these particulars from a gentleman who was at Benares at the time.

† On the authority of an officer who was at Benares at the time.

The first of these precautions was to despatch an urgent requisition to Dinapore, 130 miles distant, for troops. This was attended to, and two companies of Her Majesty's 10th foot, about 150 strong, were at once sent up by steamer.

There was unfortunately no defensible position in Benares; but arrangements were made that in the event of an outbreak, the ladies and others should repair on the first alarm to the Mint, a very large oblong brick building, proof against fire, and capable of being defended against men unprovided with artillery.

Towards the end of May the symptoms of disaffection amongst the native troops became even more strongly marked; the agents of the king of Delhi were found to be busy amongst the Mahomedan Sepoys; the Hindoos went openly to their temples, and prayed for the time to arrive when they might murder us; placards were posted up calling on the people to rise, and every thing indicated the approach of a crisis.

On the 3rd and 4th June, reinforcements of the Madras Fusiliers, sixty men in all, arrived, and it appeared that the time had now come when stronger measures might be adopted. It was felt that an insurrection was imminent, that it could not be deferred much longer; it was therefore thought that with 240 Europeans at their disposal, with the Sikhs believed to be staunch, and with the 13th Irregulars in whom their officers had every confidence, the measure might be adopted of disarming the 37th Native Infantry. About a fortnight before, Colonel Gordon had been superseded in command of the station by Brigadier Ponsonby, a cavalry officer. Both these officers, Mr. Tucker and Mr. Gubbins, debated these questions on the afternoon of the 4th June. In the height of the discussion, suddenly the brigade-major rushed in with the startling intelligence that the 17th Native Infantry at Azimgurh, sixty miles distant, had risen in revolt, and plundered the treasure. This decided them. It was unanimously resolved to disarm the 37th Native Infantry the following morning, and a plan of operations was arranged by which that measure could be effected, it was believed, without the effusion of blood.

All was settled. Brigadier Ponsonby had gone to his own house to issue the necessary orders, when the sudden arrival of one man changed the whole aspect of affairs. This man was Lieutenant-Colonel Neill, commanding the Madras Fusiliers.

As Colonel Neill is one of the characters figuring in the suppression of this mutiny, who rose at once to the surface, and never sank below it, it may be as well to give some brief outline of his character.

It is told in a very few words, and may be illustrated by one example. Colonel Neill was the type of a resolute, determined, energetic Englishman — a man of very quick observation and an iron will. He saw the true bearings of a question in an inconceivably brief space of time, and acted always at once: he was not to be trifled with when he gave orders: he always knew that he would be

obeyed. His character was quickly appreciated by those with whom he came in contact.

The illustration is as follows:—When he arrived in Calcutta at the head of the Madras Fusiliers, he was ordered up with a detachment by railway. The train was to start at a certain hour; but, owing to some delay on the part of the authorities in procuring boats, a portion of the detachment seemed likely to be a few seconds behind time. Colonel Neill had already arrived. The station-master, addressing him, stated that he was behind time, and could not wait for his men, and that the train should go without them. As he rose to execute this threat, Colonel Neill ordered his men to seize and detain him till the rest of the detachment should arrive. When they came up, the station-master was let go, the men got into the carriages, and the train started. A military man who could thus brave the civil power, was not likely to shrink before mutineers. When, therefore, Brigadier Ponsonby detailed to Colonel Neill his plan for the following morning, and the grounds upon which it had been formed, the latter inquired the reason for delaying the measure even so long. "Why," said he, "give the 37th, who will hear, or have heard, of the Azimgurh mutiny, the opportunity of rising to-night?" He strongly urged that the measure should be carried out at once. Convinced by his arguments, the Brigadier yielded, then and there altered all his arrangements, and sent orders to the regiments to parade that same evening.

The lines of the 37th were in the centre of the parade, about midway between those occupied by the Sikhs and by the artillery. At the hour appointed, and before the 37th had come out in front of their lines, the artillery advanced from the left, the Sikhs and Irregular Cavalry from the right. As they came near, the Sepoys of the 37th were directed to place their muskets in the bells of arms appointed to receive them: some obeyed, but as the Europeans still continued to advance, they appeared to repent, for, rushing forward, they recovered their muskets, many of which were loaded, and commenced a brisk fire from the whole line on their officers and the advancing Europeans. Some of their officers, confident of their loyalty even then, went amongst them to smooth them down; but upon these also they fired, and even went at them with their bayonets.

The Sikhs and Irregular Cavalry were now approaching. The commanding officer of the former, Captain Guise, riding in front of them near the lines of the 37th, was shot dead. Captain Dodgson, the brigade major, seeing the catastrophe, rode up to them, and intimating that he had been sent by the Brigadier to take the command, called on them to follow him. They flashed their swords in reply, giving vent to a low equivocal murmur. At the same moment, one of them drew his pistol and fired at Captain Dodgson; the shot took effect in his sword arm, paralysing it for the moment. The sowar then rode up and was about to cut him down, when another interfered, and both were lost in the *mêlée*.

The sound of that pistol-shot had not yet been borne away on the winds, when the Sikhs, hitherto standing firm, brought up their muskets to the shoulder, and opened an indiscriminate fire on their

own officers and the Europeans. Our guns, which, up to this time, had been blazing away at the 37th, then turned upon the Sikhs: these latter dashed forward to charge them, but were repulsed and broken. The Irregular Cavalry, most of whom had joined the mutineers, were also put to flight and dispersed. The 37th likewise fled in terror and confusion. Brigadier Ponsonby, in an early part of the day, had fallen, stricken apparently by the sun, on the ground, and the command had been assumed by Neill, who directed the arrangements which ensured the defeat and flight of the rebels.

Whilst this was going on on the parade ground, the civilians, with their wives and families, had, according to previous arrangement, assembled on the roof of the treasury, distant about two miles, and there abided the fortunes of the day. Just before the firing commenced, Soorut Singh, a Sikh *détenu*, had left Mr. Gubbins; but on the booming of the first gun, he returned to the place where he and the others were collected; and, taking a double-barrelled gun from the hands of that gentleman, announced his intention to share his fate. His arrival was most opportune. A quarter of an hour had not elapsed before it was announced to the Sikh guard stationed over the treasury, on the roof of which the civilians were standing, that our guns had been turned on their countrymen, who were being slaughtered in every direction. Already the Sikhs began to feel that they at least were capable of avenging their comrades, when Soorut Singh, going amongst them, pointed out to them that the attack must at all events have been unpremeditated, or the civilians would not have placed themselves and their families in their power. He stated his firm belief in the sincerity and good faith of the English, and announced his intention to stand by them. These arguments, proceeding from one of their own countrymen, himself a *détenu*, had the desired effect, and the men never afterwards attempted to swerve from their duty.

The presence of Messrs. Gubbins and Lind on the roof of the treasury that evening, undoubtedly saved the building from plunder. Had they not been there, the Sikh guard, hearing of the massacre of their comrades, would at once have made the best of their time, and have helped themselves, previous to making off. There would have been no one to prevent them. But the presence of Mr. Gubbins primarily, and of Soorut Singh secondarily, saved the station from that catastrophe — a catastrophe which might have been the prelude of a greater.

In the cantonment, meanwhile, the ladies and non-combatants, on the first sound of fire, had hurried into the mint, which had been prepared for their reception: here also congregated, after the mutiny had been crushed, the officers and civilians. Every bungalow was deserted; but it is a fact that speaks decisively as to the effective manner in which the *émeute* had been suppressed, that, though all the houses were deserted and every door left wide open, not a single robbery took place that evening.

The revolt of the Sepoys had, indeed, been effectually put down; but no sooner had it become known in the districts around that there

had been an insurrection, than the whole country rose as one man: communication was cut off with the neighbouring military stations, and it appeared as if the ryots and zumindars were about to attempt the execution of the project in which the Sepoys had failed. All depended on the deportment of the city. It was at this epoch that the character and influence of Mr. Gubbins came fully into play. The memory of the fruitless revolt of 1852, and of the punishment meted out to the ringleaders, had its full effect. The powers with which, in their eyes, Mr. Gubbins was endued, were sufficient to discover and overturn any cabal; and what was really the effect of untiring zeal, undaunted energy, and clear-headedness unmatched, was attributed by them to the supernatural.

They saw, indeed, that Mr. Gubbins exposed himself as much or more than any one else. One shot would have brought him low; and on his death the insurrection of the city would have followed as a matter of course: but the shopkeepers and the *canaille* had fired at him in 1852; he had laughed at their miserable attempts; he had baffled, he had punished them. They feared the same result now.

So argued the commonalty. With the superior class, his influence was of a higher order. There were two native noblemen in Benares at that time, both of them of great wealth and immense influence, and one of them possessing, in addition, strong sense and ability of no common order. This was the Rao Deo Narain Singh; the other was the Rajah of Benares. Everything that the former possessed he placed at the service of Government. After the mutiny he and the Sikh Sirdar Soorut Singh, actually lived in the same house with Mr. Gubbins. The former procured for us excellent spies, first-rate information, and placed all his resources, and they were great, whatever he possessed in the world in fact, at the service of our Government. Soorut Singh almost gave his life, at least he offered it; but, as will be subsequently shown, the rebels were content with paralysing a limb. As for the Rajah of Benares, he behaved throughout like a loyal subject. Although not so personally active as the Rao, he was equally liberal with his resources, which were even greater, and never, in our darkest hour, did he hang back from assisting us.

It has been stated that the entire district rose at the sound of the cannon at Lecrole. But in this emergency our countrymen were not wanting to themselves. A small number of the Irregular Cavalry, under the command of Lieutenant Palisser, had remained faithful; but they were suspected by every one. At this crisis Mr. Chapman, an indigo-planter, came forward and offered to accompany them anywhere; he even proposed to take a portion of them under his command, and surprise and attack the Azimgurh mutineers. But this proposal, after due consideration, was rejected by Colonel Neill, who had arrived at a very correct appreciation of native troops. But this gallant volunteer's services were not refused. He was endowed with the powers of a magistrate, and sent first with the Irregulars, and afterwards with detachments of Europeans, against the surrounding districts, and with marked success. Three gibbets were erected at Benares. Again the name of Mr. Gubbins became a proverb for

swift stern justice. Neither rank nor caste protected any man; and by this means, and the success of the flying parties who were sent out, order was temporarily restored in the Benares division. Meanwhile Colonel Neill, having driven away the rebels, and in the short space of three days made every department as efficient as possible, set out for Allahabad, making over his command to Brevet-Lieutenant Colonel Gordon.

Before we follow him in his travels, or relate the cause of his prompt departure, we may refer to the occurrences at the little station of Juanpore.

Juanpore lies, as I have already stated, forty miles from Benares, in the direction of Oudh, and was at the time of the outbreak garrisoned by a detachment of the Loodhiana Regiment of Sikhs under Lieutenant Mara. The station had remained tolerably quiet up to the 5th June. But on the morning of that day some indigo-planters, who lived three miles from the station, galloped in with the information that the 37th mutineers had attacked their factory. All the residents at once assembled in the treasury, over which was a Sikh guard. The men of this guard shook hands with our countrymen, and swore to protect them. Soon, however, information reached them how their comrades had been shot down on the Benares parade ground. They forthwith mutinied, commencing by shooting their own officer, Lieutenant Mara, and progressing by pillaging the treasury. At this crisis Mr. Guppage, a young civilian, going outside in the direction of the jail, was shot dead by the Sikh sentry on duty. The other residents remained in the enclosure of the magistrate's cutcherry*, until the Sikhs had gone off, when, at the instigation of Mr. Fane, the magistrate, they gave up their arms, and started in the direction of Benares. Had they retained their arms, and pushed on like Englishmen, little opposition would have been offered. As it was, they were reduced to the most humiliating straits, being compelled to give up their watches and personal ornaments to natives, who but the day before had crouched before them. They were finally compelled to take refuge with one Hingun Lall, a native of some power and influence. In this pitiful state they remained, until, intelligence of their situation having reached the Benares authorities, a party was organised to go out and bring them in—a movement which was effected without loss.

But we must turn from this incident to notice the events which in the interim had occurred at Allahabad. The important station of Allahabad, its fort and arsenal, were in the month of May 1857 garrisoned entirely by natives,—the 6th regiment Native Infantry, a battery of Native Artillery, and five companies of the regiment of Ferozpore (Sikhs). The military value of Allahabad cannot be over estimated. Situated at the juncture of the rivers Ganges and Jumna it commands both, and the troops who possess it can therefore prevent all river navigation. It also commands the road. Indeed it is only approachable on the Benares side by a bridge of boats thrown across the Jumna,

* Office.

and this is completely within range of the guns of the fort. The Ganges separates it from Oudh; there are or were no defences on either bank, and that river also is spanned by a bridge of boats. The fort itself is stored with immense quantities of arms and ammunition: it is of great natural strength, resting absolutely on the Jumna on one side, and commanding on the other the entire station of Allahabad, the city, and the road to Cawnpore.

To have left so strong a position and such immense stores under the guardianship of natives, so soon after the acquisition of Oudh, its nearest neighbour, was an inexcusable fault. If we had lost Allahabad, we should have lost all power of communicating with the north-west, —.the whole aspect of the campaign would have been changed; and our enemies at Cawnpore and Lucknow, after massacring our garrisons at those places, would probably have marched 50,000 in number to overwhelm our troops at Delhi. Lord Ellenborough, when Governor-General of India, was so impressed with the importance of Allahabad, that he would never allow less than three companies of Europeans to be stationed there. He built for them magnificent barracks inside the fort, and made every possible arrangement for their comfort. Sir Charles Napier also took care that European troops should always garrison the fort. But what were Lord Ellenborough and Sir Charles Napier to Lord Dalhousie, Lord Canning, and Colonel Birch? Why, it had been the practice of the two former not only to give orders direct to the parties concerned, but invariably to see them obeyed, — an unpardonable offence in the eyes of those illustrious red-tapists! Hence all they did was undone by their successors; and, amongst other "reforms," the Europeans were moved away from Allahabad.

In no scene of the drama was the action of Providence more conspicuous than in the events by which the Allahabad mutiny was characterised. The news from Delhi and Meerut arriving about the 14th May, had a visible effect on the 6th Regiment: they looked round and saw no one to interfere with their plans: they were, or might become, without even the semblance of a struggle, the masters of all they surveyed. They took duty over the treasury, in which there were 170,000*l.* in silver; they guarded, alternately with the Sikhs, the arsenal, the fort gates, the magazine; they had only to rise and say, "these are ours;" there were none or few to share it with them: the population of Allahabad are bigoted Mahomedans; their sympathies would ever be with those, of whatever religion, caste, or tribe, who would fight against the British. Why, then, did they not mutiny at once? A question to which but one reply can be given. They were Asiatics: they could not comprehend the advantages of time, circumstance, position, promptitude: they saw that they could seize these places and this treasure when they chose; therefore they did not seize them at once: they had, in fact, all the wickedness and all the irresolution of Macbeth. In their manner and tone they allowed, even at this time, something to appear which alarmed, not the authorities or their own officers, but the European residents at Allahabad. These latter wrote their fears to the Indian newspapers,

and the press, then unfettered, inserted their letters. The consequence was that, having no other Europeans to spare, the Government ordered up a portion of the European invalids from Chunar: sixty-five of these arrived on the 23rd May, and were at once placed in the fort. To their presence, and the presence of the few Europeans who followed them, the subsequent safety of the fort may be attributed. About the same time a detachment of the 3rd Regiment Oudh Irregular Cavalry, under Captain Alexander, was brought over from Oudh. All this time the officers of the 6th had the most perfect confidence in their men. There was not a regiment in the service in which the Sepoys were so looked after, so cared for, as in this one.* The officers' feelings seemed to be entirely one with theirs. They encouraged them in their wrestling and in all their sports, and contributed largely towards their maintenance from their own private funds. They had battled on their behalf with the civil authorities, and had exposed themselves to contumely by the pertinacity with which they held out for the character of their men. They were proud of them: the regiment was truly their home: they would have gone anywhere with it, and, had the entire Bengal army risen before their eyes in revolt, they would still have placed implicit confidence in the 6th. Men like Mr. Mangles, who passed their career in India, in the luxurious ease of a civilian's life, may, if they chose, libel the officers, whose character and interest they are bound to protect; they may endeavour to make those officers the scape-goats for a rebellion, which their own lust of territory and mis-government have caused; but who that studies these events will believe them? We have seen how the officers of the 6th had behaved for years past toward their men; it has now to be related how they were requited.

On the 22nd May, Colonel Simpson, who commanded the 6th, wrote a letter to the newspapers, in which he denounced the statement that the 6th had evinced symptoms of discontent and insubordination as "false and malicious." This assertion was apparently borne out on the 1st June by the 6th volunteering *en masse* to march against Delhi,—a demonstration which had the effect of inducing the utmost confidence in their loyalty. About this time, too, they made over to public justice two spies, who had come into their lines for the purpose of tampering with their fidelity: this circumstance combined with their volunteering seemed to stamp them as proof against every temptation.

Yet throughout this period they were bent on mutiny: the man in the regiment most trusted by them was the very soul of the plot: but he and the others maintained to the last every appearance of respect and loyalty, and not one Sepoy out of the thousand who composed the regiment warned their officers of their impending fate.

On the 27th May the first detachment of Europeans sent up by Government from Calcutta arrived at Allahabad: they were not detained there, but were sent on at once to Cawnpore. Daily batches of them arrived, and were forwarded with all despatch. The danger appeared to have passed: the very sight of the Europeans would, it

* Personal experience.

was thought, scare the evil-disposed from their designs. Grave error! It had an effect the very opposite: the Sepoys of the 6th saw those men arrive, and they felt that the prize was slipping from their grasp: a few more Europeans, and their chance of the treasure would be *nil.* It was resolved to strike at once, and strike boldly. In order, however, completely to deceive their officers, they, on the 1st, as already stated, volunteered for Delhi.

On the 5th Colonel Simpson received a telegraphic message from the Governor-General requesting him to inform the regiment that the thanks of the Governor-General in Council were due to them, and would appear in the next Gazette. The officers were delighted at this manifestation, and were in raptures with their men for having, by volunteering, caused so great a distinction to be bestowed upon the corps.

All was quiet till the 5th June: on that day accounts of the mutiny at Benares reached the station, accompanied by reports that the mutineers were in full march upon Allahabad. On the same day a message was received from Sir Hugh Wheeler, commanding at Cawnpore, to "man the fort with every available European and make a good stand." Preparations were consequently made: all the ladies and non-combatants were advised to go into the fort. Many of the latter obeyed, and formed themselves into a volunteer company about a hundred strong; but a great number, confiding in the loyalty of the 6th, preferred remaining outside. Two guns and two companies of the 6th were ordered down to the bridge of boats which crosses the Jumna underneath the fort, in order to be ready to play upon the Benares insurgents: the guns of the fort were at the same time pointed on to the Benares road. Captain Alexander, with two squadrons of cavalry, was posted in the Alopee bagh, a large encamping ground under the lee of the fort, and commanding all the roads to the station: the main body of the 6th were not taken from their lines,—distant from the fort about three miles,—but were kept in readiness to move anywhere at the shortest notice.

The fort itself was garrisoned by sixty-five invalid artillery-men, four hundred Sikhs, and one company of the 6th. In addition to these were the civilians and other non-military men, who might have numbered about one hundred.

The removal of the ladies into the fort did not appear to satisfy the men of the 6th, who, it may be inferred, were bent even then on bloodshed; for they remonstrated with one of their officers for sending his wife into the fort, and begged him to allow her to return to cantonments, as they were one and all determined and able to defend her. The officer hesitated; but his better genius prevailed: he did not bring back his wife. Still he had no distrust of his men, and showed his feeling of confidence by himself remaining in the lines.

On the afternoon of that day (the 6th) Colonel Simpson ordered a parade of the regiment, in order to communicate the Governor-General's message. Great was the real enthusiasm of the officers, as great the apparent heartiness of the men. After the message had been announced, they cheered like Europeans; and when the order to

fall out was given, the European shook hands with the native officers, and congratulated them on their all being of one mind on their regiment having thus come forward. Little did they dream at that moment that their death-warrant had been signed by the very men whom they were congratulating!

That night almost all the officers in the station dined at the 6th Mess, Colonel Simpson presiding. Every one was in the highest good humour; the officers, proud of their regiment, congratulating themselves and one another that, placed in the midst of mutineers, their regiment—a word comprehending home, honour, glory, reputation, to zealous officers—had remained loyal. The cloth was removed; it was half-past nine o'clock; already some were thinking of going home, when suddenly the alarm was sounded. Jumping to the not unnatural conclusion that the Benares insurgents were advancing, or that there was an inroad from Oudh, the officers started up, buckled on their swords, and, those that had them ready, mounting their horses, rode down to their lines to call out their men. They were still in the highest spirits, rejoicing in the prospect of an encounter and proving the loyalty of their men. As they rode on to the parade, they perceived one of their companies drawn up. They called out to them: the answer was a volley. Yes: those men they had mingled with, trusted, encouraged, shown every kindness to, thus deliberately murdered them! Most of the officers were shot dead. Colonel Simpson managed to escape to the fort. Captain Gordon was miraculously saved by some of his men. All the others upon whom they could lay hands were remorselessly butchered. Those even that had remained in the mess-house, for the most part boys lately arrived from England, were treacherously assaulted by the mess-guard, and, though defending themselves with desperation, were one and all murdered.

Rebellion was now in full swing. Houses were plundered and burnt, their inmates chopped to pieces, some roasted, almost all cruelly tortured, the children tossed on bayonets. Foremost in the commission of these atrocities were the pensioners,—a body of men retired from military service, entirely dependent on Government, and receiving from it half-yearly a handsome sum for their maintenance. These men, unable from their infirmities to fight, were not thereby precluded from inflicting tortures of the most diabolical nature: they even took the lead in those villanies, and encouraged the Sepoys and others to follow their example.* And yet these men still draw, they still receive, their pensions from the merciful Government of India!

To plunder the treasury, let loose the prisoners, raise the townspeople, to hunt after Europeans, to destroy all property useless to themselves, was the work of that night and the following day. Meanwhile, on the first sound of musketry, the two companies of the 6th and the native artillerymen who had been stationed on the bridge,

* I have these particulars from an undoubted source. My informant received them from the lips of an eye-witness.

turned against their officers. These latter, however, preferred trusting the waters of the Jumna to the tender mercies of the 6th; and finally, after a swim for it, succeeded in gaining the fort, quite naked: there they were at once taken in and cared for. Captain Alexander, of the cavalry, was not so fortunate. Warned, by the firing, of some impending catastrophe, he jumped on his horse and rode towards the lines, followed by several of his men: but the Sepoys were waiting for him in ambush, and as he passed they fired at him, at so close a distance that they blew out his heart. He was a fine, noble, dashing soldier, beloved by all.

In the fort, all this time, a scene was going on which almost baffles description. Our countrymen there too heard the "alarm" sounded: they rushed to the ramparts, in expectation of an enemy; then came the sound of a volley, then another, then steady file-firing, constant, without intermission. Never doubting the loyalty of the 6th, they believed that they were in action with some insurgents. This belief was confirmed as the firing grew fainter and fainter: they congratulated one another that the gallant 6th had been so successful in beating off the foe. But these pleasing impressions did not remain very long: the sight of the flaming cantonment first suggested a doubt, and immediately afterwards an officer who had escaped the massacre brought in the fatal tidings.

Their situation was a very precarious one: not 200 Europeans in the fort,—of these 65 invalids, a hundred non-military, the remainder officers, conductors, sergeants, &c., to meet 400 Sikhs and a company of the 6th, the latter now known to be hostile, the former, since the conduct of their brethren at Benares, scarcely to be trusted. It was necessary to act boldly, and, as the only chance of safety, to take the initiative. Fortunately there was a man on the spot, who comprehended all this at once, and acted accordingly. This was Captain Brazier, who commanded the Sikhs, an officer who had risen from the ranks, having been promoted for daring and cool courage displayed during the Sutlej campaign. He had been originally posted to the Sikh regiment as quarter-master, and had risen through the grades of adjutant and second in command to the post of commandant, which he still holds.

The first thing was to disarm the 6th, who had loaded their muskets. This was difficult on account of the temper of the Sikhs, amongst whom some little hesitation was visible. Thanks to the coolness of their commandant, who went amongst them and almost forcibly kept them firm in their loyalty, the operation was successfully accomplished. The muskets were then taken from the 6th, and the men of that corps were turned out of the fort. The Sikhs then quietly resumed their posts on the ramparts.

That night passed in painful anxiety. Nor was this feeling sensibly diminished the next day. The conduct of the Sikhs alone was sufficient to give cause for alarm. They were permitted to plunder in every direction; the stores of the European merchants and others, containing wines of every description, private packages from Calcutta, and provisions were sacked, wholesale — the commandant of the for-

tress, Colonel Simpson, looking on, and fearing by checking to exasperate them. But in another point this officer was even more culpable.

The greater portion of the 6th, after their successful mutiny, despairing of gaining the fort, and eager probably to secure their plunder, had made off, some for their houses, others for Oudh. There remained then at Allahabad only a few Sepoys, the inhabitants of the neighbouring villages, untrained to arms, and possessing only the two guns which had been abandoned on the bridge on the night of the mutiny. And yet Colonel Simpson allowed himself and the fort to be invested by this rabble; nay more, to such an extent did his amiability stretch, that on some few Sepoys being pointed out to him passing in and out of the village of Deragunj, the inhabitants of which also had rebelled, he refused to permit the guns of the fort to be turned upon them, for fear of destroying the innocent with the guilty.

Such a state of things could not last very long without producing most disastrous consequences. Fortunately it was not permitted to last. On the 11th June, Colonel Neill arrived, and from that moment affairs took a turn.

How he raised the investment, and dispersed the enemy, how he restored order out of chaos, and, infusing his own energy into all around him, equipped an army out of an exhausted country, will be recounted in another chapter. For the present we must unwillingly leave him to survey the effect which these events produced on the magnates of Calcutta.

CHAPTER IV.

CALCUTTA TO 30TH JUNE. — MASSACRES AT FUTTEHPORE, JHANSIE, NOWGONG, AND ROHNEE.

THE latter end of May and the beginning of June witnessed the arrival of strong reinforcements to our European garrison in India. In quick succession the Madras Fusiliers from Madras, the 64th Foot and 78th Highlanders from Persia, the 35th from Moulmein, a wing of the 37th, and a company of Royal Artillery from Ceylon, were poured into Calcutta. It would have been imagined that the Government, aware as they must have been at this time of the universal disaffection, would have been glad to display their troops, to notify to the mutinously disposed the arrival of such strong reinforcements, to show them that they had means at their disposal wherewith, if necessary, to strike home. But they acted on a contrary principle. The European troops were smuggled in like contraband goods; the Government even went out of the way to conceal their arrival. If, for instance, it were known that the "Auckland," or some other war steamer, was bringing troops, and the public were in consequence natu-

rally on the tiptoe of excitement expecting her, orders would be transmitted by the Home Secretary, that on the arrival of the "Auckland," the telegraph should announce the "Sarah Sands," or a similar *nom-de-guerre*. The ship thus came up unnoticed, the troops generally landed in the dark, and were smuggled into the fort.* Had they landed with all the pomp and circumstance of war, in broad daylight, in martial array, with crowds of Englishmen looking on and cheering them, the insolent demeanour of the natives would have been checked, the Sepoys at Barrackpore have been cowed, the Government have been spared some very anxious moments, and Calcutta might possibly have escaped the imminent peril to which it was subsequently exposed.

But even the safety of an empire must give way to the importance of an individual. When clerks occupy the position of statesmen, they are specially impressed with the necessity of parading their power in the face of their former associates; they will do anything to attract notice, and in the dread of being despised, will often exert themselves unnecessarily to gain popular hatred.

It must be remembered, too, that in the beginning of June, the prospects of the Government were looking up. They believed that Delhi would fall in a very few days; they had called upon General Anson to send down his infantry and cavalry to Cawnpore, and to take Delhi with his artillery†; they were sending up infantry as fast as they arrived; all was *couleur de rose*.

But their dreams of restored tranquillity were destined to be somewhat rudely broken. Thick as hail, post by post, came tidings of disaster. The mutiny at Lucknow, followed by the defection of the whole of Oudh, the revolts at Azungurh, Benares, and Allahabad, already related, the fearful massacre of Jhansie, yet to be told, burst on their astonished ears. To counterbalance these, there was only the victory of Ghazee-ood-deen-Nuggur, gained by Brigadier Wilson over a portion of the rebel force on the 31st May. About this time, also, intelligence was received of the death of the Commander-in-Chief, on the 27th May. But little communication had passed between General Anson and the Government since the revolt at Delhi. He had gone to the Upper Provinces early in the year, with the assent of the Government and the Court of Directors, and when the Meerut disaster occurred he was in the hills. The tidings reached him on the 12th of May, and he at once made every preparation which man could make to meet the coming storm. His operations will be detailed in a future chapter. It is necessary to make a cursory allusion to him here, because a great outcry was made against him on account of the delay in reducing Delhi; on his shoulders was laid all the blame, and men connected with the Government were anxious to single him out as the scape-goat. The rash schemes proposed by the Government at this time have been commented upon in a previous page; had they been adopted, ruin must have overtaken us. The plan pro-

* My authority for this statement is as follows: 1st, Personal observation: 2nd, the telegraphic reports: 3rd, the notice of the circumstance by the local press.

† Blue Book.

posed and followed by General Anson up to his death, and subsequently adopted by his successor, was the only practicable one; and yet, because it involved a little delay, the gallant General became the *bête noir* of vice-regal circles and of the Secretary's walk.*

The fact is, General Anson was no favourite in Council: his abilities were far superior to those of his colleagues, and in clear-headedness not one of them came near him. His ways too were not their ways. If there was one thing more than another against which he had set his face, it was the Calcutta-prevailing system of jobbing. He would have none of it: he would not touch the unclean thing.

It was a common practice to sneer at General Anson as a mere Horse-Guards' General, as one who had gained his honours at Newmarket. But it is nevertheless a fact, that this Horse-Guards' General, by dint of application and perseverance, made himself so thoroughly master of his profession, that when the mutiny broke out, he drew up a plan of operations, which his successor, a Crimean warrior, carried out in all its details, rejecting as crude and ridiculous the suggestions sent up by the collective wisdom of Calcutta. It cannot be denied that this man, who "gained his honours at Newmarket," when brought in both the Councils face to face with men who had made legislation for India the study of their lives, "distanced" them all: that, whatever the subject, he always mastered it, and showed in reasoning a strong good sense, which was more than a match for the special pleadings by which he was frequently met; whilst in facility of expression, and power of laying down an argument clearly and forcibly, not one of them came near him.

It is not to be wondered at that they disliked him. A Commander-in-Chief is always a bugbear to civilians, who, in India at least, have an innate jealousy of military men, of which very few can divest themselves. And when the Commander-in-Chief, in addition to his superior position, is a man who is beyond them in every other respect, they invariably manœuvre to get rid of him. They like an easy, impressionable man, who will be ready on all occasions to see with their eyes, and hear only what they tell him. The Napier school is their abhorrence.

When, therefore, the intelligence of General Anson's demise reached the members of Government, whatever they might have felt for the man, they certainly did not sorrow for the Commander-in-Chief. Lord Canning instantly telegraphed to Madras for Sir Patrick Grant; and he appointed General Barnard to succeed to the command of the Delhi force. Sir Henry Somerset became, by virtue of seniority, Commander-in-Chief in India. Sir Patrick Grant, who was now about to proceed to Calcutta, was an officer of the Bengal army. He had always been "lucky." He had, when a comparatively young officer, raised the Hurrianah Light Infantry, a local battalion which he commanded for many years, with the character of being unsurpassed

* A public pathway in Calcutta, in which secretaries of Government and their toadies meet every evening to discuss the gossip of the day.

as a commandant. A vacancy occurring in the department of the Adjutant-General, Grant was selected to fill it. Whilst in this position, he married a daughter of Lord Gough, and from that moment his rise was assured. He became Adjutant-General, served in that capacity under his father-in-law and Sir Charles Napier, and finally obtained the command of the Madras army, — the first officer of the Company's service to whom that honour had been vouchsafed.

Sir P. Grant was not altogether undeserving of his fortune. Without being a general, he was a fine soldier under fire, possessing great coolness and imperturbable presence of mind; his general capacity was good, though not great: he had a clear knowledge of the details of his profession, and an intimate acquaintance with the natives of India. On the other hand, he was ill-informed, had received an inferior education, was destitute of imagination, and had not been endowed with the slightest spark of genius. He was better fitted to carry out the details of a campaign than to plan one; he adopted favouritism rather than merit as his principle of dealing out the rewards in his gift; was at the same time a subtle courtier, and ever ready to give up his own opinion at the proper time, and with the best possible grace.

He was just suited for the officials of Government House, but, with a true instinct, the people of England divined that he was not the man to command the army which they were sending out to crush the mutiny.

Sir Patrick Grant was telegraphed for on the 3rd of June: he arrived on the 19th. In the interim events of great importance had occurred.

The disastrous tidings from Azimgurh, Benares, Allahabad, and Oudh—the rumours afloat respecting Jhansie, Cawnpore, Rohilcund, and Central India — made a deep impression on the Government. They appeared at last to have an idea of the magnitude of the crisis. But what could they do? They had, as it were, anticipated all their resources. Not three weeks had elapsed since they had refused the volunteering offers of the British and French merchants, with the rude and baseless insinuation that they were the result of "a passing and groundless panic." Had they accepted those offers in May, they would, in June, have had at their disposal a militia ready to take the place of the regiment of the Line, which might have been despatched to the scene of action. But again they were "too late." All their anticipations had failed them; and, to add to their troubles, they at this time received intelligence of the mutinous disposition of the troops at Barrackpore, and the certain proof of the connection of the King of Oudh with the revolt. Strong measures were, indeed, necessary. What could they do?

In the beginning of June, it had been brought to the notice of the Governor-General that the native newspapers were primed with incendiary articles, abetting and encouraging the insurrection. It was then strongly urged upon his lordship that the native press, being the organ of the enemy, it would be politic, convenient, and justifiable

to suppress it. The reply of Lord Canning was, "The remedy is worse than the disease."

He was wrong. The native newspapers were the organs of the enemy; they disseminated treason throughout the country; they were read by all natives who could read; they advocated the cause of the King of Delhi. It was the bounden duty of Lord Canning to suppress them.

But Lord Canning was in the hands of his secretaries. The Indian Press, that is, the English portion of it, had been, as every press must be, the organ of the European society in India. Formerly, a portion of that press had advocated more especially the interests of the Civil Service. But as India became more closely connected with England, as the interests of both countries became more closely involved, the conductors of that portion of the newspaper press favourable to the Civil Service perceived, that in advocating the peculiar interests of that service, they were running counter to the interest both of England and India — that an exclusive service was, in fact, the bar, the most effectual bar, to all improvement in the latter country. Hence all the old established and respectable journals had dropped their cause, and none other of any character had risen to advocate it.

It may be imagined, then, that the hostility of the leading members of the Civil Service to the Indian Press was not light. That Press had already in fact commenced the exposure of their shortcomings in this insurrection: it had discriminated between Lord Canning and his advisers, knowing that the avowed opinions of the former at the outset of the mutiny were very different from those which he afterwards adopted—knowing also that he was dependent on the advisers whom he had inherited from Lord Dalhousie. The leaders of the Civil Service had, too, at this time, prepared an outline of the policy to be carried out at all risks, as the only policy which could save their service — the policy of ignoring, as much as possible, the magnitude of the insurrection; of treating it as a mere revolt of the Sepoys, caused by the incapacity of commanding officers; a policy of conciliating the natives, of pardoning the mutineers — even those red with the blood of our countrymen; and they dreaded nothing more than the exposure by the Press, not only of this line of action, but of their previous neglect of warnings, of their false security, of their design of implanting a native magistracy with power over all Europeans, of their discouragement of European settlers, of their betrayal of the great trust confided to them by treating India, not as a country to be improved, but solely as an appanage of their own exclusive service. When, therefore, the incendiary articles appeared in the native newspapers, openly advocating the cause of the King of Delhi, they jumped at the opportunity of making a crusade against the entire Press, of shutting the mouths of those who alone could expose their shortcomings, of triumphing over the great domestic enemy of their interests. It was necessary, in the first instance, to gain over Lord Canning to their views.

That nobleman, prompted by his English instincts, and true to the

principles he had inherited from his great father, had only a fortnight before declared, with reference to any restriction even on the Native Press, that the "remedy was worse than the disease." But the leaders of the Civil Service knew Lord Canning.* The great man of their party, the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, had just arrived from his retreat at Darjeeling, to give his counsel in the crisis. He was the head of the family clique, whose policy is comprehended in the words "India for the Civil Service." He entered cordially into the views of his colleagues, and the thing was done. Mr. Halliday had an interview with Lord Canning; Mr. Beadon had an interview; Mr. Grant had an interview. The result was, that without consulting those whose English instincts would have made them invaluable counsellors in such a crisis, Lord Canning went down to the Legislative Council, suspended all standing orders, and in the course of forty minutes abolished the Freedom of the Press.

The Legislative Council is a council of nominees: it comprehends, besides the members of the Supreme Council, and the judges of the Supreme Court, four civilians—a member for Bengal, one for the North-west Provinces, one for Madras, and a fourth for Bombay. They are generally selected on account of their great interest, and because, from physical or mental incapacity, they are unfit for the heavier duties of a Judge's Court.

There were present when the Gagging Act was read three times in forty minutes, and passed, Lord Canning, Mr. Dorin, General Low, Mr. J. P. Grant, Mr. Peacock, to all of whom the reader has been introduced; the two Judges, Sir James Colville (a painstaking, industrious Judge, but, as regards the Vice-Regal Court, the most obsequious Chief-Justice that ever occupied a seat on the bench), Sir Arthur Buller (brother of the lamented Charles Buller, and himself possessing more abilities than were contained in all the Council besides, but indolent to a degree that made him one of the drones of life), Messrs. Currie and Le Geyt—the former a most amiable gentleman, but of no capacity whatever, the latter well known at Bombay under Lord Falkland's administration. Lord Canning, in introducing the measure, took the whole responsibility upon himself: he said it had been caused by the seditious tone of the Native Press; that it was not "specially levelled at the European Press, but that he had found it impossible to draw a line of demarcation between the two, and that therefore he must place the gag upon both." His Lordship's argument amounted to this: that because in a conquered country, the natives of which had risen in revolt against our rule, the Native Press had sided with them, therefore a law should be passed placing restrictions upon the European Press as well as on the native, notwithstanding the loyalty of the former, and the support it had given to Government. It was not a logical argument, but in a case in which his Lordship was arguing against the convictions of a life-time, the tool, though he knew it not, of a corrupt party, logic was scarcely to be expected.

The motion was seconded by Mr. Dorin, and carried without a

* I received these details from one of the rank and file of the party.

division. Sir James Colville went so far as to profess his readiness to take his share of the responsibility, and Mr. Grant moved an augmentation of some of the penalties that had been proposed.

The only man, in fact, in that Council from whom a generous opposition to this truly Austrian measure (as the *Examiner* well terms it), might have been expected, was the brother of Charles Buller. He possessed all the ability, all the readiness necessary for the purpose. A few sentences such as he was capable of pouring forth would have utterly discomfited his assailants: there was not a man amongst them (Lord Canning having already spoken) who possessed sufficient ability to reply to him. Had he done so, had he obeyed the whisperings of his heart, his name would have been enshrined for ever in the grateful recollection of his countrymen. He would have gone down to posterity as the one Englishman who in that Council of nominees had had the courage and the honesty to withstand tyranny to its face. He might have so acted without any personal risk, for, as a Puisne Judge of the Supreme Court, he was entirely independent of the Company.

But he was dumb, and spake not. He afterwards stated that he believed the assertion of the Governor-General, that the measure was not to be directed against the English Press.

Unopposed, therefore, it became law.

It has been said that strong measures were earnestly required. This was one of them. With the whole country up in arms, with station after station rising in revolt, the opportunity was chosen to insult the entire European community, to place them before the law on a level with the natives who had revolted, to show contempt for the rights and privileges which they had inherited from their ancestors, and to intimate to them, in a manner that could not be misunderstood, that they were living under a despotic Government. This treatment was the better appreciated by the inhabitants of Calcutta, as they had but just given the best proofs in their power of their earnest desire to assist the Government to strengthen its hands in the crisis.

It will be recollected that in May, the offers of the inhabitants of Calcutta to serve as volunteers had been contemptuously refused. In June the Government found that had those offers been then accepted, they would have been in a position to detach a reinforcement of at least one European Regiment to assist our countrymen at Cawnpore. Rendered wise by experience, they now desired the aid which they had before declined. But there was one difficulty; the Calcutta residents were not likely to proffer their services again, and the Government did not wish to place itself in the "humiliating position" of having to ask for them. In this emergency negotiations were opened between some of the officials of Government House and the leading merchants. The latter were assured that if they would offer their services again, the Government would accept them. This compromise was arranged, and on the 12th of June Lord Canning announced, that having received many offers from the inhabitants to enrol themselves, he had much pleasure in accepting them, and directed the formation of a corps of Cavalry and Infantry. Such

was the origin of the Volunteer Guards of Calcutta,—a body of men comprehending the leading lawyers, merchants, and tradesmen of the place, who, foregoing their customary pleasures, gave themselves up ungrudgingly to all the fatigues of drill and discipline; who, through the long nights of the hot weather, and the inclement rainy season, took all the duties of a corps of the line; who, by their very formation, gave the first check to the insolent demeanour of the natives of Calcutta; who were instrumental in saving that city from the horrors of an insurrection; who, raised in June, were thoroughly organised in July, and who, when brigaded with crack Highland Regiments in November, were halted by Sir Robert Garrett, in order that he might compliment them upon the unsurpassed manner in which they went through their duties. It cannot be denied that but for the Calcutta Guards, Horse and Foot, this city, in the suburbs of which were 60,000 fanatical Mahomedans, ready and waiting the opportunity for a rise, would, in all probability, have been exposed to the most imminent peril.

On the 12th June, Lord Canning accepted their services; on the 13th he rewarded them by gagging the Press, of which they were the principal supporters.

It cannot be denied that the Gagging Act of the 13th June, 1857, was a very bold measure, but the Calcutta public had not many hours to wait before they had ocular demonstration that it was the work of very timid men.

On the evening of the same day an express arrived from Major-General (now Sir John) Hearsey, commanding at Barrackpore, to the effect that the native troops there contemplated rising that night, that he was about to send for the 78th Highlanders from Chinsura, and he proposed disarming them all, to prevent the outbreak which must otherwise ensue. The Government, terribly alarmed, at once authorised General Hearsey to carry out his views.

It has been said by a great writer, that "there is scarcely a less dignified entity than a patrician in a panic." The veriest sceptic as to the truth of this aphorism could have doubted no longer, had he witnessed the living panorama of Calcutta on the 14th June. All was panic, disorder, and dismay. The wildest reports were in circulation. It was all but universally credited that the Barrackpore brigade was in full march on Calcutta, that the people in the suburbs had already risen, that the King of Oudh, with his followers, were plundering Garden Reach. Those highest in office were the first to give the alarm. There were Secretaries to Government running over to Members of Council, loading their pistols, barricading the doors, sleeping on sofas; Members of Council abandoning their houses with their families, and taking refuge on board ship: crowds of lesser celebrities, impelled by these examples, having hastily collected their valuables, were rushing to the Fort, only too happy to be permitted to sleep under the Fort guns. Horses, carriages, palanquins, vehicles of every sort and kind, were put into requisition to convey panic-stricken fugitives out of the reach of imaginary cut-throats. In the suburbs, almost every house belonging to the Christian

population was abandoned. Half-a-dozen determined fanatics could have burned down three parts of the town. A score of London thieves would have made their fortunes by plundering the houses in the neighbourhood of Chowringhee * which had been abandoned by their inmates.

It must in fairness be admitted, that whilst his advisers—the patricians of Leadenhall Street—were hiding under sofas, and secreting themselves in the holds of the vessels in port, Lord Canning himself maintained a dignified attitude: his palace remained guarded by armed Sepoys: he might have provoked the danger, but he did not flinch when it was at hand. Meanwhile General Hearsey, at Barrackpore, had quietly disarmed the Sepoys: they had been deterred, probably by the extra precautions which were taken, from rising in the night, and when morning came, and they saw the 78th Highlanders march into the station, they felt that the game was up. But there can be little doubt but that some of the bolder spirits amongst them had been anxious to hasten an *émeute* before the arrival of the 78th. But whatever their intentions, their hearts failed them when the hour for action arrived. It passed, and they saw themselves overmatched. The entire brigade, comprising the 2nd Grenadiers, 43rd Light Infantry, 70th Native Infantry, and a portion of the 34th, was disarmed successfully in the afternoon of the 14th. This result having been telegraphed up to Calcutta, the native troops on duty there were marched into the Fort, and were disarmed without resistance.

On the following morning, the King of Oudh and his Prime Minister, Ally Nucky Khan, were arrested. Every precaution had been taken to prevent resistance: a detachment of the 37th Foot and a company of Royal Artillery were posted in the vicinity of the house occupied by the ex-king, every outlet was secured, and every salient point commanded by our guns. Mr. Edmonstone, the Foreign Secretary, then went forward to the residence of the Prime Minister, and asked for him. "He is at his prayers," was the reply. Mr. Edmonstone signified his intention of waiting, and at the end of half an hour, Ally Nucky Khan appeared. He seemed a little startled at the sight of the soldiers, but quickly regained his composure, and when it was signified to him that his presence was required in the Fort, he simply acquiesced. His house was then searched, and himself and his papers were secured. The party then proceeded to the king's apartments: after some little delay they were admitted. Mr. Edmonstone almost immediately broached the subject of his visit. He plainly told the ex-king that the Governor-General had reason to believe that he had connected himself with the disaffected in the Bengal army, and that he wished to see him. Wajid Ally, taking off his jewelled turban and placing it before the Foreign Secretary, replied, "If I have by word, by deed, or in any way whatever encouraged the mutineers, I am worthy of any punishment that can be devised: I am ready to go wherever the Governor-General thinks fit." The public apartments, but not the zenana, were searched for

* The patrician quarter of Calcutta.

papers, but, as might have been anticipated, none of any importance were found. As the king was being carried off, a ludicrous incident happened. The inmates of the zenana had been spectators, behind a lattice, of the scene: as the king was departing, one of them, tall, dark, and ill-favoured, stepped into the room, and forbad his removal. "What will the king do without us?" was the burden of her song, accompanied by protestations of his innocence. They were of no avail; the king and his minister were both taken off and lodged in the Fort; the former in the Government House there, the latter in the Royal Barracks, both guarded by Europeans.

The demeanour of both prisoners since their incarceration has been strikingly characteristic of their respective characters. Whilst the King has relapsed into the state of idiotcy which is natural to him, Ally Nucky Khan has omitted no plan, has left no stone unturned, with the view of communicating with his friends outside. He has admitted, in the course of conversation, that he considered the insurrection as a just measure of retaliation for the seizure of Oudh; that we, leaving the high road of justice, had condescended to fight them with the weapons of trickery and expediency, and that we ought not to be surprised at their meeting our attacks with the weapons we had selected.

That he was the soul of the plot, that that plot was organised and arranged at Garden Reach, is beyond a doubt. The Government of India have, or had, in their possession, proofs sufficient to convict the King of Oudh and his minister of complicity in the plan of insurrection. Whether they will use them is another question. The lives of their enemies seem to have a far greater value in their eyes than the lives of those English troops who have been sent out to subdue them.

The King of Oudh was arrested on the 15th June: on the 17th Sir Patrick Grant arrived from Madras. He brought with him the account of General Barnard's first victory at Delhi — the victory of the 8th June. Great was the delight; it was even announced by vice-regal lips that evening that Delhi had fallen. Intense was the gratification of every one; the Gagging Act was for the moment forgotten, until it was discovered that instead of the city it was only the cantonment of Delhi of which we had obtained possession. Still Sir Patrick Grant had arrived; and at first many men believed in Sir Patrick. It was thought that he would give a tone to the proceedings of Government, that he would infuse a little energy into their counsels, and induce them to feel that the Sepoy Army, and not the European population, was the enemy most to be feared. Such were the feelings with which Sir Patrick Grant's arrival was greeted. He held the command for nearly two months. What he did during that interval has not been made public. Ensconced in his comfortable quarters in Government House he may have performed wonders — upon paper; but one thing is certain, that the public mind was sensibly relieved, when it was announced, in the month of August, that Sir Colin Campbell had arrived to relieve him. Simultaneously, in the same steamer in fact with Sir Patrick Grant, arrived General

Havelock, Adjutant-General of H.M. forces in India. This officer, on the breaking out of hostilities with Persia, had been sent to Bushire to assume the command of a division; he had commanded the troops at the attack of Mohumrah, and was preparing to give further proofs of his capacity for command, when the preliminaries of peace were signed. Havelock then returned to Bombay, and, unaware of the state of the country between Meerut and Calcutta, sailed for the latter place before even he had heard of General Anson's demise. Had the intelligence of that melancholy event reached him before leaving Bombay, he would not have come on to Calcutta, as his proper place as Adjutant-General of H.M. forces would have been with the temporary Commander-in-Chief, General Somerset.

Providentially he did not hear of it until he had too far progressed in his voyage to be able to return. General Havelock had seen perhaps more Indian service than any living man. He had served throughout the first Burmese war, of which he wrote a clear and graphic history. In 1838-9 he went into Affghanistan, and only left it in 1842 in company with the avenging armies of Pollock and Nott: he had in fact remained one of the illustrious garrison of Jĕllalabad, throughout our terrible disasters in that country. In the campaign of Gwalior, in 1843, and in the Sutlej campaigns of 1845-6, he took a distinguished part, having in one action had two horses, in another a third horse, shot under him. It was after this that he became first Quarter-Master-General, and subsequently Adjutant-General of H.M. forces in India. In his private life, and in manner, Havelock was the most quiet and retiring of men. He ate and drank little — sufficient only for the purposes of life, and devoted his whole time to his profession and to his God. Religion was not with him a mere outward sign; it was a part, and by far the most important part of his daily exercises. He had mourned over the idolatry-encouraging system of the Government of India, but he was powerless to prevent it. Nevertheless, he was one of those men who, in olden days, would have led the Crusaders to Ascalon, and whose deep enthusiasm would have inspired all around him with equal fervour in the cause.

Who indeed that saw that spare figure, below the middle height, that pale, thoughtful face, seldom showing any interest in the general conversation, but often lighted up by the latent fire within, would have thought him capable of mighty deeds? He would sit silent and meditative. He might be thinking of the yet possible destiny of India under a bold and God-fearing policy. The smile would gleam on his face, but as quickly die away, for what chance seemed there then of action for him? He was approaching the term of life, the end of his days, and all India lay before him calm and still, not a breath agitating her bosom, not even a ripple indicating the quarter from which a storm might be approaching. The faith of our rulers in Hinduism was never stronger.

Who that saw him then would have believed that that pale, thin, spare man, studiously avoiding all fare but the plainest, was the hero who would place his heel on the neck of this terrible rebellion?—was the man who, under a July, August, and September sun,—deadly to

the strongest,—would march without tents against twenty times his number, would baffle all their attempts to overwhelm him? Who would ever make a retreat the prelude of a further step in advance; and finally, after three months' encounters with a persevering foe, would succeed in forcing his way, at the head of 2,500 British troops, through 50,000 fanatics, holding the largest and most defensible city in Asia, and be the first to bring relief to our countrymen?

And yet Havelock did all this.

This day, 27th November, intelligence has reached Calcutta that he is dead. Mourn not for him, my countrymen, for a nobler and a purer spirit never winged its way to its God. Mourn rather for India, that at such a crisis as this, a God-fearing soldier, a Christian warrior, as yet unsurpassed—in the present crisis unequalled by any —should have been removed from the head of her armies!

An officer of far inferior rank to General Havelock, Captain Stuart Beatson of the 1st Bengal Cavalry, came round to Calcutta about the same time. He was an officer of great promise, of very considerable talent, and of a very manly nature. He, too, on the outbreak of the war with Persia, had been sent to that country to raise a regiment of Arab Horse. But peace was concluded too soon for his ambition, and he returned to Bombay. Arriving there, he heard of this mutiny, and that his own regiment, the 1st Cavalry, had broken out into insurrection at Mhow. It had previously been his intention to proceed to England to recruit his failing health, but on hearing this intelligence, he came round to Calcutta, determined to place his services at the disposal of the Government, in the hope that he might be useful in some way. He had scarcely arrived before he was struck with the fact, that all or the greater part of our native cavalry having mutinied, we should experience the greatest difficulties from our deficiencies in that arm. Looking about him and making inquiries, it appeared to him, that it would be feasible to raise a corps of Eurasian Cavalry on the spot, provided the Government would sanction the arrangement. He accordingly drew up a scheme, the bases of which were, forty rupees per mensem nett pay to each trooper, the Government furnishing horse, arms, and accoutrements. But the eyes of the Government were not even yet opened to the necessities of the times. The scheme was of a novel character; Captain Beatson had no personal acquaintance with any of the Secretaries or Members of Council: his scheme was rejected, and he was himself informed that the Government had no need of his services.*

One month later, when Havelock was advancing towards Cawnpore, when the fiend Nana Sahib was escaping for want of cavalry to pursue him, when the prices of horses had risen enormously, the Government which had rejected Captain Beatson's plan of forty rupees per mensem, was compelled to raise a corps on the infinitely more expensive basis of 100 rupees per mensem for each trooper, with horse, arms, accoutrements, and camp equipage supplied by Government.

* My informant received this account from Captain Beatson himself.

But although Captain Beatson's offers were not appreciated by the members of Government, he received shortly after the offer of the highest appointment in his gift from one second to none in his capability of judging men—General Havelock.

Before, however, alluding to this officer's nomination to high command, it will be as well to give a brief detail of the events which had been occurring in different parts of the country, and accounts of which reached Calcutta about this time.

Of the places or districts which had been especially distinguished by deeds of atrocity, and intelligence of which reached Calcutta at the end of June, Central India and Rohilcund demand separate chapters; Futtehpore, Jhansie, Nowgong and Rohnee may be treated of here.

Futtehpore is a small civil station, distant about two-thirds of the road from Allahabad to Cawnpore. It is the centre of a Mahomedan district, and indeed furnishes many of the recruits for the Cavalry. The native troops there consisted of a detachment of fifty men from the 6th Regiment, stationed at Allahabad. Besides these were only the usual hangers-on of a civil station, consisting of burkundazes, chuprassés, deeroghas, moonsips, and others. The residents comprehended the judge, the magistrate and collector, the assistant-magistrate, the opium agent, salt agent, the doctor, and three or four gentlemen connected with the railway; in addition to these, amongst the officials, was the deputy-magistrate, a native and a Mahomedan.*

Although the district had been tolerably quiet during May, yet in anticipation of possible evil the residents had adopted the wise precaution of sending their wives and families to Allahabad. At the same time they made arrangements for all to assemble in the house occupied by the magistrate in case of need. On the 4th they received an account of the events of the 30th May at Lucknow, and an intimation from Cawnpore that the troopers of the 2nd Cavalry would certainly rise in insurrection that evening. On the following day (5th June) heavy firing was heard in the direction of Cawnpore, only forty miles distant; the residents accordingly adopted the precaution of all sleeping on the flat roof of their house, with their weapons by their sides, to guard against surprise. On the following day, expecting a party of the 2nd Cavalry and 56th Native Infantry in progress to Cawnpore, they deemed it advisable to make a permanent lodgment on the roof, conveying thither tents, water, provisions, ammunition, &c. On the 7th this detachment arrived, and shortly after, in confirmation of the worst fears of the residents, made an attempt on the treasury. The "loyalty," however, of the 6th repulsed them—this loyalty consisting in an earnest desire to appropriate the treasure to themselves, and to permit none to share it with them. The troopers shortly after went on towards Cawnpore.

Thus far they were delivered, but they were still in a hostile

* The name of this man was Hikmut-oolla Khan: on the arrival of Havelock's victorious force at Futtehpore six weeks subsequently, he went out to congratulate him, was recognised, and hanged.

country, and in a dangerous position. That same day they received intelligence of the Allahabad catastrophe; they learned that the deputy-collector and all their subordinates had turned against them, and that some mutinous troopers, accompanied by some released prisoners, were in full march for the place. Still, unable to devise a feasible plan of escape, they determined on remaining; they barricaded the house, and waited the issue.

On the 9th the ruffians came on, and, burning every bungalow, threatened to attack them. But they showed a determined front, and the natives, with their instinctive dread of Europeans, feared to make the assault. During the day they heard that the 6th from Allahabad, and some mutineers from Cawnpore, were marching upon them. In the afternoon, the recreant deputy-collector, attended by a large body of armed men, made his way towards them, apparently on a friendly errand, but our countrymen, suspecting him, made the best of their way to the roof. That night, environed by dangers, they held a council of war, in which it was resolved to fly. Accordingly, at 10 P. M., they mounted their horses, and attended by four sowars who were faithful, all started for Banda, which, after many difficulties and hair-breadth escapes, they reached in safety.

All started—all save one—the judge, Robert Tucker of the Civil Service; he steadily and manfully refused to desert his post. He remained as usual in his own house. But the natives who had been deterred from attacking eleven armed Englishmen, felt themselves not unequal to the murder of one. They could not appreciate the sublime rashness which prompted Mr. Tucker to remain alone at Futtehpore; nay, so confident did they feel of "victory" over him, and so determined were they on his death, that, at the suggestion of the deputy-collector, who now openly avowed himself their leader, they resolved upon making him undergo the mockery of a trial, with all the forms of the Civil Court. Full of this idea they marched against him.

But Mr. Tucker, enthusiast as he was, was not the man to give away his life. The native Christian who witnessed the attack upon him asserts, that he killed sixteen men with his own hand before he was secured. Secured, however, he was at last. He was, in mockery, tried; of course condemned; and, as naturally, executed. His hands, head, and feet were cut off, and held up for the inspection of the rabble—the deputy-collector being present, and directing the proceedings.

It is a noticeable fact that, under the *régime* of the exclusive Civil Service, those men only have been chosen for the appointment of deputy-collector who, in the opinion of the civilians, were the *élite* of the natives of India. It is also to be observed that, in the month of February, 1857, a project of law had been read a second time in the Legislative Council, without opposition from any of the Civil members, by which it was proposed to place the persons and property of Europeans under the jurisdiction of natives of even a lower class than those who, like the Futtehpore assassin, filled the office of deputy-collector. Had the mutiny been unhappily postponed one

year, our civilian legislators, labouring for their exclusive system, would have organised a system by which men devoid of honour, without conscience or self-respect, and gifted only with a smattering of education, would have been placed as arbiters over the lives and fortunes of our countrymen in India.

Can we wonder that the isolated mutiny of one regiment drifted into a wide-spread insurrection in the hands of puling theorists such as these?

We must turn for a moment to another horrible incident, the details of which made Calcutta mad for vengeance about this time,—the massacre of Jhansie.

The town of Jhansie, in Bundelcund, lies in the direct route from Agra to Saugor, about 140 miles south of the former. It is surrounded by a wall, and this again is overlooked by the fort, a lofty stone building, surmounted by a round tower. In the cantonments, which were outside and a little distance from the town, was a smaller fortified building, denominated the Star Fort, in which the guns and treasure were deposited.

The garrison of Jhansie was composed entirely of natives. There were a detail of Foot Artillery, the left wing of the 12th Regiment, the head quarters and right wing of the 14th Irregular Cavalry. Towards the end of May, apprehensions of an outbreak were entertained, as some of the agents of the dewan of the Ranee of the district were discovered plotting to seduce the Sepoys: but there was nothing in the demeanour of the latter to sanction the belief that they had been in any way successful. Still, as a precautionary measure, the authorities stored the Star Fort with provisions and ammunition.

To their dismay, on the afternoon of the 4th June, a company of the 12th Regiment marched into this fort, and announced their intention of holding it on their own account. The greater part of the residents then retired to the town fort; but the regimental officers went among their men, and, encouraged by their demeanour, which was quiet and respectful, ordered a parade for the following morning. The parade was held, and the native officers and men of infantry, cavalry, and artillery solemnly declared that it was their intention to stand by their officers to the last. That very afternoon they all rose in revolt. The Irregular Cavalry, scouring across the plain, came upon two officers of the 12th: these they shot dead with their carbines. They then made a rush at their own commanding officer, who, well mounted, was making for the fort; but though they managed to wound him, he reached the fort in safety, and our countrymen on the ramparts, opening fire on his pursuers, killed some five or six of them. There was only one officer now remaining outside, and he was on foot—Lieutenant Turnbull of the Artillery—a young man of great promise, and of a fine, generous disposition. Despairing of escape, and believing himself unseen, he climbed a large leafy tree, about midway between the fort and the cantonment. But a miserable townsman had seen him, and this wretch, in his fanatic zeal, or, perhaps, in a true spirit of Asiatic servility, could not rest till he had pointed him out to the sowars. He was at once shot down.

With loud shouts the mutineers then proceeded against the fort, and, on the second day, the Ranee sent her guns and elephants to assist them. But there was not only force without, there was treachery within. The Europeans numbered only fifty-five, including women and children: the natives who were with them were numerically superior. Two of these, brothers, were discovered in the act of opening one of the gates to the enemy. Lieutenant Powys, who saw them, instantly shot one dead, and was himself cut down by the brother. Captain Burgess avenged him in a second, and the assassins lay side by side in the ditch.

But provisions were failing them; two attempts to communicate with Nagode and Gwalior had been abortive; some Eurasians who had tried to escape over the parapet had been caught and killed; all appeared hopeless. At this crisis, the Ranee sent to say that, if they would surrender, their lives should be spared, and they should be sent safely to some other station. She swore, the troopers of the cavalry swore, the Sepoys swore, the native gunners swore, to adhere to these terms. Seizing this as the only chance of life, unable indeed to hold out for twenty-four hours longer, the garrison surrendered.

They came out two and two; as they advanced through the line of cavalry and infantry they saw none but hostile faces, but there was no movement against them. At last, every Christian had quitted the fort: then was commenced a deed of ruthless treachery, unsurpassed even by the Nana Sahib. The gates were shut behind them; they were seized, the men and women separated, and tied together in two rows, facing one another; the children standing by their mothers. The men were then decapitated; the children were seized, and cut in halves before their mothers' eyes; and last of all, the ladies found what, under those circumstances, they must have felt to be a happy release in death.

The natives, upon whose authority it is alone possible to give any details of this terrible massacre, assert that the lives of the quarter-master sergeant and his wife were spared: nothing has since been heard of them; but it has been ascertained that his name was John Newton, that his wife was a country-born woman, or Eurasian, and that they had four daughters, all of whom were with them in Jhansie when the troops mutinied.

Such was the massacre at Jhansie, a deed unsurpassed in fiendish cruelty by any in the world. In reflecting upon it, we are struck with the impolicy of allowing native troops to be thus congregated in close vicinity to a native power beyond the influence of a European force; with the folly, in any case or under any circumstances, of trusting to the oaths of natives; with the preferable alternative of perishing of starvation or of running all the chances of war, to trusting to the tender mercies of the natives of India.

It may be as well, for the sake of connection, to follow the movements of the other wings of the same regiments in Nowgong, the sister station to Jhansie, in Bundelkund. At Nowgong were quartered a company of Artillery, the head quarters and right wing 12th Regiment Native Infantry, and the left wing 14th Irregular Cavalry, the whole under the command of Major Kirke of the 12th. On the 5th of June,

the wing of 12th Regiment volunteered to march against the Delhi mutineers: the men of that wing and the native gunners professed the most enthusiastic loyalty, whilst the sowars* of the 14th stood aloof, and acted as if they believed it was impossible to doubt them. On the 8th, the account of the terrible events of that morning at Jhansie reached them: on the following day the Artillery volunteered to go against Delhi. But something in the deportment of the men having excited suspicion, four of their number, notoriously disaffected, were seized, and, it being dangerous in the temper of the men to try them by court-martial, were sent off to the Fort of Chutterpore. This bold demonstration had a wonderful effect for the moment, and that day and the next morning all appeared quiet. But on the evening of the 10th, as the guards were being relieved, three Sepoys of the 12th, all of them Sikhs, and one a large and very powerful man, stepped forward with loaded muskets, went up to the havildar-major, and shot him dead. They then made a dash at the guns: these the Artillery sergeant made an effort to defend; but, deserted by his own men, he was compelled to fly, and, though fired at, he succeeded in getting off. Almost immediately, a discharge of musketry was heard from the lines—a sure sign that the revolt was universal.

But the officers did not flinch from their duty. Careless of the consequences to themselves, they rushed to the parade, and endeavoured by every argument in their power to induce the men not to swerve from their allegiance. But their efforts were not very successful: about a hundred rallied round them, out of five times that number, and accompanied them to the appointed rendezvous at the mess-house.

Here also all the residents were assembled. It being evident that the efforts of the mutineers would not stop at this point, Major Kirke endeavoured to persuade the hundred "staunch" Sepoys to go out and attack the enemy before their preparations were completed. But not a man would stir. At this moment, before any definite plan of action had been settled, the mutineers brought up the guns to bear upon the mess-house: intelligence also reached them that the sowars were going from house to house thirsting for their blood. Unless they were prepared to undergo the fate of their friends at Jhansie, there was left them but the resource of flight. On flight then they determined; and mounting horses, buggies, and a carriage drawn by three camels, and accompanied by about eighty Sepoys, they started.

It does not belong to this history to follow them in their flight. It will suffice to say, that after suffering incredible hardships, after enduring in fifteen days privations more than sufficient to be allotted to an ordinary existence, a few of them arrived in safety at Banda: of the rest many were killed by the natives, others struck down by the sun. Those that were saved bore up with the most unflinching fortitude, with the most unselfish heroism,—the men guarding the women with the utmost solicitude,—caring not for the ladies only,

* Troopers.

but for the sergeant's wife, evincing in the trying circumstances under which they were placed a firm reliance on a Higher Power.* They did not abandon one another, neither did He desert them.

It is necessary that one more tragical event should be recorded — the murderous assault at Rohnee. Rohnee is a new station in the Sonthal district, distant about 300 miles from Calcutta. It was the head-quarters of the 5th Irregular Cavalry: there were present of that regiment Major Macdonald, commanding; Sir Norman Leslie, the Adjutant; and Dr. Grant. On the 8th June these three officers were seated outside the bungalow of the first-named, engaged in friendly conversation. During a pause, Dr. Grant rose, with the intention of entering the bungalow. In the very act of rising he noticed the stealthy approach of three men, apparently strangers. As he turned to point them out to his companions, the intruders, drawing their swords, rushed upon them. Our party were without weapons of any sort, and had not time to fly. Sir Norman Leslie indeed turned to enter the house in search of his sword, but his foot slipping at the threshold, he was cut down at once. The other two seized the chairs on which they had been sitting, and with them endeavoured to ward off the blows aimed at them. Both, however, were wounded, Major Macdonald receiving three severe cuts on the head; and the affair would probably have terminated unfavourably for both of them, when unaccountably their assailants lost heart and fled. It was not known who they were; there was a guard close to the house, but the troopers composing it declared that they had neither seen nor heard anything of the intruders.

The news of this dastardly attack was quickly conveyed to the lines; all the men were instantly collected, and their swords drawn for inspection: all, however, were found clean: not a speck of blood was apparent on any of them. All was mystery: no suspicion attached to the men of the regiment, who had up to that time behaved well; and from the fact of the murderers having worn dhotees †, they were believed to be disbanded Sepoys, many of whom had been seen in the neighbourhood.

Such were the first impressions, but time brings to light every evil deed. It was ascertained, by the confession of a comrade, that these men belonged to Major Macdonald's own corps. They were at once seized, brought to a drum-head court-martial, and sentenced to be hanged. Now came the trying moment, it was impossible to say whether these men had or had not any accomplices in the regiment; whether the entire corps was not infected. They might refuse to allow the sentence of death to be carried out; they might turn against their officers, only two in number, one of them deprived of his scalp. These contingencies appeared not only possible but probable: more unlikely events had happened before, and have occurred since. In this emergency Major Macdonald showed the undaunted

* Mrs. Mawe's narrative, sent by Lady Canning to the Queen. Captain Scott's letter, published in the *Times*.

† A cloth wrapped round the loins.

pluck of a Briton. Let him tell his own story; it is worth recording: "One of the prisoners was of very high caste and influence, and this man I determined to treat with the greatest ignominy by getting a low caste man to hang him. To tell the truth, I never for a moment expected to leave the hanging scene alive; but I determined to do my duty, and well knew the effect that pluck and decision had on the natives. The regiment was drawn out; wounded cruelly as I was, I had to see everything done myself, even to the adjusting of the ropes, and saw them looped to run easy. Two of the culprits were paralysed with fear and astonishment, never dreaming that I should dare to hang them without an order from Government. The third said he would not be hanged, and called on the Prophet and on his comrades to rescue him. This was an awful moment; an instant's hesitation on my part, and probably I should have had a dozen balls through me; so I seized a pistol, clapped it to the man's ear, and said, with a look there was no mistake about, 'Another word out of your mouth and your brains shall be scattered on the ground.' He trembled and held his tongue. The elephant came up, he was put on his back, the rope adjusted, the elephant moved, and he was left dangling. I then had the others up and off in the same way. And after some time, when I dismissed the men of the regiment to their lines, and still found my head on my shoulders, I really could scarcely believe it."

In another letter, in reply to a brother officer who advised him to go away on account of his wounds, he replied: "Certainly not: leave any strange officer with the men! I'd rather stay and die first."

Such is the stuff of which British officers are composed! Who can wonder that, in spite of divided counsels, or orders and counter-orders, of procrastination unheard of before, of the weakest, the most selfish, and most incapable Government that ever ruled in any crisis, the mutiny should have been put down? Had Captain Macdonald gone away for the cure of his wounds, had he flinched on the day of execution, had he feared to take upon himself the responsibility of ordering that execution, the 5th Irregulars would then and there have risen in revolt. Subsequent events have proved, that there was at that time an organised conspiracy in the regiment; that many knew of the plot to assassinate their three officers; that they waited its fulfilment to rise *en masse*.

They were cowed first by the ill-success of the plot, secondly by the determined spirit and truly English pluck displayed by Major Macdonald. At the execution, everything depended upon his spirit. Another call from the condemned trooper to his comrades to save him, and Major Macdonald's life would not have been worth five minutes' purchase. The regiment would have risen; and in the middle of June an insurrection in that part of the country would have endangered Calcutta, Patna, and the whole of Bengal.

And yet although Major Macdonald's firmness undoubtedly saved us at that time from a great calamity, we fail to trace in the papers published by authority any signification to him of the approval of the Supreme Government. There are glorifications *in extenso* of

civilians, an occasional notice of military men, but in praise of Major Macdonald, the Government of Lord Canning is silent.* Does any one inquire the reason? Major Macdonald was a nominee of the late Sir Charles Napier. For a deed of unflinching daring and ready presence of mind in shutting the gates of the fortress of Umritsur against the whole body of the mutinous 66th in 1849–50, Sir Charles Napier gave him the command of the 5th Irregulars. To the army at large the bestowal of an appointment by that great man was a proof that it had been deserved; from the clique that ruled at Calcutta, it insured coldness, neglect, often insolence. The account of these massacres arriving towards the end of June simultaneously with rumours of butcheries at Hansi and Hipar, with telegraphic messages from Sir Henry Lawrence, intimating that he was closely besieged and could afford no help to Sir Hugh Wheeler, who was worse off than himself, at length aroused Government from its lethargy. It was resolved to assemble a considerable force at Allahabad, and to make an onward movement towards Cawnpore. General Havelock was selected to command it. He appointed Captain Stuart Beatson, before referred to, as his Adjutant-General; and, accompanied by him, on the centenary of Plassey, left Calcutta to assume his command.

That day too was another panic day in Calcutta. The "patricians" had imbibed the idea that there was to be an universal rising. The scene of the 14th was therefore repeated, although on a scale not quite so large; that is to say, the wives and daughters were sent on board ship, but there was less personal apprehension. In the interval ridicule had done her work, and fears, if entertained at all, were less loudly expressed. There is little pleasure in dwelling upon such a topic; it has been introduced to show that the men who advised and passed the Gagging Act were bolder in the Council Chamber than they cared to be on other occasions, and to demonstrate the truth of the axiom, that there can be no more dangerous legislators than those who in every respect of life must be regarded as little men.

From the contemplation of their characters, let us turn to a far nobler and more inspiriting theme; let us survey the actions of those who restored victory to our standards, and dwell, while we may, on the unsurpassed achievements of real men — men inspired by an earnestness of purpose, by a depth of zeal, by a determination to avenge the murder of our countrywomen, which those who guided our counsels in Calcutta could neither understand nor appreciate.

* There is an expression of approval from the Commander-in-Chief, but it is not endorsed by the Governor-General.

CHAPTER V.

ALLAHABAD TO 4TH JULY.

COLONEL NEILL left Benares on the night of the 9th of June, and proceeded by post, in company with forty-three men of his own regiment, to Allahabad, to the command of which post, in supersession of Colonel Simpson, he had been appointed. The road between the two stations was deserted; the post-horses had been carried off; the country round about was infested with plunderers; and it was with the utmost difficulty and by intense labour, that a journey ordinarily occupying from eight to ten hours was performed by our troops in twenty-four. However, on the afternoon of the 11th, the Colonel and his party found themselves at Jhoosie, a village on the high bank overlooking the junction of the Jumna and the Ganges, and the point where the road from Benares merges into the bridge of boats across the former river. This bridge, however, was partly destroyed and in the hands of the enemy: the village, or rather the suburb of Deragunj, which commands it, was also in their possession: not a boat was visible on the right bank: the men were prostrated by fatigue. But Colonel Neill was not the man to be overcome by any difficulties. Descending the Ganges below the junction, he obtained possession of a solitary boat, having bribed a native to bring it over from the right bank: in this he embarked a portion of his men, intending to wait for its return to cross over with the remainder; but at this juncture he was seen by the guards in the fort, and boats were sent over for the whole detachment: by their means they all arrived safely in the fort, though completely exhausted by the long journey and the intense heat.

His first act on arriving was to assume command. It was indeed time. He found the fort invested; the Sikhs, coaxed into the appearance only of subordination; confusion and disorder in every direction; — an unchecked enemy without, vacillation within.

He did not lose an hour. Notwithstanding his fatigue and consequent exhaustion, he did not sleep until he had arranged his plans for the early morrow. Day had scarcely dawned when the guns of the fort opened on the suburb of Deragunj, the head-quarters of the most bigoted Brahmins. After eighteen or twenty rounds had been fired, three companies of Sikhs, sixty Madras Fusiliers, and forty Irregular Cavalry, — the sole loyal remnant of the Oudh corps,— advanced from the fort, attacked the suburb, drove the enemy out, bayoneting all that came within their reach, burnt a great part of the village, and secured the bridge of boats. This he instantly caused to be repaired, and, placing at its head a company of Sikhs, re-opened the communications with the Benares road.

The movement was opportune. The very next morning, 13th, Major Stephenson, at the head of a hundred Fusiliers, arrived at

Jhoosie: instead of being compelled to hunt for boats, and to expose himself and his men to the deadly fury of a June sun, he was able, thanks to Colonel Neill's vigour and forethought, to cross by the bridge of boats.

On the same day an attack was made on the village of Kydgunj, situated midway between the fort and the city. The attacking party consisted of the Sikhs, the remnant of the Irregular Cavalry, and a small party of European Volunteer Cavalry, composed of railway engineers and others, whom Colonel Neill, even in this short space of time, had succeeded in organising. The Sikhs went in advance, the cavalry on their flanks. The enemy attempted a mere nominal resistance, and were driven out with loss. Our troops then returned to the fort.

All this time, since the hour of Colonel Neill's arrival in fact, a very sharp cannonade had been kept up day and night on the city. The enemy, headed by a fanatic Moulvie or priest, had taken up their head-quarters at the gardens of Sultan Khoosroo at the other extremity of the city, about three miles distant from the fort. They had few regular troops with them, but the whole country had risen, and arms were plentiful. They had also possession of the two guns which we had lost on the bridge on the night of the 6th: they also occupied the cantonment and the villages in its vicinity.

It was incumbent to drive them out of these positions. Colonel Neill having obtained an accurate plan of the station, and received reports from the residents of the bearings of the several villages, came to the conclusion that by marching from the fort directly on to the jail,—about three miles, and situated midway between the gardens of Sultan Khoosroo and the cantonments,—the enemy's position would be cut in two, and he could destroy them at a blow.

He was not, however, yet strong enough to attempt it: he had no carriage for his guns, and the Sikhs were daily becoming more troublesome and more unmanageable. It was necessary, in the first instance, to deal with these men.

It has been already related how, after the events of the 6th of June, Colonel Simpson permitted the most disgraceful pillage on the part of the Sikhs. The go-downs of the European merchants, of the agents of the steam companies, and of others, were plundered of all their contents: the Sikhs were actually allowed to bring the property they had thus obtained into the fort, and to guard it as their own. There was, indeed, much more than sufficient for their own consumption,—and they are a money-loving race; consequently, upon the arrival of the Europeans, they opened a store on their own account, and sold the liquor,—comprehending everything from brandy to champagne,—at four anas (sixpence) a bottle. The result was, that facilities to drunkenness were afforded to Europeans; and experience has shown that that is a temptation that they are seldom able to resist.

Colonel Neill's object, then, was to deprive the Sikhs of this liquor, and to locate them outside the fort, away from our magazine; for he did not quite trust them. But it was quite evident that they would not give up their plunder; and it was doubtful whether they would leave the fort without a struggle. Under these circumstances,

Colonel Neill's conduct was singularly judicious. He wished to avoid embroiling himself with these men: he was anxious, indeed, that their sympathies should remain with us; but he was as resolved to maintain discipline. He accomplished his purpose in this way:—he ordered the Commissariat to purchase from the Sikhs all the liquor in their possession: he then paraded the regiment, and, by dint of a little management, in which he was ably abetted by Major Brasyer, the Commandant, he succeeded in marching them out and in locating them outside the fort and under its guns, in some old storehouses on the banks of the Jumna. The Sikhs had scarcely reached their new position before they were attacked by the enemy, and were, at first, compelled to retire; but they soon regained their lost ground, and never after receded from it.

Secure in this important particular, Neill again turned to the enemy. Unable yet, from the causes before stated, to execute his plan of cutting them in two, he resolved to clear the suburbs, which had been re-occupied in the night. Accordingly, early on the 15th, he commenced pounding Kydgunj with round-shot; he sent a steamer up the Jumna with twenty picked men and a howitzer-gun; at the same time the Sikhs, supported by fifty Fusiliers and the cavalry, were directed to scour Kydgunj and penetrate beyond it.

The plan succeeded admirably. The villages on the banks of the Jumna suffered very severely from the firing of the party on board the steamer, to which they were unable to reply with any effect. The land-party were opposed, the Europeans especially, very obstinately; nevertheless, the rebels were so completely beaten, were followed up with such vigour, and lost so many men, that the chiefs of the insurrection were completely panic-stricken, and that very night the Moolvie himself, with three thousand of his followers, evacuated his quarters in the gardens of Sultan Khoosroo, and fled with precipitation across the Ganges into Oudh.

This result was not known to Neill till the next morning. He had proposed sending a steamer up the Ganges, with the view of procuring bullocks for his guns. The steamer, indeed, had already started, when the news of the evacuation of the city reached him: his wants, in the way of bullocks, were at once supplied. It was fortunate; as the small depth of water in the Ganges effectually prevented the progress of the steamer.

On the 18th, his force having been augmented by successive reinforcements to 360 Europeans, he resolved to move out, and sweep the enemy altogether away.

On that morning, therefore, while a steamer containing eighty Fusiliers and a hundred Sikhs steamed up the river to attack the villages of Durgabad, Sydabad, and Russoolpore, on its banks, Neill, with the remainder of the Sikhs, 200 Fusiliers, and the cavalry, marched on the jail. Interposed thus between the city and the insurgent villages, he turned on the latter and destroyed them,—the enemy making no opposition. Finding the work of destruction so easy, he did not proceed with the European portion of his force beyond the parade of the 6th, leaving the Sikhs and the cavalry to

complete what he had so well begun. It was his intention to have permanently occupied the cantonments; but cholera had broken out among his men. He therefore deemed it advisable to return with the Europeans to the fort, leaving the church to be occupied by the detachment of the 84th, then daily expected.

That morning another party of one hundred and fifty Fusiliers, under Captain Fraser, reached Allahabad. This officer had been detached, in company with eighty sowars, under Lieut. Palliser and Mr. Chapman, an indigo planter, but to whom the necessities of the times had given the appointment of magistrate, to clear the country between Benares and Allahabad. Right well had the task been performed. Not long before, Mr. Moore, the Magistrate of Mirzapore, had been murdered, in company with two friends, whilst bathing at Gopeegunj, midway between the two stations on the Grand Trunk Road. Terribly was their death avenged: everywhere our authority was re-asserted. One man in the neighbourhood of Sydabad, who had set himself up as Raja, having been caught and condemned to death, threatened to appeal to the Sudder.* In twenty minutes he was dangling from a tree! Large quantities of plunder and treasure, to the extent of twelve thousand rupees, were recovered by this party; and not only this, but communication with Benares was rendered facile and safe. From this day (the 18th) all opposition from the villages in the Allahabad district having ceased, the town having been coerced by a very heavy contribution — the native merchants having evinced the strongest feelings against us throughout — and the constant arrival of troops having been regulated, Colonel Neill turned his attention to procuring carriage and stores for an onward movement. Indefatigable himself, he infused his own energy into all around him, and he received the most willing and effectual assistance from Messrs. Chester and Court, the Commissioner and Magistrate of the district, whose local knowledge and experience were invaluable. In a very few days affairs began to assume an improved aspect. The cantonment was occupied, carts and camels were brought in, and the natives, ready to run from one extreme to another, from crowing over our downfall became as cringing and as suppliant as before. On the 24th everything was getting on famously; Captain Russell at the Ordnance, Captain Davidson in the Commissariat, and Captain Brown of the Artillery, and others, working well, and with effect. Neill superintending all, and encouraging them in their up-hill work. Throughout this period, the gallows were well at work. Daily some three or four scoundrels were brought in, who, on being convicted of being concerned in the massacre of our countrymen and women, were strung up without hesitation. Extraordinary was the effect of this promptitude. The natives, accustomed to our civil courts, to the long delays, the appeals, and all the trickery of native subordinates, could not comprehend this sharp and severe justice — this necessary retaliation on them for their misdeeds.

* The highest court of appeal in India, presided over by civilians. Its natural action is to render the prompt execution of justice impossible.

It was on this day, 24th June, that Neill, having surmounted all the difficulties in his path, having organized a force, ready to start in a few days for Cawnpore, learned that another was to reap the fruit of his labours — that he was superseded.

It is true that he was superseded by Havelock : but to replace him at all was an injustice to him. He was the first man who had turned the tide of the mutiny; his arrival at Benares had converted what might have been a massacre into a victory ; his presence at Allahabad had produced order out of chaos ; he had proved himself a real man ; he had gained the confidence of the troops under his command ; he had organised all the arrangements for the advance. It was unfair to deprive him of the opportunity of reaping the fruit. It is true, I repeat, that he was superseded by a good man ; but it is a fact, that it was not because he was a good man that Havelock was appointed. They gave him the command because he wanted active employment. To prove that it was a mere hap-hazard selection, it is only necessary to point to the supersession of Havelock himself, after he had reached Cawnpore, by Sir James Outram.

Nevertheless, disappointed as he doubtless felt, as he must have felt, the true-hearted Neill never relaxed a single energy. He was now working for another ; but he worked with as much heart and vigour as before : the preparations for the march of the column progressed every day, and on the afternoon of the 30th June, a force, consisting of 300 Sikhs, 400 Europeans, and 120 native horse, under the command of Major Renaud, a gallant and most intelligent officer, started for Cawnpore. The same day, General Havelock arrived and assumed command of the station.

It had not been merely on the organisation of this advanced body under Renaud that the attention of Neill had been fixed. He had made arrangements also to follow them up, at the expiration of two or three days, by a much larger force. When, therefore, Havelock assumed command, it was with the determination to follow out this plan, to leave with the main body on the 4th, if possible, and to detach a steamer up the Ganges with provisions and stores for Cawnpore. This latter arrangement was very speedily carried out, and, on the morning of the 3rd, a vessel having on board 100 Fusiliers and two guns steamed from Allahabad.

But before she started, terrible rumours had reached Havelock as to the fate of the Cawnpore garrison. On the 2nd, a message came from Sir Henry Lawrence informing him that they had one and all been massacred. Neill disbelieved it. Havelock doubted. To provide against accidents, the two guns were placed on board the steamer. On the following day the intelligence was confirmed ; time, place, dates, all were given. Havelock no longer hesitated. He sent up orders to Renaud to halt till he could join him himself, and he delayed his own departure until he could make arrangements for the transport of his guns.

It was not till the morning of the 7th that all his preparations were complete. On that evening, at 4 o'clock, he gave orders to his column to march, and bent his steps resolutely towards Cawnpore.

But before we follow him in his heroic achievements, it will be necessary to record the actual occurrences at that ill-fated station.

CHAPTER VI.

CAWNPORE.

THE news of the outbreak at Meerut reached Cawnpore on the 13th May. The force at that station consisted at that time almost entirely of natives. So unsuspicious were our rulers of intrigue on the part of the late sovereign of Oudh, so confident in their policy of annexation, so sure of the loyalty even of those whom their recent measures had reduced from wealth to poverty, from a state of seigneur-ship to a condition of vassalage, that although Oudh had been occupied by our troops so recently as 1856, they did not deem it expedient in 1857 to add a single European soldier to the sixty artillerymen who were the representatives of our army at Cawnpore. They even went further: at the end of 1856, they ordered the wing of the 1st Bengal Fusiliers, which had been temporarily detained at Cawnpore at the request of the Chief Commissioner of Oudh, to proceed to Umballa!

The departure of the wing of the Fusiliers left Cawnpore garrisoned as follows. There were the 1st, 53rd, and 56th Regiments of Native Infantry: the 2nd Regiment Light Cavalry, and sixty one European artillerymen with six guns — five of which were nine-pounders, and the sixth, a twenty-four pound howitzer. In case of a revolt of the native troops, there were therefore at the disposal of the General only sixty-one Europeans, besides the officers, to oppose to, in round numbers, three thousand five hundred trained soldiers, backed by a rabble of at least equal numerical strength.

It can easily be imagined that the intelligence of the events at Meerut, following, as they did, an agitation in the minds of the men of the Native army of more than four months' duration — an agitation which the weak and vacillating measures of the Government had served but to increase, must have been received with no slight anxiety by the Commander of a force so almost wholly native as was this at Cawnpore. It is true that the officer who in May, 1857, held the command of the Cawnpore Division, was one of the most distinguished generals of the Company's army. Sir Hugh Massy Wheeler had spent nearly fifty-four years in India, and throughout that period he had served only with natives. He had had peculiar facilities of studying their character; he had served with them under Lord Lake, against their countrymen; he had led them in Affghanistan against foreigners: they had achieved victory under him in both Sikh campaigns, in the second of which he held an independent command. By Lord Gough, under whom he gained his brightest

laurels, he was most highly esteemed. He had proved himself on so many occasions so fertile in resources, so ready to overcome difficulties, so prompt, active, and energetic, that it was thought he was the man of all others most competent to deal with an insurrection of this character, most fitted to unravel the web of mystery in which its origin was then clouded, and to open the minds of the Sepoys to the insensate folly of their proceedings. And if this had been a mere military outbreak, as some have imagined, if the dispossessed princes and people of the land, farmers, villagers, ryots, had not made common cause with the Sepoys, there is every reason to believe, as will be shown hereafter, that but a portion of the force would have revolted: the certainty exists that not a single officer would have been injured.

The outbreak at Meerut was not wanted to open Sir H. Wheeler's eyes to the magnitude of the crisis. He had, from the first sign of disaffection at Berhampore, been watching with an anxious eye the progress of events, and, in common with many others, he had been deeply struck with the fatal delay which occurred in dealing out punishment to the 34th Native Infantry; and with the immunity granted to those who attacked Lieutenant Baugh. Still, the Government of India, having announced that their "forcibly feeble" acts had restored discipline to the Bengal army, Sir Hugh was bound to strengthen their hands as much as possible, by endeavouring to maintain and to justify the confidence they felt. He was powerless to do more without exciting the suspicions of those whom the Government had proclaimed well-affected and loyal.

The news of the Meerut outbreak, which reached Cawnpore on the 13th May, left him freer scope to act. Although the Government even then professed to look upon that outbreak as a mere local revolt, although they ignored the possibility of its being part and parcel of a plan for a general rising, it was not so with Sir Hugh Massy Wheeler. That experienced officer felt that the army was gone; that, incapable of acting in concert, every regiment would take its own time and opportunity; but that all would go he felt morally certain. Surveying then his own position, he found himself the commander of a large native force, separated by the river only from Oudh, and in the heart of a native population, with but sixty-one Europeans at his disposal: his cantonment was an open one, no semblance of fortification existing in any portion of it; the magazine, which bore the nearest approach to anything of the sort, being seven miles distant. It was, in truth, a perilous position.

The minds of all in Cawnpore were naturally much excited by the accounts of the Meerut insurrection, full details of which reached the station on the 15th. It was felt that, composed as their own force was, a revolt might break out any day; and as there were many ladies in the station, and all the families of H.M. 32nd Regiment then quartered at Lucknow, as too there was a large mercantile community, it was deemed desirable to select and to fortify some place of refuge to which the entire European community could retire in case of need. The magazine, a very large building on the banks of the river, sur-

rounded by a high wall, was first proposed for this purpose: but the fatal objection existed that it was seven miles from the native lines, and on the Delhi road. It was argued that, in case of a rising, the native troops, as at Meerut, would, after massacring every European who might come in their way, march as quickly as possible towards Delhi, and that it would only be necessary to provide a place of refuge at the opposite end of the station, sufficiently fortified to resist a sudden attack, and provisioned for a few days, in which the whole of the residents might remain until the first fury of the mutineers had been spent, and they had left Cawnpore for Delhi. These views prevailed, and two large barracks, formerly the hospital barracks of the European Regiment *once* stationed at Cawnpore, were selected, and earth-works were commenced upon without any further delay.

These barracks were situated in the centre of a very large plain, with a tolerably clear space all round them. In front was the cricket-ground, a very clear space, bounded on its left and left-front by unfinished barracks, then in the course of construction; on its right was the road, and beyond it another level plain of smaller extent terminating in a row of houses; beyond these another road, another row of houses, and then the river. To the left and left-rear of the barracks was an extensive plain, upon which the European Regiments, on passing through the station, were wont to encamp: to the right and right-rear the description I have already given of the country to the right of the cricket-ground applies. It has, since the catastrophe, been regretted by some that the magazine had not been selected as the place of refuge. As one who knows the locality well, I cannot coincide with those who are of this opinion. The magazine was seven miles distant from the new native lines, and on the Delhi road; it was next door to the jail. Unless Sir Hugh Wheeler had chosen to abandon the station before any signs of mutiny were apparent, he, the officers, and ladies would have found it impossible to get there. The Government of India had loudly proclaimed their trust in the Native army. Could Sir Hugh Wheeler have told the portion of that army stationed at Cawnpore, "I have no trust in you; I resign command of you: your officers I take from you into the magazine, and bid you defiance," — this too before a single overt act of mutiny had been committed? Had he acted so, he would at once have been made the scape-goat for all that has since followed. Had he, on the other hand, waited for a movement on the part of the native troops, and then endeavoured to reach the magazine with the ladies and children, not one-third the number would have arrived there.

There is more plausibility in the expression of regret which I have also heard, that Sir Hugh did not entrench himself on the river, still not abandoning his position in the native lines. To this I can only reply, that an officer of General Wheeler's judgment and experience must have perceived the advantages resulting from such a course, but that under the circumstances he must have perceived also that it was not feasible. There were no barracks on the immediate banks of the river, and therefore there would have been no

cover for the women and children. He had the terrific heat of the months of May, June, and July to calculate upon, as well as the enemy; besides which, it was not then a question of standing a siege. The object was to provide a temporary refuge for the European residents till the mutineers had left the station. The barracks afforded this better than any other place he could have selected, and he was justified, both by his innate knowledge of the Sepoys and by events which had occurred elsewhere, in making that selection.

That position was therefore chosen, and it was commenced to fortify it, and to furnish it with supplies. At the same time everything was done which could be done to keep the Sepoys firm in their allegiance. At this time, and to the very day of the outbreak, the regimental officers had perfect confidence in their men. They had associated with them, had joined in their sports, and had in every way identified themselves with them; the name of their regiment was to them all in all; its glory, its honour were their pride. They refused to entertain the slightest suspicion of those with whom they had for years past mixed so freely and unreservedly; who had followed them through the swamps of Burma, and the snows of Cabool; who, in the Sutlej campaign, had withstood all the seductions of the Sikh soldiery. They believed them faithful, and they showed their belief; every night the officers slept in tents in the lines, each officer at the head of his own troop or company, liable to be murdered in their sleep, but they flinched not. Most of them rejoiced in the opportunity of showing their confidence in their men. So much, and to such an extent, can the wily Asiatic deceive the open-hearted, too credulous Englishman!

At this epoch another character appeared on the scene — one whose powers of duplicity exceed the bounds of imagination, and whose treachery and cruelty stand out in bloody relief, far surpassing the crimes that have been recorded under the same headings in the annals of the world.

Dhoondoopunt Nanajee, quasi Raja of Bithoor, was the son of the late Peishwa's Subahdar, Ramchundur Punt. Although never legally adopted by Bajee Rao, for adoption requires the performance of many ceremonies, commencing in the lying-in room, Dhoondoopunt was yet as a boy received into his family, and was treated as a member of it. He received a tolerable education, and can both read and write English. On the death of the Peishwa without issue, either actual or adopted, his widow became, according to Hindoo law, his legal heiress, Dhoondoopunt still continuing in the position of a dependant. But his grasping ambition was ill-content with so subordinate a position. He forged a will, and on its authority claimed posession of the personal property of the Peishwa. That chieftain's widow having unsuccessfully contested the claim, fled to Benares, determined to appeal to the British Government. She was, however, inveigled thence by the arts of Dhoondoopunt, and persuaded to proceed to Bithoor, where she had ever since remained, her claims having been abandoned from that date. Emboldened by the success of his measures against the personal property of his deceased benefactor, Dhoon-

doopunt laid claim to his title and possessions, on the ground of his being the adopted son, and he sent an agent to England to push his appeal. He was not, as I have already shown, the adopted son, but his claims were refused on other grounds by the British Government—the principle of inheritance by adoption having been disallowed. He was, however, allowed to keep six guns, to maintain as many followers as he chose, and to live in almost regal state at Bithoor—a castellated palace about six miles north of Cawnpore. In his social relations he much affected European society, and appeared fond of joining those pursuits in which Englishmen in all climates delight. He was hospitable, too, after his fashion, gave entertainments on a large scale, and was always ready to lend his elephants to any of the more exalted *employés* of Government.

Between this man and the Collector of Revenue at Cawnpore, Mr. Hillersdon, there had been considerable intercourse on official subjects, and the latter had been greatly impressed by his suave and courteous manner of transacting business. This intercourse had increased since the commencement of the agitation in the Sepoy mind, and the Nana Sahib (as I shall call him in future—that being the name by which he is now best known to the world) had more than once commented on the folly of the Sepoys in believing that any plan was being hatched against their religion. Very soon after the news of the Meerut outbreak had arrived, he again met Mr. Hillersdon, and advised him to send his wife and other ladies to Bithoor, assuring him that they would be quite safe there, as he would protect them against any number of Sepoys. Although Mr. Hillersdon did not act upon this offer at once, yet so confident was he in the loyalty of the Nana Sahib, that he made arrangements for carrying it into effect on the first symptoms of insurrection. He further arranged a plan with the Nana, that the latter should organise 1500 fighting men, who should be ready to surprise the Sepoys on their showing a disposition to rise, and to put them all to the sword.

This plan had been arranged in consequence of the successful insurrection at Delhi, an account of which reached Cawnpore on the 17th May. This information redoubled the anxiety of General Wheeler; the works at the barracks were hastened, and the preparations for the supply of provisions hurried on, for it was felt that no time was to be lost. On any night the signal might be given, and the women and children massacred in their beds. It was felt on all sides that the speedy recapture of Delhi could alone avert a great catastrophe. The General had learned from his spies that meetings of an insurrectionary character were held nightly in the lines of the 1st Regiment of Native Infantry and the 2nd Light Cavalry; that these latter especially were bent on revolt, that they knew their power and our weakness. Fatal knowledge for all parties! Lamentable want of foresight in the Government that sanctioned such a disposition of troops!

On the night of the 21st matters were very nearly coming to a crisis. The 2nd Cavalry had completed their arrangements, the examples of their comrades at Meerut and Delhi had fired them, and

they were determined to revolt. Sir Hugh Wheeler had received early information of the probability of such an event; he had, therefore, sent to all the European residents, advising them to repair towards evening to the barracks, and he had dispatched an express to Sir Henry Lawrence at Lucknow, begging him to lend him two or three companies of H.M. 32nd, or as many as could be spared. He made at the same time an attempt to move the treasure, which was seven miles distant from the station, into the barracks; but, as the Sepoy guard at the treasury showed a disinclination to part with it, loudly protesting that they were able to defend it where it was, and Sir Hugh being powerless to coerce them, he preferred accepting the offer of the Nana Sahib, made through Mr. Hillersdon, and strongly recommended by that gentleman. It was to the effect that the Nana's troops should guard the treasury. Accordingly, that night, 200 Mahrattas, armed with matchlocks and fully equipped, accompanied by two guns, moved from Bithoor and took up their quarters at the treasury, close to the jail, and within a stone's throw of the magazine in which were all our military stores.

That night all the European residents, with the exception of Sir George Parker, the cantonment magistrate, who at that time disbelieved the excess of danger, slept in the barracks: the ladies had scarcely arrived there ere the arrival of the Mahratta troops caused an alarm, and the guns were sent for; they arrived about 11 P.M. Meanwhile, four native officers of the 2nd Cavalry, either finding that the other regiments would not join them, or that the pear was quite ripe, and unable of their own authority to control some of their younger and more excitable privates, had made a virtue of the emergency, and reported to their commanding officer, Major Vibart, that the regiment was ready to rise. He instantly went down to the lines, turned out the men, and addressed them in a manly style, appealing to the number of years he had passed with them, the dangers and vicissitudes they had encountered together, and imploring them to remain true to their colours, and to maintain the glory of their regiment unsullied. How they were affected by this address it is impossible to say, but they returned to their lines apparently contented.

Of the scene in the barrack that night descriptions have appeared, from the pens of some of the actors in it. One of them, a gentle lady, wrote: "There were an immense number of ladies and gentlemen assembled there, and oh! what an anxious night it was. The children added much to our distress and anxiety; it was some hours before I could get them to sleep. I did not lie down the whole night." Another, a high-spirited and promising young officer: "Nearly all the ladies in the station were, however, turned out of their houses, and hurried off to the barracks. The scene in the morning you can imagine. They were all huddled together in a small building, just as they had left their houses; on each side of this the guns were drawn up." It seems strange now to read what follows: "I still put all trust in our Sepoys, and shall do so until I see that they are unworthy of it." Such was the confidence engendered by

long association and constant intercourse with their men, that even these sad events could not shake it.

Early on the morning of the 22nd, eighty-four men of H.M. 32nd Foot, under the command of Captain Moore of that regiment, a most able and energetic officer, cheered the hearts of the residents by their arrival; they were all that Sir Henry Lawrence could spare — he himself being in a most precarious situation. Indeed, most men in his position would have declined General Wheeler's request; but Sir Henry had an enlarged and sympathising soul, and he did not hesitate to reduce his garrison to the smallest possible number, in order to render assistance to his imperilled countrymen at Cawnpore. They were accompanied by two squadrons of Oudh Cavalry, who were at that time believed to be staunch: their fidelity, however, being shortly afterwards questioned, they were sent back again.

For an entire week, from the 24th to the 31st of May, the state of suspense was awful, in some instances, more than could be borne. One lady lost her reason in consequence, and almost all suffered in a manner defying description. They were daily, hourly, expecting an insurrection,—in fact almost praying that it might come, in order that the too terrible suspense might pass away. Every precaution was taken to avoid giving the natives the slightest cause for revolt. Even the customary salute in honour of the Queen's birthday was forbidden, lest the sound of the guns should afford a pretence to the Sepoys to revolt. Still the officers slept in the lines of their men: in the most heroic manner they passively placed themselves in the power of those who had shown but too clearly their ultimate intentions against them. They did it, it is true, by order; but they went without hesitation to what some of their number at least must have considered certain death: but they looked that fate boldly in the face, and not in one single instance did they shrink from encountering it.

At length on the morning of the 31st, after a terrible night, in which rumours of the rising of the 1st Native Infantry were rife, the joyful intelligence spread through the station that the first instalment of the European reinforcements had arrived. It was quite true; on that day and the two following, fifteen men of the Madras Fusiliers and 150 of the 84th Foot joined the garrison, and cheered their hearts by the information that they were but the forerunners of several regiments; that troops had poured into Calcutta from Madras, Burma, and Ceylon, and were being sent up with all possible speed. A letter also arrived from Lord Canning to General Wheeler, in which it was stated that all the available troops should be sent up; that many were on their way, some coming by steamers, some by bullock-train, some by dâk carriages.

All might yet have been well, and all would have been well, but for the stoppage of those reinforcements by the mutiny of the 6th Regiment of Native Infantry at Allahabad. The Government had permitted this, the most important military post in India, a strong fortress and immense magazine, to remain, after this crisis had commenced, under the charge of a native regiment. The result was, that

all Bengal very narrowly escaped destruction,—Cawnpore and the adjoining stations were swept away.

So confident were the authorities at Cawnpore that the crisis had passed, that the daily arrival of European troops would render our force more than a match for the natives, that on the morning of the 8th of June Sir Hugh Wheeler ordered one company of the 84th and a portion of the 32nd Foot back to Lucknow.* There then remained at Cawnpore:—

1st comp. 6 batt. Artillery - -	61
H.M. 32nd Foot - - - - - -	84
1st Madras Fusiliers - - - - -	15
H.M. 84th Foot† - - - - - -	50
Total	210 men.

In addition to these were about a hundred officers, the same number of merchants, and about forty drummers; making a total of 450 Europeans, with six guns. These, had they been alone, could have fought their way either to Agra or Allahabad; but there were besides about 330 women and children, many of them reared tenderly, and unaccustomed to hardships. Their lot, indeed, was the hardest of all, and his heart must be hardened who can think of their protracted sufferings without a pang.

It was on the morning of the 3rd of June that the Europeans left for Lucknow. On the evening of the same day, half of the 3rd Oudh Horse Battery, under Lieutenant Ashe, which had been sent towards Futtehgurh to quell a disturbance in that quarter, but had been compelled to retreat on account of the mutiny of the troops which accompanied it, arrived at Cawnpore. They had with them two 9-pounders and a 24-pounder howitzer, which were at once placed in the entrenchment. The men had behaved well on the road, had refused to join the mutineers, and it was hoped and believed that they would continue proof against the inducements to revolt which seemed to loom in the future.

On the morning of the 4th June, Sir Hugh Wheeler received positive information that the 2nd Cavalry, the 1st and 56th Regiments, were determined in the course of the next four and twenty hours to rise and murder their officers: these latter were therefore directed to discontinue sleeping in their lines. Orders had been previously issued to Mr. Reily, in charge of the magazine, to blow it up, in the event of an outbreak. He was prevented carrying out these directions by the Sepoys on guard at the magazine: consequently, when the mutiny did break out, immense stores of ammunition, guns, and small-arms, fell into the hands of the insurgents.

Meanwhile the Nana Sahib, in order, as it was imagined, to testify his sincerity, had moved, with a very large number of his followers, from Bithoor to the civil station, and had taken up his residence in a house not far from that belonging to the collector. He was here for

* Lieut. Delafosse's Narrative. † Mr. Shepherd's Narrative.

a double purpose, to excite the Sepoys to revolt, and to guard the treasure for himself. Nevertheless, he was not once suspected; every one, even after the outbreak of the mutiny, placed implicit confidence in him. It was believed that it was his interest to remain true to us, not only on account of his vast territorial possessions, but because he had invested upwards of 500,000*l.* in Government securities. It was not known until afterwards that ever since the annexation of Oudh he had been gradually disposing of these securities, until in the month of June, 1857, only 30,000*l.* worth remained.* This is one of those incontestable facts which prove that it was the spoliation of Oudh which decided the large chieftains and landowners to rise against us. It was the last feather on the camel's back; they thenceforth saw no security for themselves in passive submission; they had no hope remaining but the sword.

By the 4th of June nearly a month's provisions had been stored in the entrenchment, the guns placed in position, and every possible arrangement to secure the lives of the European residents had been completed. Dire suspense reigned in every mind: the arrival of reinforcements from Calcutta had ceased, and there appeared no hope from any quarter. They all felt, as had been the case during that last long fortnight in May, that any day they might be attacked and massacred. Nevertheless, no hearts quailed: there was but one feeling amongst the men—an indomitable resolution to defend the British flag and the lives of the ladies and children committed to their charge to the very last.

At length, on the night of the 4th, the 2nd Cavalry, on the pretence that they felt themselves suspected, and could not bear it, rose in revolt with a great shout, mounted their horses, and set fire to their sergeants' bungalows. Thence proceeding to the commissariat cattle yard, they took thirty-six elephants, the property of Government, and went direct to the treasury, some seven miles distant: here, assisted by the Mahratta troops of the Nana Sahib, they plundered the treasury (about eight lakhs and a half of rupees), and packed it on the elephants and carts. They had hitherto been unsuccessful in persuading the 1st Native Infantry to join them; but these latter being informed of the process going on at the treasury, also left their lines with a loud shout, and joined the 2nd Cavalry. Their officers attempted, but in vain, to persuade them to be loyal. Command and entreaty were alike ineffectual: the Sepoys begged and even forced them to return to the entrenchment, intimating at the same time that they were no longer under their orders. They then took the road to the treasury, burning and plundering all the bungalows, and seizing all the property on which they could lay hands.

This had been a night of horror in the entrenchment: the mutinous shouts, the discharge of pistols, the blazes of fire in every direction must have struck terror into the hearts of the ladies and children. The men were, however, not at all dismayed. No attack had been made upon them; there had been no disposition to shed blood:

* Vide Government Gazette, published by authority.

accordingly, about seven o'clock next morning, three or four officers sallied forth and proceeded on horseback toward the assembly-rooms, with the intention, it is stated*, of blowing up the magazine. But when they reached the canal, less than one-third of the distance, the Sepoys fired upon them, and killed one officer; the remainder returned to the entrenchment. On their arrival, the 3rd Oudh Horse Battery (natives), with a company of Europeans, were ordered to pursue the rebels. On reaching the canal they were recalled, as symptoms had in the meanwhile manifested themselves in the 53rd and 56th Native Infantry, which rendered it highly undesirable that the barrack should be left unprotected.†

These symptoms were soon changed for actions. The native officers had reported that the men were no longer to be depended upon; and very soon after, about 9 A.M., a bugle was sounded, and the two regiments were seen drawn up in columns on their parade ground, showing a defying front: they were, however, dispersed immediately, on hearing the booming of cannon from the entrenchment, and, making a circuit, they joined their rebellious brethren at Nawabgunj (the place where the treasury, magazine, and jail were situated). The native artillerymen (belonging to the Oudh Battery) went off about the same time, to swell the ranks of the rebels.

The station was now clear of insurgents, and yet Sir Hugh Wheeler had no choice but to remain where he was. The road to Allahabad was the only one open to him, had he been inclined to make a move; but, independently of his being unprovided with carriage, it was clear to him, from the non-arrival of further reinforcements, that something had gone wrong there also. He could do nothing, then, but remain where he was, and strengthen his fortifications as much as possible. Some muskets had been left in the native lines; these were brought in and distributed to the merchants, clerks, drummers, and others. These latter were told off in sections, placed under the command of officers, and assigned distinct duties.

Hopes were entertained at this time that they would be allowed to remain in the barracks unmolested, for information reached them early on the 6th of June, that the mutineers, having cleaned out the magazine, and loaded as much as they could carry upon carts, had marched to Kullianpore, the first stage on the road to Delhi, leaving a small body of cavalry behind as a rear-guard. That they would have gone on, that they were then innocent of any bloody intentions against our garrison, is more than probable. They were themselves inclined to push on to Delhi: it was in their eyes the principal seat of war; there they thought the struggle for the empire of India would be fought and decided, and they were emulous to join those comrades and relations who were so fiercely combating under the green flag in the city of the Mogul. Their intentions were, in fact, pronounced by

* Deposition of Marian ayah.

† The narrative that follows is compiled from the following sources: viz. Mr. Shepherd's and Lieut. Delafosse's Accounts, Marian's Deposition, Statement of the Writer in the Pay Office, Statement of an Eye-witness, Nujoor Tewarree's Account.

their march on Kullianpore. DELHI was the cry which burst from every lip as they marched forth from Cawnpore. And it must be a strong temptation to induce them to forego that resolution; nevertheless, that temptation was held out, and by one whom our party even at that moment believed to be their friend—by the treacherous friend—the Nana Sahib.

This man in fact saw that, if the troops were to go to Delhi, all the advantages he had promised himself from the revolt would slip from his hands. The shadowy dream of a Mahratta Empire reconstructed on the ruins of the British power was already passing away: the march to Delhi would dissipate it for ever. He knew the extent of the conspiracy, and there can be no doubt but that he firmly believed that the British authority was about to receive a death-blow. His object then was to lay the foundation of his future sovereignty at Cawnpore; his influence would thence be spread into the surrounding districts; it would penetrate to Delhi itself. The mighty power once exercised by the Peishwas would be restored, and to himself, the architect of his own fortunes, would belong the glory of replacing their vanished sceptre. There can be little doubt that some such thoughts influenced him, when, as he accompanied the insurgents to Kullianpore, he used every argument to persuade their leaders to place themselves under his orders, and to return and destroy the band of Feringhees whom they had left behind. He, in all probability, pointed out to them, that, so long as their officers lived, their lives would not be safe; they would always be marked men, and, should their insurrection prove unsuccessful, they would be hunted to death all over India. These considerations, and the reports brought out by the Oudh Artillery-men of the large quantity of treasure in the entrenchment, and of the facilities existing for attack, in consequence of the quantity of powder and guns still remaining in the magazine, besides about forty boat-loads of shot and shell lying in the canal, decided the mutineers to place themselves under the orders of the Nana Sahib.

Accordingly, about 8 o'clock on the morning of the 6th, the whole force returned to Cawnpore, with the Nana at their head. He pitched his camp in the centre of the station; and, although a high-caste Brahmin himself, he hoisted two standards, one to the honour of Mahomed, the other of Hunaman (the Hindoo Deity); and to these he bade all the faithful repair. He then sent about fifty sowars into the town, to kill any Europeans who might be found there, as well as the native converts to Christianity; at the same time the houses of the Cawnpore Nawab and other influential native gentlemen were attacked and gutted, on the pretence that their owners had harboured Europeans: he himself spent the greater part of the day in mounting some heavy guns, of which he had obtained possession, and of making preparations for the attack.

On the following morning, the 7th of June, a letter was received by General Wheeler from the Nana Sahib. Up to that moment, his fidelity had not been questioned, but now the mask was thrown off. The letter merely intimated the Nana's intention to attack the gar-

rison. It very soon appeared that this was by no means an idle threat, for two guns opened upon them from the north-west, and musketry from all directions. On the 8th three more guns were brought against them, and on the 11th the enemy had in position, and playing upon the garrison night and day, three mortars, two 24-pounders, three 18-pounders, two 12-pounders, the same number of 9-pounders, and one 6-pounder. Their numbers had in the same interval greatly increased. The 6th from Allahabad, red with the blood of our countrymen there, irregular corps from Oudh, and *budmashes, i. e.* armed rabble from all parts of the country, had poured in to make common cause against us. All the bungalows in the neighbourhood of the barracks were occupied by rebel infantry, and these poured an incessant fire day and night upon our unhappy countrymen. A small church, situated to the south-east of the entrenchment, was strongly occupied, and the fire from it was most galling. The unfinished barracks, to which I have already referred as lying on the left front of the entrenchment, were also constantly threatened and attacked; but fortunately the enemy were never able to obtain a permanent lodgment in them.

Meanwhile, the sufferings of the garrison were such as no description can adequately portray.* The heat was very great; and what with the fright, want of room, want of proper food and care, several ladies and soldiers' wives, as also children, died with great distress: many officers and soldiers also were sunstruck from exposure to the hot-winds. The dead bodies were thrown into a well outside the entrenchment near the unfinished barracks; and this work was generally done at the close of each day, as nobody could venture out in the daytime, on account of the shot and shell flying in all directions like hail-stones. The distress was so great, that no one could offer a word of consolation to his friend, or attempt to administer to the wants of another. The dead bodies of young ladies tenderly brought up, were placed outside the verandah amongst the ruins to await the time for the fatigue party to carry them to the well. For there was scarcely room to shelter the living, the buildings were so riddled; and every available corner was considered a great object.

They began too to be badly off for water. There was but one water-well, in the middle of the entrenchment, and the enemy kept up their fire so incessantly both day and night, that it was as much as giving a man's life-blood to go and draw a bucket of water. So great did the demand become, even after the second day's siege, that five rupees were paid for a leathern bag full, and one rupee for a small bucket of water: it became finally a matter of necessity for every one to procure it for himself, and as, after the first three days' incessant firing, there was generally a cessation for two hours about candle-light, the well was then crowded by gentlemen and others endeavouring to fill their pitchers and buckets.

As the siege went on, as the weary night succeeded the never-ending day, each fraught with new horrors, their sufferings increased

* Mr. Shepherd, an eye-witness.

tenfold. Although after the first few days the barracks became so riddled as to afford little or no shelter, yet the greater portion of the garrison preferred remaining in them to exposure to the heat of the sun outside. A great many had made holes under the walls of the entrenchment, covered over with boxes, cots, &c. In these they were safe from the shot and shell of the enemy, but not from the effects of heat; and the mortality from apoplexy was considerable. At night every person had to sleep out and take watch in turn: the women and children then slept under the walls of the entrenchment, near their respective relatives. Here the bomb-shells kept them in perpetual dread, for nearly all night they were seen coming through the air and bursting in different places, often doing mischief. To add to their miseries, the stench from the dead bodies of horses and other animals was not only horrible in itself, but the means of their being annoyed by myriads of flies, who never left them. Nevertheless, if their sufferings were great, their fortitude was greater. Sir Hugh Wheeler himself, an old man and worn with anxiety, was physically unable to take an active part in the defence of the entrenchment, but his subordinates rivalled one another in their exertions and contempt of danger. Prominent* amongst these was Captain Moore of H.M. 32nd Foot, who, though severely wounded in the arm, never gave himself the least rest, but wherever there appeared most danger, he was sure to be foremost, his arm in a sling and a revolver in his belt, directing the men or leading them to the fight. It was his custom to place scouts on the top of one of the unfinished barracks, who were able to direct the fire of our artillery. Occasionally the Sepoys would endeavour to take possession of these buildings; but Moore was always on the alert, and whenever they came on in large numbers he would call for volunteers, who, sallying out under cover of a line of carts which connected the unfinished barracks with the entrenchment, would quickly put the enemy to the rout. On such occasions our men generally escaped unhurt, whilst the loss of the enemy was invariably great. They could never stand a British cheer and a British charge. On two occasions this gallant officer sallied forth at night, with about twenty-five Europeans, and succeeded in spiking the nearest guns of the enemy. On every occasion the immense superiority of the British soldier was apparent,—even the enemy's cavalry, though their numbers were very great, never daring to attack our small party.

Meanwhile events were progressing in the rebel camp, which plainly showed that the soul of the Nana was open to no compunctions, that his primary object was the extirpation of the European race, and that he would allow no consideration to interfere with that object.† On the 10th June, a lady with four children, travelling by post from the north-west to Calcutta, arrived, unsuspicious of evil, at Cawnpore. She was taken before the Nana, who, at once, ordered that she and her babes should be slaughtered. The innocent children, exposed to the sun, and unable to comprehend the scene, were crying

* Mr. Shepherd's Narrative. † Journal of a Native.

to their mamma to take them into the bungalow and give them food; but no one listened, and in a few minutes, tied hand to hand, and made to stand up in the plain, they were shot down by pistol bullets. On the following day another lady fell into the hands of these fiends, and experienced a like fate, her head being subsequently offered as a "nuzzur," or royal gift, to the Nana Sahib.

On the 12th, intelligence reached them that a large party of Europeans were coming from the north-west. Some cavalry and infantry were at once despatched to reconnoitre; and it was found that the advancing party were fugitives from Futtehgurh, about 136 in number, most of them females. They had left Futtehgurh with the intention of proceeding to Allahabad, thence to Calcutta by water, when, on passing Cawnpore, they were pounced upon by these rebels. Being brought before the Nana and sentenced to death, one of them, disdaining to sue for life, reproached him with his cruelty and the insensate folly of his proceedings; showing how futile it was to imagine that by the slaughter of a few hundred women he could exterminate the English. She also warned him of the fate which, sooner or later, must inevitably overtake him. In reply to this spirited remonstrance, the ruffian ordered that her two hands should be filled with powder, and the powder exploded: the rest were ruthlessly shot down. At the same time an order was issued that all boats should be secured, in order to prevent the escape of even a solitary individual. The story of these atrocities never reached the garrison, and some of them still believed that the Nana was an unwilling instrument in the hands of others.

Flushed by this easy conquest over unarmed women, the Nana prepared on the following day a tremendous assault on the entrenchment. For some days past he had been firing shells, with the intention of firing the barrack; but it was not till 5 P.M. on the evening of the 13th of June that he succeeded in setting fire to the hospital barrack: it contained not only the sick but the families of the European soldiers, and the flames spread so rapidly that many of the former unfortunates (about forty in number) were consumed. Nearly the whole of the medicines and surgical instruments shared the same fate. No sooner was the fire visible to the enemy, than they came down, 4000 in number, to attack our half-starved, dispirited countrymen; but not even on such an occasion, with such odds, could they muster up courage to dare a hand-to-hand encounter with Englishmen. The fire of our artillery was sufficient to keep them at bay, and, although they prevented our men from offering effectual succour to the wounded in the blazing hospital, they finally slunk back discomfited to their lines.

From the 13th to the 21st similar attacks were made, and with a similar result. Although the enemy succeeded in disabling six out of our eight guns, they never could get beyond the fire of those that were left. But on the 21st, having been largely reinforced from Oudh and other districts, a tremendous attack was made on all sides of the entrenchment. To counteract the effect of our fire, the enemy had provided themselves with large bales of cotton, which they used

as a flying sap. On the north-west they took possession of three of the empty barracks, and endeavoured to drive our picket out of the rest: on the south-east they advanced under cover of the cotton bales. On the former, Captain Moore advanced with twenty-five men under the cover of a fire of grape, and, after a very brief conflict, succeeded in driving them entirely out of the barracks. The latter party were equally unsuccessful; for, having advanced behind the bales within 150 yards of the entrenchment, they suddenly made an attempt to charge, but a few rounds of canister and perpetual file-firing speedily caused them to change their determination; and they dispersed with a loss of about 200 men, including their leader. An attack was made at the same time by about 200 men on the north-east; but the fire of the enemy, after having been kept up for an hour and a half, was silenced by our musketry.

Among the deeds of daring performed on this day, the following, related by Mr. Shepherd, deserves a place, not in the history of this revolt only, but in the annals of national prowess. About mid-day one of the ammunition waggons in the north-east corner was blown up by the enemy's shot, and whilst it was blazing the batteries of the rebels directed all their guns towards it. Our soldiers, being much exhausted with the morning's work, and almost every artillery-man being killed or wounded, it was a difficult matter to put out the fire, which endangered the other waggons near it. However, in the midst of all this cannonading, a young officer, Lieutenant Delafosse, 53rd Native Infantry (one of the survivors), with unusual courage, went up, and, laying himself down under the burning waggon, pulled away from it what loose splinters he could get hold of, all the while throwing earth upon the flames. He was soon joined by two soldiers, who brought with them a couple of buckets of water, which were very dexterously thrown about by the Lieutenant; and whilst the buckets were taken away to be replenished, the process of pitching earth was carried on amidst a fearful cannonade of about six guns, all firing upon the burning waggon. Thus at last the fire was put out, and the officer and men escaped unhurt.

A deed like this tells its own story. It betokens that calm, cool, determined courage which is rarely bestowed except upon those who are capable of even greater things. It is, as a simple act of courage, without a parallel in history. The chief performer, Lieutenant Delafosse, still lives: it will be a consolation to him to know that he has earned the lasting admiration of his countrymen: I will hope that he has gained more—the highest reward for valour which it is in the power of the Crown to bestow. Of his comrades, let him speak: if they still live, let them share with him the gifts of the Crown; should they not have escaped the fearful ordeal, let their families reap some portion of the benefit derivable for matchless courage.

From the 21st to the 24th June our unhappy countrymen were subjected to an incessant bombardment: the barracks were now riddled with balls and shot, and afforded but little protection. The season, too, for the commencement of the rains had arrived, and it was evident that at the first heavy shower not only would the whole

edifice come down, but the holes which, as mentioned before, had been made in the ground, would be filled up. Added to this, since the first five or six days of the siege, the supplies of fresh water had failed entirely, and the garrison had subsisted on otta (ground wheat) dak, and gram (two species of grain peculiar to India). In order to make this supply last the longer, they had lived for some days on half rations. They were now in great straits, and all felt that affairs could not last as they were much longer. With insufficient food, the prospect of the barracks, their only place of refuge, tumbling about their ears, with no hope of relief, and with the agonising sight before them of gentle ladies perishing before their eyes, it was the conviction of all that something must be done. A great many of the officers and men were of opinion that it would be best to sally out in a body at night and take the guns, or perish in the attempt—and this course, if adopted, would probably have succeeded; but it was felt that, if unsuccessful, the women and children would be left a prey to their infuriated antagonists. Although often considered, and earnestly advocated by many, it was never put into execution. The fact is, the character of the Nana Sahib was not rightly appreciated in our entrenchment: he had mixed so much with Europeans, his prime minister, Azimoollah, a Mahomedan, had actually been to England, and been received in society there, and he had been apparently so earnest in our behalf before the outbreak occurred, that some believed that he was secretly in our favour, that at all events he would, if he had the power, protect the lives of our countrymen. Had a contrary belief prevailed, had the massacre of the 12th of June been known in the camp, there can be little doubt that the first alternative would have been tried, and as little (from information subsequently obtained, whereby it appeared that the enemy's guns were almost abandoned at night) that it would have been successful.

However, under the impression which unfortunately prevailed, it had been almost determined to treat with the Nana, when, on the afternoon of the 24th, a note arrived from that individual, brought by Mrs. Greenway (a member of the family of Greenway Brothers, merchants of Cawnpore), to the effect that all the Europeans in the entrenchment who had nothing to do with Lord Dalhousie's Government*, and would lay down their arms, should be sent to Allahabad. The preliminaries were agreed to, and the following day Azimoollah, on the part of the Nana, and Captain Moore, deputed by General Wheeler and armed with full powers, met in one of the unfinished barracks. Azimoollah attempted to open the conversation in English, but was prevented by the sowars who accompanied him. It was, therefore, carried on in the Hindustani language. An agreement was concluded to the effect that the Government money, the magazine, and the guns, should be made over to the Nana, who on his part bound himself to provide tonnage and permit every individual in the entrenchment to proceed to Allahabad unmolested. This agreement

* It will be recollected that it was Lord Dalhousie who annexed Oudh and deviated from the previously recognised practice of acknowledging the principle of adoption.

was drawn up in writing, signed, sealed, and ratified by a solemn oath by the Nana. On the morning of the 26th a committee of officers went down to examine the boats; they found them serviceable and in good order: they were molested neither in going nor in returning. On their report every preparation was made to start on the morrow.

That fatal day at length arrived, and on the morning of the 27th, carriage for the women, children, and wounded having arrived, the whole party started,—our men taking with them their muskets and ammunition, and being escorted by nearly the entire rebel force. They arrived at the river about 8 A.M. without being at all molested. There were no signs of any preparation for a breach of faith; they were even allowed to seat themselves in the boats, and some of these actually pushed off. But no sooner had our unfortunate countrymen laid down their muskets than, at a signal given by the Nana, two guns were run out, and opened upon them immediately, whilst the Sepoys, running from every direction, kept up a strong musketry fire. The boats' crews (natives) immediately deserted them; some of the boats were set on fire, whilst volley after volley was poured on the unhappy fugitives, numbers of whom as they attempted to get away were followed into the water breast-deep by the Sepoys. A few boats managed to get over to the opposite bank; but there they were met by the Sepoys of the 17th Native Infantry and by a regiment of Oudh Cavalry, who effectually prevented their escape. The boats, with one exception, were finally all secured, and all the males they contained were at once massacred: the women, reserved for a worse fate, were brought to the Nana's camp and placed in a brick building, where for the first three days no attention was paid them, beyond supplying them with food of the coarsest description.

But one boat had managed to run the terrible gauntlet, and on this many of the wounded and the refugees from other boats had crowded. The bloodthirsty Sepoys, not content with the massacre of the others, were resolved that our countrymen in this boat also should fall into their hands, that not one, in fact, should escape. For the first day and night she was followed by the two guns and by crowds of Sepoys along the bank.* On the 28th there was still one gun on the Cawnpore side, and the infantry on both sides blazing away. Still they pushed on. But on the morning of the third day their strength was gone, the boat had stuck on a sandbank; and there she lay, a mark for the enemy's fire. Directly any of our men jumped into the water to try and move her, they were fired upon by thirty or forty men at a time. In this emergency, it was resolved again to try the efficacy of a British charge, and fourteen of the wearied band were deputed to drive over the persevering fiends. Amongst them were Lieutenant Mowbray, Thomson, and Delafosse, 53rd Native Infantry, private Murphy of the 84th, and gunner Sullivan of the Artillery. Amongst those in the boat severely wounded was Captain Moore of H.M. 32nd, whose exertions in defence of the entrenchment had been the theme of

* Lieut. Delafosse's Narrative.

universal admiration: many other gallant spirits were there, stiff with their wounnds, or lying in the agony of death, unable to strike a blow for their own lives and those of their countrywomen. Of many tender beings the success of these fourteen was the last hope, the only chance of life. It was but a glimmering, and was destined soon to be extinguished. They saw them, however, advance boldly and rapidly, and drive the enemy before them. A bend of the river soon hid them from their sight: the sound of the firing grew fainter and fainter, and presently a boat filled with Sepoys was discerned advancing from the direction of Cawnpore.* They still, however, had sufficient strength to repulse these new assailants, and, a flood coming on in the night, they were carried off the sandbank and floated down a short distance. Meanwhile the Nana hearing of their position, had sent off a force of three companies of Sepoys to secure them: these, placing themselves on board boats propelled by men accustomed to the work, soon came up with our unfortunate countrymen, after a short struggle overpowered them, and, lifting them from their boat, took them back to Cawnpore in carts. On arriving there they were at once taken out of the carts and seated on the ground. There were sixty men, twenty-five women, and four children. The Nana in person ordered the men to be shot; but the Sepoys of the 1st Regiment, of which General Wheeler's son had been Quarter-master, making some demur, an Oudh regiment was brought up for the purpose. The order was then given to separate the wives from the husbands; but to this last indignity the poor captives refused to submit, and it was finally accomplished by force. In one instance husband and wife were so firmly locked together that they were unable to separate them, and finally desisted from the attempt. The Sepoys were then making every preparation to fire, when the Chaplain of Cawnpore, the Rev. E. Moncrieff, formerly Curate of Tooting, requested leave to read prayers. Permission being accorded, the whole party read and prayed together; they then shook hands all around. The signal was then given, and the Sepoys fired. Many were killed, others only wounded; but these latter were quickly despatched with swords. This bloody work having been completed, the women were conveyed to the place in which those previously captured were confined, whence the whole party, about 150 in number, were taken to the house in which they were finally slaughtered.

There yet remain to be accounted for the fourteen heroic Englishmen who left the boat on the sandbank to drive off their persevering assailants.† Wading to the shore, musket in hand, they charged the enemy: these did not wait their attack, but fled before them. Our party, however, having followed them up too far, were cut off from the river, and were compelled, for fear of being surrounded, to retire. Unable to make direct for the river, they took a road parallel to it, and came upon it a mile lower down. But as they approached, they found they had been cut off by a large body of men, whilst another party on the opposite bank was ready to receive them in case they

* Nujoor Tewarree's Account. † Lieut. Delafosse's Narrative.

should attempt to cross. There appeared indeed no hope of safety. But even at this moment they did not despair. Close to the river, and very near the force in front of them, was a small temple. They fired a volley at the enemy and made for this temple, losing in the attempt one man killed and one wounded. However, they gained it, and, secure themselves, they fired on every insurgent who showed himself. The enemy finding that they could effect nothing so long as our party remained inside, determined to smoke them out. They accordingly heaped wood all around it, and then set it on fire. Our gallant countrymen, unable to stand the smoke and heat, took off their clothes, and, musket in hand, charged through the fire and the enemy. Seven out of the twelve remaining reached the river, and began to swim for their lives, followed by the insurgents along both banks, wading and firing as fast as they could. Before they had gone far, two of their number were shot, leaving five only remaining. After swimming about three miles down the stream, one of these, an artillery-man, to rest himself, began swimming on his back, and not knowing in what direction he was going, got on shore and was killed. The other four, Lieutenants Thomson and Delafosse (the same whose heroism is recorded at page 137), private Murphy 84th, and gunner Sullivan of the Artillery, succeeded in out-swimming the mutineers, and finally gave themselves up to an Oudh raja who was friendly to the English. They eventually succeeded in rejoining a party of our troops.

It remains * only to add that, on the evening of the 27th June, the day on which his deed of treachery was consummated, the Nana celebrated his "victory" by a grand parade of his troops, at least ten thousand in number, on the plain of Subada to the north of our entrenchment. Three salutes were fired: one of twenty-one guns for the Nana as sovereign, nineteen guns for his brother Balla Sahib as Governor-General, and seventeen guns for Jowalla Pershad (a Brahmin) as Commander-in-Chief. He then caused to be proclaimed by beat of drum throughout the district that he had entirely conquered the British, whose period of rule in India had come to an end; that they were defeated at Delhi, and dared not set foot in Cawnpore; that he himself was prepared to drive them all out of India. A few days after, he broke up his camp and proceeded to his seat at Bithoor, where he ordered one hundred guns to be fired in honour of the King of Delhi, eighty in honour of his self-styled adopted father, the ex-Peishwa Bajee Rao, sixty in honour of himself, and twenty-one each for his mother and his wife. He evidently thought that he had laid the first stone of the Mahratta sovereignty, and made it firm with a bloody cement.

Such was the termination of the Cawnpore insurrection. If, on the one hand, it resulted in the defeat of our arms, in the massacre of our soldiers and our countrywomen, it formed, on the other, a scene for the display of those qualities which pre-eminently belong to the national character. We see here Englishmen, originally only three hundred and fifty strong, of whom two-thirds only had been bred to

* Mr. Shepherd's Narrative.

arms, their numbers daily decreasing, successfully defending a barrack situation on a level plain, against ten thousand trained soldiers,—for although the rebels numbered only four thousand when they made the first attack, yet, by reinforcements from Allahabad, Oudh, Agra, and other districts, they gradually increased to more than double that force. We see them deprived of animal food, living for days on half rations of grain, performing feats of individual heroism unsurpassed, eager to make a dash at the enemy with their full strength to the cry of victory or death, yet restrained solely by the thought that failure would leave three hundred and thirty women and children the prey of men who knew neither mercy nor pity, who neither feared God, nor regarded man. We see them again, on their own accounts unwillingly, and animated solely by a hope of saving the women and children, giving themselves up to a faithless enemy, who, despite of oaths the most binding, condemned them all to the most ruthless massacre. We see them finally in the hour of death, forcibly separated from their wives and daughters, still comforting themselves as Christians, devoutly appealing to their Creator for pardon, and, incapable of resistance, submitting, in firm reliance on Him, to the fire of the enemy.

But we may conjecture, Did they not, in that last hour, when they prayed to their God for pardon, look to their country also for retaliation on those who had so treacherously murdered them? Could they have imagined it possible that, within a few days of the account of their fate reaching Calcutta, an order would be issued by which immunity to their assassins would be virtually secured? by which evidence would be required as to the actual presence of every individual at this massacre before he could be convicted? Evidence! when the Sepoys had ruthlessly murdered all who could witness against them! Evidence! when the four native regiments at Cawnpore had for three weeks been attacking our countrymen in that all but defenceless barrack! Evidence! when it could be proved from the muster-rolls that there was scarcely a man belonging to those regiments * who was not a partner in the revolt, a consenter to the massacres that had been perpetrated from the very commencement! The names of the few who had remained staunch were known to Government; the rest had revolted *en masse!* But the members of the Government of India could not nerve themselves to summary proceedings. Instead of expressing sympathy for the dead, in place of acknowledging their devotion and their valour, they issued an edict, promising immunity to their murderers! Why should it have been otherwise? There are some natures so cold-blooded as to be incapable of feeling sympathy with suffering humanity. Lord Canning was safe: his kith and kin were far away in England: what were the lives of three or four hundred unknown English women and children to him? Was it worth while further perilling the ancient and anti-Christian system of Government, which had lasted a century, on such an account? The answer may be found in the Home Secretary's circular of the 30th July!

* The 1st, 6th, 17th, 53rd, 56th, Native Infantry; the 2nd Cavalry.

But the shades of our brave countrymen and the surviving relatives of our countrywomen appeal from the selfish and cold-blooded Government of Lord Canning to the People of England. Our generous-hearted countrymen at home have answered by anticipation. They have sent out their thousands of warriors; they have testified by public meetings, by subscriptions, by letters in the newspapers, how they sympathise with those who to the last never despaired of the fortunes of England, who, perishing in her cause with their latest breath testified to their belief in her ability to reassert her sway, who died, I must believe, in the fullest confidence that she would avenge them. And she will yet avenge them. The soldiers she has sent forth have no sympathy with the *doctrinaires* who govern India: no special pleading will restrain them; they will view with their own eyes the charnel-house in which our sisters were murdered, and the cry of all will be:—

"Front to front
Set thou these fiendlike Sepoys and ourselves;
Within our swords' length set them; if they 'scape,
Heaven forgive them too!"

CHAPTER VII.

HAVELOCK'S ADVANCE TO CAWNPORE. — FUTTEHGURH. — ATTEMPTS TO RELIEVE LUCKNOW.

It is now time to return to Havelock's movements. That gallant officer left Allahabad at 4 P. M. on the 7th July. His force was composed as follows:—

3rd company, 8th battalion Royal Artillery	-	76 men
H. M. 64th Regiment	-	435 „
„ 78th Highlanders	-	284 „
„ 84th Regiment	-	190 „
Volunteer Cavalry	-	20 „
Natives.		
Sikhs	-	150 „
Irregular Cavalry	-	30 „

His staff consisted of an assistant adjutant-general, an assistant quarter-master-general, and an aid-de-camp. In the selection of officers for these posts he had been particularly happy. Captain Beatson, of whom mention has already been made, filled the first-named office; Colonel Tytler, a dashing Irregular Cavalry officer, acted as quarter-master-general, and the General's son had been taken from the adjutancy of the 10th Foot to perform the duties of aid-de-camp in this his first campaign.

The rain was falling as the column passed through the streets

of Allahabad, extending for nearly three miles between the fort and the Grand Trunk Road leading to Cawnpore. As it marched, the inhabitants, so lately in revolt, turned out to observe our first offensive movement.* The Hindoos appeared indifferent or apprehensive; but wherever a Mahomedan was seen there was a scowl on his brow and a curse in his heart. Of such demonstrations our troops were careless: they had started on a noble errand; they were animated by the hope of being able to save, by the certainty at all events of avenging, their countrymen at Cawnpore: like Cromwell's Ironsides, there was a stern determination in their aspect, even in their very tread, which showed the earnestness of purpose within. For the first three days they marched at the ordinary rate of about thirteen miles a day: the weather was hot, and there was more to be risked in hurrying them on unnecessarily than was to be gained by forced marches. Whatever might have been the prevailing impression among the men, Havelock knew that Cawnpore had fallen. Major Renaud, with his advanced party, seven hundred strong, was within nineteen miles of Futtehpore. All his efforts were being exerted to settle the country, and procure information from the front; and it was to him that the General would look for the intelligence which would quicken his movements. For the first three days, then, they took the ordinary marches. The entire country was under water, the rainy season having set in with great severity. Our troops, however, marched cheerily on; the road presented one scene of desolation, every one of the staging bungalows erected for the accommodation of travellers had been pillaged and burnt down by the insurgents; on the other hand, their blackened homesteads, and the bodies of rebels hanging by half dozens from trees on the road-side, and nick-named by our soldiers "acorns," afforded ample evidence that Renaud had not been slack in the work of retribution.

On the 11th the force arrived at Khagu, twenty-four miles from Futtehpore. They had scarcely reached the ground when information was received from Renaud, himself then only five miles in advance, that the enemy were advancing in considerable force on Futtehpore, and that it was apparently their intention to hold that place against us. Havelock could scarcely credit such good tidings: no one indeed thought that they would be foolish enough to move out of Cawnpore, and give us the opportunity of beating them in detail. However, the authority was good, and the news positive. Havelock therefore, sending orders to Renaud to be prepared to join him with his detachment on the following morning, broke up his camp at midnight.

After an hour and a half's marching, the two detachments met, and went on together. The plan of the General was to halt about six miles from Futtehpore, rest his troops for the day, reconnoitre that place, and, if the enemy should be found in position there, to move on him the following morning. In accordance with this idea, on arriving at Belunda, within five miles of Futtehpore, the column

* Letter in a London Paper.

was halted, the men fell out to light their pipes and make a brew of tea, whilst a party of Volunteer Horse, under Colonel Tytler, went in advance to reconnoitre.

Whilst they are engaged in this important movement, it may be as well to return for a brief period to Cawnpore, and ascertain as far as possible the intentions and objects of the Nana Sahib.

Scarcely had that miscreant proclaimed himself Sovereign of the Mahrattas, when he experienced the cares and perils of his elevation. He found himself not the master, but the servant, of those mutinous Sepoys whom he had abetted in their treachery; many of them were anxious to proceed to their homes, and enjoy or secure their ill-gotten plunder. Others again, and in this line of policy the native officers of the 2nd Cavalry took the lead, pressed him to pursue his advantage, and exterminate the "Kafirs" * at Allahabad. The Nana himself was very much under the influence of these men; they had been the leaders of the revolt; they had influenced the Infantry regiments to turn and attack us; they had superintended the slaughter of our countrymen; they were relentless and violent in their hatred to us. The views of the Nana also coincided with theirs; he probably felt that he would never be safe at Cawnpore so long as a base for operations remained to us in the Fort of Allahabad; to be secure he must have more blood. He, therefore, was not indisposed to march against us.

The difficulty consisted in persuading the troops to leave their ease and plunder for a fresh campaign against the dreaded "Gora log." But he was well served with spies: all our movements were reported to him, and at this crisis he received information of the march of Renaud's column from Allahabad. This was just what he wanted. He communicated with the native officers of the 2nd Cavalry; then held a durbar, in which he pointed out the ease and facility with which Renaud's detachment might be cut off, and the treasure they had with them plundered.

Both these inducements and that belief in his own invincibility, which even the cowardly massacre of Cawnpore naturally produces in the mind of a native †, had the desired effect. An expedition was at once organised to crush Renaud.

It left Cawnpore on the morning of the 8th July, commanded by Sikka Singh, subadar of the 2nd Cavalry. At 8 o'clock on the morning of the 12th, as our troops were marching on to the encampment of Bolinda, the enemy's force, composed of 100 native artillerymen and twelve guns, 500 cavalry, 1400 mutinous Sepoys, and 1500 Mahrattas and armed insurgents, was passing through Futtehpore. They had advanced some little distance on our side of that place, their infantry, in column of route, marching along the high road, with three guns, a 6, a 9, and a 24-pound howitzer, a little in advance, and about half a mile in rear, the Mahrattas with two guns, an iron 18, and

* Europeans.

† A native classes every species of "Killing" with "courage." Even in his sports he is cruel; after having wounded a deer or a hare, he will prefer torturing it to putting it out of misery.

an iron 24-pounder, the cavalry on their flanks, when Colonel Tytler with his reconnoitring party rode up. He had scarcely halted his escort, and taken a position in advance to survey the enemy's position, when he was seen, and their entire cavalry dashed at him. There was nothing for it but to gallop back with the information to the General. That instant the assembly sounded, the troops fell in as cheery and hearty as possible, notwithstanding that a bright July sun was burning overhead, and they had just marched eighteen miles. The guns, eight in number, under Captain Maude of the Royal Artillery, moved to the front, and a cloud of skirmishers, armed with the Enfield rifle, aligned themselves with them, ready to concentrate their fire on the head of the enemy's column, which by this time was seen in the distance advancing. Behind the guns were the several detachments of infantry, forming a line of quarter-distance columns at deploying distance: the Volunteer Horse guarded the left flank. The bulk of the Irregular Cavalry was on the right.

These dispositions had not been completed, when the enemy's artillery, coming within distance, opened fire on our men, their infantry still remaining in quarter-distance columns; their cavalry, at the same time, wearing their cold-weather suit of French grey and mounted on stud horses, but armed in the native fashion, threatened our flanks. Their guns were permitted to fire two or three rounds before ours replied; but the moment our dispositions were completed, Captain Maude answered them, and in a few minutes it became a species of duello at 400 yards between our artillery and theirs, ours assisted by the skirmishing fire of the Enfield rifles. This appeared to paralyse them; its range took them quite by surprise, and, being quite unable to reply to it, they deserted their guns in a shorter space of time than it has taken to record it. Colonel Tytler, Captains Maude and Beatson, then raced up to have the honour of capturing the guns. They were all close together, and the honour may be equally divided, although Captain Beatson was first up. The infantry then deploying, advanced in pursuit, and although the enemy endeavoured to make a second stand by falling back on their 18 and 20-pounders, it was but momentary: they dreaded the Enfield rifle, but still more the bayonet, and they fled in confusion—Major Renaud, commanding the advance, pushing on their centre, composed of the main body of their infantry, and giving them no rest.

Meanwhile the enemy's cavalry were manœuvring very steadily and with great precision on our flanks; they were anxious evidently to get round and take our infantry in rear; on our left they were checked by the steady attitude of our Volunteer Horse; but on the right we were nearly meeting with a disaster.

In that quarter was the remnant of the Irregular Cavalry that had remained faithful at Benares and Allahabad. They had hitherto acted with spirit against the insurgent villagers, but to fight their kinsmen was a different affair. They were advancing on the right of our line, when about eighteen or twenty horsemen (formerly of our own 2nd cavalry) advanced towards them at a trot, and called out to them in the most appealing terms to join them. Lieut. Palliser who com-

manded the Irregulars at once sounded the charge: he was followed most gallantly by Lieut. Simpson, the adjutant, but by only three or four of the men. Seeing this, the enemy's cavalry came down upon this handful, charged them, and somehow in the scrimmage, Palliser was unhorsed. It would then have gone hard with him, but that some of the men who had previously refused to follow him, rallied round him, and brought him off. At this place seven of the Irregulars were killed, and three or four wounded, while but one of the enemy's horsemen lay dead upon the field; three or four however were wounded.

While this was going on on the right our main body of infantry was passing through Futtehpore; the right column, consisting of two companies of the Madras Fusiliers and one of the 78th Highlanders, was making its way through the walled enclosures, gardens, and plantations that skirt the left of that town. At this moment they beheld the Irregular Cavalry coming towards them in full flight, pursued by the troopers of the 2nd (enemy's) cavalry. Captain Beatson, who was with the infantry, at once halted the column, and having succeeded by his coolness and commanding manner in halting the fugitives, directed a volley to be poured in upon the enemy: he never attempted to form our men into square, although they were expecting the order, but remaining in line, some even in skirmishing order, they succeeded not only in checking but driving off the enemy.

All this time the centre and left were pressing into and beyond Futtehpore. The town or village consists of but one narrow street, with lofty houses, high walls, and garden enclosures, on either side. This street was found to be choked up with the enemy's baggage, which had followed close upon his main column: so closely, indeed, were they packed that they presented the appearance of a defence run up by the enemy; but a few rounds of shrapnel and the action of the skirmishers on the flanks speedily dislodged the most hardy of their opponents, and caused them to abandon the whole of their stores. In the midst of the ruck were two new six pounders, with limbers and ammunition complete, besides large quantities of gun and musket ammunition; a little beyond, two tumbrils of treasure were found, one of which fell into the hands of the Sikhs and was no more seen.* Amongst the plunder which was taken on this occasion were ladies' dresses, worsted work, and other tokens of our lost countrywomen, the discovery of which served to make the men still wilder for vengeance.†

By the time the baggage had been cleared away from the town, the artillery had passed through, and a last parting shot had been sent at the enemy's infantry, it was past mid-day. The heat was intense; many of the men dropped down, struck by the sun, some never to rise again. These, indeed, formed the only casualties amongst the Europeans; their number amounted to twelve. The fury of the sun had effected more injury than the fire of the enemy.

* Correspondent, "Saturday Review." † Ibid.

In addition to their baggage, treasure, and camp-equipage, twelve pieces of ordnance fell into our hands; the enemy were too intent on flight to care to struggle for their guns.

It was nearly 1 o'clock before our wearied troops, who had marched four-and-twenty miles and fought a pitched battle on an empty stomach, reached their encamping ground; their tents were pitched, and it was on the hard ground and in the shade of the mango-trees that our exhausted countrymen sought for repose.

The action of Futtehpore, in the manner in which it was conducted, as well as in its result, was a type of many that were to follow. It showed that meeting the enemy face to face in the field, we must inevitably beat him; that he could not stand for an instant against our men: but it also evidenced that our deficiency in one arm, in cavalry, almost neutralised this vast superiority. We could beat the enemy, but we had no means of following him up; he was consequently able to take up a new position, often a stronger one, after each defeat.

If the Government had acceded to Captain Beatson's proposition already alluded to—if it had even adopted General Havelock's suggestion, of sending up the officers of disbanded corps to act as troopers—if it had called for volunteers from the infantry, and taking the horses from the native body guard, had sent them up by steamer, or by forced marches, in the middle of June, Havelock might have had at his disposal a body of 400 horse, splendidly mounted, and all drilled men. With these at Futtehpore, he could have destroyed many of the enemy; had they joined him even at Cawnpore, he could have annihilated him.

But of what avail was the iron firmness of our general, the unmatched bravery of our troops, placed under the control of red-tape officials? For want of cavalry, all their labours, all their exertions, all their privations were of comparatively little avail. The enemy, though invariably beaten, yet never followed up, aided too by that powerful sun under which they could move about with comfort, whilst its rays were fatal to our men, as constantly re-appeared, their leader rejoicing if, by the sacrifice of ten of his own followers, he could spill the blood of even one European.

On the 13th, the day after the action, Havelock halted his men, as well to give them rest as to bring in the captured guns and ammunition; much of the latter, which could not be brought on, was destroyed. It may here be mentioned that no sooner had the victory been gained, and our troops had entered Futtehpore, than the deputy-collector of that place, the man who had murdered Robert Tucker, Hikrimtoolah Khan, came out to meet us, little thinking that his crimes had been discovered. It is needless to add that he was at once seized, tried, and hanged.

On the 14th, the march was resumed. The road was strewed with evidences of the precipitancy of the enemy's flight, tents standing in their camp, chests of cartridges, and various articles of property. The morning was unmarked by any particular event, but one slight incident afforded an opportunity for disarming the Irregular Cavalry.

These men, after their disgraceful behaviour on the 12th, had been turned into baggage-guards. Whether they were unable to resist the temptation thus offered, or were actuated by a spirit of disaffection, is immaterial. On the morning of the 14th, as they were in rear with the baggage, the alarm was given that the enemy were in force in a village in front, whereupon the artillery was brought up, and a few rounds of shot and shell were fired into it. Hearing the firing in front, the sowars believed that a good opportunity offered to make free with the baggage. Fortunately, the alarm was a false one, and the plunderers were discovered in the very act. The Highlanders at once went after them; they were brought into camp, and at once disarmed and dismounted. Their horses were found useful for the public service.

It is an almost incredible, but well authenticated fact, that many of these men, disarmed on the 14th July, 1857, for base and treacherous behaviour, and for misconduct in the field on the 12th, were, on the 28th of August following, promoted to higher rank in their corps, one of them to the title of "Buhadoor" for "exemplary loyalty," and "conspicuous acts of devotion to the state," — their loyalty consisting in their refusal to face the mutineers on the 12th, their devotion in attempting to plunder the baggage of our army!*

On the evening of the 14th, intelligence was received that the enemy had entrenched themselves at Aoung, a small village some six miles distant. Our force then started on the 15th, in anticipation of a fight. Directly Havelock came within range, their guns opened upon him; our artillery, however, had been greatly strengthened by the guns captured at Futtehpore; they at once moved to the front, the skirmishers aligned with them, as on the previous occasion. The enemy also threw out skirmishers, and sent his cavalry to turn our right flank: the guns and the Enfield rifles succeeded, after a smart encounter, in driving them back, but only that they might make a wider detour, and fall on our rear. But a sergeant of the Highlanders, who had been left in charge of the baggage and sick, collected all the stragglers, and received the enemy with such a volley that they were glad to make off. Meanwhile, their guns in front had been silenced by ours, and our men, pressing onwards under Colonel Tytler, carried the village after some hard fighting. The enemy were not here, as at Futtehpore, taken by surprise; they expected us, and fought much better.

* Vide Government Gazette, 29th August, 1857.

The names of the men who were dismounted on the 14th July, and promoted on 28th August, were as follows:—

Repaldar Heera Singh, 13th Irregular Cavalry, received title of Buhadoor for exemplary loyalty to the state, — dismounted.

Naib Repaldar Maharaj Singh, promoted to Repaldar for conspicuous acts of devotion to the state, — dismounted.

Duffadar Ulta Hossen Beg, promoted to Jemadar for ditto, — deserted.

Kote Duffadar Delaur Hossein, promoted to Ressaidar for ditto, — dismounted.

Duffadar Khurrug Singh, promoted to Jemadar for ditto, — dismounted.

Duffadar Share Singh, ditto, ditto, for ditto, — dismounted.

As our men halted on the other side to rest after the engagement, which had lasted fully two hours, information was received that the insurgents had retired to a very strong entrenchment on the other side of the Pandoo Nuddy, and that they were then preparing to blow up the bridge. Forward again was the cry: the troops got up with alacrity, and recommenced their march. They had scarcely gone three miles, when the little nullah, swollen by the rains to the dimensions of a large river, the stone bridge intact, and the enemy's entrenchment on the other side, burst upon the view. The bridge was guarded by two long 24-pounders, and we had just become visible, when a puff of smoke was seen, and the shot came pounding amongst our advance. Our guns of smaller calibre never attempted to reply, but moved on steadily in face of a continuous fire till well within range, when unlimbering, they opened fire. The effect was instantaneous. The fire of the enemy ceased as if by magic. It subsequently transpired that the first discharge from our guns had smashed their sponge-staffs, and, having none in reserve, they could no longer load their pieces. Finding the firing suddenly cease, the general sent forward the Fusiliers under Major Renaud, whilst the guns turned on the cavalry. The Fusiliers, advancing in skirmishing order, and covering the rest of the force, quickly gained the bridge, dashed on to it with rare gallantry at a run, and drove the enemy before them. The victory was now gained, and the guns, limbering up and crossing the bridge, poured a last volley on the flying enemy. It was ascertained, after the engagement, that, had we not advanced that afternoon, the bridge would have been blown up, and we should have been left to cross as best we could. There were no boats available for the purpose, and the river was not fordable. Our loss must necessarily have been very severe. Of such importance is promptitude in war.

In these two actions, we lost about five-and-twenty men in killed and wounded. But the loss most sensibly felt was that of Major Renaud, of the Madras Fusiliers, a most able officer, who had hitherto always commanded the advance. He was wounded in the thigh by a musket ball, whilst cheering on his men to the bridge; he did not survive more than two days. His short career in Bengal had been most brilliant, and he died nobly doing his duty.

In these actions, too, the want of cavalry paralysed our successes. With four hundred men, the slaughter at the Pandoo Nuddy might not only have been avoided, but our men going on might have held the bridge, and the insurgents would have been in our power.

Let it be remembered that, as will be recorded in full detail presently, it was on that very evening that the Nana Sahib, enraged at the defeat and flight of his legions, murdered in the most savage, horrible, heart-rending manner, our countrywomen at Cawnpore. It is not only possible, but probable that, if we had had cavalry, this awful catastrophe might have been prevented. Not only might the rebels have been hemmed in, in the manner described in the preceding paragraph, but a detachment, pushing on that night before the news of the defeat of his troops could have reached the Nana,

would, by their sudden arrival, have so terrified the Asiatic spirit, ready at all times to sink from excess of triumph to the lowest depth of depression, that he would have had neither time nor opportunity to execute his merciless intentions.

But we had no cavalry; and whilst the horses of the native body-guard were growing sleek in their stables near Calcutta, whilst hundreds of young officers were panting to flesh their maiden swords, and many infantry privates were available and anxious for the service, not a step was taken in the matter; no cavalry were embodied until it was "too late"* and for want of them our countrywomen were massacred.

Our tired soldiers bivouacked that night on the spot whence the last gun was fired at the retreating enemy. But to them there was little rest. That evening, Havelock received information that his most severe encounter would take place on the morrow, and that the Nana in person, at the head of 7000 men, would oppose his advance into Cawnpore, every defensible point of which had been strongly fortified.

This intelligence roused every one to fresh exertion. News had reached our camp the day before, that our unfortunate countrywomen were then alive, and our gallant troops were not without the hope that their exertions might not be altogether in vain — that they might yet arrive in time to save them. The very idea shook off all sense of fatigue. That night they moved on, proud in hope, and strong and stern in the thought of vengeance. Cawnpore was twenty-two miles distant: they marched that night and morning fourteen. Bivouacking then under the trees, and there cooking and eating their food, at 2 P.M. the signal for advance was given. They moved in the array of battle, the small body of volunteer cavalry in advance, the artillery behind, supported by the infantry. The heat was fearful: at every step some one fell out of the ranks, many never to return to them, and the calls for water were loud and continuous. After proceeding for about two miles, the force of the enemy became visible — every point guarded — the guns bearing on the road by which it was thought we must advance. But Havelock had determined to trust rather to generalship than to dash, or, to speak more correctly, to the combination of both. As soon then as he ascertained the position of the enemy's batteries, he still advanced his handful of cavalry to mask his movement, but made with the bulk of his force a detour to the right with the view of taking the enemy in flank. This masterly movement had all the effect he anticipated; the enemy's guns poured their showers of shot and shell in the direction of the cavalry, whilst the main body moved off unmolested. But our men had not proceeded half a mile before they were perceived, and the enemy at once changed the direction of their fire. Not a gun of ours replied. Havelock had resolved to reserve his fire, until it could take place with effect. Forward then, with sloped arms, our men advanced, trudging alternately through marshy and ploughed land, the fierce

* 23rd July.

CHAPTER VI.

How Joseph, when he was become famous in Egypt, had his brethren in subjection.

§ 1. JOSEPH was now grown up to thirty years of age, and enjoyed great honours from the king, who called him Psothom Phaneeh, out of regard to his prodigious degree of wisdom; for that name denotes the Revealer of Secrets. He also married a wife of very high quality; for he married the daughter of Petephres*, one of the priests of Heliopolis: she was a virgin, and her name was Asenath. By her he had children before the scarcity came on: Manasseh, the elder, which signifies Forgetful, because his present happiness made him forget his former misfortunes; and Ephraim, the younger, which signifies Restored, because he was restored to the freedom of his forefathers. Now after Egypt had happily passed over seven years, according to Joseph's interpretation of the dreams, the famine came upon them in the eighth year; and because this misfortune fell upon them when they had no sense of it beforehand†, they were all sorely afflicted by it, and came running to the king's gates; and he called upon Joseph, who sold the corn to them, being become confessedly a saviour to the whole multitude of the Egyptians. Nor did he open this market of corn for the people of that country only, but strangers had liberty to buy also; Joseph being willing that all men, who are naturally akin to one

* This Potiphar, or, as Josephus, Petephres, who was now a priest of On, or Heliopolis, is the same name in Josephus, and perhaps in Moses also, with him who is before called head cook or captain of the guard, and to whom Joseph was sold; see Gen. xxxvii. 36. xxxix. 1. with xli. 50. They are also affirmed to be one and the same person in the Testament of Joseph, § 18. for he is there said to have married the daughter of his master and mistress. Nor is this a notion peculiar to that testament: but as Dr. Bernard confesses, note on Antiq. B. II. chap. iv. § 1. common to Josephus, to the Septuagint interpreters, and to other learned Jews of old time.

† This entire ignorance of the Egyptians of these years of famine before they came, told us before, as well as here, chap. v. § 7. by Josephus, seems to be almost incredible. It is in no other copy that I know of.

few inspiriting words. "That gun must be taken by the bayonet; I must have it. No firing; and recollect that I am with you." There needed no more; the two regiments advanced, the grape from the battery crashing through them. They fired four times before they charged, but when they did charge their onset was irresistible. All opposition was now over, but the troops still advanced; as they came upon the ridge which immediately overlooks the grand parade, the artillery came to the front and chased the rebels into the town: here again the want of cavalry was keenly felt; with the aid of that arm the enemy might have been cut up almost to a man, his retreat on Bithoor intercepted, and the Nana himself captured. As it was, he effected his escape across the canal, and thence marched leisurely on his stronghold. Our army bivouacked for the night on the plain of Jubada.

Such was the battle of Cawnpore, in which 1000 British troops and 300 Sikhs, labouring under every disadvantage, a powerful sun over their heads, a merciless enemy in their front strongly entrenched, without cavalry, and with an artillery of inferior weight, defeated 5000 native troops, armed and trained by our own officers. Perhaps in no action that ever was fought was the superior power of arrangement, moral force, personal daring, and physical strength of the European over the Asiatic more apparent. The rebels fought well; many of them did not flinch from a hand to hand encounter with our troops; they stood well to their guns, served them with accuracy: but yet, in spite of this, of their strong position, of their disproportionate excess in number, they were beaten.

Napoleon has, in his memoirs, alluded to the immense effect which *morale* has on the physical efforts of soldiers. Never was the truth of this axiom exemplified to a greater extent than at Cawnpore. The enemy were traitors and rebels, who had gained possession of the station which they were now fighting for by the treacherous and cruel murder of their masters; they were men not only without honour, but devoid even of a conscience; they pretended to have revolted from us on account of their religion, and yet the Hindoo portion of them, at least, had committed or connived at enormities which, according to their own impure theology, would have caused the transmigration of their souls into the meanest species of animal; they had, in fact, been corrupted from their allegiance by appeals to their avarice, and they were now fighting in the sole hope of being able to retain the plunder which had accrued to them by treachery and murder. Assailed by the countrymen of those whom they had murdered and despoiled, with what heart could these men combat? Their negation of conscience was their only saving clause, for, with that guilty witness in their bosoms, their evil deeds must have choked them!

On the other hand our men, strong in the conviction not of the justice only, but of the holiness of their cause, seeing before them, not an enemy they could respect, but the vilest assassins, murderers of women and children, were animated by a zeal and fervour which nothing could repress or resist. Had you directed one of those men,

on an ordinary day in cantonments, to walk ten miles under a July sun, fully armed and equipped, with sixty rounds of ammunition in his pouch, he would have considered it the most cruel order that could have been issued. But, animated by the holy feeling of revenging his murdered countrywomen, this was but a light undertaking. Neither the length of the road, the heat of the sun, the weight of his accoutrements, or the fire of the foe diminished his ardour: he was sensible when in action of none of these difficulties; he pressed on, conquering and to conquer, because he felt that his cause was a righteous cause, and that in no other quarrel could the strength, the intelligence, and the capacity with which he had been endowed by his Maker be more nobly or more worthily employed.

Thus inspired, no numbers were too disproportioned. Our troops bivouacked on the Cawnpore parade ground; no tents were pitched, but, after such a day's work, even the wet ground was a luxury; and though disturbed for a few minutes by a false alarm of an enemy, they slept, and slept soundly.

Our loss, in killed and wounded, was about a hundred. But chiefly was to be mourned the death of Stuart Beatson, the Assistant-Adjutant-General. Arriving from Persia in a weakly state of health, and actuated solely by devotion to his country, he had endured with fortitude and even pleasure, all the privations of the campaign. He had ever been foremost in the fight, and had never lost an opportunity of showing his capacity. Though suffering from the effects of fatigue, he shrank not from the anticipated dangers of the 16th of July. But the sun, more dreaded than the enemy, struck him down. Recovering from this shock, it was yet only to meet the more fatal onslaught of cholera, which carried him off on the following day. In him, Havelock lost one of his ablest followers, the most earnest, disinterested of soldiers. In addition to his military acquirements, Stuart Beatson possessed very considerable literary capabilities, which he was fond of exercising. His store of varied knowledge, his genial wit, and his kindliness of heart, made him a most delightful companion, one who will never be forgotten by the many friends who have been left to mourn his lot in India.

Our troops, I have said, slept on the night of the 16th. Let them sleep on, for the morrow will convey to them fearful tidings; while they rest, be it our task to notice the occurrences which had taken place in Cawnpore and its vicinity since we last parted from it. And first must be recorded the tragedy of Futtehgurh.

Futtehgurh is a small station on the right bank of the river Ganges, eighty-three miles above Cawnpore. It is the head of the agency for the manufacture of gun carriages, being, by its vicinity to the vast forests of the Serai, peculiarly adapted for the storing of wood. The agency yard itself is merely an enclosure surrounded by mud walls on three sides abutting on the river on the fourth. Within these walls is a bungalow for the residence of the agent, and large go-downs for the reception of muster guns, carriages, ammunition, &c.

The rising in the Bareilly district (which will be treated of in

another chapter), the revolt in Oudh, and the events at Cawnpore, had had their influence on the residents at Futtehgurh. They were thus cut off from all land communication with any of our military posts; the river alone was available. The troops at Futtehgurh consisted of a detail of Native Artillery, and the 10th Native Infantry. This latter was one of the regiments which had volunteered for and had proceeded to Burma, on the occasion of the late war with the King of Ava. It had there done good service. In addition to the officers of the 10th, there were at Futtehgurh the gun-carriage agent, Major Robertson, the judge, magistrate, and an assistant, Colonel Goldie, his wife, and his daughters, on leave, the chaplain, the Reverend Mr. Fisker, several indigo-planters, tent-makers, merchants, and others. Here, also, were the native Orphan Asylum, and a large native Christian community under the special care of the members of the American Presbyterian mission, a most devoted body of men. So great was the alarm amongst the non-military portion that, on the 3rd of June, they held a meeting, and resolved to leave Futtehgurh by boat on the following day, it having been currently reported that the 10th had resolved to mutiny on the 5th. The party, consisting of about 166, including women and children, started accordingly at one o'clock on the morning of the 4th, and got on very well as far as they went. The next morning they were joined by three officers of the 10th, with the information that that regiment had mutinied.

This intelligence was untrue. The fact was, that there was an attempt to break out of the jail; some of the convicts actually did get out, and, firing a portion of the station, advanced towards the cantonment. It was this that the three officers mistook for the mutiny of the regiment, and to avoid its effects they went off to join the boats; had they remained, they would have seen their own men turning out willingly and beating back and securing the jail-birds.

The boats meanwhile went on, but were fired upon by the villagers; information also reached the fugitives that the Oudh troops had assembled a little below to obstruct their further passage. Whilst they were debating on their plans, Hurdeobukhsh, an Oudh landholder, and owner of the petty fort or "gurhee" of Dhurrumpore, offered them protection, if they would remain with him. The counsels were divided. Forty, however, including two of the officers, the collector, Mr. Probyn and his wife, and Mr. Edwards, accepted the offer. The boats, then carrying only 126 passengers, went on downwards towards Cawnpore; they could have met with little obstruction, as it is known they reached that station on the 12th. But tidings of their arrival had preceded them; they were intercepted and taken on shore, and massacred by Nana Sahib in the manner recorded in the seventh chapter. Meanwhile the majority of the party, which had taken refuge at Dhurrumpore, hearing that the troops at Futtehgurh had not mutinied, resolved to return thither. This they did. Mr. Probyn, his wife and family, and Mr. Edwards, alone remaining.

At Futtehgurh all had been quiet: the military had been engaged in as far as possible providing against an outbreak. Still the behaviour of the 10th had been on the whole satisfactory. A few of the young Sepoys had indeed on one occasion shown a refractory spirit, but the firmness and promptitude of the colonel — Colonel Smith, a capital officer — had put it down most effectually. Had they been left to themselves, all would still have gone well; but they were about to be exposed to new dangers and temptations.

On the 15th June, the revolted 41st Native Infantry, fresh from the slaughters of Seetapore and Mohammerah*, arrived on the left bank of the Ganges opposite Futtehgurh. They at once sent over to the 10th an invitation to join them in murdering their officers and seizing the treasure. But the men of the 10th, even if they would have accepted the former proposal, saw no advantage in sharing treasure which was already *de facto* theirs. They accordingly replied to the 41st that they would have nothing to do with rebels and traitors, and were resolved to remain true to their salt. At the same time, by order of their commanding officer, they zealously set to work in breaking up the bridge of boats which connected the right bank of the river with the left, and in sinking all the other boats they could lay hands on.

On the evening of the 17th June, however, the 41st, having ascended the river, found the means of crossing, — the same having been furnished, it is supposed, by the Nawab †,— and that night marched down towards Futtehgurh. On hearing of their approach, there was a great commotion in the lines of the 10th; many wished to remain faithful; others were as resolved to take possession of the treasure. A bold movement decided them; the Grenadier Company seized the bullocks, yoked them to the treasure cart, and marching to the Nawab, saluted him as ruler of the district; the treasure, however, they kept to themselves. They then, joining the 41st, marched to attack the Sepoys who remained faithful to us; many of these, seeing the course of events, joined them, but a few, conspicuous amongst whom was the havildar major, still held out, even to blows; but they were beaten and dispersed, and the havildar major hanged as an example to the rest.

Meanwhile our countrymen and women, one hundred and ten in number, of whom thirty-three only were able-bodied men, had retired into the Agency Compound, which served them as a fort. They had about three hundred muskets, seven guns, viz. three, six, and nine-pounders, and twelve, eighteen, and twenty-four pound howitzers, and a small brass mortar. But there was a very limited supply of ammunition, — even of gunpowder, — and they lay therefore under the necessity of husbanding their resources as much as possible.

On the 27th June the attack on their position began. It is needless to follow them through the daily round of their defence, varied

* To be recorded subsequently.

† The Nawab of Futtehgurh, a Mahomedan and a man of great influence, has since assumed the government of the district.

as it was by few uncommon incidents. Suffice it to say that after defending themselves with great spirit up to the 4th July, with two practicable breaches in the walls, with a mine underneath them almost ready to be sprung, wearied with fatigue, two of their number killed, others disabled, they resolved on evacuating their position, and trusting to the Ganges. On the 4th July, accordingly, they embarked in three boats, and started. As they passed the fort, the Sepoys saw them, and calling out, "The Feringhees are running away," pursued them with a hot fire for about a mile along the banks, but happily without effect.

They had not proceeded far before one of the boats became unmanageable, and they shifted into two. In these they proceeded in safety as far as a place called Singheerampore. Here, unfortunately, one of the boats grounded. Guns were immediately opened upon her from the bank, and although our countrymen, wading in the water, made many efforts to shove her off, they were all fruitless. They had been in this position half an hour, when two boats, apparently empty, were seen coming down the stream; on approaching them, they were found to be filled with Sepoys, who immediately opened a strong fire of musketry on our party. Not content with this, they came close and commenced boarding the boat. On seeing this, and finding resistance ineffectual, our countrymen resolved rather to fall into the hand of God than of man, and to trust rather to the Ganges than to the mercy of the Sepoys. In carrying out this resolve, many of course were drowned, — all the ladies and children. But Major Robertson, and Mr. Churcher, junior, succeeded in reaching the shore, and were cared for by friendly natives. Mr. Fisher too, and Mr. Jones *, swam on and were taken up by the sole remaining boat.

But on board of this everything was in confusion; attracted, however, by voices from the shore, they put in for the night, and were kindly received by the villagers. Here Mr. Jones, suffering intensely from a wound, remained, careless of the fate that might be in store for him, and to this circumstance he owed his life. The remainder of the fugitives started on the following morning, and proceeded safely as far as a village just above Bithoor, of which † a man named Jussa Singh was the Zumindar. As they were passing this, the people on the bank called out that their Rajah was friendly to the British. Allured by this statement they took the boat into the bank, but they had no sooner landed than they were made prisoners by the Zumindar. Information of their seizure was forthwith sent to Nana Sahib, who immediately despatched carriages and other conveyances for the ladies and children, twenty-three in number, whilst the men, of whom there were twelve, walked. They were, with the exceptions already noted, the sole survivors of the Futtehgurh party. On arriving at Cawnpore, on the evening of the 11th July, they were thrust into the little house in which our country-

* From whose narrative these particulars are chiefly taken.

† Statement of Lall Khan.

women, the survivors of the tragedies of the 27th and 28th of June, were congregated.

Here they were, in a small, confined building, lying in filth, without comfort of any sort, their food, bread, water, and salt, their bedding, the hard floor. Surrounded by savages who insulted them, who took a delight in their miseries, their children pining, even dying before their eyes, themselves powerless to help them—what must have been their feelings? They must at least have felt satisfied that, in the event of their murder, they would be terribly avenged. Hoping, perhaps, that they might be relieved, they must at times have anticipated their fate. Themselves Englishwomen, accustomed all their lives to exact courtesy from others, they must, even at the last hour, have been animated by a proud consciousness that England's hand would yet reach the fiends that were tormenting them. The inscriptions on the wall prove this; these show that our murdered ladies were animated by a full conviction that we should advance, and that speedily, to the rescue, though not in time to save, yet certainly to avenge them.

And it must be acknowledged that of those who have been engaged in the terrible work of retribution, all parties but one have done their duty nobly. Our generals, our officers, our soldiers, have lost no opportunity of dealing out a vengeance as prompt as it has been severe. The Government of India alone has held back; the Government of India alone, by its representatives in Government House, has openly proclaimed its sympathy with our "poor Sepoys." Not a word for our suffering soldiers, not a syllable of commiseration for our murdered countrywomen: but even after the event I am now about to record had been published, for whomsoever sympathy might have been felt, it was expressed at the parties in Government House only for the Sepoys who had been disarmed because they had conspired!

It will presently be shown that these were not mere words: that all the acts of the Government of India have tended to show, that they considered these mutinous, murdering Sepoys in the light of pet children, who should be coaxed back to their duty, and in no case punished for their bloody deeds.

People have talked, and may still talk, of strengthening the hands of this Government? Of what use is it to strengthen the hands when the head is weak, the heart tainted, the blood cold—the whole system rotten. To strengthen the hands of such a one, is to infuse fresh poisonous virus into the body, to give greater capabilities for mischief.

To return to the sad story of our countrywomen. There were upwards of one hundred and eighty of them in that little two-roomed house that has been so often described. On the morning of the 15th, the Nana's best troops had gone out to stay our progress at Pondoo Nuddy; in the evening they came back baffled, beaten, savage. Defeated by our men they resolved to work vengeance on our unarmed women. The Nana was nothing loth. He forthwith gave the order for an unreserved massacre. It was a congenial task for the fiends by whom he was surrounded. With every kind of weapon,

from the bayonet to the butcher's knife, from the battle-axe to the club, they assaulted these English ladies; they cut off their breasts, they lopped off limbs, they beat them down with clubs, they trampled on them with their feet: their children they tossed upon bayonets: blood flowed like water, but they were not glutted, nor did they quit that building, till they were satisfied that not a living soul remained behind them. The bodies yet warm, in some life not yet extinct, were dragged into a well hard by, limb separated from limb, — all were thrown in in one commingled mass: the blood was left to soak into the floor, to remain a lasting memento of insatiable vengeance.

It was this sight which met our victorious soldiers on the 17th July, as they entered the re-conquered station. The 84th in advance marched across the canal, and scoured the town, but scarcely one rebel soldier was to be seen; they had all left on the previous evening for Bithoor, after blowing up the magazine in their retreat. As our troops moved on, a dark looking man, apparently almost mad with terror, rushed towards them, and announced himself to be the sole survivor of the Cawnpore massacre. This was Mr. Shepherd, a commissariat clerk; he had left the entrenchment in June, two days before the surrender, in the disguise of a cook. Being almost at once apprehended, he had been taken before the Nana, and sentenced to hard labour on the roads. During the panic of our advance on the 16th, he had been apparently forgotten, for he found no obstruction in the way of his escape. He has since written a lucid narrative of the events of the siege, which must form the basis of any authentic history of that fearful period. The troops then encamped, and the officers proceeded in their search for survivors. Too soon the dismal truth broke upon them; there were not wanting men to point out to them the charnel-house. It was a flat-roofed building, containing two rooms, with a court-yard between, in the manner of native houses. The floor of the inner room was found two inches deep in blood, — it came over the men's shoes as they stepped. Ladies' hair, back combs, parts of religious books, children's shoes, hats, bonnets, lay scattered about the room; there were marks of sword-cuts on the walls low down, as if the women had been struck at as they crouched. From the well at the back of the house the naked bodies, limb separated from limb, protruded out. It was a sight sickening, heart-rending, maddening. It had a terrible effect on our soldiers. Those who had glanced upon death in every form, could not look down that well a second time. Christian men who had hitherto spared a flying foe, came out bearing a portion of a dress or some such relic in their hands, and declaring that, whenever they might feel disposed for mercy, they would look upon that, and steel their hearts.

Meanwhile, Havelock had sent on the 15th a pressing message to Neill at Allahabad for reinforcements. This officer, who, possibly to compensate for his supersession, possibly to ensure him against the recurrence of such a calamity, had been created a Brigadier-General, sent off two hundred and twenty-seven men that same afternoon, and started himself on the 16th. He arrived on the 20th. On the previous day Havelock had marched with a strong detachment of his

force towards Bithoor, over a very difficult country, in which the enemy was reported to be strongly entrenched. But Havelock met with no opposition, the Nana despairing of success had crossed with the main body of his troops into Oudh, leaving behind him fifteen guns, several horses, and cattle of every description. His palace was fired, and his magazine blown up; our troops then returned to Cawnpore with their spoil, to prepare for fresh toils, and renewed exertions.

Before following them in this undertaking, it will be necessary to review the position of our troops in Lucknow.

We left them there on the 2nd of June, holding the Residency, Muchee Bawun, and the cantonments. But in the interval between the 2nd and the 30th, the whole of Oudh had risen, and although our troops were not very closely invested, still they were surrounded, and in no little danger. The native troops, those belonging to the 13th Native Infantry especially, six or seven hundred in number, had for some time remained staunch, and by their means they were enabled to maintain an imposing front, and to overawe the rebels from attacking them. Their communication by means of cossids or native messengers was still open, and it was through Sir Henry Lawrence, that the disastrous events at Cawnpore were first made known to the Government. On the 14th of June Sir Henry received a message from General Wheeler, asking for aid: it pained his noble heart to be compelled to refuse, but he could not spare one company without endangering the lives of those for whom he was responsible; but he sent off a message at once to Calcutta, pointing out in the strongest terms the perilous hazard to which Wheeler was exposed.

His own position was full of danger. Although able himself to despatch messages, none were received by him. On the 24th June, he wrote to Colonel Neill, then commanding at Allahabad, that he had received no intelligence from any quarter for twenty days, and that from every side the mutineers were threatening him. Nearer and nearer did they advance; the provisions of our garrison were gradually failing them. Still Sir Henry Lawrence and most of the officers were of opinion that it would be the wiser plan to endeavour to hold their own position, and to procure provisions by sorties, than to risk the safety of the entire force by an attack upon the enemy's positions. But one or two so very strongly held an opposite view, believing that our inaction would only increase the number of our enemies, and that we had only to appear to be victorious, that Sir Henry gave in, and towards the end of June, resolved to take the first favourable opportunity of making a dash at the enemy.

On the 29th June, information was received, that a large body of the enemy, some 6000 in number, preceded by an advanced guard of about 1,000 men was advancing steadily from Fyzabad, in the direction of the canal, and that the smaller party would arrive the following morning. It was at once determined to take hold of this opportunity and to destroy that advanced body. Accordingly at daybreak on the 30th, a party consisting of three companies of H.M. 32nd, thirty volunteer cavalry, eleven guns, including an 8-inch howitzer, manned by native artillerymen, and 120 sowars, went forth from the

cantonment; they marched about six miles to a place called Chinbut, when, instead of only 1000 men, they found the entire insurgent army in position behind a village, in which they had fixed a battery of heavy guns. From these, on the approach of our men, they opened a very heavy fire. Our artillery, however, reserving its fire till well within range, replied with such effect, that that of the enemy was silenced, and their centre was forced back. The victory was ours, when at this critical moment our artillerymen of the Oudh battery overturned the guns into the ditches and abandoned them, thus totally exposing our flanks. On these the enemy's horse at once made a dash, and it required all the coolness and intrepidity of our men to effect their retreat to the Residency. Our loss was very great: of the three companies of the 32nd, and the European artillery, 130 were left on the field; we lost besides three light guns and one 8-inch howitzer; we forfeited our prestige, and, what was of even greater importance, Sir Henry Lawrence received a severe wound.

The rebels followed up their success with extraordinary pertinacity. Before 12 o'clock that day, round shot and shell were flying into the Residency, and Sir Henry Lawrence felt that his position was ten times as bad as before the attack. He wrote to General Neill that day, that unless relieved within fifteen or twenty days, he would scarcely be able to hold his ground.

It became also necessary, in consequence of the defection of the natives, and of our loss in Europeans, to contract the position. The cantonments were abandoned on the 1st, and on the 2nd, as much ammunition and supplies as could be taken away having been moved out of it, the Muchee Bawun was blown up, and the besieged were all concentrated in the Residency. On the 2nd and 3rd, by these movements, by the accumulation of one month's supplies, and by the proved ability to repulse all the attacks of the enemy, the spirit of our men revived, and they were reported as being hearty and confident.

On the following day (the 4th*), Sir Henry Lawrence was killed by the bursting of a shell in the room in which he lay wounded.*

In him India lost one of the worthiest of her adopted sons. An honest and able administrator, an artillery officer of marked ability in his profession, a good Christian in whatever situation he had been placed, he had been able to advance at the same time the interests of his country and of his God. Unlike the Government of which he was the agent, in his eyes those duties were not antagonistic. The consequence was, that he, sooner than any man, gained the respect and admiration of those amongst whom he was placed, and he was thereby rendered able to perform actions, which in men inferior in capacity, and less reliant on their conviction of right, would have been deemed hazardous and imprudent. But not to great things alone had his attention been turned: his was a mind active to ferret out suffering, in order that he might relieve it. Impressed, after the Sutlej campaign, with the unhappy condition of the children and orphans of the soldiers who had been struggling for their country, he established, in 1846, the Lawrence

* He was struck on the 2nd, and died on the 4th.

Asylum, a noble institution, in which a Christian education, and, if possible, employment, is provided for the wards. But in every department of life his active benevolence was conspicuous. He was in fact a man, great in the world's estimate of greatness and good, if sincerity of belief, abnegation of self, and untiring devotion to duty, constitute goodness.

Almost immediately before the Chief Commissionership of Oudh had been offered to him, his medical adviser had recommended his return to England, assuring him that his life would not be worth two years' purchase if he remained in India. But the terms in which the virtual government of Lucknow were offered forbad him to think of life. He was a man selected in a crisis: what was life to him, except as his existence might benefit others? He at once accepted the position, and by so doing saved the lives of our countrymen at Lucknow, by at least deferring the catastrophe.

He died on the 4th July: not till the 21st September did the Government of India notice his demise, and then only because the merchants and public of Calcutta threatened to hold a public meeting to do honour to his memory. The press, gagged as it was, had spoken out on his behalf, but,—he was a military man—his measures, so far as he could regulate them, had been eminently successful—his administration had formed a marked contrast to the administration of India and the north-west provinces. The Government could afford to praise Mr. Colvin: no amount of encomium from Lord Canning could elevate Sir Henry Lawrence in the public estimation!

Hence, probably, the more than ten weeks' silence!

On Sir Henry's decease, the direction of affairs was assumed by Major Banks, an officer of very great ability. From the 4th to the 20th July, the siege assumed as it were a chronic form: the enemy daily firing, but doing little damage, our garrison remaining closely packed within the walls, officers and men alike working at the defences with untiring industry. These were of the meanest description; but such was the innate dread of the European face to face, that the enemy seldom ventured on a real attack.

But on the 20th July they were more bold. They had probably heard of the state of affairs at Cawnpore, and were resolved at one effort to exterminate the Lucknow garrison also. They came on in swarms, pounding with their heavy guns; their fire of musketry was incessant; their numbers were actually countless. They had every advantage; yet, in spite of their numbers, their perseverance, their showers of shot and shell, our countrymen never yielded an inch, but compelled their assailants, before the shades of evening had fallen, to desist from the attack.

This happened on the 20th July. On that date Havelock was crossing the Ganges to relieve them: it is time we should return to him.

Having demolished Bithoor, and having been joined by all the reinforcements he could expect, Havelock made preparations for crossing his little army into Oudh. Fortunately the means were at hand. The little steamer "Burhampooter," which left Allahabad on the 30th

July, having on board Lieutenant Spurgin, and a hundred Fusiliers, armed with Enfield rifles, and two guns, had arrived, after effecting capital service on the way. At one spot a little above Allahabad, guns had opened out on her from the bank. Lieutenant Spurgin at once went on shore with a detachment, charged the gun, put the enemy to flight, and captured it. The range of the Enfield rifles had effectually cleared both banks of the many small parties who were lying in wait there in hopes of a repetition of the tragedy of Cawnpore or Futtehgurh. The steamer managed to reach Cawnpore about the same time as Havelock's column, her instructions having been to co-operate with it as far as possible, and on no account to steam on in advance.

On the 21st July Havelock commenced crossing his artillery, the infantry following on the succeeding days. On the 25th, the whole force, amounting to about 1500 men, were united on the left bank, holding the only road to Lucknow, thence fifty miles distant. All the sick and wounded were left at Cawnpore, under General Neill, who, with three hundred men at his disposal, had received directions to maintain that station, and to restore order in the district. How well he executed both these commissions will be recorded a little further on.

Havelock crossed over on the 25th, and advanced that day to Nungurwar, a little village five miles on the Lucknow road. Here he halted, in order to complete his arrangements for the carriage of his ammunition and supplies. The men were without tents; the entire country was under water, and along the hard road alone could any advance be made with rapidity. This was a very great disadvantage to an attacking force, as the villages were all built upon the road, which, being straight without any windings, could be entirely commanded by the guns placed in them. The state of the country, therefore, compelled every attack to be made in the face of a heavy fire, without any possibility of avoiding it by a flank movement.

On the 29th July, every arrangement having been completed, Havelock set out at five o'clock in the morning. He had not proceeded five miles before the advanced pickets of the enemy warned him that he was approaching their strong position. He at one deployed his infantry, halted them in a clump of trees, and ordered them to lie down. The Fusiliers and Highlanders in skirmishing order, with two guns aligned with them, he moved to the front. He found the enemy occupying a very strong position in the village or town of Oonao, stretching for about a mile along his front, and terminating on either side in an impassable swamp. In advance of it was a succession of small gardens and walled enclosures, filled with the enemy's skirmishers; the town itself was intersected by a road, at a distance of about a quarter of a mile from its extreme right. This road was commanded by the loopholed houses on either side of it, whilst batteries were so placed as to be able to pour a concentrated fire on any troops advancing against the town. In addition to this, our preparations had scarcely been completed, when another body, the remnants of the cavalry of Nana Sahib, were observed advancing on our left rear, thus threatening our communications. They were

commanded by Jussa Singh, the villain who had entrapped the fugitives from Futtehgurh.

Nothing daunted by the strength of the enemy's position, Havelock, after a brief reconnaissance, gave the order to advance. It was obeyed with alacrity, the artillery, as usual, reserving its fire till well within range: they then opened, and made such good practice that that of the enemy was speedily silenced. Still, however, they kept up a very galling musketry fire from the walled enclosures and loopholed houses guarding the approaches to the road. Havelock therefore ordered the 64th to drive them out of these outworks. They rushed forward at once; but one of their number, whose name deserves to be recorded, Private Cavenagh, a man of great personal strength, dashed in front of the line, cleared the wall with a bound, and found himself face to face with at least a dozen sword armed Mahomedans. He killed one or two of them; but before his comrades could join him, he had been overpowered, and literally hacked to pieces. His death was speedily avenged; the 64th on one side, the Madras Fusiliers and Highlanders on the other, were quickly amongst them. Lieutenant Bogle of the latter corps attacked a house filled with armed fanatics; and though wounded severely in the attempt to penetrate it, his object was attained. The rebels were either bayoneted, or driven helter-skelter through the town, and their strong position was gained.

But though the town was gained, the enemy had not yet given up all hope of victory. As our troops debouched from the narrow road on to the plain beyond, the rebel cavalry, which were in swarms, made as if they would attack them; but they wanted the pluck to charge the thin red line that at once formed up to receive them. Their infantry, however, had taken up a new position in the open, and were still threatening us. Thereupon Havelock, collecting his men, advanced upon them at once in echellon of batteries and detachments from the right. They scarcely waited the attack, but at the first charge made off, leaving all their guns in our possession. Our loss in this engagement was eighty-eight in killed and wounded: theirs was necessarily more severe.

It was now half-past eleven o'clock, and there was a burning sun overhead. The general, therefore, halted to allow the men to take their breakfast and a little rest. At two, P.M., the advance was again sounded, and our men, refreshed, but suffering fearfully from the intense heat and the burning sun, moved on: they passed at about two miles the little river Lôn without opposition. Four miles beyond they came to a large gheet, or pond, the water of which, owing to the general inundation, was running like a river: on the opposite side of this, in the town of Bessaruthgung, the enemy, strongly entrenched, were awaiting our arrival. Bessaruthgung is a walled town, situated in an open country; not a tree was there anywhere to afford shelter for our skirmishers: it is surrounded by a wet ditch, and in front of it the gheel referred to; in rear of it is a still larger piece of water, having all the appearance of a lake at this season, crossed by a narrow causeway and bridge. It is flanked on either side by a swamp. The road approaching to it was commanded by four pieces of cannon, mounted

on a round tower, by which the gateway was supported. Havelock having reconnoitred, thought that it would be possible to cut off the enemy from the causeway in rear, whilst he attacked them in front. The 64th he detached on this duty: whilst they waded up to their hips in the swamp on the right of the town, he advanced with the main body, the guns in front, interlined with skirmishers, direct against the town. The enemy's fire was heavy, but their guns had too high an elevation, and did little damage: ours, on the contrary, played with great effect on the gateway. Under their cover the Fusiliers and Highlanders steadily gained ground. When within charging distance they rushed forward with the bayonet. There was a sharp but short struggle at the earth-works, the enemy fighting with great determination; but no sooner were these gained — Lieutenant Dangerfield, of the Fusiliers, showing his men the way over — than the town was in our possession, the enemy retreating by the causeway to the village on the other side of the lake, from which they kept up an unintermitting fire all night.

It was six o'clock before even the town was gained, and our troops were completely knocked up. All had behaved nobly: Colonel Tytler, scarcely able to sit his horse from sickness, had given to the General "glorious support." Officers and privates had vied together in the terrible struggle. But if they had done well they had also suffered severely. Numbers of them had been struck down by the terrible sun; others, from the damp, the exposure, the want of dry clothes, had fallen victims to cholera and dysentery: in two days, from these causes and the fire of the enemy, the effective strength of the force had been reduced to 1200 men. The General found, indeed, that from these combined influences he was losing at the rate of fifty men per diem. He could leave no men behind to keep open communication with Cawnpore; all the wounded must accompany him. There were still thirty-six miles between him and Lucknow. As the enemy fell back they approached their resources, as we advanced ours became fewer and less available.

These considerations probably induced General Havelock to retire for the present to Cawnpore, with the intention, not of abandoning our garrison at Lucknow, but of making a new advance after having deposited his sick and wounded in a place of safety.

On the following morning the troops were allowed to rest. At noon all of them were moved into the town of Bessaruthgung, and orders were issued to prepare for a move at two o'clock, P.M. Great was the surprise of the men when they ascertained that this move was to be in retreat; that they were to abandon the ground they had gained after so much hard fighting: it dispirited them. But as they came to reason on the subject, they admitted the prudence of their General. The force retired that night to Oonao, and on the following morning (31st July) to Mungurwa. From this point Havelock detached his sick and wounded into Cawnpore (five miles distant), detailed to General Neill the cause of his retirement, and begged that officer to send on all the reinforcements that he could spare.

Meanwhile Neill had been engaged in the work of restoring order

at Cawnpore. His first object was to render his own position secure. To this end he selected a high piece of ground, on the river bank, commanding every approach to it, and made an entrenched camp. He then authorised a levy of sweeper police *, and issued a proclamation, that if within seven days from that time goods, proved to have been the property of our murdered countrymen, were found in the possession of any native, he would be liable to be hanged; at the same time a rigid search was instituted throughout the city, the bazaar, and the neighbouring villages, and an immense quantity of plunder was recovered. Every day, too, rebel Sepoys and others were brought in; were it proved that they had taken a part against our countrymen, they were taken to the charnel house, and compelled with their own hands to wipe up a portion of the blood of our murdered ladies. This operation was in itself sufficient to deprive them of their caste, and they went to the performance of it with more abhorrence than to the gallows. It may appear incredible, but it is a fact, that the high civilians, amongst them a secretary to Government, in Calcutta, disapproved of this proceeding, pronouncing it unchristian, inasmuch as it deprived the victims, in their last hour, of all hope of heaven; as if those blood-stained scoundrels, who had lived all their lives without honour and without a conscience, whose theory of an after-death state consisted in a belief in transmigration of souls, possessed any real sense of religion! If they had had any, the contemplation of their own deeds would have been more harrowing than the performance of an act, the degradation of which, in their eyes, consisted in their being seen to perform it; but as they had none, it were surely far better that their punishment should be aggravated, and that they should leave this world with the conviction that their vile souls were about to migrate into the bodies of cats and monkeys!

So at least thought Neill. He was not to be disturbed by the scruples of men† who were ever the most violent antagonists of their own religion, and, in spite of their remonstrances, the wiping up the blood and the hanging went on without interruption. Amongst those who underwent this disgrace and this penalty was an old subadar of the 1st Native Infantry, who had been most fierce in his animosity against our countrywomen. Had he known that in his last moments he possessed the sympathy of our Members of Council and Secretaries, his end might have been more dignified than it was!

By these and similar energetic measures order was soon restored in Cawnpore; the defences also progressed rapidly, and confidence in the stability of our rule began once more to prevail amongst the well-inclined natives.

Neill received Havelock's message on the 1st August; he at once took charge of the sick and wounded, and sent on to him every available man he had, trusting to his own *prestige* and the convales-

* Men of the lowest caste.

† The members of the Government of India who oppose Christian education and support Juggernath!

cents in hospital to keep his entrenchment. In this he acted a noble part,—a nobler never was performed. Havelock had superseded him, but he risked his own safety to ensure the success of Havelock's onward movement.

This latter General, having got rid of his non-effective men, and having received a small reinforcement, which brought up his force to about fourteen hundred men, again prepared for offensive operations.

On the 4th of August, having completed his arrangements, he sent his cavalry to reconnoitre. Oonao was found evacuated, but as they neared Bessaruthgunge it became evident that it was there that the enemy had resolved to make a stand. They had apparently taken up a very strong position in rear of the town, in a row of smaller hamlets abutting on the lake beyond it. Being fired upon on their approach, our men retired to Oonao, and bivouacked for the night; they were there joined by the main column. Next morning (the 5th), at dawn of day, our troops marched. There were but six miles between them and the enemy, and the ground had been trodden over before. As they came near, Havelock went forward with the cavalry to reconnoitre their position. It was very strong, and Havelock, notwithstanding the difficulties of the ground, resolved to attempt to turn it. With this view, sending up the cavalry to the front, to within about seven hundred yards of their position, to occupy their attention, he ordered the light guns and a portion of the infantry to make a flank movement to the right. This manœuvre succeeded; the enemy were completely taken by surprise, and after a brisk cannonading, in which our shells did fearful execution amongst them, they evacuated their first position, and fell back upon a second on the other side of the lake.

Here it was impossible to turn them: the only practicable road was a kind of causeway and bridge across the lake. Our men, pushing over this, found the enemy in great force, occupying a second line of villages. From these a heavy fire at once opened upon our advance, but their guns being badly laid, the shot went principally over the heads of our men: these dashed on unhesitatingly, and drove the enemy from village to village, until they fled into the plain beyond. Here they could no longer be followed up: their horse artillery, and their swarms of cavalry, effectively protected their retreat; our men too were knocked up, and it was necessary to spare them as much as possible.

That evening cholera again made its appearance amongst our men: this circumstance, our losses, and the strong position taken up by the enemy, again induced Havelock to retreat. The next morning, accordingly, he once more retired upon Mungurwa.

Here he lay recruiting his men for four or five days; but resolving not yet to give up Lucknow, he again, on the morning of the 11th, moved them in that direction. His intentions he had kept to himself, and no one in the force knew whither they were going, or how long they were to be absent. The force was by this time reduced to about a thousand men, but the same daring spirit still animated all, and they were relieved rather than dispirited, when the order to advance

was given. They moved out that morning in the old order, the volunteer cavalry in advance, the artillery in the centre, the main body of the infantry supporting it. On approaching Oonao, they came across the enemy's advanced picket. About three miles beyond, their new position came in view, stretching about five miles, with strong batteries of guns at intervals; and their centre so well masked by walls, gardens, and entrenchments, as to be almost invisible. In front was their cavalry in skirmishing order. It was not the object of the General to provoke an engagement that day; he accordingly gave orders to retire slowly on Oonao. This operation was performed in perfect order, without any molestation from the enemy. It was dusk when our force reached that place; no supplies were ready for them, and they went dinnerless to bed on the wet ground. In the middle of the night a heavy shower came on, which did not tend to their comfort. Nevertheless at dawn of day they rose uncomplaining, rendered perhaps even more eager, from their hunger, to have a dash at the enemy. In anticipation of meeting him at the same spot where they had seen him on the previous evening, they marched at sunrise. Soon they came upon him; his line drawn up in the manner previously described, his guns well sheltered, his cavalry on the flanks: in front of him a broad open plain, across which our infantry must advance unsheltered, and with but a handful of cavalry to protect their flanks. Their line, as I have said, stretched out for about five miles; ours, on deploying, did not extend half a mile: there could not have been less than 20,000 of them in the field. Havelock must then have felt, if he had not been sensible before, that, although he might beat these men, he could never, with his present force, hope to reach Lucknow. In their relative positions, and with their relative forces, there was but one mode of proceeding: manœuvring was out of the question; he must beat them by the exhibition of sheer British pluck, or not at all. No one knew this better than the General: his position, indeed, was something similar to that of Sir Charles Napier at Meeanee, and he adopted similar tactics.

Covered by artillery and skirmishers, our troops advanced in echellon of battalions from the right. As they came within range the enemy unmasked his batteries and poured in a deadly fire; round shot, shell, canister, grape, and shrapnel flew around, about, and amongst our men; fortunately their guns were levelled too high, and the round shot principally went over the heads of our advancing array: still the fire was fearful; it did not, however, for an instant check our men; on they went covered by the guns, till at length these latter had obtained a sufficiently advanced position to get a flanking fire on the enemy's line: this appeared to paralyse them, and at the same moment the Highlanders, who were on the extreme right, making a dashing charge, carried the enemy's left battery of two guns. This completed their panic, they at once turned and fled, and our guns and their own captured batteries turning on them completed their confusion. On the left we had been equally successful. There the enemy's cavalry had attempted to turn our flank; but the

Madras Fusiliers nobly repulsed them: they fled with the remainder of the line.

The victory was gained; but it was one of those victories which must have called to the General's mind the despairing exclamation of Pyrrhus. He had lost one hundred and forty men out of a thousand, and had not advanced ten miles on his road to Lucknow. There was but one course to pursue,—to abandon all thought of reaching that place for the present, and to fall back upon Cawnpore. If there had been wanting any further argument to persuade him to this measure, he had it in the intelligence which reached him about this time, that the Nana Sahib had crossed in great force, and was threatening that station.

His mind was made up. But he held possession of the field of battle; rested on it for two hours, then taking with him the two guns, trophies of the victory, slowly retired on Mungurwa. The following morning, the 13th August, he recrossed the Ganges, and rejoined General Neill at Cawnpore.

He found this officer threatened on all sides: on his right, the Nana Sahib had re-occupied Bithoor in great strength, pushing out his advanced pickets towards the station; on his left, and occupying the plain of Subada, was another detachment of rebels threatening the station. Until the arrival of Havelock, Neill had been unable to leave his entrenched position to attack one party, without leaving that position exposed to the other. However, he was now able to act otherwise.

Havelock arrived on the evening of the 13th of August. The 14th was devoted to rest; on the 15th Neill moved out and attacked the enemy posted near the ground on which the battle of Cawnpore was fought, about six miles from his camp. They could not stand before him; they did not even attempt more than a nominal resistance, and fled almost at the first discharge. The mere fact of Neill going to attack him had the most beneficial effect, and it enabled Havelock to concentrate all his forces for a final attack upon Bithoor the day following. This was the more necessary, as the cavalry pickets of the enemy had shown of late more than usual boldness, and had advanced even into the suburbs of Cawnpore itself.

On the succeeding day (the 16th) Havelock accordingly resolved to beat up the enemy's quarters at Bithoor. Leaving a small detachment in the entrenched camp, he marched at daybreak with the remainder, about sixteen hundred in number. About mid-day they came upon the enemy, drawn up in three lines. The first line consisted of an entrenched and all but completely masked battery in the heart of a dense field of sugar-cane,—the cane rising high above the heads of the men, — defended with very thick mud ramparts, and flanked on both sides by entrenched quadrangles filled with Sepoys, and sheltered likewise by plantations of sugar-cane. The two villages formed as it were the supports of this formidable position, being situated at some distance to the rear, one on either flank. The rebel army was arrayed in front of the entrenchments, ready to give us battle; they consisted principally of Sepoys from the 34th (whose disbandment at Barrackpore in May 1857 was thought by the Govern-

ment to have suppressed the spirit of mutiny), the 42nd, and 28th Regiments, who up to this time had not met us on the field; they were perhaps on that account the more confident.

On observing the enemy's position, and their infantry drawn up in front of it, Havelock brought his guns to the front, and opened upon them; but it soon appeared that this was only a part of their plan to draw us on, for no sooner had our guns opened, than the enemy retreated into their defences, and their guns at the same moment poured in a tremendous shower of shot and shell on our advancing line. During the twenty minutes that this was kept up our men lay down, replying with their rifles, our artillery also blazing at them. But at the end of that time, finding that our guns made little impression, and did not even silence their fire, although within six hundred yards of their position, Havelock resolved to have resort to the bayonet. A simultaneous advance was made in skirmishing order on the entrenched quadrangles before alluded to. These were quickly cleared, the Sepoys retreating to the two villages in rear: whilst the Madras Fusiliers went in pursuit of these, the 78th Highlanders advanced on the battery, alternately lying down and moving on, as it vomited forth its fierce discharges of grape and canister. The rebels, confident in their position, awaited the approach of our men; but no sooner had the foremost of them cleared the parapet, than the Sepoys' hearts failed them, and they fled in confusion. Their position was so strong, and our men were so exhausted by the heat of the sun and by their own exertions, that a determined stand here might have changed the fortunes of the day. No fact, however, has been more clearly established in the course of this insurrection, than that Asiatics, whatever may be their strength, cannot resist the charge of the smallest number of Englishmen: there is something in the sight of Europeans advancing at a run, with stern visage, bayonets fixed, determination marked in every movement of the body, which appals them; they cannot stand it, they never have stood it yet.

Meanwhile the Fusiliers, pursuing the enemy out of the entrenched quadrangles, came down upon the loopholed villages in the rear. Not an instant did they pause, but, rushing into them, gained them with scarce a struggle,—the enemy being quite unable to make head against their impetuosity. In rear of these villages was a little bridge leading to the town: across this the Fusiliers, now joined by the whole force, drove them, a few only endeavouring to make a fruitless stand; these were bayoneted; the remainder fled, followed by our men right through the town. Further it was impossible to pursue them: our troops, exposed to a hot sun and undergoing fearful exertions, were completely knocked up: they bivouacked on the ground they had won, and the next morning returned to Cawnpore, to take up a commanding position on the plain of Subada, close to the spot on which our heroic garrison had so long defended themselves.

With this action terminated Havelock's first grand campaign for the relief of Lucknow. Strictly speaking, perhaps, it was concluded on the day on which he recrossed the Ganges. In this great effort he had fought five pitched battles against an enemy vastly superior in numbers; he had been compelled to leave open his communications—

to carry with him sick and wounded—to dare the rays of a scorching, often a deadly sun—to march without tents—to carry with him every article of supply. With these difficulties to encounter, he had advanced three times, and three times had struck so great a terror into the enemy that his retreat had been invariably unmolested. He found, indeed, that he could gain victories, but that for want of cavalry he could not follow them up; that the enormous numbers of the enemy enabled them to recruit, and more than recruit, their losses as he advanced; that another large body, under the Nana Sahib and Jussa Singh, was always ready to interpose between him and the Ganges. He fought, in fact, more conscious that victory would secure his retreat, than facilitate an advance, which, with his numbers, was impossible.

His countrymen in England have paid homage to his deeds—feeling a national pride in one who fought so nobly, so earnestly, with such an end in view; but the Government of India—his masters—what did they do? Testing everything, as was their wont, by the result, they only saw that Havelock had failed to relieve Lucknow. Careless of the sun, more deadly than the foe,—of the small numbers,—of the want of cavalry,—they superseded him. And the noble-hearted Havelock had scarcely recrossed the Ganges, conscious that he had deserved the gratitude of his countrymen, when he learned that reinforcements were on their way up, but that they were under the command of Major-General Sir James Outram, his superior officer.

It is nothing to the purpose to state that Sir James did not subsequently assume the command: it was the intention of the Government that he should take it; they did not count on his abnegation of his own rights.

CHAPTER VIII.

CALCUTTA TO 5TH AUGUST.—DINAPORE, PATNA, ARRAH, GYA.—THE CLEMENCY ACT.—MR. J. P. GRANT.

REPORTS of the terrible fate of our soldiers and countrywomen at Cawnpore had reached Calcutta early in July, but it was not until the 17th of that month, when Havelock telegraphed down the account alike of his victory and of their murder, that all hope of their surviving disappeared. Then, indeed, the agony of suspense was succeeded by the deadening height of despair. But as that feeling gradually wore off, there sprang up in its place a desire for retaliation, an unrepressed eagerness for vengeance on those who, to the crimes of revolt and treachery, had added those of murder and torture. Such was the effect, alike on those whose relatives had been massacred, and on the great body of the European public. Every heart panted for

news from Havelock, sympathising most deeply with his noble efforts. General Neill became even a greater favourite. His stern measures for the restoration of order at Cawnpore, his contempt for the instructions he received to be merciful to these villains, stamped him at once as the man for the occasion. His praise was in every one's mouth, whilst in all ranks of society the measures of the Government earned only contempt.

And truly did the Government of India deserve it: all their measures had been too late! They had been over-confident and vainglorious when the horizon appeared likely to clear, depressed and suppliant when the clouds seemed to gather around them. So it was, as we have seen, in the matter of the Calcutta Volunteers, and with reference to the raising of a corps of Yeomanry Cavalry; so it was, to an extent far greater and infinitely more culpable, as we shall now see exemplified, in their dealings with the Court of Katinandoo. That city is the capital of the vast district of Nepâl, a mountainous country lying due north of Bengal Proper. Its people are bold, hardy, and resolute; possessing, like all mountaineers, a supreme hatred and contempt for the inhabitants of the plains, over whom they had often asserted their superiority. The entire power of the government of Nepâl was in the hands of Jung Buhadoor, a man the very type of the better class of his countrymen, and endowed in a supreme degree with vigour, energy, and power of will. His visit to Europe, some eight years ago, had impressed upon his mind a deep conviction of the power and resources of England, and had made him sensible that it were better policy for him to retain the friendship and alliance of her people. In the intrigues which brought about the revolt of the native army he had no share. Under no circumstances could that revolt advance his interest or the interests of Nepâl, and he never, from the moment of the outbreak, gave the smallest encouragement to its abettors.

In the month of May, as we have seen, the Government of India felt very confident of the speedy repression of the insurrection. Even in the beginning of June that confidence was unabated; they were expecting by every post to hear of the fall of Delhi; and the fall of Delhi, they felt sure, would tranquillise the country. But there was one man, an Asiatic, who knew differently, who was aware that our troubles were only commencing, and that unless the insurgents should commit the grossest errors (which happily for us they did commit), there would be an end temporarily to our rule in India. Certain of the accuracy of his information, and well aware that nothing but promptitude could save us, he communicated his opinion, and made offers of assistance in men to Major Ramsay, our political agent at the Court of Katinandoo. This officer, like all the Ramsays, a very able man, entered at once into the views of Jung Buhadoor and the Nepâl Durbar, and without any delay transmitted an abstract of the Prime Minister's opinions, together with his offers of assistance, to the Supreme Government in Calcutta.

Unfortunately, the letter containing this offer arrived at a time when the political barometer pointed to "fair." Not only, therefore,

was the proposal refused, but refused in terms which, so far as our political agent was concerned, were most uncourteous.

But the ink with which this "wigging" had been penned was scarcely dry, when tidings from Oudh, Azimgurh, Benares, Allahabad, Cawnpore, Jhansie, Rohilcund, came pouring in, each brimful of disaster. The Government at once perceived that Jung Buhadoor had not been so ill-judging, nor Major Ramsay so hasty, as they had supposed; they, therefore, after an interval of ten days, signified their willingness to accept the six Nepâl regiments, which Jung Buhadoor had placed at their disposal.*

Jung Buhadoor, still anxious to show his devotion to the British cause, at once sent a favourable reply, and ordered his six regiments to move to Goruckpore, thence to proceed to Lucknow. Had this move been made even at that time, such a diversion would have been created that the relief of Lucknow would have been an easy, or, at all events, a feasible matter; but we were fated to have one more instance of the hap-hazard and hand-to-mouth system on which the Government of India is conducted. By the time that the Goorkhas were well on their way to Goruckpore, another change in the barometer had taken place. Benares, Allahabad, Azimgurh had been quieted, Cawnpore had been re-occupied, and Havelock was preparing to advance upon Lucknow. His success was looked upon as certain. Where then was the necessity for employing the Goorkhas? The order was transmitted to them on no account to advance beyond Goruckpore. Again, however, our necessities compelled us to apply for them: they were sent on, and have since performed excellent service, showing how they might have assisted us in the earlier stages of the revolt. They now, supported by a handful of Europeans, form our only column of defence for the Benares district, against a force of 15,000 rebels who are threatening it.

The foregoing is a sample of the foreign policy of Lord Canning; his domestic measures were scarcely more happy.

Patna, the chief city in the province of Behar, contains upwards of 300,000 inhabitants, a large proportion of whom are Mahomedans. It is situate on the right bank of the river Ganges, 380 miles north-west of Calcutta, and ten miles east of the military station of Dinapore.

The small civil stations of Gya, fifty miles to the south, Dinprah, forty miles to the north, and Arrah, thirty-five miles to the west of Patna, are entirely under the control of the Commissioner of that place.

At the time of which I am treating, the Commissioner was Mr. William Tayler, a civilian, very proud of his "order," and a great upholder of their rights and dignities. He was at the same time a gentleman and a scholar, possessing good abilities, an elegant mind,

* It would be by no means an unprofitable occupation to trace the connection of the acceptance of this offer with the Gagging Act. The "Friend of India" was warned for treating of the probability of India becoming Christianised on the 25th June: on the 25th a favourable answer to the application of Government had been received from Jung Buhadoor.

and a large fund of common sense. Thus it happened, that although starting as Commissioner wedded to the time-honoured principle of "India for the Civil Service," he had sense enough to perceive that an adherence to it would swamp the vessel he was piloting—and he threw it over. By so doing, he saved Patna and lost his appointment.

It may be easily imagined that with a rebellion incited, fostered, and kept up by Mahomedans, a city, in which men of that religion formed a preponderating class, must be an object of no ordinary anxiety. From the days of Meer Kassim Ally, Patna had always been a rebellious city. Even so lately as 1846, its Mahomedan nobility had endeavoured to take advantage of our balanced fortunes on the banks of the Sutlej. They had then succeeded in corrupting some of the native officers and Sepoys stationed at Dinapore. What might not be expected now, when our own native troops had spontaneously, apparently, revolted, and when our European troops lay scattered and beleaguered all over the country? And in fact the question which, not private individuals only, but secretaries to Government also, asked themselves, when news of the revolt of the half of India reached them, was this, "Why has not Patna risen?" For weeks and weeks the intelligence was expected. Every letter described the city as being "shaky." The wonder at its long state of quiescence was increased by the contemplation of the military means at the disposal of the Government to coerce it. To ascertain what those means were, we must transport the reader for a moment to Dinapore.

Dinapore lies, as has been stated, ten miles westward of Patna. This station was garrisoned by H. M. 10th Foot, three regiments of Native Infantry, the 7th, 8th, and 40th, one company of European and one of Native Artillery. These regiments had hitherto been "staunch;" that is to say, they had not mutinied; but two of them at least had given intimations which ought to have been sufficient, that the opportunity alone was wanting.

The regiment supposed by their own officers and by the Government to be actually loyal, was the 40th, one of the corps lately returned from Burma: its officers were good officers, and if they believed in their men, it merely proves the falsity of the charge which Mr. Mangles and others have levelled against the officers of the Bengal Army.

The station and the military division of Dinapore were commanded by Major-General Lloyd, an officer who in his day had done excellent service. Only in 1854 he had been selected by the Government of Lord Dalhousie to suppress the Southâl insurrection, and right well had he done it. He was an old man, but he had grown old in the service of his country, and that service had been passed chiefly amongst Sepoys. Take the world at large, and see how few men verging upon seventy would have been fit to control a crisis of this sort—a crisis the more trying to General Lloyd, as he was called upon to forego the experience of forty years, and to doubt those very men who under himself had, in numerous instances, given proofs of their devotion to the Company.

He had indeed no ordinary task. He was in constant communication with the Commissioner of Patna to preserve the order of the district; he had only European troops sufficient to look after the native regiments.

The district which the troops at Dinapore are supposed to command is indeed an enormous one. It extends on the north side to the very foot of the Nepâl Hills, on the east to Berhampore, on the west to Benares, on the south to Hazariebagh and Rampore; on the north alone, at the station of Segowlie, distant about a hundred miles, was a corps of irregular cavalry, a detachment from which had been located at Patna: to that place also, as a measure of security, Captain Rattray's new Sikh levies had been ordered.

It will thus be seen that to maintain the security of the Patna district, the Commissioner had very little effective military aid upon which he could rely: he had to depend entirely upon his own energy and foresight, and the influence which he could bring to bear upon others.

He had been trained, as has been stated, in the school of "India for the Civil Service;" as an adept in the practice of that school, he had earned the applause of Mr. Halliday, on the occasion of the vice-regal visit of the latter to Patna, two years before, and he had been looked upon as a most promising pupil.

He was so indeed, as are many civilians, most excellent men naturally, so long as their eyes are blinded by prejudice, routine, prescription. But this terrible insurrection had scarcely raised her Hydra-like head, before the scales fell from Mr. Tayler's eyes; he felt that the gods he had worshipped were no gods: — he acted at once the part of a true Englishman; he threw away his theories to the winds, and exerted all his endeavours — not to gain applause from Mr. Halliday, but to save Patna!

In this attempt he was ably seconded by Major Holmes, the officer who commanded the Irregular Cavalry Regiment (the 12th), already noted, at Segowlie. Constant intercourse passed between the two, and they had both come to the conclusion that Repression, not Conciliation, was the policy to be pursued in the crisis.

This, unfortunately for Mr. Tayler, was antagonistic to the principle which had been adopted by the leaders of the Civil Service, of whom Mr. Halliday, Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, Mr. Grant, a Member of Council, and Mr. Beadon, Home Secretary, were the chiefs. They had laid it down as a maxim, that no corps ever mutinied which was properly commanded, and that a civil district had no business to revolt, inasmuch as this was a mere military mutiny. But Mr. Tayler, although he was aware of the existence of this principle, refused to be a *doctrinaire* of this stamp. All Patna wanted but the opportunity to rise: he was face to face with incipient mutiny: like a bold, fearless man, he determined to take the initiative, to arrest the ringleaders, and, by paralysing their plans, to check the revolt in the bud.

The opportunity was not long wanting.

The fact of a conspiracy being on foot had been made clear by the

perusal of intercepted letters. At the head of it was the Moulvie Ally Kurem, a man of great wealth, large estates, and corresponding influence. He was indeed the soul of the plot. Mr. Tayler resolved to lose no time,—to arrest him and the other ringleaders at once, and bring them to prompt trial. A party accordingly was sent to seize him, but the Moulvie was well served. Unknown to us he had stationed horses along the road in anticipation of some such catastrophe as that which was impending. He had scouts upon the look-out. No sooner did they inform him that a party, with Mr. Lowis, one of the civil subordinates, at its head, was on its way to his house, than he mounted his elephant, and started in the direction he had previously resolved upon. He was seen and pursued, but no sooner did our men buoy themselves with the hope that they were gaining upon him, than they observed him descend from his elephant, mount a very powerful horse, and gallop off.

He has not since been re-captured.

But although the principal conspirator escaped, the subalterns were not so fortunate. But before referring to their capture, it is necessary to allude to the ebullition on their part which preceded it.

On the evening of the 3rd July, sixty or seventy fanatics, raising the cry of religion, beating drums, unfurling the green flag, and calling out "Ya Allah," rushed to attack the Roman Catholic cathedral, situate in the very heart of the city. No sooner had intelligence of this reached our authorities, than Rattray's Sikhs were ordered down to the spot. Dr. Lyell, the opium assistant, thinking that his presence would overawe the rioters, and being well mounted, rode on in advance. As he approached them, several shots were fired at him, one of which took effect. He fell never to rise again.

The moment was critical. Had it been attempted now to carry out the policy of conciliation, it had been all over with Patna. The sight of blood had roused the evil spirits of the populace; their number was increasing, when at this moment arrived the armed and disciplined Sikhs. The feeling with which the Sikhs regard the Mahomedans is one of intense and bitter hatred; when, therefore, they came upon this crowd of fanatics, howling out pæans in honour of a religion which they detested, their fury was ungovernable; they rushed with a will upon the undisciplined mass, and dispersed them in a moment.

The next morning the city underwent a complete search. Thirty-one ringleaders were apprehended. Amongst these were Pera Ally, an emissary from Lucknow, Shekh Ghuseeta, the Jemadar of Lootf Ally Khan, the richest banker in the town, and Lootf Ally Khan himself.

The three men named above were unfortunately* reprieved, with the view of eliciting more information from them. Of the thirty-one who were seized, fourteen were hanged that same afternoon, in company with a man named Waris Ally—the Jemadar of the

* I say unfortunately, because Mr. Samuells, the successor of Mr. Tayler, released them.

Moulvie Ally Kureem. When taken to the gallows this worthy exclaimed in a loud voice, "If there is any one here who professes to be a friend of the King of Delhi, aid me."

These vigorous measures saved Patna for the moment, but not an hour passed by without a risk of an insurrection, and Mr. Tayler's unceasing vigilance alone enabled him to discover the plotters. By means of a native Christian at Moughyr, a correspondence was brought to light which proved that the flight of the Moulvie Ally Kureem had by no means quelled the spirit of revolt, that the train was laid, and that the conspirators were only waiting for the opportunity to fire it.

By dint, however, of constant arrests, and an unceasing use of hemp, the city was kept quiet: the inhabitants were over-awed. Major Holmes, on the Segowlie frontier, pursued the same policy: the greatest cordiality existed between the Commissioner and himself: they were one on the subject of the only course to be pursued: they followed it, and maintained order in the district as well as in the city.

But these constant arrests, these continual hangings, the credit which they brought to Mr. Tayler from the planters and mercantile community,—even from the fettered press of India,—were all galling to Mr. Halliday. They falsified his maxim that this was a mere revolt of the soldiery. They rendered patent to the world that the largest civil district under his control was surging with revolt. They endangered the stability of the exclusive Civil Service. Mr. Tayler, too, had committed another act of "imprudence," which was not likely to further his interests with his superiors. He had suspended one of his subordinates, Mr. Lowis. Now Mr. Lowis was a son-in-law of Mr. Mangles. Mr. Mangles was Chairman of the Court of Directors, and prime patron of the Government of Bengal. The inference is easy.

Before, however, that Government could recall a man whose energy was at the same time saving Patna and spoiling their crude theories, it was necessary to provide a pretext for so strong a measure. This was not long wanting; it will appear in its proper place in this history.

The disaffection prevailing in Patna, and the threatening attitude of the three native regiments stationed at Dinapore, had not been viewed without alarm by the mercantile community of Calcutta. Their interests were in a great measure bound up in the district of Tirhoot, of which Patna and Dinapore were the two most important stations. As the great indigo-producing portion of Bengal, they were more than any class interested in the maintenance in it of peace and order. Any revolt at this period, before the plant had been cut, and even subsequently during the process of manufacture, would have been fraught with ruin to many of them. The measures of Mr. Tayler therefore met their warmest approval; they saw in him just the man for the occasion. At the same time they were sensible that all his arrangements, his vigilance, and his energy were liable to be rendered nugatory by any *émeute* or disturbance

amongst the troops at Dinapore. They had indulged the hope that those regiments, like their brethren at Barrackpore, would have been disarmed — such a step would have put to flight all their fears, and have inspired them with a confidence in the Government which had hitherto been wanting. It was easy of accomplishment. Her Majesty's 10th Regiment was on the spot; one wing of the 37th Foot was on its way up, and the 5th Fusiliers, 800 strong, arrived from the Mauritius on the 5th July.

The subject was early in that month debated in Council: the minutes of that discussion have not yet been published; its result is before the world. That result added another proof to the many that had preceded it, that the Government of Lord Canning was not above half-measures; that it was ready, in order to have a scape-goat, to shift responsibility from its own shoulders. The Supreme Council decided in this important matter, that it would not take upon itself the responsibility of ordering the native regiments at Dinapore to be disarmed; neither would it assume the responsibility of directing that those corps should retain their arms; but, casting the entire responsibility on Major-General Lloyd, it left it optional to him to disarm them or not, as he might think fit.

To cast the sole responsibility of an important measure upon an agent, is to say to him, we have confidence in you; we are ready to abide by what you do; we are ready to support you; we are perplexed and divided; act as you think best. A Government has no right to turn round to the public, after committing their power to their own agent, and that agent has acted, and acted unfortunately, and to say, "This is not our act, it is the act of our agent; we atone for it by turning him out." A Government by throwing all responsibility on an agent, becomes itself responsible for his acts, and must share with him the blame or praise. It is the more necessary that this rule should be applied in the present instance, because the Government was aware of General Lloyd's partiality for the Sepoys, that he could not bring himself to believe that they would mutiny, and that he had already on a previous occasion avoided disarming them when the opportunity presented itself.

This decision of the Government was not published, but it was privately communicated to the members of the mercantile community. It failed to satisfy them: they too, knew the disposition of General Lloyd; they felt satisfied that he had no heart for disarming the Sepoys; they saw their interests, and, with theirs, the interests of the European settlers in India, — a class of men whom the leaders of the Civil Service discouraged in every possible manner, — abandoned, by the cowardice of the Government, to the prejudices of a feeble old man.

There was one course still open to them — to appeal in a body to the Government, and to endeavour, in a personal interview with Lord Canning, to point out to him the course which they humbly deemed both feasible and advisable. They came to this resolution on the 17th of July.

But Lord Canning was a great man in petty things. This

uncalled for opinion of men, who were in no way connected with the Government, appeared to him very like trenching upon his prerogative. He resolved to show them that the will of the Governor-General of India was perfectly independent of the feelings of those who possessed the only real stake in the country.

When therefore, on the 20th July, the deputation reached him, pointed out how their interests were involved in the maintenance of peace and order; how both were threatened by the attitude of the regiments at Dinapore; how disarming them would quiet the public mind and possibly restore confidence; how that the most favourable opportunity now presented itself for carrying out that measure, as the 5th Fusiliers had left by steamer on the 12th and would be off Dinapore on or about the 22nd; how that disembarking from the steamer, disarming in conjunction with the 10th Foot the mutinous regiments, and then re-embarking, would be the work of less than three hours,—Lord Canning replied, "They shall not stop for one hour." He said more, but that was the main point of his speech. He was very curt, and very ceremonious.

This was on the 20th July: if a message had been sent to Dinapore on that day or the following, to comply with the request of the merchants, the calamities which subsequently followed would have been avoided. As it was, and because Lord Canning would not allow the 5th Fusiliers to stop one hour, they were detained three weeks at one of the most critical periods of the revolt. Before tracing out the result of his obstinacy, it may be convenient to notice another characteristic act of the Government of India.

The bearing of the natives of Calcutta, the Mahomedan portion especially, had given no little cause for anxiety: they outnumbered the European population by about twenty to one, and it appeared quite possible that fanaticism, combined with the hope of plunder, might induce them to rise at any moment. It was known, too, that the suburbs were crowded with disbanded and disarmed Sepoys, and some of them had been heard to express their conviction that the rule of the Company was about to close. The means of providing them with weapons were at hand: the bazaars and streets in the outskirts were crowded with armourers and venders of swords and muskets, and it was remarked that they were driving a rattling trade. This circumstance, combined with the insolent demeanour of the Mahomedans, the experiences of Cawnpore and other stations, and the near approach of a Mussulman festival, the celebration of which invariably caused great excitement amongst the votaries of that religion, conjoined to impress upon the European inhabitants the policy of adopting some precautionary measure. The grand jury had, on the occasion of their being sworn in, forwarded an address to Lord Canning, urging the disarming of all natives in Calcutta, and the mercantile community had adopted with alacrity this suggestion, and had petitioned the Governor-General on the subject. But Lord Canning, impressed with the dogma of "imperial legislation," that is, with the necessity of treating the loyal and the rebellious on the same terms, after many delays, caused a project of law to be introduced

into the Legislative Council, by which Europeans and natives were to be alike disarmed; thereby rendering it penal for the former to possess without a license (which a native magistrate might refuse) a weapon wherewith to defend himself against the murderous assaults of the latter. This was imperial legislation with a vengeance.

On the 31st July, a few days after the Dinapore mutiny had been known, just one fortnight after the details of the horrible massacre of our countrywomen at Cawnpore had been published, when every post brought accounts of some fresh deed of atrocity, some new instance of the blackest treachery on the part of our Sepoys, occasion was taken to publish a manifesto*, in which the members of the Civil Service, with Lord Canning as their accomplice, laid down their patent scheme for the suppression of mutiny and insurrection.

In this document a free pardon was offered to all mutineers against whom it could not be proved that they had been guilty of any heinous crime against person or property, or that they had aided and abetted in the commission of such crime.

Sepoys who had mutinied without murdering their officers were to be treated with all reasonable leniency.

No deserters from disarmed regiments were to be apprehended, unless with arms in their possession.

Other mutineers against whom it could not be proved that they had murdered their officers, were to be sent for trial to Allahabad.

These were the principal provisions of this celebrated order, which the *Times* has well designated "The clemency of Canning"—an order which will remain a lasting stamp of the manner in which civilians meet mutiny and revolt. To secure its being efficiently worked, a member of the council that framed it, Mr. John Peter Grant, was sent up to Benares, copies of it were transmitted to the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West Provinces, and to all the Commissioners in the Province of Bengal. At the same time Mr. Tayler, the commissioner of Patna was removed from his appointment, and replaced by a gentleman pledged to maintain the cause of his own exclusive service.

The effect of the document above alluded to, published as it was at a time when Havelock was being driven back by the men to whom it specially bore reference, was to impress them with an idea of our weakness which nothing could eradicate. They saw us, at a time when they were beleaguering our countrymen at Lucknow, suddenly offer them, under very easy conditions, a free pardon. It had all the effect upon them of an offer to sue for peace, it emboldened them to renew their efforts, to push us hard whilst we were in distress, to exert themselves more than ever against us.

It is almost needless to add that when this resolution of the Supreme Government was sent up to the gallant Neill, with an order that it should be enforced at once, he declined paying any attention to it. The district of Cawnpore, he replied, was under martial law, and according to the provisions of that law, and of no other, would

* Resolution of Government of India, No. 1359, 31st July, 1857.

he act. It is currently reported that for this act of disobedience he would, had he survived, have been brought to a court-martial. The government would have found it difficult to assemble fifteen officers who would have convicted him.

Meanwhile, the governmental policy had been yielding its natural fruit at Dinapore. General Lloyd had received the instructions by which the sole responsibility of disarming the Sepoys devolved upon him; but he too bethought him of a half measure: he was permitted to take away the muskets to prevent the Sepoys from rising; the same end, he imagined, might be attained by depriving them of their percussion caps. Accordingly, on the morning of the 25th July, he gave orders for carrying this measure into effect. It may be necessary, before describing the manner in which this was performed, to give a slight sketch of the station.

Dinapore lies, as before stated, ten miles west of Patna, on the right bank of the Ganges. The European troops are cantoned in a large square immediately to the west of the native town; beyond this, and still immediately on the bank of the river, is a smaller square; outside this are a few houses, and further on the native lines; on the other side of the lines was the magazine in which the caps were kept. It will be seen, then, that to bring away the caps from the magazine into the European part of the cantonment, it was necessary to convey them along the front of the lines of the Sepoys. This measure, therefore, like all half measures, was more dangerous than disarming.

However it was tried. On the morning of the 25th the 10th Foot and the Artillery were drawn up in the large square already alluded to, whilst two bullock-carts were sent down to bring away the caps under the charge of an officer; the caps were taken from the magazine, and stowed in the carts, which then set out on their return. As they passed the lines of the 7th Regiment, a great commotion was visible; the Sepoys were parading for guard, but they broke their ranks, and rushed forward, shouting, one of them calling out in a loud voice, "Kill the sahibs! don't let the caps be taken away." But their officers went amongst them, and even forced them to abstain from any further demonstration; the men returned sullenly to their posts, and the carts went on. All was now supposed to be over, the Europeans were dismissed to their lines, and the General, congratulating himself on the success of his manœuvre, went on board one of the steamers, which had that morning arrived, to lunch. It had been previously arranged, that in the event of any disturbance two musket shots in quick succession should be fired by the European guard at the hospital — a large building between the smaller square and the native lines, and commanding a good view of the latter. At half past one, the sound of these shots was heard; instantly the 10th Foot, two companies of the 37th Foot which had arrived the day before, and the Artillery, turned out. It appeared that, previous to going on board the steamer, the General had issued an order that the caps actually in the possession of the Sepoys should be given up. But these latter, when called upon to obey, had fired upon their officers. When the Europeans came within sight of their lines, all

was uproar and confusion, but a few shots from the Enfield Rifles of the 30th who were in advance, and a sharp fire opened upon the Sepoys from the roof of the hospital, soon cleared the scene. The Sepoys made off with precipitation, leaving behind them the greater part of their property. The Europeans followed them up to the limits of the cantonments, burning their lines as they advanced. They were then halted; there was no one to give orders, no general, and no one would take the responsibility. It was a bad business as it was; and, serving under a Government which judged only by the result, no one would run the risk of making it worse.

A few of the Sepoys endeavoured to cross the Ganges in boats, but the steamer at the Ghat opened fire upon them with considerable effect; the main body therefore took their way towards the Soane river in the direction of Arrah. Information was instantly transmitted to the residents of that little station in order that they might be prepared to avoid, or to give a warm reception to their unwelcome visitors.

Arrah is only five and twenty miles west of Dinapore, but it is separated from it by the Soane; and it was hoped that this river, swollen by the rains, would oppose an effectual bar to the passage of the mutineers. But for three days they were left unpursued; leisure was allowed them to procure boats, and even to cross by the ferry, and they experienced no difficulty in passing over a river which might have been made an insurmountable obstacle. They received assistance too from a quarter on which we had even reckoned for opposition to their movements.

No sooner was it known in the district that the troops had risen at Dinapore than Koour Singh, a large landowner, possessing estates in the neighbourhood of Arrah and all along the banks of the Soane, declared in their favour. He was a known bad character, and was supposed to be in communication with Nana Sahib: at the same time he was permitted unmolested to carry out his schemes. He it was who procured boats for the passage of the mutineers across the Soane, and it was he who advised them to march without delay on Arrah, plunder the treasury, murder the residents, and then, crossing the Ganges at Busat, to make at once for Ghazeepore and Oudh. It was a bold plan, and was very nearly succeeding. The Sepoys mutinied on the 25th, on the 26th they crossed the Soane and were joined by Koour Singh; on the 27th they arrived at Arrah, let loose the jail-birds, plundered the treasury, and attacked the residents.

But these latter had not been idle in anticipation of the visit which they were now awaiting: they had, under the direction of Mr. Boyle, a civil engineer, fortified a small detached two-storied house, fifty feet square, with a flat roof. In this they had stored supplies of meal, wine, beer, water, biscuit, and sheep. Their only garrison consisted of fifty Sikhs: these, however, were true to the very core. The Europeans numbered only sixteen, but they were well armed, and besides possessed the prestige attaching to their country. They might, had they chose, have abandoned the station to the mutineers; but they were Englishmen, and resolved rather to defend one corner of it than to submit to so humiliating an alternative.

On the morning of the 27th, the Sepoys, having gutted the station, came down to attack them. They advanced boldly at first in unbroken order; but being met by a steady, well-directed fire, they changed their tactics, and occupying Mr. Boyle's own house—only sixty yards distant—commenced, from it and from the trees which stood around it, an unintermitting fire. At the same time they offered every possible inducement by bribes and threats to the Sikhs to join them. Their own countrymen, serving in the ranks of the mutineers, were employed as mediators, but without effect. The Sikhs remained staunch: their courage and their fidelity were alike proof, and they showed throughout the siege an unwavering attachment to our interests. On the 28th the rebels brought two small guns to bear upon the besieged: these they fired as fast as they could manufacture some species of projectile: the house in which our countrymen were shut up, was riddled, but they themselves were unhurt. Every evening a Sepoy standing behind a pillar of the house occupied by the enemy, was in the habit of offering terms—in the name, not of Koour Singh, but of the commander of the allied forces, a subadar of the 8th Native Infantry. It is needless to say his "terms" were rejected, and it is satisfactory to know that the worthy at whose instigation they were made—the subadar of the 8th—was subsequently killed. He did not happily fall into the hands of Mr. Grant.

Meanwhile intelligence of the beleaguered state of the Arrah residents had reached Dinapore, and it was resolved to equip forthwith an expedition to relieve them. Accordingly, on the evening of the 26th, 193 men of the 37th Foot started to steam up the Soane, with the intention of landing at the spot where the road to Arrah joins that river. Unfortunately the steamer, running on after the moon had gone down, stuck on a sand-bank. Here she remained for six and thirty hours. Information of the catastrophe having in the meanwhile reached Dinapore, it was resolved to despatch another steamer with a detachment of the 10th Foot, to take on the troop-boat attached to the first steamer, and to carry out the original resolution. This they did. Starting with 150 of the 10th Foot, and seventy Sikhs, she came up to where the first steamer was lying, detached her troop-boat with the 37th on board, and then steamed up to the appointed spot. Here she arrived at 4 P. M. on the afternoon of the 29th, and disembarked her force. This amounted to 410 men, under the command of Captain Dunbar of Her Majesty's 10th Foot.

The point at which they disembarked was but twelve miles from Arrah, and about four miles from it was an unfordable nullah, traversable only by boats. The detachment commenced its march immediately after landing, led by a native guide, who informed them that Arrah had been evacuated by the rebels. On arriving at the nullah, Captain Dunbar was strongly advised to bivouack for the night; but finding boats on the right bank ready for crossing, and being strongly urged by the guide, he persisted in pushing on. He accordingly crossed, and marched in military order, an advanced guard in front feeling the way. At last the guide announced that Arrah was gained:

there was no sign of life anywhere: all was still. Captain Dunbar thereupon called in the advanced guard, and moved on in column of march. He had scarcely proceeded ten paces before a volley was fired into the party from a clump of trees close in their front, whilst from both flanks almost simultaneously there commenced a leaden shower. Captain Dunbar and several of the officers were shot dead at the first discharge; the enemy was invisible: our men appeared to be surrounded; their commanding officer had been shot. Great confusion ensued; the men got separated from one another, and feared to fire on their comrades. After an interval of about a quarter of an hour, order to a certain extent was restored, and the men retired to a small enclosure which afforded them some cover, and enabled them to keep together. The enemy, however, fired upon them all night. As morning dawned, they found themselves much reduced in numbers, the men dispirited, and altogether unable to resume the offensive. They therefore turned their faces towards the Soane. They had, however, scarcely moved out of their cover before they were followed by the enemy, who, advancing in skirmishing order to the number of three thousand, and keeping at a very respectful distance, poured in an unceasing fire. In vain did our men endeavour to keep them off with musketry: in vain did they attempt to drive them back by a successful charge: as they advanced the enemy fled: as they retired, again the foe returned to the pursuit. To be wounded was a worse fate than death; for it was impossible to carry away those in that condition, and a man with a broken limb was reserved for that most dreaded of all fates—the tender mercies of the Sepoys. At last the nullah was reached, and to the delight of the survivors the boats were all on the left bank. Two of them were filled and shoved off; but the nullah had gone down a little in the night, and all the other boats had become fixed in the mud. Meanwhile the enemy were advancing: from the front and on both flanks they poured in their fire. The number of our men was few: any fate was better than falling into the hands of the Sepoys: there was no longer any hesitation: as if by mutual consent, they stripped off their clothes, and plunged into the stream, and swam for dear life.

Many were drowned, many were shot, but more reached the right bank: their difficulties were then over: the steamer was gained in safety, and with heavy hearts they paddled back to Dinapore. Such was the issue of the first attempt to relieve Arrah. Out of the party fifty only were untouched: out of fifteen officers, three only unwounded. The truth is, the fault lay with the commanding officer: our men fell into an ambuscade. Captain Dunbar's first fault was in not halting on the right bank of the nullah till daylight; his second, in trusting to the assurances of a native guide, in a case in which natives were concerned; his third, in not marching in military order. Any one of these mistakes would have been sufficient to cause a check; the three combined occasioned a disaster.

The attempt to relieve our countrymen at Arrah from Dinapore only increased their perils, for its ill-success flushed the Sepoys, and encouraged them to push their efforts against them with more deter-

mination than ever. The situation of the garrison would have been hopeless but for the occurrence of a series of seemingly fortuitous events, which can be regarded in no other light but providential intervention.

Major Vincent Eyre, an artillery officer of great ability, had left Dinapore in a steamer *en route* for Allahabad with half a company of European Artillery, and two 9-pounder guns and a 24-pounder howitzer. He arrived at Ghazeepore, half way between Dinapore and Allahabad, on the 28th. Here for the first time he received intelligence that our countrymen were beleaguered in Arrah. His chivalrous spirit could not endure the idea of their being allowed to remain in that position without an attempt being made to relieve them: he accordingly went to the authorities, and pointed out to them the ease with which an attack might be made from Busar by a party under his orders, which could also co-operate with any demonstration from Dinapore. The news of the Arrah disaster had not reached any of them, and willing to afford some assistance, the Ghazeepore authorities offered Major Eyre five-and-twenty Highlanders. This would increase his entire force to but sixty men, but Eyre at once accepted the offer, and embarking the Highlanders, turned the head of the vessel, and steamed back for Busar. Fortunately, on arriving there on the 30th July, he found a steamer and flat with 150 of the 5th Fusiliers on board. He gladly availed himself of their services, and sending back the Highlanders to Ghazeepore, with a force now increased by the Fusiliers, and volunteers from the Stud and Railway Departments, to about 200 men, he on the evening of the 1st August pushed on. That night, or rather the next morning, they reached the Shahpore, a village twenty-eight miles distant, and here they received the first intelligence of the Arrah disaster. This only made them the more desirous to hasten on to the rescue. At 2 P.M. on the 2nd Eyre renewed his march, having to halt occasionally to repair the bridges which had been broken down or cut through. It was about sunset when they arrived at Goojeerajgung, about nine miles from Arrah. Here it was known that there was a very strong bridge over a nullah, and Eyre fully expected to find it broken down: to his surprise it was in capital order. Some were of opinion that he should take advantage of the neglect of the rebels and push on at once. But Eyre was too prudent: he did not fancy a night march into an enemy's country, and he resolved to halt where he was, the only approach to his camp being covered by the bridge. It was fortunate that he did come to this resolution: the bridge had not been broken down, solely that he might be tempted to cross it; preparations had been made to receive him a little distance on the other side, and, had he moved on, there can be no doubt but that he would have shared the fate of the Dinapore party. But he was happily proof against the temptation: it was no light one, for it seemed to them all possible that the delay might make all the difference in the fate of the garrison of Arrah.

At break of day next morning Eyre resumed his march, but had not proceeded above a mile before he discovered that the copses in

his front and on his flanks were filled with Sepoys. The road beyond them was bounded by inundated rice-fields on both sides. Observing that the enemy were more intent upon taking him in flank than in guarding their own front, he resolved to push on, under the cover of his skirmishers, armed as they were with the Enfield rifle. The enemy fell back before him, abandoned the copses, and hastened to take up a new position.

Beyond the copses was a large marshy plain, unprotected by cover of any kind; beyond this again were some thick clumps of trees, the approach to them defended by a small river, spanned by a bridge; behind the trees were the houses which formed the village of Beebeegunj. The Sepoys had made this their main position, and had strengthened it in every possible way; the bridge had been broken down, earthen breastworks thrown up on the opposite side of the river, and every house in the village occupied in force. Their numbers were estimated at from 2000 to 2500. Eyre having reconnoitred, concluded that with his force their position was unassailable in front: he resolved therefore to turn it. Masking this movement by the fire of his guns, he diverged to the right, taking a course parallel to the river, in the direction of the railway embankment by which it is crossed. His intention had no sooner become evident to the rebels than they left their entrenchment, and proceeded in the same direction on their side of the river, keeping upon our men a hot fire. It seemed as though the victory ought to lie with the party which first reached the railway embankment, for close to it was a large clump of trees which commanded the angle of the only approach. In this the Sepoys had a great advantage over us; our men were moving across partly swampy, partly rugged and broken ground—they had a hard soil to traverse; we were encumbered with guns—they had none. However, our men pushed on with a will, and with every hope of being beforehand with them, until within 300 yards of the railway line.

Here the ground was broken and rugged; the guns were moved with difficulty, and it was found impossible to get them on to the line. The Sepoys saw their advantage: they had reached the woods already alluded to, which quite commanded the road by which our men must pass. Under cover of these they poured a very brisk fire on Eyre's party, but these latter were not entirely unsheltered by trees, and Eyre at this moment getting the guns into position, opened upon them a heavy fire of shot and shell. But the Sepoys were bent on mischief. Led by their subadars, they made several very gallant and very desperate efforts to gain possession of our guns, and their numbers were so great that these were in very great peril. All this time the Fusiliers, moving in advance in extended order, were interchanging volleys of musketry with the enemy, whose numbers, however, were so great that they were able at the same time to occupy our infantry, and attempt to carry our guns. It became evident by this time that a much longer continuance of these tactics must end in our discomfiture, more especially as our gun-ammunition was almost exhausted, and of the sixty rounds carried by the men more than half had been fired away. The rebels, too, were becoming bolder, from observing our stationary tactics. Seeing this, Eyre re-

solved to have recourse to the bayonet — that glorious weapon which has never yet failed in the hands of England's sons. Accordingly the word was given, and with hands well down and hearts in their right place, this band of less than 150 men, extending over 300 yards and led by their gallant commandant Captain L'Estrange, bore down to the charge. Conspicuous on either flank, as the best mounted officers present, were Captain Hastings of the Stud Department, and Mr. Kelley of the Railway — both big men on big horses, charging with, and cheering on the infantry. On they came to that wood from which so many volleys had been poured forth on our devoted band. But the Sepoys would not wait for them. Sheltered behind trees they would have fought for hours; but here, as in Oudh, the sight of the cold steel was sufficient to scare them; they broke and fled. The victory was now gained; the enemy gave up the contest and fled in confusion. Our troops followed them up to within four miles of Arrah, when their further progress was stopped by an impassable river. They therefore halted whilst the engineers prepared a temporary bridge.

The reader, judging from the account I have given of this action, may imagine that the infantry charge ought to have been made sooner in the day. Such a judgment would, at least, be hasty. If there were any quality exhibited throughout the action, which called forth more than any other the admiration of all, it was the coolness and complete self-command displayed by Major Eyre. This officer showed that he possessed all the abilities which, fifteen years before, had brought him prominently to the notice of Lord Ellenborough. On this occasion, he had guns and few infantry: the enemy had no guns and swarms of foot-men. It would have shown the most culpable rashness on Eyre's part, if he had dashed at them with his handful of men, without endeavouring to make them sensible of the power of his guns. The moment he saw that they were too strongly posted for his artillery to dislodge them, he let go the infantry, and drove them out. If they had had the heart to resist, then our position would have been very critical. It was, in fact, a last resort. Like a good general, he husbanded it till the proper moment arrived, and then, by using it effectually, assured himself of victory. The gallantry of officers and men, as well as of the volunteers, was most conspicuous. Lieut. Wild, an officer of the 40th—the men of which corps were fighting against him—was observed to be everywhere, distinguished from all his comrades by wearing his red-jacket. But all were animated by the same noble spirit, and it is gratifying that all were spared to reap the fruits of their success. Our losses were little more than nominal.

Meanwhile, the party in the little house at Arrah were still holding out bravely against the foe; their hope never wavered, their hearts never sank. Every assault of the enemy was repulsed with loss; all his offers of terms repelled with indignation. On the third day, water began to run short; a well was dug within the house in less than twelve hours. Did the enemy raise a barricade, ours grew in proportion; did a shot strike a weak place in the defence, it was

made twice as strong as before. But, perhaps, their greatest danger consisted in the possibility of their being undermined. This also was attempted. The mine was dug, the powder was stored, the train was laid; why it was not fired yet remains a mystery. But the probability is, that the party on watch over the house were awaiting the return of their victorious comrades from Beebeegunj. Return they did, but how? Broken in spirit, tumbling down, after the manner of Asiatics, from the fever heat of exultation to the zero of depression, seeing an enemy in every shadow; they came but to warn their associates to fly with them. And fly they did, leaving in their haste the train which was ready for the spark unfired. The next morning Eyre arrived. Great were the congratulations on all sides. The little house in which our countrymen had held out so long was quite a picture; not a single brick unmarked by shot or bullet. Yet in it, for seven days, a few Englishmen had resisted the attacks of three thousand men. Honour to them! They all deserve the admiration of their countrymen. But, by common consent, foremost amongst them stands the civil engineer, Mr. Boyle. He it was who planned the defence; he it was who laid in stores and supplies; he it was whose engineering skill enabled the garrison to render nugatory all the efforts of the foe. The mine to which I have cursorily alluded had, under his instructions, been countermined, and another blow of the pick would have broken into it. The heroic exertions of Messrs. Wake and Colvin are also deserving of the highest praise; it was to the acuteness of the former that the garrisen discovered that a mine was being attempted; whilst the untiring exertions of the latter were remarked by all.

But not the least amount of praise must be awarded to the Sikhs. Fighting for aliens against their own countrymen, for there were many of these latter in the ranks of the rebels, they displayed throughout a fidelity and a staunchness which was the more to be admired as it had become so rare; they knew that in case of our defeat they would receive no mercy from the Sepoys,—that an act of treachery, on the other hand, would ensure them the warmest welcome. But such an idea was never entertained for an instant; they had at the outset announced their intention of casting in their lot with us, and from that resolve they never swerved.

Eyre's first act after arriving at Arrah was to send in to Dinapore a report of his proceedings, together with a request that ammunition might be sent out for his detachment. His requisition was acceded to; and it having been ascertained that the Sepoys had rallied at Jugdeespore, between twenty and thirty miles south-west of Arrah, and that Eyre had proposed following them up, a detachment of two hundred men of the 10th, under Captain Patterson, burning to revenge their comrades, were sent to join him. On coming within sight of the enemy, it was found impossible to restrain the impetuosity of these men; Eyre accordingly let them go. They charged with a shout of fury, and taking three guns as they rushed on, at length came to a hand-to-hand *mêlée* with the enemy. Then did they execute terrible vengeance—a vengeance which was sufficient to wring tears of blood from the heart of Mr. Grant and his co-sympathisers with the muti-

neers. Happily Eyre was not a *doctrinaire;* he had witnessed the mangled remains of our countrymen at Arrah, and he did not check the furious onslaught of our avenging soldiers. The charge of the 10th was decisive; it struck a terror into the hearts of the rebels; they were now utterly broken and fled in dismay. The district of Shahabad was at once cleared of their presence, and those that were not killed hastened under the guidance of Koour Singh to find refuge in a more congenial part of the country. By their departure Eyre's further detention in Behar became unnecessary, and he returned to gain fresh reputation on his road to Cawnpore and Lucknow.

We must now return to Patna.

Scarcely had Mr. Taylor, the Commissioner, received intelligence of the mutiny at Dinapore, followed by the disaster at Arrah to the west, than news reached him that two companies of the 8th had revolted at Hagareebagh to the south, and that the 12th, the most trusted regiment of Irregular Cavalry, had risen in insurrection at Legowlie to the north, and had murdered their commanding officer, his own most valued coadjutor, Major Holmes. It was too true. The regiment had been doing splendid service up to the 25th of July. Major Holmes had reported most favourably of them, and this officer had been quoted as an example of the truth of Lord Canning's axiom, that no regiment which was properly commanded would mutiny. But on the evening of the 26th, as he was driving out in his buggy with his wife, a daughter of the heroic Sale, four sowars rode up to him with their swords drawn, and almost before he knew what they wanted they had beheaded both himself and Mrs. Holmes. The regiment then rose, murdered the doctor, his wife and children, plundered the treasury, and let themselves loose on the country. The fears of the mercantile community, expressed on the occasion of their interview with Lord Canning, were thus so far realised. The native troops had not been disarmed; they had mutinied; the entire district was at their mercy. It appeared to the Commissioner of Patna that the natural course of the mutineers would lead them to those small civil stations — the arteries of Patna — in which the local treasuries were deposited; he accordingly issued a circular to the magistrates of those stations which lay most prominently in the route of the mutineers, directing them to retire, with their treasure, if possible, on Patna, leaving, for the present, the district unprotected. It was this order which was made the pretext for his recall.

At the little civil station of Gyah, to which, amongst others, this order was transmitted, Mr. Alonzo Money was the magistrate. The troops there consisted of forty Europeans of the 84th, and 116 Sikhs. Eighty men of the 64th Foot had left two days before for Patna. Mr. Money, on receiving the circular, called a meeting of the residents, read out the Commissioner's orders, and announced his intention of abiding by them. The roads being considered impracticable for wheeled carriages, it was resolved to abandon the treasure, 70,000*l.* It must be premised that the station of Gya lay on the direct route from Hagareebagh to the north-west, and the residents were daily expecting a visit from the mutineers.

On the morning of the 31st of July, the party started, every European in Gya abandoning that station, their houses, property, the Government stores and money. They had not ridden far before the idea came into the head of Mr. Hollings, an uncovenanted servant of Government—that is an "adventurer" in Governmental employ—that this was a very shameful abandonment. The more he brooded over the idea, the more satisfied did he become of its being well founded. He accordingly rode up to Mr. Money, and mentioned his convictions on the subject. Mr. Money, who had felt uneasy himself on the very point, cordially sympathised with him, and adopted on the spur of the moment the resolution of returning. He halted the party, announced his individual intention, asked none of them to join him, and in company with Mr. Hollings alone rode back. He found the station in the same order as when he had left it; nothing was disturbed, the native police were doing duty over the jail and over the treasury as when he had set out. His first measure was to send a despatch for the return of the company of the 64th Foot which had left two days before; his second to endeavour to re-assure the minds of the native population, an attempt in which he was but little successful.

On the 2nd of August, the company of the 64th returned, and Mr. Money busied himself in procuring wheeled carriages for the treasure. Still everything was apparently secure; but on the 13th, as Mr. Money was going out of his house, he heard a fearful yell, and perceived the convicts from the jail accompanied by the jail guard rushing toward his house. Fortunately, a horse ready saddled was awaiting him at the stable close at hand. He instantly mounted, galloped to the treasury, turned out the Europeans, yoked the bullocks, and set out in the direction of Shergotty, in the hope of soon getting on to the Grand Trunk Road. He had not proceeded five miles before the crowd of savages, filling the air with discordant cries, was seen approaching. They had not perhaps counted on the warm reception which they met with, and which had the effect of completely dispersing them. Mr. Money then, unmolested, pursued his journey to Calcutta, whither we must precede him.

The account of Mr. Tayler's circular, of Mr. Alonzo Money's successful disobedience of its provision, had no sooner reached Calcutta than Mr. Tayler was suspended. This was not the real cause—that has been previously pointed out; but the Bengal Government was glad to pounce upon Mr. Tayler's first indiscretion, to replace him by a man after their own heart.

Whether Mr. Tayler's order to abandon the small stations of the Patna division were an indiscretion or a crime, or whether it were a wise forethought, is a point upon which public opinion in India is still divided. That gentleman has set forth in a pamphlet lately published, that he intended the order to be discretionary, and that in no case did he contemplate the abandonment of the treasure. If this be the case, and in the absence of the circular itself it may be accepted as a correct account, Mr. Tayler's order possesses the character of a wise and prudent measure. The entire country was swarming with revolters; the small stations were weakly garrisoned and isolated,

It were surely then wise to accord to the chief person in authority at those stations liberty to retire, if needs be, with the treasure to the chief town of the district, there to mass the available forces. If this was all that Mr. Tayler did, he is scarcely deserving of blame.

And in that view the conduct of Mr. Money loses much of its chivalrous aspect. In any case he was wrong to leave the station, unless he conceived he were threatened by an overwhelming force; and when once he resolved on returning, it was very courageous, but not very wise, not to order back the escort and residents also. Fortune favoured him, as it so often favours those who are brave and self-reliant; but it is unfortunate that the firmness which he displayed after his conversation with Mr. Hollings had not been exerted prior to his desertion of Gya. By that means the whole scandal would have been avoided.

These gentlemen received their reward. Mr. Money, the civilian, was promised almost immediate promotion from a grade in which he received 100*l.* per mensem to another wherein that salary would be doubled. The allowances of Mr. Hollings, the "uncovenanted," received an addition of 20*l.* per mensem.

A new era was now about to be inaugurated. On the 30th July, the circular known as "Canning's Clemency" was issued; on the 4th August, Mr. J. P. Grant was sent up country to carry out its provisions; on the 5th, Mr. Samuells was appointed Commissioner of Patna, on the principle of conciliation, and Ameer Ally, a Mohammedan pleader, directed to proceed with him as his assistant; and finally, General Outram, who had arrived in Calcutta on the 1st, was on the 5th appointed to the joint commands of Dinapore and Cawnpore, thus superseding the incapable Lloyd and the noble-hearted, indefatigable Havelock!

All India stood aghast at these changes, all in the wrong direction. But the public voice was dumb, for the Press was gagged, and letters to England formed the only outlet for public opinion. On that account perhaps the thraldom was the more keenly felt; for, from the drawing room to the barrack, the tone of society was very bitter against Lord Canning and his advisers.

CHAPTER IX.

GWALIOR.—CENTRAL INDIA.—AGRA.—ROHILCUND.

THE state of Agra and the surrounding districts, up to the beginning of June, has been already related. From that date its fate, and the fate of India, it may be said, was entirely dependent upon the movements of that large body of men who form the Gwalior Contingent. It will be convenient, then, primarily to notice the influences under which those men, most of them natives of Oudh, first rose against their officers, and were subsequently persuaded to abstain from adding

their weight, at that critical period, to the burden which was then almost bowing us to the earth.

When, in 1843, Gwalior lay at the feet of Lord Ellenborough, its army discomfited, their leaders disheartened, and its king a minor, that far-seeing nobleman conceived the idea of so binding it to our interests, that without any violation of faith, without any infringement of the rights of the native ruler, it might be hereafter a source of strength to our empire; and the means by which he proposed to accomplish this result were these. To the lawful ruler, of whose infancy his counsellors had taken such unwise advantage, Lord Ellenborough returned the whole of his patrimony. But his army he disbanded. In lieu of it, he raised another army, officered and paid by British officers — the money for the purpose being furnished by the Maharaja. He placed near the person of that prince a resident, armed with plenary powers, whose duty it should be to guide, instruct, and educate the youthful monarch; to make his policy, though he remained Maharaja, and in name the despotic master of Gwalior, entirely dependent on the views and instructions of the British Government.

By these means, no shock was offered to the feelings of the native princes: these were not suddenly and rudely, even treacherously, as in the case of Oudh and Nagpore, made to feel that their existence depended on the pleasure of one man. On the contrary, the generous policy of Lord Ellenborough drew from them all the expression of satisfaction, with a devotion to our rule. Nor was it in any other respect a less wise policy. Instead of weakening our empire, as was done in the two instances referred to, by transferring to our rule, and to a more dreaded ordeal — to our civil courts, a wild, rude, untamed people, untaught in the technicalities and trickeries of law, he strengthened it by retaining them under their native laws, and by imparting thereby a sense of security to all who had inherited or purchased property under the ancient *régime*. It was hoped too that the Maharaja, as he grew up to manhood, perceiving the stability of the tenure by which he held his possessions, secure alike from all fear of his protectors, the British, and from the danger of combination among his own officers, would recognise and appreciate the tie which bound him to our rule, and would use all his efforts to strengthen rather than to break it.

Of all the schemes which the penetration of statesmen has shadowed out, there is not one which has been more justified by the result than that embodied in the policy adopted by Lord Ellenborough towards Gwalior in 1843.

Whilst other provinces under the systems of those who had preceded and who came after him — whilst Affghanistan under Lord Auckland, the Punjab *, under Lord Hardinge, Oudh under Lord

* It is readily admitted that the Punjab, since its annexation in 1848, has shown splendid results; but it is equally a fact, that the system under which she has been so ably administered was borrowed by Lord Dalhousie from Sir Charles Napier's administration of Sinde.

The plan, too, first adopted to any great extent by Sir Charles Napier, of em-

Dalhousie, have proved thorns in our sides, Gwalior has been a tower of strength. She has been an outwork, as it were, of Agra, and at the same time has overawed and kept in subjection to us, the chiefs of Rajpootana, Dodypore, and the petty rajas of Central India. Before the battle of Maharajpore she had been the source of unceasing anxiety to our Government.

The Maharaja, now a grown man, has perceived that Gwalior had had her crisis: that the administration of her affairs had been committed to him on the sole condition of dealing out impartial justice to his subjects: he has seen that he possessed great social power, a princely revenue, a high status amongst native princes, an army officered by Europeans. He had therefore no want; there was nothing to tempt him to offer any opposition to British rule: he had no sympathy in common with the Mahomedan sovereigns of Delhi and Oudh: his interests and ours had become identical.

Such was the result of Lord Ellenborough's statesmanlike policy in 1843. It was destined, as I shall now proceed to show, to save our empire in 1857.

On the revolt of Delhi becoming known at Gwalior, the Maharaja at once resolved to cast in his lot with the British: he sent his body-guard, men of his own Mahratta clan, to Agra, where they were most successfully employed, and placed at the disposal of Mr. Colvin the entire Contingent. But it soon became evident that the causes which had induced our own native army to mutiny had infected the Sepoys of the Gwalior Contingent with the virus of revolt. The first symptom of it appeared at Hattrass on the 28th May *, when a portion of one of the cavalry regiments under the command of Lieutenant Cockburn revolted and went to Delhi; again, in the beginning of June, one of the regiments of the Contingent stationed at Neemuch mutinied; those at Augur and Sullutpore followed these examples; and finally, on the 14th June, those remaining at Gwalior rose in the night and massacred their officers.

The Maharaja was in no way to blame for these calamities: the troops which had mutinied were not Gwalior men; they came from Oudh, and had been enlisted by us. Like the rest of our native troops, they had been seduced by the emissaries of the former sovereign of their country — the king of Oudh — to rise against us; they received their orders from another power than that at Gwalior, and obeyed them.

Nevertheless, no sooner had they murdered their officers, than they placed their services at the disposal of the Maharaja, and begged him to lead them against Agra. At this time not only did the insurgents occupy Delhi, but the entire country north-west of Agra had risen in

ploying hardworking subalterns on moderate salaries to do the work of highly paid civilians, has been tried in the Punjab with the best effect.

It is not necessary to enter into the reason now why a different policy was put in force with respect to Gwalior and Sinde. It was absolutely necessary that it should be so; any measure short of the annexation of Sinde would have been destruction to us. One remedy will not cure every constitution.

* Vide Chapter I.

revolt; our guns were beleaguered at Cawnpore and Lucknow; and the aspec our affairs was in the highest degree unpropitious. If, therefore, policy adopted in 1843 had been a vicious policy like that pursi towards Affghanistan in 1838–39, if it had been a selfish and grang policy like that carried out towards Oudh in 1856, now would hi been the Maharaja's opportunity — most favourable the moment frecovering his lost authority: it was merely necessary to accede the proposal of the mutinous Contingent to revenge himself on thBritish. Had he so acceded, had he put himself at their head, ar accompanied likewise by his trusty Mahrattas, proceeded to the ne of action, the consequences would have been most disastrous to urselves. He would have brought at least twenty thousand troo, one half of them drilled and disciplined by European officers, on ourweak points. Agra and Lucknow would have at once fallen. Havelock would have been shut up in Allahabad; and either that fortress uld have been besieged, or the rebels, giving it a wide berth, would ve marched through Benares on to Calcutta. There were no troop there was no fortification to stop them. But, happily for us, the policynaugurated by Lord Ellenborough, unlike many other excellent meaures introduced by that nobleman, had not been repealed; and te Maharaja felt that a Mahomedan power raised upon the ruins of te British would be of all things most unfavourable to his interests, iat, in fact, his prosperity depended upon our supremacy. He was, however, to a great extent in the power of the Contingent troops: he culd not coerce them; he was compelled therefore to temporise.

It was a difficult matter. It was not the Maharaja's object, acting for our advantage, simply to decline going with the troops himself: he saw that, t whatever part of our territories they might proceed, they would inflict terrible damage on our interests, and that his refusal to go with them would be useless unless he managed to detain them altogether, or until such time as our resources should be better able to ward off their attack.

But, in spite of the difficulty of the case, he managed it. By liberal donations of pay, by pretended difficulties in the way of procuring carriage, by all the arts to which an Asiatic mind can have recourse, he did manage to detain them. Nay, more, when the Mhow mutineers and the rebel troops of Holkar, 3000 strong, passed through his territory, he actually so temporised with the Gwalior troops as to prevent their accompanying the former in their expedition against Agra. He could not keep them back much longer, but he detained them up to the proper time; they finally rose against him, left Gwalior on the 16th October, and, after many marches and countermarches, arrived at Cawnpore in time to fall into the hands of Sir Colin Campbell, on the 7th December.

Meanwhile the 3000 men above alluded to moved on to Agra; but, before referring to their doings at that station, it will be necessary to give a sketch of the risings in the principal districts in Central India.

The revolt at Neemuch, long previously threatened, took place on

the 3rd June. The regiments at that station consisted of the 72nd Native Infantry, the 7th Regiment of the Gwalior Contingent, and a wing of the 1st Bengal Cavalry. Their mutiny was characterised by the usual occurrences. Loud protestations of fidelity on the part of the men until their arrangements had been completed; then a sudden rise, and an attempt, more or less successful, to massacre their officers. At Neemuch, fortunately, there was a fortified square, in which our countrymen and women were able to find shelter at the commencement of the outbreak: and before this was threatened, they had time to make some preparation for escape. The rebels, thus masters of the station, plundered the treasury, and made for Delhi. Their operations there on the rear of our force, and their sudden assault on Agra, will be detailed in due course.

At Nusseerabad, about one hundred and fifty miles nearer to Delhi, the revolt had commenced even earlier: the troops here were the 15th and 30th Native Infantry, a battery of Native Artillery, and the 1st Bombay Lancers.

The mutiny commenced at 3 P. M. by the men of the 15th and the Artillery taking possession of the guns, and bidding defiance to the officers; the 30th appeared to hesitate at first, but it was not long before they also joined. The officers were fired at on all sides, and many of them escaped very narrowly. In this situation, the Bombay Lancers were brought up. As they approached, the guns opened fire upon them. In vain they tried to charge: every attack was repulsed; and their officers, leading them on with great gallantry, suffered out of all proportion. Finding it fruitless to persevere, the Lancers desisted, and contented themselves with covering the retirement of the women and children to a place of safety. The mutineers then made their way to Delhi, and managed to reach it in time to take an efficient part in the defence.

The regiments at Mhow consisted of the 23rd Native Infantry, a wing of the 1st Cavalry, and a company of European Artillery. The mutiny first commenced at Indore, some thirty miles distant, the residence of the Maharaja Holkar, and of the Governor-General's agent. The Maharaja himself was quite innocent of any share in the catastrophe: his troops had caught the infection, and turned against us in spite of him. But a sufficient number of the Bhopal Contingent, who were fortunately on duty there, remained faithful long enough to enable Major Durand and the residents to retreat uninjured.

That same day an account of the occurrence reached Mhow. That very morning two guns had been sent out on the Bombay road to join General Woodburn's advancing column; but on the news of the revolt at Indore orders were transmitted to recall them. The men who were ordered to bring them back showed little alacrity in turning out, and on arriving up to the guns seemed unwilling to coerce the gunners. However, the remonstrances and example of their officers prevailed, and the guns were brought back. The bearing of the men, however, was sulky and unsoldierlike.

These circumstances being reported to the commanding officer, the European Artillery was ordered into the fort. Thither also the

ladies repaired. That very night, as their officers were sitting at dinner close to their lines, the men rose, fired upon them, killed two or three, plundered the station, and then made the best of their way to Gwalior. The great body of the officers found refuge in the fort. Here we must leave them for the present, whilst we follow the fortunes of our countrymen at Agra.

Towards the end of June the country all around Agra had assumed so threatening an aspect, that the residents had all been ordered into the fort, and the Kotah Contingent, then supposed by Mr. Colvin to be trustworthy, was moved up to the assistance of the garrison. It had certainly performed good service up to the time of its reaching Agra, collecting revenue, hanging mutineers, and burning villages; but it had scarcely arrived at the seat of the Lieutenant-Governorship before the men mutinied, firing upon their officers. Next day the Neemuch mutineers arrived within four miles. The authorities had been expecting them, but had forborne to mention their fears: the consequence was that much property belonging to those who could least afford to lose it was destroyed. However, hearing of the approach of the rebels, it was resolved to meet them. They numbered about four thousand men, of whom one-half perhaps had been disciplined by us. Our force consisted of seven companies of the 8th Europeans, one company of European Artillery, and a few volunteer cavalry. The enemy had eight guns, which they had strongly posted in the little village of Sussia, on the road to Futtehpore Sikri, being themselves encamped on the plain beyond. Our force advanced against them in line, the artillery being on the flanks; the cavalry on the rear. When about six hundred yards from the village, their artillery opened upon our line: it was immediately replied to by D'Oyley's battery with so great effect that they were temporarily silenced. A charge of infantry at this time, such as Havelock ordered at Cawnpore, and Eyre directed at Beebeegunj, would have gained us the day; but no one of those possessing authority could appreciate the crisis, and, instead of a charge, a cautious advance was directed. But the enemy had gained courage from our inactivity. The gunners returned to their guns, and opened a fire on our line with great effect; at the same time their cavalry threatened our flanks and rear, and their infantry, advancing in skirmishing order, gave us great annoyance. It was at this time, as we were advancing too slowly for heroic souls, that Captain D'Oyley, seated on one of the gun-carriages, was mortally wounded. His horse had been previously shot under him. When struck, he called out in a loud voice, "Follow them up, follow them up," and still continued, for a short time, to direct the advance of the battery. He knew that his wound was mortal, but still he gave his orders. When at last he was overcome with pain, he turned to the man nearest him, and said, "They have done for me now; put a stone over my grave, and say that I died fighting for my guns." He did not survive long.

Meanwhile our slow advance had had some effect, for the enemy had abandoned the village to a charge of two companies of the Europeans, and the day seemed our own, when it was discovered that

all our ammunition was exhausted. There was nothing for it then but a retreat, as our creeping movements had permitted the enemy to carry away his guns. Retreat then we did, threatened by the cavalry, even surrounded. Had they had any pluck, they might have cut up every man of our party. But they still feared the red-coated European; and our force, scarcely beaten, but certainly baffled and humiliated, at last found shelter under the walls of the fort. Our loss on this day was one hundred and forty, out of five hundred engaged; that of the enemy was not known. Strange to say, he did not think of following up his advantage, but took the road to Muttra and Delhi the next day, contenting himself with letting out from the jail four thousand of the most determined villains in India. Our countrymen were thenceforth confined to the fort, whence they were subsequently released by the arrival of Colonel Greathed's column, of which an account will be given hereafter.

Before proceeding to the north-west, and detailing the circumstances connected with the siege and recapture of Delhi, it will be necessary very briefly to refer to the events which had been passing in the districts surrounding that city, as well as in the rich province of Rohilcund.

In the end of May, the men of the Hurrianah Light Infantry, a local battalion stationed at Hausi Hissar and Sirsa, and part of the 4th Irregular Cavalry, rose upon their officers and the European residents, massacred many of them, and, after plundering the entire district, made for Delhi. Every village in that part of the country is a castle on a small scale: the inhabitants, sympathising with the mutineers, rose almost simultaneously with them, and declared for the cause of the King of Delhi. They did more: every unfortunate straggler who fell into their hands was ruthlessly butchered. And yet, many of the villages in which these deeds were perpetrated have been spared. It is a fact, to which there are hundreds of witnesses, that when, after the capture of Delhi, Colonel Greathed's column reached one of the largest of these rebellious towns, notorious for the cruelties which had been perpetrated within its walls—in which too the decapitated skeleton of an European woman was still exposed, bearing besides marks of the infliction of torture—that village was, at the earnest prayer of the civilian who accompanied the force as "political adviser," it is supposed, actually spared. Does the reader ask why? Because it supplied a large revenue to the Government of the North-West Provinces. These are some of the sordid considerations which the agents of the East India Company allow to interpose between our soldiers and retributive justice. But this is but an ordinary instance; others remain to be told which proclaim even more clearly the cold-blooded nature of our rulers, their want of sympathy with humanity, if that humanity be allied to their own.

The important province of Rohilcund, lying east of Oudh and north-west of Delhi, is inhabited by a race of Mahomedan warriors, the descendants of the victorious Affghans who settled in that country nearly a century and a half ago. Notwithstanding that lapse of time, they had retained, in all its perfection, their national

character: they were brave, treacherous, revengeful, very idle, careless of any occupation save that of a soldier. Hence this race supplied many recruits to our Irregular Cavalry. Its daring, dashing service was peculiarly suited to men of their disposition, and there were always numerous applicants for the vacancies which occurred.

We had three military stations in Rohilcund,—the principal and most important at Bareilly, the chief town of the province. Here, when the Delhi outbreak occurred, were the 8th Irregular Cavalry, the 18th and 68th Native Infantry, and a battery of Native Artillery, — not a single European besides the officers and residents.

From the very day that the news arrived the infantry regiments had shown their sympathy with the mutineers. But the 8th Irregular Cavalry, one of the best corps in the army, and commanded by a very gallant officer, Captain Mackenzie, evinced every disposition to continue loyal. So well had the men behaved, and to such an extent were they trusted by all, that Captain Mackenzie was empowered to raise several additional troops for permanent service, and the lines of the Irregular Cavalry were appointed as the place of rendezvous in the event of an outbreak. That these men were at the time faithful, cannot be doubted: many of them evinced their fidelity shortly afterwards by leaving house and home, wife and children, to the mercy of the insurgents, whilst they followed the fortunes of their officers to the bleak hills of Nynee Tal. But the great bulk of the men were unable to resist the combined influences of religion and example, and the golden prospects held out to them by the tempters. Foremost amongst these was Khan Bahadoor Khan, a pensioner of Government, and the nearest descendant of the famous Rohilla chief, Hafiz Rahmut. This man, in fact, received a double pension,—one as the heir of Hafiz Rahmut, the other in his capacity of retired Principal Sudder Ameen.* He enjoyed the entire confidence of the authorities at Bareilly: he was closeted daily with the commissioner and the magistrate, who concerted plans with him for the preservation of order. He was an old, venerable-looking man, with a soft, insinuating answer: his interests were supposed to be bound up with ours. Little did the magistrate imagine, when he announced his conviction that Delhi must fall in a week, that the hearts of the people were with us, and that the cavalry would remain staunch, that the old man listening apparently so respectfully was laughing in his sleeve, that he himself was the soul of the conspiracy, that the entire district, and the infantry regiments, were ready to rise at a signal from him, and that he was busily engaged in seducing the Irregulars by means of Mahomed Sheffie, a resaldar whom he had gained over to his interests.

But so it was: the hoary traitor had, under the mask of servility, wound himself into our confidence, and he employed the hold which he had thus gained on our authorities to bring about their destruction.

* Native judge.

All was ready by the end of May. In the morning of the 31st a servant, who had been sent with letters to the post, reported that he had found the office surrounded by armed Sepoys, who had tore up the letters: information came from another quarter to the effect that the Sepoys had resolved on rising at eleven o'clock, and that they had told off parties to each bungalow to murder all their officers. The cavalry were at once ordered to turn out, but before they could be got ready the revolt had commenced. As the clock sounded eleven, the Sepoys of the 68th rushed furiously out of their lines, seized the guns, and turned them upon the mess-house, firing grape into it. The officers immediately mounted their horses, and, finding it worse than useless to attempt to restore order, rode across the parade ground to the Irregular Cavalry lines, exposed all the time to a galling fire. At the same time both the 18th and 68th Sepoys went off in parties to execute their murderous commissions. One of these came across Brigadier Sibbald, a fine old soldier, riding towards the Irregulars: they saluted him with a volley which produced instant death. Most of the other officers reached the cavalry lines in safety.

There, indeed, had assembled by this time almost all the residents of the station, civilians, military men, merchants, and others. They found Captain Mackenzie and his adjutant, Lieutenant Beecher, haranguing their men and endeavouring to keep them together; but some were already sneaking off, and the disposition of others seemed doubtful. Colonel Troup, who commanded on the death of the Brigadier, saw at once that they too were gone, and gave the order to retire on Nynee Tal, a hill-station a hundred miles distant. Captain Mackenzie, however, was anxious to give his men the opportunity of proving themselves faithful. But he had scarcely returned from taking Colonel Troup's orders than the left wing went bodily off and joined the mutineers. They halted at the magazine, raised the green flag of Mahomed, and called on the others to join them. In spite of every solicitation of their officers, they obeyed: out of the entire regiment assembled that day at Bareilly, nineteen only remained faithful, and these escorted their officers and the refugees to Nynee Tal, leaving, as I said before, their property and families behind them. The residents whom choice or accident caused to remain were brutally murdered. Khan Bahadoor Khan himself taking a leading part in the atrocities.

At Moradabad and Shahjihanpore, the two other military stations in Rohilcund, the troops rose almost immediately after. At the former place, indeed, the 29th Native Infantry only joined their comrades when coerced by the arrival of the mutineers from Bareilly; but at Shahjihanpore the 28th revolted with a will, surrounded the Christian residents as they were at church, and murdered almost all of them. A few who escaped managed, after incredible difficulties, to reach the little fort of Mohammerah in Oudh; but, compelled to leave this place of refuge, they endeavoured, under an escort of men believed to be faithful, to make their way towards Lucknow. On the road they were met by the 41st Native Infantry, red with the blood of the Europeans sta-

tioned at Seetapore: by these they were one and all brutally murdered; some of the servants alone escaped to tell the tale.

Meanwhile the mutineers from these three stations having plundered all the treasuries and accumulated enormous quantities of spoil, prepared to take it with them into Delhi. They were about 5000 strong, and had with them 400.000*l.* in silver, laden on country carts. They crossed the Ganges within thirty miles of Meerut. We had in that station a thousand Europeans doing nothing beyond guarding an entrenchment; and yet the general commanding did not attempt in the slightest degree to interfere with their passage. They even lay at Gurmuckteser for some days, whilst they sent over their baggage, and, to keep our men off, sent the General taunting messages that they were about to attack him, a threat which sufficed to make him keep his Europeans within the entrenchment. How the spirits of the gallant young officers, panting to revenge their countrymen, chafed at this inaction, may be imagined. More than one implored the General to permit them to go with even 500 men to attack the rebels as they were crossing: but he would not hear of it. Meerut, he said, was too important a station to be left undefended. Most true! But there are some cases in which a bold attack is the best defence, and this was one of them. The defeat of the Rohilcund rebels at Gurmuckteser Ghât would have struck terror into the surrounding district, and would have had even a material effect on the siege of Delhi.

But it was not to be: this force, laden with the plunder of Rohilcund, marched within thirty miles of a thousand Europeans, crossed the broadest river in India in boats, traversed the country, exposing their left flank to our inactive forces, and finally reached Delhi on the 1st of July,— a very critical period for the garrison of that city,— without a shot having been fired at them in anger.* Let us turn from the contemplation of one of the most disgraceful passages in the whole course of the rebellion to recount the progress and result of the siege of Delhi.

CHAPTER X.

DELHI.

THE easy conquest of a place, the most important in India, because traditionally the seat of Indian sovereignty, had the most pernicious effect on the minds of every class of native. It convinced the wavering, unnerved the staunch, and furnished the last inducement for the yet dissimulating to throw off the veil and openly proclaim themselves rebels and traitors. Once, therefore, in the hands of the

* I have not given the name of the general officer who commanded at Meerut at the end of June, because it is possible that General Hewitt may have previously left. Whoever he may have been, he deserves to stand in a literary pillory.

insurgents, Delhi became the rallying point for all the mutinous and disaffected in the Doab. Muttra, Kurnaul, Bareilly, and all the surrounding stations contributed their quota of rebels to garrison the captured city. With vast supplies of warlike stores in their possession, and ample time afforded them to concentrate without interruption, no wonder that, before a single besieger appeared before its walls, Delhi was a stronger place than any that had ever offered resistance to a European force in the East. The news of its capture reached General Anson, the Commander-in-Chief, while on a shooting excursion in the hills, on the 12th May. He at once issued the necessary orders for the formation of a force at Umballah, whither he himself proceeded in all haste, arriving there on the 22nd. There were at Umballah at this time the following troops, commanded by Major-General Sir H. W. Barnard: — Her Majesty's 9th Lancers, two troops European Horse Artillery, 4th Light Cavalry (native), and the 5th and 60th Regiments Native Infantry, with a detachment 9th Irregular Cavalry.. At the hill stations of Kussowlie, Dugshai, and Subatho, all within sixty miles of Umballah, were Her Majesty's 75th, and the 1st and 2nd Fusiliers respectively; these regiments were immediately ordered down, marched on the 14th, and reached Umballah on the 17th May. That night a force, consisting of four companies of 1st Europeans, one squadron 9th Lancers, and two guns Horse Artillery, were despatched to Kurnaul, to quell disturbances taking place there. General Anson followed on the 23rd, with the following troops: — four guns, two troops 1st brigade Horse Artillery, 2nd troop 3rd brigade and 3rd troop 3rd battery Horse Artillery, and 4th company 6th battery Artillery; Her Majesty's 9th Lancers, one squadron 4th Lancers, 75th Foot, six companies 1st E. B. Fusiliers, Head Quarters and six companies 2nd E. B. Fusiliers, 60th and 5th Regiments Native Infantry. He reached Kurnaul on the 25th, and died on the 27th May.

Major-General Barnard then assumed the command, and, pushing on, arrived at Alleepoor, ten miles from Delhi, on the 8th June, having been joined by the siege train from Phillour on the 6th, and by the force under General Wilson on the 7th. On the 23d May, the Commander-in-Chief had despatched to General Hewitt at Meerut the following lucid and definite instructions:—

(INCLOSURE 18.)

"*The Commander-in-Chief to Major-General Hewitt.*

"My dear General, "*Umballah, May* 23, 1857.

"I wish to place you in possession of what has been done and is doing here, and of my ideas with respect to the future movements of the force from Meerut, which will be required to join this column in its advance towards Delhi.

"The force from Umballah consists of the 9th Lancers, one squadron 4th Lancers, Her Majesty's 75th foot, 1st European Regiment, 2nd European Regiment, 60th Native Infantry, two troops of Horse Artillery.

"They are formed into two small brigades. Brigadier Halifax commands

the 1st, composed of two squadrons Lancers, Her Majesty's 75th Foot, 1st Europeans, 3rd troop 3rd brigade Horse Artillery of six guns.

"Brigadier Jones will command the 2nd Brigade — 2nd Europeans, 60th Native Infantry, two squadrons 9th Lancers, one squadron 4th Lancers, 2nd troop 3rd brigade Horse Artillery, six guns.

"Four companies 1st Fusiliers, one squadron of 9th Lancers, two guns Horse Artillery, were moved to Kurnaul on the 17th, and arrived on the 20th.

"Six companies of 1st Fusiliers followed on the 21st.

"Her Majesty's 75th Foot and 60th Regiment Native Infantry march on the 22nd.

"One squadron 9th Lancers and four guns will march on the 24th or 25th.

"The above will all be at Kurnaul on the 28th.

"The 2nd Europeans, 3rd troop 3rd brigade Horse Artillery, will probably follow on the 26th. The whole will be at Kurnaul on the 30th.

"I propose then to advance with the column towards Delhi on the 1st, and be opposite to Bhagput on the 5th. At this last place I should wish to be joined by the force from Meerut. To reach it four days may be calculated on.

"This would require your movement on the 1st or 2nd, according to circumstances. By that time it is hoped you will have made every preparation.

"Irregular detachments have been sent on the road to beyond Paneeput to stop plundering, and to protect the well disposed.

"The road has also been opened to Meerut. Captain Sanford arrived here with your despatches early on the morning of the 23rd, and found no obstruction.

"A detachment of 150 sowars of the 4th Irregular Cavalry will leave Kurnaul to-morrow; 25 will be posted at Shamlee, 50 will proceed to Mozuffurnugger, to restore confidence in that district, and to punish any villagers and marauders that may have been concerned in the plundering of that place.

"I have directed 75 to proceed direct to Meerut and to place themselves at your disposal; they will be under the command of an European officer. You will then be enabled to secure carriage for your troops, if you still require it. You must ascertain whether there are any difficulties on the road from Meerut to Bhagput, and the best mode of overcoming them.

"It would be very desirable to push forward some reconnaissance to as near Delhi as possible. It is reported here that a detachment of the mutineers, with two guns, are posted on the Meerut side of the river. They should be captured, and no mercy must be shown to the mutineers.

"On the 20th, I sent a detachment of 2nd company of the 5th Native Infantry and a squadron of the 4th Lancers towards Saharunpoor. I have the satisfaction of having heard that they arrived just in time to save that place from pillage, and that confidence is restored there. I hope that the occupation of Mozuffurnugger will tend to tranquillise that district.

"Many of the 5th Native Infantry have deserted, but it is gratifying to find they have done their duty when detached.

"Two companies have been sent to Roopur on duty. The remainder, with light companies of the 2nd European Regiment, will be left to guard these cantonments.

"If any families at Meerut would consider themselves more secure in the hills, they might go there with safety.

"A small siege-train has left Loodiana and is expected here on the 26th. It will require eleven days to get it to Delhi. It may join us at Bhagput on or about the 6th, the day after that I have named for the junction of your force.

"I depend upon your supplying at least 120 artillerymen to work it.

"You will bring besides, according to statement received, 2 squadrons of Carbineers, a wing of the 60th Rifles, 1 light Field Battery, 1 troop of Horse Artillery, and any Sappers you can depend upon, and of course the non-commissioned European officers belonging to them. I wish to know whether you have any information respecting troops or guns coming from Agra, or the co-operation of any native States.

"I beg you will communicate this to the Lieutenant-Governor at Agra, and to the Secretary to Government at Calcutta — telegraph and letter.

"Any change in the above shall be communicated to you instantly.

"I remain, &c.,

"GEORGE ANSON.

Acting upon these, Brigadier-General Wilson left Meerut on the 27th May with the force in the margin, and arrived at Guzeeoodeen Nugger on the 30th. At this place the little river Hindun is crossed by an iron bridge, which, as it formed part of the high-road to Delhi from Meerut, it was of the utmost importance to guard. The rebels had sent out a large force with siege-guns to take possession of this bridge; and accordingly, at four o'clock, P.M. of the day of his arrival, General Wilson found himself attacked by the enemy, who had taken up a very advantageous position on some rising ground about a mile from the British camp on the other side of the river, whilst a company of 60th Rifles was detached to hold the bridge. The two 18-pounders replied to the heavy guns, and four guns of Major Tomb's troop Horse Artillery, supported by a squadron of Carbineers, moved along the bank of the river to outflank the enemy's position. They were supported by two companies of the 60th Rifles, four guns of Major Scott's battery, the Sappers, and a troop of Carbineers. The movement completely succeeded: the raking fire from the 6-pounders disconcerted the enemy, whose fire slackened, and shortly ceased. The Rifles were then ordered to advance, which they did in the most dashing style, capturing all the guns, ammunition, and stores of the enemy, who took to flight, pursued by the Carbineers under Lieutenant-Colonel Custance. In this battle, the first in which they had met us in the open field, the mutineers fought most determinedly. "They actually," writes one engaged in the action, "crossed bayonets with us, and met their death like Trojans," and did not relinquish their guns before they had attached slow matches to the ammunition waggons, one of which exploding caused the death of Captain Andrews and four men of the Rifles. The next day about one o'clock the insurgents appeared in force almost on the same ground from which they had previously been driven. After movements on our part similar to those of the day before, a general advance was ordered and the rebels were driven from their position, and the ridge was crowned. The British force, however, was so knocked up by the sun, that the enemy was not pursued, and succeeded in carrying off all their guns.

400 rank and file 6th Rifles.
200 6th Carbineers.
1 Horse Field Battery,
Half troop Horse Artillery.
Head-quarters of Sappers and Miners, about 100 men of all arms.
2 18-pounder guns.

On the 3rd June, General Wilson was reinforced by the Sirmoor battalion (Goorkhas) 600 strong. On the same day he marched towards Alleepoor, where on the 7th he joined the Commander-in-Chief, whose force had been somewhat augmented in the meantime by troops from the contingents of the Putteala and Jhund Rajahs. Sir H. Barnard broke up his camp on the 8th at one A. M., and after marching ten miles found the enemy fully prepared to dispute his advance, in a strong intrenched position with a canal in his rear, at a place called "Badul ka Serai." The British force, divided into three brigades, was disposed as follows: — The 1st brigade, under Brigadier-General Showers, was to act on the right of the main trunk road, along which the column was to advance; the 2nd brigade, under Brigadier-General Graves, was to take the left; and the 3rd brigade, under Brigadier-General Grant was to gain the opposite side of the canal, and recross it below and in rear of the enemy's position as soon as the action commenced, so as to take the enemy in flank: the heavy guns were to remain in position on the road, the rest of the artillery to act on either side. As soon as the advanced picket met the enemy, these brigades deployed, leaving the main road clear. The enemy's guns, served with the greatest precision, now opened upon the advancing troops, causing considerable loss, the second shot killing Colonel Chester, the Adjutant-General. The light field-pieces which replied to them failing to silence guns of such heavy calibre, the 75th were ordered to advance and take the battery. This was done, as General Barnard says, "with heroic gallantry," — the 1st Europeans supporting the attack. The 2nd brigade now coming up and threatening their right, and the 3rd brigade their left, the enemy abandoned the position entirely leaving their guns on the ground. Knowing from the natives of the country, that if he halted a similar opposition might be offered him the following morning, General Barnard determined to push on, and his victorious though exhausted army was nothing loth. Arriving at a point where the road branched off to the left through the Delhi cantonments, it became advisable to divide the army into two columns, one of which should take the branch, and the other the main road. To General Wilson was given the command of the former column, which had to fight its way through lanes and gardens enclosed by high walls and other obstacles, affording cover to an enemy as far as Hindoo Rao's house on the ridge to the extreme right of the cantonments. General Barnard, commanding in person the column proceeding to the left, soon came in sight of the enemy strongly posted on the elevated ridge which separates Delhi from its cantonments. Making a rapid flank movement under cover of the cantonment itself, General Barnard succeeded in gaining the ridge ere the enemy could get their guns into a new position to oppose him. Taken in flank and rear, the out-manœuvred rebels hastily fled, abandoning their guns, twenty-six in number, ammunition, camp equipage, and even wounded men. The whole ridge was at once in our possession, and the army was placed in position upon it. General Barnard meeting General Wilson at Hindoo

Rao's house, which became Army Head-quarters. The goal was now reached. Delhi, the city of horrors, the loathsome refuge of thousands of murderers and traitors, lay beneath our army, and distant but a mile. Welcome as the sight was to our brave little band of soldiers, few could gaze at the immense extent of the city and its formidable defences, without feeling that to attempt a "coup-de-main" with such a force, would be to risk our all upon a rash and perhaps profitless enterprise. It was determined, therefore, to retain the position on the ridge until adequate reinforcements should arrive, and in the meantime to throw up batteries at a distance of 1500 yards from which to shell the city. The extreme right of our position, or the house of Hindoo Rao before mentioned, was the nearest to the walls of Delhi, and faced in a south-easterly direction the Moree Bastion and Gate, the most salient point opposed to us. Here then were placed our batteries. A little on the left, on the ridge which from this point took a north-easterly direction till it joined the river Jumna, was a strong picket in an old mosque, and to the left of that a building called the Flag-staff Tower. Immediately behind this tower lay the cantonments, where the bulk of our force was encamped, protected from the fire of the enemy by the ridge itself, on whose slope descending towards the camp were still the ruined huts of the mutinous regiments and the houses of the unfortunate officers. Behind the camp flowed a small river, taking a northerly course through the plain, and joining the Jumna a few miles above Delhi. This river was crossed by several bridges which however were commanded by some of our heavy guns. The right of the camp was defended by a field-battery, placed upon a convenient elevation, and called the "Mound Battery." To the right of this battery, and almost in rear of Hindoo Rao's house, was a suburb of Delhi called the "Subzee Mundee." It consisted of old houses, gardens with high walls, narrow streets and lanes, affording the very cover behind which only the Sepoy is brave, and in which, as the sequel will show, some most desperate hand-to-hand fights occurred. Similar suburbs intervene between the actual defences of Delhi and the whole front of our position. The defences of Delhi enclose an area of about three square miles; they consist of a series of bastions connected by long curtains, with occasional martello towers to aid the flanking fire: these bastions rise about sixteen feet above the general level of the ground, and are built of masonry twelve feet thick; the curtains are also of masonry and about the same thickness and height. Each bastion mounts eleven guns, one at the salient, three on each face, and two on each flank. Running round the base of these bastions and curtains, is a berm or terrace varying in width from fifteen to thirty feet, and having on its exterior edge a wall eight feet high loopholed for musketry. This wall is a continuation of the escarp wall of the ditch, which descends to a depth of twenty feet, and is twenty-five feet wide. The counterscarp is not of masonry, but is a mere earthen slope of easy incline, the glacis is about sixty yards wide, and covers scarcely half of the walls. On the eastern side of the city runs the river Jumna, on whose banks stand

the palace of the king, and the old fort of Selimgurh, fronting which is the bridge of boats leading to Meerut. At the north side of the king's palace is the Calcutta Gate, and, following the defences in a north-westerly direction, is the Magazine, St. James's Church and the main guard. This was the extreme point of the face which our position fronted, and is the northernmost point of the city walls. Going still round to the left in a northerly direction, we come to the Cashmere Gate, and then to the Moree Gate and Bastion, on which our first fire was directed. This forms the left point of the face opposed to us. To the left of this again, the walls circling towards the river in an arc of which the Calcutta Gate would be about the centre, were the Cabul, Lahore, Furaskkhana, Ajmeer, Toorkaman, and Delhi Gates. Outside the Ajmeer Gate was a crown work for the defence of the tomb of Ghazee Khan. During the rainy season the river Jumna almost washes the walls of the eastern face of the city, rendering it unassailable. With the exception therefore of the three-quarters of a mile faced by our army, the enemy had free ingress and egress through the walls of the city, into which reinforcements from almost all quarters daily poured. The numerical strength of the Sepoys within the walls, on the 8th June, was estimated at 7000. On the 9th General Barnard was joined by the Guides (horse and foot), from the Punjaub, who had marched 600 miles in the extraordinary short period of twenty-two days. They were engaged on the afternoon of the day of their arrival in repelling the first of a series of assaults on our position, that occurred almost daily up to the actual storming of the place, and it was in this action that they lost their gallant young second-in-command, Quintyn Battye, a soldier of extraordinary promise. The enemy invariably endeavoured to turn our position, and was on every occasion repulsed with great loss. It would be mere repetition to describe each separate assault, and I shall therefore select only one or two of the most desperate: — The 23rd June, the 100th anniversary of the battle of Plassey, was the day predicted by the Hindoo seers for our downfall. It was the one specially selected for the General Massacre of Europeans throughout Bengal (if not India), and was by a coincidence favourably ominous both to the Festival of the Ruth Juttra of the Hindoos and the first day of the new moon sacred to the Mussulmans. The attack begun on our right from the suburb of the Subzee Mundee. The object of their attack was to get possession of our battery on the hill, but finding that they could not succeed, they confined themselves to the gardens and houses of the suburb, where a most desperate hand-to-hand fight continued for many hours. Fortunately the bridges in our rear had been blown up the day previously; yet notwithstanding that this relieved the army of all anxiety for its rear, and left a larger disposable moveable force, such was the determination with which the rebels fought that it was necessary to order out Rothney's Sikhs, who had only arrived that morning after a night march of twenty-four miles. It was not until after sunset that all resistance was overcome, and the enemy retired into the city through the Lahore Gate exposed to a fire of three eighteen pounders, which com-

mitted immense havoc amongst them. The enemy's loss was estimated at 1000 men. In one inclosure 150 were bayoneted, so desperately did they cling to cover. The casualties on our side were 180 killed and wounded, of whom 45 were Europeans of the 1st and 2nd Fusiliers and 60 Rifles, who bore the brunt of the battle. On the next day Colonel Chamberlain arrived to fill the post of Adjutant-General of the army. On the 26th appeared the first symptoms of disunion amongst the rebels in the desertion from the town of the 9th Native Infantry: they fled in great confusion, and were fired upon from the walls; after wandering about for a week or so, they surrendered themselves and claimed pardon under Mr. Colvin's proclamation. On the 28th our army was reinforced by 1000 men from the Punjaub; and on the 1st July the head-quarters, and a wing of Her Majesty's 61st from Ferozpore, arrived in camp. On that day was seen from our batteries on the ridge a large encampment on the other side of the Jumna; it was the whole body of the Rohilcund mutineers from the three stations of Bareilly, Moradabad, and Shahjehanpore, four regiments of infantry, one of irregular cavalry, and a battery of artillery. For a time it had been hoped that they would find the Ganges impassable, but the anticipated rise of the river did not take place; it was crossed at Gurmuktesur, the usual place of passage, the Doab was traversed, and Delhi was attained. For two whole days our troops had the mortification of watching the long train of men, guns, horses, and beasts of burden of all kinds, streaming across the bridge of boats into the city, without the possibility of preventing or in any way annoying them. An immediate attack on the part of the reinforcements was anticipated from the known practice of the insurgents with regard to new comers. Accordingly on the afternoon of the 3rd, they came out in force, and threatened the right rear of the English position. But, finding our men well prepared, they drew off and marched away several miles to our rear along the Kurnaul road as far as Aliepoor, the place where our army bivouacked the night before the advance upon Delhi and the first brush with the enemy.* Finding no enemy to oppose them, they returned, and though twelve guns and 1000 infantry, and two squadrons of cavalry had been sent out by General Barnard to intercept them, the rebels, after a short artillery fight, continued to effect their retreat with the loss only of a little baggage. On the 3rd, the force was joined by "Coke's Corps" of Punjaub Irregulars. On the 5th General Barnard died, the last of the officers that formed the council of war at Umballah. General Reed, an old officer in bad health, in virtue of his seniority, succeeded to the command in chief. On the 9th the enemy added a first attempt at stratagem to his usual mode of attack. He detailed to our rear a body of cavalry, who, advancing slowly, were mistaken for our 9th Irregulars. It was not until they came upon our advancing picket, consisting of two light guns and about 80 of the 6th Carbineers, that they were dis-

* Letter from an officer present.

covered. The artillery officer in command of the guns (Lieut. Hills) was about a hundred yards in front of his guns with the party of Carbineers, who, from some unexplained reason, immediately on catching sight of the enemy's cavalry, turned and fled. The guns being limbered up, Hills could do nothing; but rather than fly he charged by himself.* He fired four barrels of his revolver and killed two men, throwing the empty pistol in the face of another, and knocking him off his horse. Two horsemen then charged him, and rolled him and his horse over. He got up with no weapons, and seeing a man on foot coming at him to cut him down, rushed at him, got inside his sword, and hit him full in the face with his fist. At that moment he was cut down from behind, and a second blow would have done for him, had not Tombs, his captain, the finest fellow in the service (who had been in his tent when the row began) arrived at the critical moment, and shot his assailant. Hills was able to walk home, though his wound was severe, and on the road Tombs saved his life once more by sticking another man who attacked him. The enemy's horsemen charged right through the camp, firing into the tents. They halted, however, in our rear, on the banks of the canal, and there made a stand. They were taken in flank by some guns under Major Tombs, and ridden down, almost to a man, by some of the 6th Carbineers, and mounted guards from the Subzee Mundee road. Meantime a general attack upon all our pickets was made by about 6000 of the enemy in front; it was repulsed, after some severe fighting, with immense slaughter, and the enemy was driven as usual into the gardens and inclosures of the suburbs, from which they were dislodged at the point of the bayonet, our guns making lanes in their ranks as they retreated into the city. Similar actions were of almost daily occurrence, so that up to the 31st July no less than 23 battles had been fought, in which 22 officers and 296 men had been killed; and 72 officers and 990 men wounded. Our force at this date consisted of 6200 effective men, and 1060 sick and wounded. General Reed had been compelled, by ill health, to go to the hills; and General Wilson of the Artillery had taken the command, Colonel Baird Smith being Chief Engineer: two abler officers it would have been difficult to find in India or elsewhere. The General had now determined to act entirely on the defensive until the arrival of Nicholson's column with another siege train, should sufficiently strengthen his hands to attempt the final assault. On the 7th, our engineers made an ineffectual attempt to blow up the bridge of boats by floating down infernal machines, so arranged that they should explode when they came in contact with anything. An officer writing from the camp, about this time, gives the following description of it: — "What a sight our camp would be even to those who visited Sebastopol! The long lines of tents, the thatched hovels of the native servants, the rows of horses, the parks of artillery, the English soldier, in his gray linen coat and trowsers (he has fought as

* Letter to the "Times."

bravely as ever without pipeclay) the Sikhs with their red and blue turbans, the Affghans with their red and blue turbans, their wild air, and their gay head-dresses and coloured saddle cloths, and the little Goorkhas, dressed up to the ugliness of demons in black worsted Kilmarnock hats and woollen coats, the truest, bravest soldiers in our pay. There are scarcely any Porbeas (Hindoos) left in our ranks, but of native servants many a score. In the rear are the booths of the native bazaars, and further out on the plain the thousands of camels, bullocks, and horses that carry our baggage. The soldiers are loitering through the lines or in the bazaars. Suddenly the alarm is sounded, every one rushes to his tent. The infantry soldier seizes his musket and slings on his pouch, the artilleryman gets his guns harnessed, the Affghan rides out to explore, in a few minutes every one is in his place. If we go to the summit of the ridge of hill which separates us from the city, we see the river winding along to the left, the bridge of boats, the towers of the palace, and the high roofs and minarets of the great mosque, the roofs and gardens of the doomed city, and the elegant looking walls with batteries here and there, the white smoke of which rises slowly up among the green foliage that clusters round the ramparts." Yet it must not be supposed from this *couleur-de-rose* sketch that our troops were enjoying much rest; they were harassed by almost daily attacks, to repel which required almost every available soldier in camp. The season was most inclement, the rains being at their height, and the men were frequently under arms for hours without any shelter whatever. There was hot work in store for them. Nicholson, the Bayard of the Punjaub, had pushed on in advance of his column, and arrived in camp on the 8th of August. This gallant and comparatively young officer was a brevet Lieutenant-Colonel and regimental Captain in the 27th Native Infantry, and at the time of the breaking out of the mutiny was a 1st class Deputy-Commissioner in the Punjaub. On General Chamberlain being sent to Delhi, Colonel Nicholson, with the rank of Brigadier, was ordered to succeed him in command of the moveable column which had been organised at Wuzeerabad. This column consisted, on the 22nd of June, when Nicholson joined it, of the following troops:—

Dawe's troop, Horse Artillery.
Two guns, Smyth's troop (Natives).
Bourchier's Light Infantry Battery.
Her Majesty's 52nd Light Infantry.
2nd Punjaub Light Infantry Sikhs.
35th Bengal Native Infantry.
Wing 9th Bengal Cavalry.
Mooltanee Horse.

This force was, however, speedily reduced, for on the mutinying of the troops at Sealkote, on the 9th July, it was considered necessary to disarm the 35th Native Infantry, the cavalry and the native gunners of Smyth's troop. This was done at Umritsir, and immediately afterwards Brigadier Nicholson started with Her Majesty's 52nd

and artillery to cut off the Sealkote mutineers, who would, it was thought, endeavour to join the Irregular Cavalry stationed at Goordaspoor; starting at 8 P. M., they reached that station, distant forty-four miles, the artillery in sixteen hours, the infantry (in carts) in nineteen. On the next day, spies brought word that the enemy were crossing the Ravee, and then might Brigadier Nicholson have closed his glass and said, "The day is ours." Marching out at 10 o'clock in the morning, in a couple of hours they came in sight of the enemy drawn up in battle array. Our guns opened immediately they got within range, and Pandy made a feeble attempt at a charge. His small body of cavalry actually rode into the Horse Artillery, but were cut down to a man. Then came the *sauve qui peut*, and they were unmolested in their flight, for there was no cavalry to pursue them. They took up a position upon an island in the river, where they threw up a parapet for their single gun, a 12-pounder. On the 14th General Nicholson crossed the 52nd, a point below the enemy's position, unobserved, and sweeping the entire island, killed or drove into the river every soul opposed to him. On the 25th of July Nicholson crossed the Beas, and commenced his march towards Delhi, which was reached by himself on the 8th, and by his troops on the 14th of August. How welcome was such a reinforcement need not be told. While it revived the ardour of the worn-out besiegers, it depressed in a far greater degree the spirits of the besieged. From the 14th of August to the 14th of September, the latter hazarded but one attack. On the 28th of August General Nicholson's brigade, of the strength in the margin, was ordered out to intercept a force of the enemy reported to have left Delhi with the intention of cutting off our expected siege-train. He marched at daybreak, and after crossing two difficult swamps arrived at a village called Naugloo, about nine miles to the north of our position, where he obtained intelligence of the enemy being expected at Nujuffgurh, a place about five miles further on. He arrived there about 4 P. M., and found that the enemy, 7000 strong, had taken up a strong position in front of the town of Nujuffghur, with their left centre resting on an old serai, in which they had four guns. Between this point and a bridge crossing the Nujuffgurh Canal, they had nine more guns. After a hasty reconnoisance, General Nicholson determined upon attacking their left centre, which seemed the key of the position, and then changing his front to take their line of guns in flank, and drive the enemy towards the bridge. Reserving 100 men of each of the corps, he sent Her Majesty's 61st and 1st Fusiliers, and 2nd Punjaub Infantry, with four guns on the left flank, and ten on the right, to carry the position. This was done in the most brilliant manner, with scarcely any loss, and following out his previously arranged movement with perfect success, the enemy were soon in full flight over the bridge, leaving the whole of their guns in our hands. The column bivouacked that

1 squad. 9th Lancers,
16 guns Horse Artillery,
120 Guide Cavalry,
200 Mooltanee Horse,
Wing of H.M. 61st,
1st European Battl. Foot,
1st and 2nd Punjaub Irr.
30 Sappers and Miners.

night at the bridge without food or shelter of any kind, and after blowing up the bridge the next day, marched back to camp, which it reached in the evening. On the 4th of September, the siege-train from Ferozpore, consisting of 32 pieces, 24-pounders and 10-inch mortars and howitzers, came in. Up to this time we may be looked upon as having been rather the besieged than the besiegers, for the guns at our disposal were quite inadequate to compete with the heavier metal with which the enemy returned our fire; now, however, with fifty-four heavy guns, the siege might begin in earnest, and our general and his engineers lost no time in setting to work. Ground may be said to have been first broken before Delhi on the 7th September. This usually laborious process was materially assisted by the nature of the ground, which was scored by a series of nullahs, running almost parallel to our position in the direction of the Jumna. These nullahs, which served only to drain the eastern slope of the ridge, were dry at this season of the year, and afforded capital cover for our troops. On the night of the 7th, No. 1 siege battery was commenced; it consisted of four 24-pounders, destined to demolish the Cashmere Bastion, distant 850 yards; and five 18-pounders and one 8-inch howitzer, to silence the fire of the Shah Bastion, distant 700 yards.

During the day and night of the 8th, the whole of these guns were got into position, and commenced a most destructive fire upon the enemy's works. On the night of the 10th, No. 2 battery was constructed, and opened fire at half-past 5 o'clock, A.M. of the 11th; it was armed with nine 24-pounders, intended to breach the curtain adjoining the right flank of the Cashmere Bastion, distant 500 yards, and seven 8-inch howitzers, and two 18-pounders, to batter the bastion itself, destroy its masonry parapet, a small tower in the curtain, and the musketry parapet on its left face. No. 3 was armed on the night of the 11th with six 18-pounders, at a distance of 160 yards, to demolish the Water Bastion, and twelve 5½-inch mortars to shell the interior of the bastion. This battery opened at 1 P.M. on the 12th. No. 4 mortar battery was ready on the evening of the 9th. It was, however, ordered not to open fire until the morning of the 11th, on which date it saluted with a storm of shell, from four 10-inch and six 8-inch mortars, the Cashmere and Water Gates and bastions, the church, and Skinner's House. "At different times," says Colonel Baird Smith, in his despatch, "between the 7th and 11th, these batteries opened fire with an efficiency and vigour which excited the unqualified admiration of all who had the good fortune to witness it. Every object contemplated in the attack was accomplished with a success even beyond my expectations, and I trust I may be permitted to say, that while there are many noble passages in the history of the Bengal Artillery, none will be nobler than that which will tell of its work on this occasion." On the night of the 13th the breaches were pronounced practicable, and instant orders were issued for the assault to take place next morning. The assaulting force was divided into four columns as follows:—

		Men.
1st, Brigadier Nicholson commanding	Her Majesty's 75th	300
	1st European Battalion, foot	200
	2nd Punjaub Irregulars	450
2nd, Brigadier Jones, Her Majesty's 61st, commanding	Her Majesty's 8th	250
	2nd European Battalion, foot	250
	4th Regiment Sikhs	250
3nd, Colonel Campbell, Her Majesty's 52nd, commanding	Her Majesty's 52nd	200
	Kemaon Battalion	250
	1st Punjaub Irregulars	500
4th, or Reserve, Brigadier Longfield, Her Majesty's 8th, commanding	Her Majesty's 61st	250
	4th Sikh Rifles	450
	Belooch Battalion	300
	Jheend Rajah's troops	300
	Her Majesty's 60th Rifles	200

The first column was destined to assault the main breach, the second the breach in the Water Bastion; the advance of both was covered by a battalion of Her Majesty's 60th Rifles. The third column was directed against the Cashmere Gateway; it was preceded by an explosion party covered by the 60th Rifles. The fourth column was kept in reserve. The 1st Bengal Fusiliers, headed by Brigadier Nicholson in person, escaladed the left face of the Cashmere Bastion, while the 75th and 2nd Punjaub Infantry carried the breach on the left of the Cashmere Gate. The bastion carried, the column reformed and, moving rapidly to the right, carried the various bastions up to the Caubul Gate; on reaching the head of the street at the Caubul Gate, the enemy made a resolute stand but were soon driven forward. Pushing on along the rampart road, the column was checked by a heavy fire from two guns commanding the road, which at this point was so narrow as scarcely to admit of four men abreast. After endeavouring for two hours to effect a passage, the column was withdrawn to the Caubul Gate, where it was met by Brigadier Jones's column. It was whilst rallying the men to a last charge down that fatal passage that the brave Nicholson received his mortal wound. The 2nd column carried the breach in the Water Bastion, and, turning to the right, followed almost in the footsteps of the 1st column, joining them as before stated at the Caubul Gate.

It was the duty of the explosion party to blow in the Cashmere Gate, and the way in which this desperate service was performed cannot be better told than in the words of Colonel Baird Smith. "The party was composed, in addition to the two officers named, of the following:

Serjeant John Smith,
„ A. B. Carmichael, and
Corporal F. Burgees, alias
Joshua Burgees Grierson,
} of the Sappers and Miners.

Bugler Hawthorne, Her Majesty's 52nd.
14 Native Sappers and Miners.
10 „ Punjaub Sappers and Miners.

Covered by the fire of Her Majesty's 60th Rifles, this party advanced at the double towards the Cashmere Gate,—Lieutenant Home, with Serjeants J. Smith and Carmichael, and Havildar Madhoo, all of the Sappers, leading and carrying the powder bags, followed by Lieutenant Salkeld, Corporal Burgees, and a section of the remainder of the party. The advanced party reached the gateway unhurt, and found that part of the drawbridge had been destroyed; but passing across the precarious footing supplied by the remaining beams, they proceeded to lodge their powder against the gate. The wicket was open, and through it the enemy kept up a heavy fire upon them. Serjeant Carmichael was killed while laying the powder, Havildar Madhoo being at the same time wounded. The powder being laid, the advanced party slipped down into the ditch, to allow the firing party under Lieutenant Salkeld to perform its duty. While endeavouring to fire the charge, Lieutenant Salkeld was shot through the leg and arm, and handed over the slow match to Corporal Burgees, who fell mortally wounded, just as he had successfully performed his duty. Havildar Tiluk Singh, of the Sappers and Miners, was wounded, and Ram Hetch, Sepoy of the same corps, was killed, during this part of the operation. The demolition having been most successful, Lieutenant Home, happily unwounded, caused the bugle to sound the regimental call of the 52nd Regiment as the signal for the advance of the column. Fearing that amid the noise of the assault the sound might not be heard, he had the call repeated three times, when the troops advanced and carried the gateway with entire success." The gateway was stormed with a cheer, afid the entire column entered the main guard. Re-forming, it then advanced with the intention of occupying the Kotwallee (Police Court), and, if possible, the Jumma Musjid. Clearing the Water Bastion, the church, and the "Gazette Press" Compound, the column proceeded through the Cashmere Gate Bazaar, arrived within about 100 yards of the Jumma Musjid, when it was found that the arches and gates of that building had been bricked up, and could not be forced without powder-bags or artillery. After remaining for half an hour under a galling fire of musketry from the houses, in the expectation of hearing of the successful advance of the other columns, Colonel Campbell deemed it prudent to retire upon the Begum's Bagh, or garden, a large enclosure, which he held for one hour and a half under a fire of grape and musketry. The Jumaon battalion, which, having diverged to the right, had for some time held the Kotwallee, here rejoined the column, which now fell back upon the church. Meantime, the Sirmoor battalion and the Guides made an attack upon the enemy's position in the suburbs of Kissengunge and Pahareepore, with a view of driving in the rebels and supporting the main attack by effecting an entrance at the Cabul Gate after it should be taken. This attack was supported by the cavalry under Brigadier Hope Grant, 9th Lancers, and Horse Artillery under Major Tombs. Though conducted with the utmost gallantry, this attack failed in its object: the enemy, however, abandoned their position the next day, leaving their guns in our hands.

At the close of the day, the whole of the defences, from St. James's Church to the Caubul Gate inclusive, then remained in our hands. Our loss in killed and wounded was severe, viz. 1160,—283 under the former head, including 7 officers; 877 under the latter, including 57 officers. On the walls were captured 37 pieces of ordnance. On the 15th, the magazine was breached, and carried by assault on the 16th. It was found to contain no less than 171 guns and howitzers, most of them of the largest calibre. The resistance of the enemy now became less determined, large bodies deserted, and the townspeople crowded out of the city. Every available mortar was now turned upon the palace, the old fort of Selimgurh, and the southern part of the city. On the 17th and 18th, advance posts were taken up in the face of considerable opposition, and on the 19th, the Buree Bastion was surprised and captured. On the 20th the troops pushed on, occupied the Lahore Gate and the other bastions and gateways, until the whole of the defences were in our hands. On the same day the gates of the palace were blown up, and the head quarters established there.

In the history of sieges, that of Delhi will ever take a prominent place. Its strength, resources, and the prestige attached to it in the native mind, combined to render formidable this citadel of Hindostan. Reasonably might the "Northern Bee," or the "Invalide Russe," question our ability to suppress this rebellion, if they drew their conclusions from the numerical strength of the little band that first sat down before Delhi. But the spirit that animated that handful of soldiers was not simply the emulative bravery of the military proletarian. The cries of helpless women and children, ruthlessly butchered, had gone home to the heart of every individual soldier and made this cause his own. There was not an Englishman in those ranks, from first to last, that would have consented to turn his back on Delhi without having assisted in meting out to those bloody rebels the retributive justice awarded them by his own conscience, his country, and his God. It was this spirit that buoyed them up through all the hardships of the siege, that enabled them for four long months of dreary rain and deadly heat, to face disease, privation, and death, without a murmur.

It was for the "crowning mercy" of that day of assault that every heart throbbed with intense longing; it was in the fixed determination to do or die, that, silent with pent-up hate, every soldier dealt his death-thrust on his brutal foe. Quarter was neither asked nor given, and when at the Cashmere Gate, the charred remains of a British soldier were found about a stake, to which he had been tied, it is not to be wondered at that even the wounded, abandoned by the enemy, met the fate they had failed to find in the field. For two days the city was given up to the soldiery, and who shall tell in how many obscure corners the injured husband, son, or brother, took his blood for blood. How the King was taken prisoner, and two of his sons shot, and how the reign of red tape supervened on General Wilson's departure to the hills for his health, I shall tell in a future chapter; but I shall not

delay till then to tell the people of England, that, at the time I am writing, the King is still royally treated; that a surviving prince rides in state, with two British officers attending upon him; and that the cherished mosques and temples of Mussulman fanatics and Hindoo idolaters are still preserved intact in this modern Sodom.

THE END.

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A FEW WORDS

ANENT

THE 'RED' PAMPHLET.

BY

ONE WHO HAS SERVED UNDER THE MARQUIS OF DALHOUSIE.



THIRD EDITION.

LONDON:
JAMES RIDGWAY, PICCADILLY.
1858.

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PREFACE TO THIRD EDITION.

As some persons have thought that more credence would be given to the "Few Words anent the Red Pamphlet" if the name of the writer was given, I publish a new edition, and attach my name.

One remark in page 7 was not quite accurate, I have therefore corrected it.

C. ALLEN,
Bengal Civil Service Retired List.

Oriental Club, February 1, 1858.

A FEW WORDS,

ETC.

The 'Red' Pamphlet, entitled 'the Mutiny of the Bengal Army, by One who has served under Sir Charles Napier,' is so full of gross misrepresentations that One who has served under Lord Dalhousie feels constrained to contradict some of them and to ask the Public to distrust more.

It has not been without some misgivings as to the entire propriety of such a step that I assume, on the present occasion, in their absence from this country, an attitude involving the defence of such persons as Lord Dalhousie and the Members of the Indian Government: nor should I, probably, have thought it worth while to notice at all the gross calumnies of an anonymous writer, had these not received apparent countenance from some remarks which lately fell from the Earl of Derby in his place in Parliament.*

Without following him over so extensive a field as the causes of the late Revolt, I will enumerate *seriatim* such of the writer's statements as can be proved to be incorrect:—

Page 9. "The slumbering feeling first shewed "itself of late years during the rule of Lord Ellen- "borough, but the prompt and vigorous measures

* See Times Newspaper of December 4th.

"of that nobleman so completely repressed it, "that for six years no similar sympton was any "where apparent. A second time it rose in a still "more dangerous form, and attempted to coerce "the iron will of Sir Charles Napier. That gal- "lant veteran extinguished it ere yet the spark had "smouldered into a flame, and was rebuked by Lord "Dalhousie for so doing. He retired, to avoid wit- "nessing with his hands tied the catastrophe which "he foresaw. A third time, in 1852, the prejudices "of the Sepoys were placed in opposition to the will "of Government. Lord Dalhousie requested the "38th Regiment to proceed to Burmah. They re- "fused. Lord Dalhousie succumbed. From that "moment a revolt became a mere question of time "and opportunity."

Lord Dalhousie did not rebuke Sir Charles Napier for any measure which he took for extinguishing the mutiny in question; nor did Lord Dalhousie at any time express an opinion that Sir Charles Napier had exercised too great severity towards the insubordinate troops. The latter's chief act of severity on the occasion referred to was the disbanding of the 66th N. I.—an act which, though beyond the power of a Commander in Chief to originate, was immediately and cordially sanctioned by Lord Dalhousie.

On the other hand, when Sir Charles Napier let off only with imprisonment some mutineers who had attempted to seize the fort of Umritsur, and who had been condemned to suffer death, Lord Dalhousie, I

have been assured, informed him that if he had carried out the original sentence, he should have been cordially supported.

It may be conjectured that the writer refers here to certain remarks made by Lord Dalhousie or rather by the Government of India, on the embodiment by Sir Charles Napier, without previous reference to that Government, of a Ghoorka Regiment in the place of the 66th. But such embodiment was no step in the repression of the mutiny in question. The Ghoorkas had not assisted in pacifying the 66th or any other Regiment; they were at the time many marches off; they had done nothing extraordinary, nothing which called for special—much less instantaneous—reward: and, granting that the measure was in itself a judicious one, there was no reason why the General should not, before taking it, have waited for the consent of the Supreme Government, distant only some five days post from him. Moreover the whole proceedings took place in February 1850, many months before Sir Charles tendered his resignation.

The real causes of Sir Charles Napier's retirement are exposed in Lord Dalhousie's published Minutes;* and the Duke of Wellington has left upon record a judgment† which has settled the question of who was right and who was wrong in the controversy between them.

With regard to the 38th Regiment, the facts are, that its Commanding Officer, without any order or

* 14th June, 1850—(Rawul Pindee) 28th July, 1851.

† Memorandum, 30th July, 1850.

even hint from Government, took upon himself to ask some of the native officers if they would volunteer for Burmah, and to report to Government afterwards that the men were so inclined. Lord Dalhousie, not suspecting that the Commanding Officer had deceived himself, authorized him to parade the Regiment and to ask it to give formally its collective assent. The men then refused, and as by the terms under which they had enlisted they could not except with their own free will be sent beyond the sea, Lord Dalhousie of course did not force them to go. There having been no mutiny, there could be no *succumbing*.

P. 10. 'The stations of Etawah and Mynpoorie' are 'in the vicinity of Cawnpore and Agra.' The nearer of the above-mentioned stations is more than 100 miles from Cawnpore, and is about 70 miles from Agra, no railway existing to connect the respective points. It is also stated that 'Bolundshur is close to Meerut:'—it is above 40 miles off.

Ibid. "Of all the considerable native states with "which we had come in contact, the province of Oudh "was the only one which had maintained its inde- "pendence intact." This is most curiously inaccurate. In the first place, how can a State be said to have preserved its independence intact when (as is admitted in the very next page) there was a Resident at its Court, backed by three Native Regiments, who made suggestions which were always attended to; and when intrigues for the British Resident's favour on the part of the candidates for seats in the King's Council, were openly carried on? Secondly,

Holkar, Scindia, the Nizam, the Rajah of Bhurtpoor, and others, particularly the Rajpoot Princes, were equally, if not more independent than Oude.

P. 11. "The Kings of Oudh had more than once, "in the season of our distress, accommodated our "Government with loans to a considerable amount, "in re-payment of which we, to our shame be it "said, compelled them to receive accessions of terri- "tory alike useless to both parties." Now this is not correct. The Kings of Oude have ceded lands *to* us in lieu of subsidies which they had bound themselves to pay; but, with one exception,* we have never transferred to the Kings of Oude an acre of land. By the first article of the treaty of 1801 the King of Oude ceded to the East India Company in perpetual sovereignty, certain portions of his territorial possessions, in commutation of the subsidy agreed upon in the treaty of 1798. In later years the Kings of Oude have lent us money *at interest*, which interest has been regularly paid to certain persons, pensioners of the King, pointed out by him. This debt has never been repudiated, and the interest has been regularly paid.

Ibid. 'The King of Oudh was the sole remaining

* The only time we transferred land to Oude was in 1817, at the conclusion of the Nepaul war, when certain districts, which we had conquered from Nepaul, and which bordered Oude, together with some forest land situated on the Oude side of the river Gogra, were made over to the king in extinction of a loan borrowed the previous year; but in thus extinguishing that portion of our debt, there was no *compulsion*. The king preferred the receipt of territory to the receipt of interest.

independent Mahomedan Sovereign in India.' The Nizam ruling over a larger territory than that of Oude, is a Mahomedan sovereign and is independent; and he has remained faithful to us during the mutiny.

Ibid. "It is a remarkable fact, and one that "fully refutes Lord Dalhousie's assertions about the "misgovernment of Oudh, that not a single instance "has been known of a Sepoy settling down after "the completion of his service in our provinces; "he has invariably proceeded to Oudh, to invest his "little fortune in land." This is not a fact. Very many of the Oude men, Sepoys and others, have emigrated into our provinces, particularly into Azimghur, Jounpoor, and Goruckpoor. So remarkable has been the immigration from Oude into those districts, that Mr. Reade, the Senior Member of the Board of Revenue at Agra, who had been many years Commissioner and Collector there, once pathetically lamented to me the great injury that would result to those districts from the annexation of Oude. He said:—'Goruckpoor will return to its former waste state, for the Oude population, who have during the last quarter of a century emigrated with their cattle and ploughs in large numbers into it, will, now that Oude has come into our possession, return to their own hereditary lands.' It is true that the Oude ryots have not emigrated in the numbers that British cultivators under the same circumstances would have done; but that is on account of the extreme attachment which, as Hindoos, they bear

to their ancestral homes. This love is most eloquently and most truly described by Lord Metcalfe in these words :—"If a country remain for a series "of years the scene of continued pillage and massa- "cre, so that the villages cannot be inhabited, the "scattered villagers nevertheless return whenever "the power of peaceable possession revives. A "generation may pass away, but the succeeding "generation will return. The sons will take the "places of their fathers; the same site for the same "village, the same positions for the houses, the same "lands will be re-occupied by the descendants of "those who were driven out when the village was "depopulated; and it is not a trifling matter that "will drive them out, for they will often maintain "their post through times of disturbance and con- "vulsion, and acquire strength sufficient to resist "pillage and oppression with success."

It is also erroneous to say that the Sepoys invested their savings in land; for land had no saleable value in Oude. It is only within our own territories that land is purchased. In Native States, money is given to an influential minister, or as a fine to Government, by government farmers, for the right of levying from the occupiers or the proprietors the land tax over large tracts: but this is not a proprietary right; for the farmer is changed almost annually, and is usually a courtier who has no hereditary connection with the farm.

Ibid. "Colonel Sleeman, for many years our "Agent at the Court of Lucknow, and one of the

"ablest men who ever held that appointment, was "so well aware of this fact, that he lost no oppor- "tunity of impressing upon the Government his "conviction that the annexation of Oudh would pro- "duce disaffection in the native army, principally "because it would transfer the family of the Sepoy "from the operation of the Regal Regulations and "justice of the King of Oudh to our own Civil "Courts." Where has Colonel Sleeman said this? and what are the Regal Regulations and justice of the King of Oude? Colonel Sleeman, on the contrary, in July, 1851, being then resident at Lucknow, made use of these words: "It will become a subject "of grave consideration for His Lordship, whether "the Government of India can any longer faithfully "discharge towards the people of Oude the duty to "which it is pledged by many solemn treaties; but "His Majesty has utterly disregarded all the advice "then given by the Governor-General; he has done "nothing to improve the administration, abstained "from no personal indulgence, gives no attention "whatever to public affairs." "So inveterate is the "system of misgovernment (in Oude), so deeply are "all those now employed in the administration, "interested in maintaining its worst abuses, and so "fruitless is it to expect the King to remove them "and employ better men, or to inspire any man with "a disposition to serve him more honestly, that "I should not do my duty were I not distinctly to "state that the impression is now general in Oude, "and throughout India I believe, that our Govern-

"ment can no longer support the present Govern-
"ment, without seriously neglecting its duty not only
"to the people of Oude, but to the Chiefs and people
"of India generally; and were the Government of
"India to interfere to relieve the suffering people of
"Oude from so terrible a yoke, it would, I believe,
"carry with it their best wishes and sympathies."*

The manner in which Lord Dalhousie marched troops into Oude, and prevented, by his rapid strategy, any outbreak or useless waste of blood, deserve the highest praise instead of the stupid abuse which it has elicited in the rhapsodical statement to the effect that the 'hearts' of the whole Mahomedan population were, by the annexation, 'filled with rage.' For a year after the annexation there was, by this writer's own shewing, no sign of insurrection. How can it be said that the King was "tricked out of his dominions?"—he was forcibly deposed.

P. 12. "He (Lord Dalhousie) did all this, I may
"add, in spite of, and in direct contrariety to, the
"warning voice of the great man whom his paltry
"littleness and petty jealousy had driven from
"the country." Where and when did Sir Charles Napier raise a warning voice? Who ever heard it? There was no mutiny in the 38th Regiment, as has been shewn above, and Lord Dalhousie could not have failed to check what did not exist. The real causes of Sir Charles leaving the country have also been referred to above.†

* Papers relating to Oude, page 28.

† See p. 5.

The asserted dislike of the Sepoys to Lord Dalhousie, is attributed to two measures in these words:—"Before Lord Dalhousie's time the roads were "free to man and beast; that nobleman imposed "a tax upon all travellers. Previous to his arrival "in India a Sepoy's letters were allowed to travel "free of postage all over India; under Lord Dal- "housie's administration he was subjected to the "same charge as his officer." Here we have the only two acts, with the exception of the annexation of Oude, which are advanced as *having affected* the position of the Sepoys injuriously: I will examine them in turn.

First, as to the tolls levied on the roads. Leaving out of sight for the moment the fact that a toll the proceeds of which are expended in the repair of roads is a very legitimate impost, and that men save time and money by paying it, instead of using such as were the old sandy roads of India, I will draw attention to the fact that the toll-gates which have been erected have been placed, and that at long intervals, only on such *new* roads as have been made by Lord Dalhousie and his immediate predecessors, and in almost every case adjoining bridges bestriding streams which could formerly have been crossed only by boats. At the previously existing ferries tolls had always been collected. Has any injury been inflicted by the change? more especially as the bridge tolls are less than were the ferry ones. Again foot passengers (which Sepoys usually are) are not now made to pay tolls on the roads or

bridges, though they were so charged at the old ferries.

The postage question comes next. It is true that Sepoys' letters were formerly sent free of postage to the extent of one per day per company; but they were obliged to pay for all the letters which they *received*. To be quite fair, I allow that the limit of one per company per day was not enforced strictly, and it may have been that practically with lax post-masters all Sepoys' letters *went* free; but they were entitled to receive, and did receive, *none* free of postage. Lord Dalhousie gave India the boon of penny (or rather three-farthing) postage, and with it abolished all franking, thus following the example of the mother country. What was the effect to the Sepoy, of the new postage law? Under the old law he could send a letter from Peshawur to Lucknow for nothing; but an answer would cost a shilling. Under the new law he can for three farthings send the letter, and for another three farthings receive a reply; thus paying for one intercourse by letter with his family $1\frac{1}{2}d$, instead of a shilling. I never before heard that any Sepoy ever complained of either of these measures: most certainly neither of them injured him.

The writer then remarks, finding it probably difficult to account for the delay of a year after the annexation of Oude, before the commencement of the mutiny:—"It might have been supposed that the "feelings of the native Indian community would "have been relieved sensibly by his absence. And

"so, undoubtedly they were for the moment." But natives have no idea of the persons of Governor-Generals; they cannot discriminate between a Lord Dalhousie and a Lord Canning: they merely look on their individual acts as the acts of the 'Government,' and they find fault with or praise the 'Government' of the time being, for any order which affects them, without considering who was the particular Governor-General who ordered the measure.

The characters of the several members of the Supreme Government are next given (*pp.* 13, 14, 15); and more calumnious and untrue delineations it would be impossible elsewhere to find.

First is Mr. Dorin. The writer begins by asserting, that a thirty-three years residence in India, and at the capital, must have left a confessedly well educated man as ignorant of the manners and customs of the people of India, as if he had spent those years in England. It surely is not necessary to expose the absurdity of such an assumption as this. At the capital Mr. Dorin must have seen natives from every part of India; must have been in constant communication with officers, civil and military, brim full of information from all parts; and must have acquired much knowledge and experience.

The next words are, "He was verging upon sixty "years of age, and in all his habits was a very Syba-"rite." Now I have known Mr. Dorin intimately for the last six years, and I emphatically deny that he is given to luxurious living. He is very regular in his habits, is up usually at early dawn, and, after

his morning ride sits down to business, most steadily, regularly, and industriously. I do not deny that he gives good dinners, and the writer of the pamphlet may possibly himself have suffered in his digestion from the champagne, the truffles and *pâtés de foie gras* pressed upon him by Mr. Dorin; but he did not, I venture to surmise, ever see Mr. Dorin himself indulge in any of these luxuries.

Again, it is an utter absurdity to compare the financial arrangements in India with an English *budget*; they have nothing in common: but, whatever may be the distinction between the respective systems, Mr. Dorin has succeeded well as far as I can recollect in everything that within his own sphere he has undertaken.

With the Sontĥal outbreak Mr. Dorin had nothing to do; the Sonthals having been at the time under the charge of the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, and not under that of the Council of India. The latter part of the paragraph as it goes on, is utterly untrue:—he work shard, is by no means void of energy, and has a highly cultivated mind.

After Mr. Dorin comes Mr. John Peter Grant. The writer says, "Unfortunately, he laboured under "a complete ignorance of the habits and customs of "the natives of Upper India. Accustomed, during "his service, to deal only with Bengalees, he had "imbibed the extraordinary notion that they were a "type of the Hindostanees generally." For full three years of his early service Mr. Grant was in Rohilkund in Upper India, and in daily communi-

cation with Hindostanees. It was there he first acquired the character for ability which led to his being called to the capital for service there. Subsequently he was employed for three or four years in important work in the Madras Presidency, and again was called back to Calcutta to fill high office. He has not in his nature one particle of vanity or superciliousness, though he is rather shy and reserved: he listens most attentively to any argument which may be advanced against his own opinions.

The writer goes on to say, "Of military men in "general he had a jealous dislike, which prompted "him on every occasion to oppose any plans or sug- "gestions offered by a member of that profession." One little fact will shew how groundless is this assertion:—Mr. Grant, when lately appointed a Lieutenant-Governor, contrary to all precedent selected a military man (Major Strachey) for his official secretary.

The next sentence is, "He was an adept at in- "trigue, and, being possessed of a practical know- "ledge of revenue matters, a plausible manner, an "easy address, and considerable influence at the "India House, he had gained a seat in Council at "an earlier age than was customary." Mr. Grant was selected for a seat in Council solely on account of his eminent ability; and the news of his appointment was received in India by all classes without a disparaging word.

Again, "It was his advice, given because Mr.

"Halliday proposed an opposite plan, which de-
"layed for seven or eight months the proclamation
"of martial law in the Sonthal districts." Mr. Grant proposed no plan; nor did he delay the proclamation of martial law. The fact is, that when Mr. Halliday applied for a law to enable him to place the Sonthal districts under martial law, Mr. Grant and the Council told him that no law was necessary, as he could do what he wished at once of his own authority under *Regulation* X. of 1804.

The sentence continues—"and it will be seen, that
"on the occasion of the mutiny at Barrackpore, his
"pernicious influence was always opposed to those
"prompt and severe measures, on the execution of
"which the safety of the Empire depended." This is also untrue. In the *Blue Book** is given Mr. Grant's minute, dated 2nd May, 1857, on the conduct of the 34th N. I., and therein are these words: —"Soldiers who in a large body, whether on or off
"duty, armed or unarmed, stand quietly by when
"other soldiers are in open mutiny, attempting to
"murder their Officers before their eyes, deserve a
"very much heavier punishment than the mere loss
"of a service which they have disgraced." These words, be it observed, were written before the outbreaks, either of Meerut or Lucknow took place, and were recorded on a proposition of the Governor-General to disband the regiment referred to.

I will not remark on the character given to

* Papers relative to the Mutinies in the East Indies, 1857.

General Low, nor on that to Mr. Peacock, except to say, that Mr. Peacock was not afraid of "resorting to urgent measures. On the occasion just "quoted, Mr. Peacock, on the 3rd May, begins his "minute by saying, I am of opinion that nothing "short of the punishment proposed by the Governor-"General would be sufficient for the late mutinous "proceedings, which have brought dishonour and "disgrace upon all, with only few exceptions, of the "Native Officers and Sepoys of the seven Com-"panies of the 34th Regiment Native Infantry, "who were at Barrackpoor on the 29th of March "last; and no less punishment would, in my judg-"ment, operate as a sufficient warning and example "to others."

The next person mentioned is Colonel Birch, and he is abused in most unmeasured terms. Much of this abuse it is impossible to answer, except by such downright denial as that which I now unhesitatingly give it. Of some of the statements I will try and prove the inaccuracies.

P. 15. "Sir Charles's bad opinion was, however, "of this service to Colonel Birch, that it obtained "for him Lord Dalhousie's patronage. That noble-"man, eager to show his spite towards Sir C. "Napier, took the opportunity of the first vacancy "to appoint Colonel Birch, Secretary to the Govern-"ment of India in the Military Department; thus "placing him, *de facto*, at the head of the army "in India—giving him a position, indeed, exactly

"analogous to that of the Minister of War in "France." It is almost insulting to Lord Dalhousie, to say how utterly incapable he was of such meanness as is here imputed to him. Two facts will shew his feelings towards Sir Charles Napier's friends, from which may be inferred his feelings for the other's enemies. Lord Dalhousie made a favourite Aide-de-camp of Sir Charles Napier Commandant of his own body guard,—for a young man a most lucrative and honorary post. Secondly, when Sir Charles retired, Lord Dalhousie appointed Major (now Colonel) Kennedy, the Officer on his Staff, who of all others, Sir Charles highly valued, to a new office, of which the salary was the largest ever held in India by one of Her Majesty's officers of Colonel Kennedy's then rank.

The next paragraph is "A worse appointment "could not have been made. Colonel Birch was "essentially a sycophant, always ready to give up "his own opinion, if by so doing he could curry "favour with his superior. He had tried this plan "with Sir C. Napier, but Sir Charles found him "out, and not only felt, but shewed contempt towards "him in consequence; he found it an easier task to "ingratiate himself with Lord Dalhousie and his "successor." I have often heard, and I believe it is true, that the causes of the quarrel between Sir Charles Napier and Colonel Birch are very different from those stated above. Many years ago Sir C. Napier wrote on Court-Martials, and Military Law,

and he consequently thought himself on those subjects an authority. In an important trial by Court-martial he and Colonel Birch differed on a point of law. Colonel Birch stoutly argued for his own view and asserted it, till he was authoritatively overruled by Sir Charles. The proceedings having been sent home to the Horse-Guards, they were returned with a memorandum pointing out the illegalities which Colonel Birch had previously discovered, but the existence of which Sir Charles had denied. Sir Charles never forgave Colonel Birch for being right when he himself had been wrong.

As the writer gives no instance in support of his own view, I can only put my assertion against his, and say that Colonel Birch is a very clever man and is well acquainted with the Bengal army, and that his orders are never quibbling.

Next in order is Mr. Beadon. The whole of the abuse lavished on this gentleman is so general that it is difficult to meet it. To say that he was against progress is notoriously untrue. To Mr. Beadon is due almost the whole credit of the Penny Postage scheme: he worked at that project indefatigably for more than a year. As for his asserted hatred of the press, it was Mr. Beadon who first gave official countenance to it; and the telegraphs and railways, particularly the former, owe to him a great deal. He was a most influential and active member of the Council of Education, and on Mr. Bethune's death took almost sole charge of the latter's school for

Hindoo females. It appears (*P.* 15) Mr. Beadon was 'unscrupulous' and 'honest;' I don't understand how he with all his ability can be both *unscrupulous* and *honest.*

Lord Canning's character is too well known for it to need my advocacy; and here there is no attempt at justifying abuse by the narration of facts.

On the remarks in the beginning of the 2nd chapter, I will observe, that on the supposition that they planned the mutiny before they left, the departure of the King and Queen of Oude from Lucknow are inexplicable. They might materially have assisted the plot if they had remained there; but the proceeding of both to Calcutta and of the latter again to England were, under the supposed circumstances, insane proceedings. There is little doubt that, whatever he did afterwards, the King had not conspired at the time he left Lucknow.

Then comes the following passage:—"The new "system of administration in Oudh, would, he felt "satisfied, cause considerable vexation to the fami- "lies of the Sepoys; and, consequently, no little "discontent amongst the Sepoys themselves. His "agents were accordingly directed to lay stress on "this new interference of the British with the pri- "vileges of the natives. It was pointed out to them, "that they were the original owners of the land, the "lords of the soil; but that now, gradually and "insidiously, the British were depriving them of

" their rights, and resolved to go on until they had " subverted their religion." There is some truth mixed with much misrepresentation here. The annexation to our Government of the Crown of Oude could have caused no interference with the privileges of the *natives* as a body; it did so, no doubt, to a certain extent with the privileges of the *Sepoys* and their families. With regard to the proprietorship of the land, it is well known that it has been only since the establishment of British rule and British protection that this has been at all recognized. Under the previous government the rights of the occupiers and real owners of the land had been trampled upon by farmers of the revenue, who screwed out of the actual cultivators every farthing that was attainable. How privileges of the Sepoys had been interfered with, I will make use of the words of a late writer to shew. " It is not to " be doubted that the conversion of Oude into a pro- " vince of the British empire, deprived the families " of a large portion of the Bengal army of the ex- " clusive privileges which they had long considered " to be their birthright, by placing all the other " inhabitants on a level with themselves. As soon " as the proclamation was issued, which converted " Oude into a British province, they ceased to be an " exceptional class. They had no longer the power- " ful protection and mediation of the British Resi- " dency. Fused into the general mass of the " population, they were left to battle for themselves,

" and were doubtless losers by what was a gain to " the community at large."*

P. 18: "The Enfield rifle required a parti- " cular species of cartridge, and this cartridge in " England was greased with lard made from the fat " either of the hog or the ox. Without reflecting, " or if reflecting, ignoring the consequences of his " act, Colonel Birch ordered that the cartridges for " use in India should be made up similarly to the " cartridges in use in England, and should be used " by the native troops; that is to say, that Hindoo " Sepoys should handle cartridges besmeared with " the fat of their sacred animal, the cow!" With all this Colonel Birch had nothing to do. The Enfield rifle had been introduced, and cartridges, some greased in England, and others prepared with grease composed of tallow and bees-wax, and made up in the Indian arsenal, had been served out in the ordinary course by the Ordnance authorities. Immediately on its being reported to Government that the men objected to them, Colonel Birch, under date 27 January, 1857, wrote to the Inspector-General of Ordnance to allow the Sepoys to apply whatever grease was required themselves; and on the same date he sent a telegram to the Adjutant-General of the army, directing that all cartridges were to be thenceforward issued ungreased. Telegrams to the same effect were also sent to the officers commanding

* Edinburgh Review, vol. cvi. page 566.

at Umballa and Sealkote, where there were schools of musketry.*

I would here remark that greased cartridges for the arm known as the Minie rifle have been used for years by native troops without objection.

P. 19. "The Government were confident and cal- "lous. Although, about this time (Jan. and Feb.), "the excited state of the minds of the Sepoys, con- "sequent upon the discovery of the nature of the "grease, was reported to them, not a single expla- "nation was offered, not an attempt made to soothe "them. It is true that an order was issued, after "the interval of almost a month, to serve out no "more greased cartridges; but, in the absence of "any accompanying explanation, the Sepoys viewed "that merely as an evidence that the Government "was baffled for the time, and waited only for a "more convenient season for the renewal of their "insidious attacks on their caste." The first letter which was sent to Government on the subject of the objection of the Sepoys to the greased cartridges, was dated 26th of January; the order to serve out no more was issued the next day, the 27th: this interval of one day, the writer of the pamphlet calls 'almost a month.' Moreover, General Hearsey paraded all the troops at Barrackpoor on the 9th of February, and fully explained the matter to them: but the writer of the pamphlet says there was no explanation.

* Papers, &c. App. p. 5.

P. 20. "To give one instance of the apathy of "the Government at this momentous period, it will "suffice to state that, although disaffection had been "manifested in the most marked manner by the "Sepoys at Barrackpore and Dumdum, on account "of the greased cartridges, towards the end of "January, it was not before the middle of the fol- "lowing month that Colonel Birch telegraphed to "the schools of musketry at Sealkote and Um- "balla to prohibit the use by the Sepoys at these "stations of the greased cartridge." The telegram, as we have just seen, was sent on the 27th of January, *not* the middle of February.

I pass on to page 25, where it is stated that General Hearsey had a severe *wigging* administered to him by the Secretary to Government, Colonel Birch, for promoting Sheikh Phultoo to be a havildar. This misrepresentation has already been exposed by Lord Granville in the House of Lords. The promotion was confirmed; but Government, to prevent its becoming a precedent, noticed that it had been made without authority.

At the beginning of the 3rd chapter are these words:—"The 19th were disbanded, and in the " opinion of the Government a lesson had been " therefore read to the Sepoys, which they would " not easily forget. They argued that Lord Ellen- " borough, by the disbandment of a regiment in " 1844 (the 34th Native Infantry), had repressed a " mutiny, and that Sir Charles Napier, by a similar

"measure, in 1849, had effected the same end;
"quite oblivious of the fact, that the entire circum-
"stances were dissimilar, and that both those states-
"men had followed up their disbanding orders by
"others."

It is one of the most remarkable features of the Indian army, that simple dismissal from it is a grave, nay severe military punishment. This is true in the case of a Sepoy newly enlisted, but applies with tenfold force to the native officers, and those men who are entitled to pensions. We have it confessed (*p.* 8) that a "nobler or more liberal in-
"stitution than the pension establishment for native
"soldiers does not exist, and it was thought by
"those competent to judge, that the estimation of
"the benefits accruing from it was fixed so firmly
"in the minds of the Sepoys, that that single con-
"sideration would weigh against all temptations to
"mutiny or revolt." The mere disbanding of a regiment had answered its purpose respectively in 1844 and 1849 (it should I think be 1850), why should it not answer in 1857? It is said that the circumstances were dissimilar, and that the disbanding orders were on the previous occasions followed up by others. How were the circumstances dissimilar? Mutiny in 1844 is similar I should say to mutiny in 1857; and what were the other orders alluded to? They are not mentioned, and I, for one, know nothing of them.

P. 27. "The Indian statesmen chuckled at the

"ease with which they had (to their own satisfac-
"tion) disproved the vaticinations of Lord Dalhou-
"sie's rival." Sir Charles Napier is here meant. I did fancy that no one but a Napier would ever have called Sir Charles Napier a rival of Lord Dalhousie! But what are the vaticinations here referred to. The Edinburgh Review* thus eloquently disposes of this insinuation. "Indeed a "prevailing faith in the native troops is conspicuous "in Sir Charles Napier's writings, as it has ever "been in the minds of a vast majority of the ablest "and most experienced officers. In his well-known "report on the military occupation of India, Napier "emphatically spoke of the native army of India "as one 'in a good state of discipline, complete in "'its equipments,' full of high courage,' and with "'a high military spirit reigning through its ranks.' "'This force,' he added, 'could be *doubled* without "'any injurious pressure on the population, and "'every part of India can furnish recruits in abun-"'dance. Our service is extremely popular, and "'the troops faithful to a proverb.' We look in "vain in his official writings for any thing to bear "out the assertion now so frequently made to the "disparagement of the Indian Government, that if "they had attended to Sir Charles Napier they "would not have been taken by surprise." That the Indian Government was not at the beginning of the year satisfied with the general conduct of the

* Vol. cvi. page 557.

Sepoys may be concluded from the tenor of many documents that have been laid on the tables of the Houses of Parliament; but it abstained from increasing the danger by revealing the concern they may have felt.

Ibid. "The jemadar who commanded the guard "of the 34th on the 29th of March, and who had "prevented that guard from assisting Lieutenant "Baugh, had also been tried and condemned to "death. The sentence, however, owing to some "red-tape informalities, originating with Colonel "Birch, was deferred, most prejudicially to the "public interests, to the 21st of April." Considering that this man had been tried for his life, a delay of three weeks between the commission of the crime and the carrying out the sentence of the law was not very long. But long or not, the execution of the jemadar was not deferred through any *red-tapeism* of Colonel Birch, but by the desire of General Anson, who was at a distance in the Hills, and who fancied that it would be illegal to depute to General Hearsey the confirmation of a capital sentence on a native commissioned officer (which a jemadar is).

P. 28. "Hence the wretchedly weak measure of "sparing the guard of the 34th, who had beaten "their officers; they actually feared to incense them, "and believed they were acting the part of states-"men by saving them from condign punishment." The Governor-General in Council in his general

order of the 4th of May, disbanding the 34th Regiment, expresses his deep regret that, of the ruffians "who perpetrated this cowardly act, the only one "who was identified has escaped his punishment, "by desertion."*

Ibid. "It has since transpired, that soon after the "attack upon Lieut. Baugh had been reported to the "Government, it had been determined to disband "the 34th, and that an order was at the time drafted "in which this resolution was announced. For up-"wards of three weeks that order was kept back." There was no keeping back of the order. At first courts of inquiry were held, in order if possible to separate the guilty from the innocent; but eventually on the 30th of April the Governor-General drew up his minute for disbanding the regiment. This minute was concurred in by the members of Government on the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th of May respectively, and the order was carried out on the morning of the 6th of May.

P. 29. "And it is certainly true that they had "little other surety for the tranquillity of the country "than the fidelity of the Sepoy." Events have, however, proved that the population is with us, though the Sepoy has failed us.

With regard to the suggested future encouragement of the settlement of independent Europeans, it may be asked, when has the Saxon in India wanted or required Government patronage? All he requires

* Papers, &c. App. pp. 157-8.

there as elsewhere, is a clear field and no favour;—and that he has had. When, and how, and where have members of the Civil Service encouraged the cultivation of opium; and when, and how, and where have they neglected the cultivation of cotton? And if they have, why and how do those acts tend to shut out independent Europeans from India?

In the account of Sir Henry Lawrence's proceedings at Lucknow, the writer attempts to shew that it was Sir Henry's conduct which spurred on Lord Canning to disband the 34th regiment. To this I answer, in conclusion, that Lord Canning's minute was written on the 30th of April, and that Sir Henry Lawrence's spirited proceedings began on the evening of the 3rd of May.

Oriental Club,
15th December, 1857.

THE

POLITICAL PROSPECTS

OF

BRITISH INDIA.

BY

THOMAS CAMPBELL ROBERTSON,

LATE MEMBER OF THE SUPREME COUNCIL OF INDIA, AND LIEUTENANT-GOVERNOR OF THE NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES.

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THE

POLITICAL PROSPECTS OF BRITISH INDIA.

In writing upon India, two qualifications are essential to success — an acquaintance with the people of that country, and a familiarity with the tastes, feelings, and prejudices of the reading public in England. The former may ensure accuracy, but by the latter alone can even a patient hearing, much less popularity, be expected. Wonderfully correct as are the remarks of Bishop Heber, considering his opportunities, his Journal owes its extensive circulation mainly to the elegant, yet thoroughly English-minded, tone in which it is written; while the late Colonel Sleeman's published account of his own "Rambles" as an "Indian Official," though replete with much more curious information than the accomplished Bishop could possibly collect, is hardly known even by name, because the writer, from long residence among those whom he describes, was wanting in knowledge of those whom he sought to address. Though India is no longer the stranger-land it was when the works just cited appeared, there is still the same distinction to be observed between the classes who, either by public speaking or writing, undertake to treat of its concerns; and there is still, as formerly, room to regret that the most knowledge generally resides with those who are least gifted with the art of arresting the public attention. No man really acquainted with the people of Upper India can open a newspaper without groaning in spirit to observe the winning fluency of language which is made the vehicle of the most enormous misstatements; and this feeling is often aggravated by a consciousness of his own inability, even with

truth at his back, to cope with error armed with this power of words.

Still it seems almost like shrinking from a duty, for one who has taken an active part in the government of our Indian Empire, to refrain, at such a crisis as the present, from at least attempting to impart some of the results of his experience to those who can have no practical knowledge on many points, the final decision on which is, nevertheless, certain to be influenced by their convictions.

At the present moment, it is fearful to look at the conflict of passions and prejudices through which our rulers will have to fight their way, ere they can arrive at a sound and safe decision on the course to be pursued, after the suppression of a mutiny which has given our power in the East the rudest shock it has ever yet had to sustain. Among ourselves, how many are the darling theories, speculations, and predictions, likely to be either imperilled or discredited by the final resolution, whatever it may be, to which those who have to regulate the future administration of our colossal dependency must eventually come! Among our Eastern subjects, at the same-time, what a fierce medley of passions must be agitating the breasts of thousands of guilty, and millions of innocent, men of every grade and class, as they await the decree which is to fix their future fate! With the ever-benevolent, but sometimes self-sufficient, ardour of the British proselytizer, and the no less benevolent, and in no degree more diffident, zeal of the British utilitarian, on the one side; and the chronic, sullen fanaticism of the Moosulman, with the fitful but almost objectless fury of the Hindoo, on the other, there is a prospect of such an angry clashing as may render it difficult for the sober voice of reason to be heard. At such a season, it is to be hoped that, reckless of the past as the present age in general is, it may be permitted, in groping our way to the future, to avail ourselves of the guidance of the views and sentiments of one of those leading men of former days, to whom we owe it that we have such an empire to legislate for. The lately published "Life of Sir John Malcolm" supplies exactly what is wanted.

Malcolm may, indeed, be taken as one of the best specimens

of the good Sepoy officer. He was, it is true, from an early period of his career, continually employed in high political posts, separating him in some measure from the Madras army, to which he belonged; yet we are told by his biographer, "That the habits and feelings of a soldier clung to him throughout his career. Whatever might be his official environments, his heart was continually turning with a tender and sympathising interest to the single-poled tent of the subaltern officer, and the matted hut of the faithful Sepoy." In this readiness to sympathise, not only with "the faithful Sepoy," but with natives of every class, lay the secret of Malcolm's extraordinary success in winning the affections of all over whom he was placed in authority. Such sympathy, though an engine of wondrous potency in dealing with Asiatics, is, it may be feared, regarded by the cunning workmen of the present day as an implement too rude and simple for their handling. Instead of learning from the natives themselves, as Malcolm did, how to make them happy, we now-a-days undertake to teach them what they alone can thoroughly understand.

Our designs are doubtless benevolent, but they are carried out with so little consideration for the feelings of those to be affected by them, that, coming in the shape of inflicted blessings, they more often estrange than conciliate. Take, for example, the law not many years since passed by the Legislative Council in Calcutta, to permit the re-marriage of Hindoo widows. Abstractedly viewed, no enactment could be more just, but it was a direct infringement of that tacit compact, not to meddle with the social relations of the people, in virtue of which we had ruled with ease and profit to ourselves for a whole century. Those who advocated this measure doubtless laid much stress on the precedent of the Suttee, abolished in 1829, without any of the evils predicted having ensued. But the cases were not parallel. The Suttee was an outrage on the feelings of humanity, and even worldly morality called for its suppression. Its abolition was preceded by a long discussion, in which many intelligent Hindoos argued in favour of the proposed prohibitory enactment. Thus we had a party amongst the Hindoos themselves, and the whole of our Mahommedan subjects on our side;

and thus it was that this great measure was carried through without any strenuous opposition, or even distinctly marked discontent. A great moral triumph was thus achieved; and it had been well, perhaps, if, contented with this success, we had refrained from any similar act of direct legislative interference for a century. The Widows' Re-marriage Bill, to use an English Parliamentary phrase, was directed against a purely private evil, and of the working of which natives alone could judge; for the most experienced amongst ourselves know little or nothing of them in their domestic sphere. We have only to figure to ourselves what our feelings would be, if a conqueror, obtaining sway in Great Britain, were to pass a law removing the restraints at present imposed by our creed and code on the number of wives to be lawfully wedded by each man, and we may form an idea of the shock given to the feelings of our Indian subjects by this indication of a disposition to let our legislation trespass upon points not to be alluded to, even in conversation, without a violation of Eastern ideas of decorum.

In the present state of our information respecting the movement still in progress among those who constituted the flower of our native army, we can only speculate on its source and origin; but it is probable that, when the whole truth shall be disclosed, it will be found that it was to this very re-marriage enactment,* and other analogous measures, that those pointed who wished to work upon the religious feelings of the Sepoy, and stir him up to acts of sudden and murderous mutiny. Who those instigators were, whether a Brahminical conclave in Bengal, or a Mahommedan cabal at Delhi, Lucknow, or Calcutta, matters little; all that is here argued for being, that in this instance our own legislation has probably furnished them with a weapon of offence against ourselves.

Among the various reasons assigned for the recent revolt,

* The following passage in a letter, dated 12th May, and given to us with the sadly consolatory intimation that the lady who wrote it died at Cawnpore before the massacre, is strongly confirmatory of the opinion stated in the text. "They, the natives, have an idea that the Government are trying to convert them to Christianity; and what with the mistake of the cartridges being greased with cow's fat, and this new law allowing Hindoo widows to marry, *which I think has a great deal to do with it*, they are frantic about it."

none is more frequently dwelt upon than the scanty and defective officering of native battalions, in consequence of the number of military men who are employed in the political and civil departments. The practice of thus draining the army of its cleverest members has certainly been carried too far, but it was the encouragement afforded by the prospect of such advancement that made Malcolm and others what they were, by stimulating them to qualify themselves for the highest political offices. The evil, too, it must be remembered, is not one inherent in the system, but might at any time have been corrected by each successive Governor-General, if he had perceived the mischief now alleged to have thence resulted.

But, in truth, no Indian ruler, when he wants aid in the management of a newly-acquired territory, can resist the temptation to employ the fittest available person he can find; and this will generally be a military man, because the Civil Service has few hands to spare from the duties of the original settled provinces of our empire. No man in this way did the thing against which he wrote more than the late Sir C. Napier, who not only drew military men from their regiments to act in civil capacities, but drove away six of the ablest civilians who were sent to his assistance in Scinde. The practice, if it be an evil, is only one of the many attendant on the too-rapid growth of our empire; and it would probably be best corrected, not by debarring young military men from all hope of political promotion, and so preventing the development of much latent talent, but by rendering the command of a battalion so lucrative and attractive, as to induce the juniors to remain with their regiments, in the hope of attaining to that post.

But it is not so much on the number, as on the character and capacity, of the English officers present with a Sepoy battalion, that its efficiency depends. In former times, when the attachment between them was at its height, the officers were, we believe, fewer in proportion to their men than they are now; but then they were almost all good colloquial linguists, or in the way of becoming so; and though somewhat wanting in the graces of European society, had obtained an insight into the social system of Asiatic life, such as their more accomplished

successors seem to think it beneath them to acquire. The Sepoy officer of the present day, equal to his predecessor in courage and conduct in the field, and generally his superior in book-knowledge, in manners, and perhaps in morals, falls far short of him in point of real acquaintance with those under his command.

This defect, though in some degree imputable to the system which makes escape from his regiment the great object of every young officer's ambition, is still mainly attributable to the increased facilities of intercourse with England.

Young men who are frequently refreshing their acquaintance with their mother-country cannot settle down to India as their home, in the same way as was done in the bygone days, ere steam was known, and a return to England was looked forward to as a remote and barely-possible contingency.

Tastes acquired in Europe do not readily conform to exclusively Asiatic pursuits: the native nautch is more than insipid when the opera lives in recent recollection; and thus there is no community, even of amusement, to bring the European and the native officers into something like social intercourse with each other. It is impossible here to conceal the fact, that the increased number of our fair countrywomen in the East has probably made the separation between those classes wider than it was before. It is alleged, we know not with what truth, but it is alleged by natives, that their best friends among European functionaries are lost to them from the moment of their marriage; and they generally impute the colder reception they meet with at any but business hours to the influence of the lady of the house.

It would be easy to fill many pages with instances of the friendly feeling that formerly subsisted between English officers and Sepoys of every grade, and also between the latter and the common European soldiery, classes apparently dissociable by nature; but it is enough to draw attention to the following incident in Malcolm's life, in order to show how enduring may be the recollection of kindness in the minds of men of the same class as those whose enormities of ingratitude, as well as cruelty, we are now deploring.

The first great opening stroke of Lord Wellesley's brilliant policy, in 1798, was the dispersion at Hyderabad, in the Deccan, of a force under French officers in the pay of the Nizam. In this hazardous enterprise, Malcolm, as Assistant to the Resident, bore a conspicuous part. After the terms for their surrender had been settled, the lives of the French officers were placed in jeopardy by a mutiny among the native soldiers recently under their command. Malcolm was despatched to calm the tumult, but soon became himself involved in the same peril with those whom he came to rescue. His escape is thus described by Mr. Kaye:—"Among the crowd of mutineers were some men who had formerly belonged to Malcolm's company, in the 29th battalion, but had deserted to the French corps. They now recognised their old officer, and went at once to his assistance. He had been kind to them in former days, and they had not forgotten his kindness. Lifting him up, and bearing him away on their heads, they rescued him from the hands of the infuriated mob."

While contrasting this little anecdote with the terrible tales brought by each successive mail, it is difficult so to divest ourselves of the partialities of nation and race, as to be able to decide fairly on the question of who is changed; ourselves, or those over whom our sway has hitherto rested, on moral influence rather than on superior physical force? The probability arising out of our own progressive nature, and the stationary character of the Asiatic, is turned into certainty by our knowledge of what has lately been going on among our Indian rulers, both at home and abroad; and we must pronounce that it is *we* who are not what we were. A perception of this fact is indicated in the question said to be asked by natives, "Whether the English gentlemen of the present day are of the same caste as those of former times?" It is more distinctly shown in the following extract from the pamphlet of the late Mr. Francis Horsley Robinson, of the Bengal Civil Service, published in the year 1855. Having been officially compelled to make a communication to an old retired officer of Gardiner's Irregular Horse, and to a Mahommedan of rank, calculated to hurt the religious feelings of both, Mr. Robinson thus describes what followed;—

"I shall never forget the looks of mortification, anger, and, at first, of incredulity, with which this announcement was received by both, nor the bitter irony with which the old Russuldar remarked, that no doubt the wisdom of the *new gentlemen* (Sahibilogue, so they designate the English) had shown them the folly and ignorance of the gentlemen of the old time, on whom it pleased God, nevertheless, to bestow the government of India."—(Page 17.)

But it is needless to cite authorities in support of what, so far from being denied, is with all of us more or less a subject of congratulation. That there was much room for improvement in the manners and morals of the Anglo-Indian community of former days, must be admitted even by those who regret that this improvement has not come unmingled with a certain unwinning bearing, in English functionaries of every grade, towards all natives but those who evince a disposition to Europeanize.

Our regimental officers, not being exempt from this change, it may be doubted whether an increase to their number would have abated the evil of scanty intercourse between them and the native soldiery; and it certainly would have added little to their general efficiency, under a system of centralisation calculated to lessen their influence and deaden their zeal. The conclusion to be drawn from what has just been stated is, that it is not by the inadequate officering of our army that the pending mutiny has been provoked, and, on general grounds, it may be asserted that such a cause is totally insufficient to account for the event. Insubordination in a battalion or two might thus be brought about, but it seems absurd to suppose that a large body of men would throw away pay, promotion, pension, and rush into frantic excesses, through mere disgust at the incompetency of their leaders. Such incompetency may further their ends, when revolt has been resolved on, but it requires some more stirring motive to engender the spirit to give birth to so desperate a movement.

Annexation, and consequent extension of our direct dominion, comes next in the list of causes assigned for this revolt. Whether such extension be matter for praise or blame, it is

desirable at the outset to make it clear to whose account it ought to be charged.

An examination of the various blue-books published since the year 1838 will show, that it is from Downing Street that the policy of extension has of late years, in almost every instance, emanated. The prophetic protest of the Chairman of the Court of Directors, the late Mr. St. George Tucker, against the invasion of Afghanistan is on record; and we know that some, who ought to have studied it before, could hardly, when they did peruse that able document, bring themselves to believe that it was not written after the event. The questionable sequel to that unhappy war, the seizure of Scinde, was, we all know, condemned by the same Court. The conquest of the Punjaub, to be sure, was forced upon us by circumstances, and of that even the natives do not complain. On the three remaining Indian annexations (for Pegu falls not within the limits of India) carried through by the late Government of our Eastern Empire, what judgment was pronounced by the Court of Directors is uncertain; but it is well known that each of these steps has been taken in direct opposition to the declared opinion of some one or other of their ablest servants in India.*

On the whole, then, it may be assumed that Her Majesty's Ministers, and not the Court of Directors, are the authors of that annexation-policy alleged by some to be one main cause of the prevailing disorder.

A remark of Lord Metcalfe's, made in the hearing of the author, in the year 1835, deserves to be here recorded. When an opinion was expressed in favour of sending some slight aid to Dost Moohammed, the then reigning and friendly chief of Afghanistan, Lord Metcalfe's reply was: "Depend upon it, that the surest way to bring Russia upon ourselves is, for us to cross

* The extent and population of each of the three provinces thus annexed may be roughly stated, as follows:—

Berar, in Central India, is 70,000 square miles in extent, with a population of 3,000,000.

Satara, in the south-west, 14,000 square miles in extent, with a population of 1,500,000.

Oude, on the north-east, 20,000 square miles in extent, with a population of 3,000,000.

the Indus." Had the East India Company and its servants been allowed at that juncture to rule the country, for which the British public persist in holding them responsible, it is pretty clear, from what has just been stated, that the war in Afghanistan, and all its humbling and damaging consequences, would have been avoided. That the since-ensuing annexations would, in that case, have all of them been avoided, cannot be confidently asserted; but thus much is clear, that in the plunge made in the Afghan affair our Government seemed to get rid of all those scruples about the rights of others, and strict adherence to agreements, which sufficed to hamper such weak politicians as Wellington and Malcolm in dealing with the native princes of their day.

While those two men of a former age were engaged together in settling terms of peace with the beaten Mahrattas, a question arose as to whether the important fortress of Gwalior should belong to us or to Scindiah. The Governor-General, Lord Wellesley, was for keeping; his illustrious brother, and Malcolm, for resigning it to Scindiah. In a letter to a private friend on the subject, Malcolm argued that the mere fact of doubt existing ought to decide the case in favour of the weaker party; "For," he wrote, "if we decide a case of disputable nature in our own favour, because we have power, we shall give a blow to our faith that will, in my opinion, be more injurious to our interests than the loss of fifty provinces. What has taken us through this last war with such unexampled success? First, no doubt, the gallantry of our armies, but, secondly, and hardly secondly, our reputation for good faith." In the same strain his glorious colleague, then plain Arthur Wellesley, writes on the same subject: "I would sacrifice Gwalior, or every other frontier of India, ten times over, in order to preserve our credit for scrupulous good faith. What brought me through many difficulties in the war, and the negotiations of peace? The British good faith, and nothing else."

The wisdom evinced in these sentences, written by two of our most distinguished countrymen more than fifty years since, receives a most mortifying confirmation from the following lines, penned in the English language by a most intelligent Brahmin,

on the 23rd of June last, at Indore, the capital of Holkar's dominions, in Central India:—"There can be no doubt that much of the disturbance owes its rise to the bad name our Government have lately acquired through annexations. People don't keep it a secret now, and say that our Government has become faithless ('be-eeman'), and none but the mercantile community would be glad to see order restored. I was glad to know from your kind favour that they did not warmly wish for annexation in England. This is good, but how one can believe what is in one's mind when the act is against it? Why were the measures carried? Indeed, *the* annexation-policy has done the Government of India a harm which will not be early repaired."

Passing from the question of the value of a reputation for good faith, it may be interesting to view the contrasted opinions of two high authorities, equally remote from each other in point of time, on the subject of annexation. Sir John Malcolm, in a letter to a friend, about the year 1818, thus expresses himself on that most important question:—"The native governments are abused as intolerably bad. Why, even in this view, the very contrast of their government with ours is strength. Make all India into zillas (civil districts), and I will assert that it is not in the order of things, considering the new sentiments that must be infused—the operation (unchecked by comparison) of that dislike to rule which all human beings have, and that depression and exclusion from all high rank and fame, civil or military, of more than a crore (million) of men, which must be the consequence of the establishment of our direct authority, that our empire should last fifty years; but if we can contrive to keep up a number of native states without political power, but as royal instruments, we shall, I believe, exist in India as long as we can maintain our naval superiority in Europe: beyond this date it is impossible. But, on the other hand, while we have that superiority, no European power, not even the redoubted Russians, can shake our Eastern throne, if we have wisdom enough (which I doubt) not to destroy ourselves."*

* Kaye's "Life of Malcolm," vol. ii. p. 271.

Thus wrote the soldier-statesman of the beginning of this century. Let us now see how the same subject is treated by an Editor of the present day, whose very clever paper, "The Friend of India," was not long since reputed to be the organ of the Supreme Government in Calcutta:—"The policy of annexation may be considered secure. One by one its opponents convinced, or otherwise confess by their silence, that they are logically defunct. The dreamers who feared that the empire would be weakened by extension, and the Orientalists who believed native governments better than civilised rule, are already, for practical politics, extinct. The more generous class, who invested native princes with a right of property in their subjects, and hold conquest to be excusable only by invasion, are rapidly passing to the grave; they will soon be extinct as the dodo, or the party of protection." *

A single glance at the history of the brief period separating us from the date of this manifesto is enough to check our disposition to smile at the arrogance of its assertions. Even while it was being written, the extension of our dominion over Oude had caused a European battalion to be withdrawn from Cawnpore, and so weakened the chief military station on the Upper Ganges, as to prepare it for becoming the scene of events so dreadful, that we shudder to read the recital of their details. "Dreamers," indeed, were they who "feared that the empire would be weakened by extension;" but such dreamers as seem to have seen farther in their sleep than those who sneer at them did in their waking moments. If the writer of this passage stood alone, his presumption might do little more than provoke mirth; but unhappily he is the organ of a party,—and a party having in its ranks many a name of mark, both in England and in India. The peculiar characteristic of this party is a fanaticism in favour of its own measures; so that it cannot be made to believe that the reasonable being is to be found who would take offence at their enforcement. It was to this sort of feeling that Sir Thomas Munro, though he lived before the period of

* "Friend of India," June 6th, 1856.

its fuller development, alluded, when he said that "the English are as fanatical in regard to their institutions as the Mahommedans are with their religion."

Take the case of Oude. Admit that humanity required us to eject in favour of ourselves the very ruler whom we were pledged to support, in return for the vast cession made to us by his ancestor at the beginning of the century,—admit all of this, for the sake of argument,—but the question will still remain, what grounds had we for supposing that such an enormous addition to our empire should not bring with it a proportionable addition to our risks? If it were reasonably to be assumed that the cultivator, and the agricultural community generally, would gain by the substitution of our power for that of the native ruler, were there not many, and those of the more active and energetic classes, who would suffer by the change? Were there no existing and expectant placemen to have their pride mortified, their hopes blasted, by the coming in of what the wits of Upper India have long since called the "Sweeper's rule?"

Was it not more than imprudence to take no precaution against the animosity of such a class, beyond the lamentable measure of bringing over from Cawnpore to Lucknow—a distance of fifty miles—the only European regiment to be found along a line of about 500 miles in extent? How is this apparent fool-hardiness on the part of men of eminent ability to be accounted for, but by imputing it to an overweening reliance on the power inherent in their favourite measures to command the applause and assent of all mankind?

That some material benefits would accrue to the inhabitants of Oude from its annexation was seen. What the feelings of any class among them might be was not, therefore, deemed worthy of a thought. Yet there was plenty of proof, in printed works, as well as in unpublished despatches, to show that our seizure of the country would irritate a very formidable body among its inhabitants. Bishop Heber, five-and-thirty years ago, in his hasty progress through the land, perceived this; and in repeating a conversation between a friend of his and a horseman forming part of his escort from Cawnpore, mentions that, though

full of complaints against his own rulers, this man fired up at the mere suggestion of the extension of British rule as a remedy for the abuses complained of, and said that any tyranny was preferable to such a degradation. The late Colonel Sleeman, known even in Europe by his successful operations against the Thugs, and who knew the natives better than any man of his time, when afterwards Resident at Lucknow, warned the Government of the umbrage that would be taken by many classes at our seizure of the country, mentioning particularly that our own Sepoys would be likely to be offended by such a step.

Another Resident, when compelled, some twenty years ago, to address a remonstrance to the rulers of Oude, on the alleged disorders in that kingdom, was met by the significant question, "Whether there had been any emigration from that territory into ours?" But the warnings of danger were not confined to India. More than twenty years since, on the design being hinted at in the House of Commons, the late Sir Robert Peel, not then in power, expressed his apprehension that the absorption of Oude would shake the confidence of every independent prince in India in the good faith of our Government. Thus warned of the agitation likely to ensue, common prudence seemed to require that the measure should have been postponed until, at least, two strong European regiments could be added to our force in Oude, without weakening our strength at other important points, like Cawnpore. It was not, however, only before the step was taken, that the warnings of approaching danger must have been apparent, for the author has himself seen a letter written in Hindee, in the month of November last, addressed to an officer now in England, commencing with these words:—"By the seizure of Oude all Hindostan has been thrown into consternation." Yet it was at this very juncture that the Government of India, receiving its instructions direct from Downing Street, was compelled to reduce its European force by sending regiments to Persia. Meanwhile, extension in another quarter had reduced the strength of the European portion of the Indian army. Pegu, so needlessly added to our dominions in 1852, furnished employment to four or five stout European battalions, who were thus virtually lost to British India,

properly so called; for Pegu, it must be remembered, is not a part of India, but an entirely distinct country. Annexation has, then, unquestionably contributed, both directly and indirectly, to bring about the disastrous revolt of our Bengal army. Directly, by weakening our European force, in spreading it over a wider surface; indirectly, by stirring up the animosity of influential classes, not only in the countries added to our rule, but also in the original provinces of our empire. Our annexation of Satara and Berar, on the by them accounted insufficient plea of default of natural heirs, alarmed the Hindoos; while our seizure of Oude galled the Mahommedans, every one of whom felt a pride in the independence of that principality. Thus, by these almost simultaneous measures, we have supplied a motive of potency to bind in temporary league against ourselves those two discordant races, whose dissension was our strength; and thus it probably is, that Mahommedans and Brahmins have been brought to co-operate in spreading disaffection among our Sepoys of either persuasion.

The last and most difficult question remains to be considered. Has, or has not, any indiscreet meddling on our part with their religious prejudices operated to provoke our Mahommedan and Hindoo Sepoys, hitherto so faithful, to break out into such a hideous display of perfidious cruelty as they are even now exhibiting to the world? The question is a thorny one, and whoever enters upon it must be prepared for much misconstruction.

Judging by the analogy of all past history, there is to be found in the very ferocity of the Hindoo portion of the native soldiery a proof that some religious delusion must have been at the bottom of their hostility, however mixed may have been the motives of their Mahommedan comrades.

The Hindoo Sepoys have, for nearly a century, been esteemed, by those who knew them best, to be a kindly-dispositioned race, and, when well managed, ever well affected towards their English chiefs. That such a body, having literally no wrong wherewith to garnish the manifesto issued from their rebellious stronghold at Delhi, should have been worked up into a state of deadly and unreflecting fury, by any feeling short of religious

exasperation, would be at variance with what we know of the history of mankind.

Excepting in the one case of the French Revolution, the author can call to mind no instance of men becoming for a while divested of their humanity, through the action of any weaker emotion than one of religious wrath. It seems almost superfluous to do more than allude to the recorded instances of revolting barbarities perpetrated by members of the great European family on one another, on account of a disagreement on some mysterious point of faith. It is remarkable, also, that women and children have always been the victims of these outbreaks of fanaticism, and that such slaughter has never been accounted by their own partizans as discreditable to the perpetrators. In every record of the struggles of parties during the first centuries of Christian history, we find mention made of women and infants being murdered.* Neither sex nor age were spared in the crusade against the Albigenses in the thirteenth, or in the massacre of St. Bartholomew in the sixteenth, or the Irish insurrection in the middle of the seventeenth century; while Milton's celebrated Sonnet tells us how

> "The bloody Piedmontese roll'd
> Mother with infant down the rocks."

Yet Dante devotes a whole canto of his Paradiso to the praises of Dominick, who was the main promoter of the war of extermination standing first in this list; the court of Rome returned thanks to Heaven for the treacherous butchery in Paris; no Roman Catholic writer has expressed any great horror at the event in Ireland; and the acts denounced by Milton were doubtless accounted pious by those whose descendants have, in our own days, evinced something like a desire for their repetition.

Instances of like barbarity towards females can be found even in the early annals of Scotland, as appears from the following passage in Tytler's "History," vol. i. p. 113:—"Their revenge seems especially to have been directed against the English ecclesiastics who were possessed of Scottish livings. A public edict passed by the Scottish Estates, in 1296, had banished these

* See Fuller's "Profane State," book v. chap. ii.

intruders from Scotland, and this edict Wallace, it is said, improved upon with a refinement in cruelty. Some aged priests, and it is even asserted, although almost too horrid to believe, *some helpless women*, had their hands tied behind their backs, and in this helpless state were thrown from high bridges into rivers, their dying agonies affording sport to their merciless captors."

If such is the power of this principle, even on the comparatively phlegmatic European temperament, what must not its influence be over the more excitable Asiatic races? With these its force is the greater, because it is the only one that tells at all upon their collective feelings. Patriotism is almost unknown in the East; no encroachment not trespassing, directly or indirectly, upon their religion would ever there excite any general indignation. But, then, religion is in those regions so intertwined with all social institutions, that none of these can be touched without risk of jarring with the great master-principle of the Oriental mind. It may be observed, also, that the nearer any European nation approaches in character to the people of the East, the more sensitive do we find it on points affecting religion; and we have within the last few months seen a disturbance arise at Belfast, that might have swollen into something as bad as the massacre of 1641, if the restraining hand of government had been suddenly paralysed in Ireland, as it has been in India. *A priori*, probability is, we therefore think, on the side of those who assert the present Indian movement to be essentially a religious one; and there is nothing in after-events to warrant the adoption of a contrary conclusion. It is urged by some, for whom the author feels the sincerest respect, though he cannot adopt their opinions, that a movement participated in both by Mahommedans and Hindoos cannot have religion for its source, because it is impossible to believe that these two races can be actuated by any community of feeling on such a point. Their antagonism may be admitted, without acquiescing in the inference thence deduced. The Mahommedan is astute enough, when it serves his purpose, to feign a regard which he does not feel; and the Hindoo, being by far the simpler of the two, may be so blinded

by his choler as to lend a willing ear to the suggestions of his hereditary antagonist. Cardinal Richelieu was no friend to the Protestants when he used their zeal as a weapon of offence against the house of Austria; yet surely no one will, for that reason, deny that the movement in Germany was a religious one? The real question is, what was the character of that distempered mood which fitted the Hindoo Sepoy to become, as many believe, a tool in the hands of the more wily and steadily vindictive Mahommedan? That mood was evidently one of extreme religious exasperation, arising out of dark suspicions of our designs, infused into his mind through some as yet undiscovered agency, and deriving confirmation from several indiscretions on the part of our Indian legislature, as of various individual members of the Anglo-Indian community, some of whom, we know, have acted as missionaries, without resigning their military commissions; while others, we have heard, have even gone so far as to compel their native servants to attend daily at family prayers. This view of the case is supported by the declaration of the Sepoys themselves, who loudly proclaim that they are acting in defence of their faith, and in their manifesto from Delhi accuse their rulers of nothing but a design to make Christians of them by force or fraud.

So great, however, is the reluctance to give credit to the Sepoys' own statement of their own motives, that we see continual attempts made to account for their conduct on some other principle. Not long since, in defiance, apparently (perhaps in ignorance) of the fact that for a hundred years past a million of millions has been faithfully guarded and escorted by Sepoys alone, it was stated at a public meeting, that their motives on the present occasion have been entirely sordid. Riots, of course, lead to plunder, and accordingly the Sepoys, having once broken loose from authority, obeyed the instinct of all mobs, and rifled the treasuries, which they had for so many years protected; but, like those who followed Lord George Gordon in 1782, though they ended with pillage, it was by a religious feeling that they were first set in motion.

The point is not one of mere curiosity, but of vast prospective political importance; and it may not, therefore, be lost labour

to bring together some of the proofs to be collected from the blue-books, of a religious feeling having been at the bottom of the discontents which, after long smouldering in the breasts of our native soldiery, have at last been fanned into a flame by the unwise attempt to force the obnoxious cartridge upon the 3d Cavalry at Meerut. At Amballah, the station on the plains nearest to Simla, where the Commander-in-Chief was then residing, no less than fifteen fires were reported by the cantonment magistrate to have occurred between the 26th March and the 1st May; and these he, in a letter dated 4th May, distinctly ascribes to "the newly-introduced cartridges," and the Sepoy's ineradicable belief, that "the innovation is derogatory both to his caste and religion."

The magistrate further remarks, that "similar conflagrations had occurred at Barrackpore, Oude, Meerut, and Lahore, all owing to the supposed impure and tainted cartridge." These conflagrations, unmistakable symptoms of discontent, as every reader of Eastern tales must know, ought to have made the Commander-in-Chief pause before he offered to the troops at Meerut a choice between the cartridge and the jail. The latter was accepted, and those consigned to it from that moment were regarded as martyrs. The whole Bengal army being one great military family, the feeling rapidly spread, and the contagion of revolt extended to every station. Panic aided its development, for it is clear that, in many instances, the Sepoys flew to arms under an impression that the European troops were advancing to attack them. In a Division Order of Major-General Hearsay's, published at Barrackpore on the 5th April, the conduct of the Sepoy, Mungul Pande, then under sentence of death for mutiny, is ascribed to his having been "in a state of religious frenzy." In a previous letter, dated 23d January, the same gallant officer, and thorough Orientalist, informs the Government, that "a report has been spread about by some designing persons, most likely Brahmins, or agents of the religious Hindoo party in Calcutta (I believe it is called the Dhuurma Sobha), that they (the Sepoys) are to be forced to embrace the Christian faith." In the Governor-General's Minute of the 27th March, it is recorded that the men of the 7th Native Infantry assigned as a

reason for their mutinous movement at Berhampore, that they thought that "the guns and European troops were coming; and they said they were prepared to die rather than lose caste." A letter from the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner in the Punjaub, dated 16th May, asserts the "cartridge" (which word is the embodiment of the religious feeling) to be the cause of the existing disaffection, recommends its immediate disuse, predicts that nothing else will stop the spread of the evil, and ends with the following remarkable passage:—"Even punishment will not prove effective, for the sufferers will become objects of sympathy, and be looked upon as martyrs for their religion."

Mr. Colvin, the late-lamented Lieutenant-Governor of the North-western Provinces, in a letter dated 22d May, after noticing his own address to the troops on parade at Agra, adds the following remarks:—"They all at the moment expressed their belief of my communications to them; and I have seen them in a familiar way on several occasions since. They have undoubtedly been infected by a deep distrust of our purposes. The general scope of the notion by which they have been influenced may be expressed in the remarks of one of them, a Hindoo, Tewarree Brahmin, to the effect that men were created of different faiths; and that the notion attributed to us, of having but one religion, because we had now but one uninterrupted dominion throughout India, was a tyrannical and impious one."

Again, in a letter dated 24th May, Mr. Colvin says of the mutineers: "Many are in the rebels' ranks because they could not get away. Many certainly thought we were tricking them out of their caste; and this opinion is held, however unwisely, by the mass of the population, and even by some of the more intelligent classes. Never was delusion more wide or deep. Many of the best soldiers in the army, amongst others, of its most faithful section, the Irregular Cavalry, show a marked reluctance to engage in a war against men whom they believe to have been misled on the point of religious honour." *

* In confirmation of what is stated in Mr. Colvin's letter regarding the mass of the population and their feelings, it may not be out of place to mention that a system of feeding the prisoners in messes, a system not to be carried out without occasional violation of the laws of caste, has caused the inmates of our jails to become objects of sympathy to those without.

The concurrent testimony of three such authorities as General Hearsay, Sir John Lawrence, and Mr. Colvin, ought to be conclusive; and those who still demur had better, perhaps, be left to their prejudices; nevertheless, it is as well to draw attention to a circumstance showing, in the strongest light, the extreme improbability of the Sepoys having acted under any influence of less power than one of religious delusion. Two regiments, the 26th and the 46th, broke out into open mutiny at Mean Meer, and Sealkote* in the Punjaub, after they had been disarmed, when success was impossible, and swift retribution certain, from the proximity of a strong European force. The reasonable conclusion, therefore, is, that they were not quite free agents, but were impelled by the same kind of force as has often driven our fellow-subjects in Ireland to crime, and sometimes to rebellion.

There is one other reason assigned for the mutiny, to which alliteration lends its artful aid. The Sepoys have, it is constantly repeated, been "pampered and petted" into a state of insurrection. In one sense, though not in that generally attached to the words, there is some truth in the saying. Ever since that lamentable expedition to Cabool, which destroyed our reputation for good faith, and the prestige of our invincibility, the native army has been led to think too much of its own strength and importance, and an insubordinate spirit has too often been passed over, from the necessity of gently handling a cord which might snap, if pulled too tightly. The spirit alluded to showed itself in a very formidable shape before Sir George Pollock's advance to retrieve our disasters in Afghanistan; and few know how much his country is indebted to that distinguished officer for the patience and skill with which he allayed the discontents, and raised the "morale" of the native portion of his army, before he advanced into the Khyber Pass. Various indications of the presence of such a spirit in the Bengal army have since broken

* The 5th Irregular Cavalry acted in the same manner at Bhangulpore, a station on the Ganges below Patna, on learning that Sir J. Outram had arrived off that place, *en route* to Upper India, with a large European force. Another regiment at Chittagong, far down to the south-east, and completely cut off from the rest of the army, is stated in the last accounts to have broken out into the same sort of hopeless and objectless mutiny.

out from time to time; but the Indian Government were powerless to apply the only sufficient check, by increasing the numerical strength of the European branch of its force.

In so far, therefore, as mere discipline is concerned, there, perhaps, is some truth in the assertion, that the Sepoy has been over-leniently dealt with at times, when there was a call for rigour; but, as regards his scruples of caste, it can only mean that the Government have adhered to the conditions on which the high-caste men have entered its service. One of the first of these stipulations is that of not being obliged to embark. When service beyond the sea was in prospect, volunteers were ever to be found for the duty. Certain regiments, called "General Service Battalions," were raised, upon an understanding that they were to embark when required. Of late years it has been ordered that all recruits are to be enlisted on this understanding. This order practically excludes the relations of half the men in an old regiment — men who served as much in the hope of being able to push on their kinsfolk, as to advance themselves. This order, therefore, savoured of bad faith, and must have tended to add strength to the distrust of our designs, which, however engendered, was, during this period, excited by the malevolence of the native and the extravagance of the European press,* until at last "the cartridge" appeared, with its alleged pigs' and cows' fat, to cement the union of the two classes of our subjects against us.

The cartridge was the proximate cause of the revolt; and the revolt itself is now becoming the fulcrum on which the lever to upset the East India Company is to be made to rest. Yet the revolt proves nothing against the general administration of India, and only shows that there have been great mistakes committed in the military department, where the Company holds

* How closely the English press is watched by many of the more educated natives, may be seen from the following passage, copied from a letter written by a Hindoo of rank, in the month of June last:—

"I cannot but regret the tone of several recent articles on religious subjects, especially one in the Bengal 'Harkaru,' headed Christianity *v.* Brahminism. These things, with a greased cartridge, have led to fearful results. They may promote the cause of Christianity, but they can hardly be said to promote that of humanity, when they cause so many innocent people to be slaughtered."

but divided sway. It was not, be it remembered, from a servant of the Company, but of the Crown, that the order issued which provoked the explosion at Meerut. But though there has been a mutiny, there has been no insurrection. We have lost control over a large tract of country, not by the people driving us out of it (they were too well pleased with our rule for that), but by our European officials being compelled to flee from bands of mutineers, who sought to destroy them and plunder the country. Chiefs and Princes have stood by us to a marvel, all the trading classes are with us, so are the landholders, and even the peasantry, with few exceptions, in every province but Oude, where, as yet, we are regarded as invaders. It behoves us now to beware, lest by indiscreet public speaking, and precipitate passionate legislation, we bring upon ourselves the evil from which we seem to have escaped, and cause the very suppression of the mutiny to give birth to a popular insurrection.

It unfortunately happens that the East India Company and its servants, though closely connected with, we might almost say, every family in the country, are viewed with unfriendly eyes by men of every class and order. This probably arises from their having to deal with races whose habits and feelings are so foreign to our own, that measures suited to meet their wants often strike those not conversant with Eastern subjects as being strange and unaccountable. It is easier to blame than to learn, and a fluent abuse of what they do not understand enables many to escape from the mortification of avowing that they are ignorant. Jealousy ever treads hard upon success, and the East India Company, when left to itself, has been the most uniformly successful governing body in the world. Every check which it has ever sustained may be traced in some shape or other to those disturbing influences which the late Lord Metcalfe had in his mind when he said, in the hearing of the author, that "the real dangers of British India would commence from the day when the party spirit of the British Parliament should be brought to bear directly on its administration."

The Company's troops were successful in every war, and every war engaged in was admitted to be justifiable, until the luckless Afghan expedition was forced upon the reluctant Court

in Leadenhall Street by the ministry of the day, in 1838. Since then, the Company's rule has ceased to be as firm and consistent as it was before, because Governor-Generals took their tone from Downing Street, and shaped their measures accordingly. Still it is most unjust to tax the Company with remissness in those branches of administration over which they retained their sway. If their Government in India has erred, it has been less from hanging back than from advancing too rapidly with its improvements, and striving too hard to keep up with "the spirit of the age." If the thirty years' settlement of the revenue, a work of immense labour, were all that there was to show, the agricultural classes in Upper India evince by their present conduct their sense of the value of that blessing. Conscious of its own anxiety to promote the welfare of its subjects, the Indian Government for a while forgot the necessity of being physically strong, as well as benevolently disposed. It was consequently taken by surprise, but has not found the fabric of its power to crumble beneath the shock. How is this? Is it not a proof that for one hundred years we have been moving in the right direction, slowly, it may be, in the opinion of platform orators, but as rapidly as is consistent with safety in such a country as India? Those who "account mechanical inventions the great agents in the history of mankind" will, of course, blame the Indian Government for not having overspread the land with railroads. Yet the truth is, that works of this class have perhaps gone on with greater speed than is quite consistent with safety; and the only blame attaching to the Government is, for not having sufficiently appreciated their tendency to create alarm in that Brahminical body whose influence it was folly to ignore.

Another cry, proceeding from the same quarter, blames the Indian Government for not having covered their territory with European colonists. No account is taken of the obstacles opposed by Nature to British colonisation in any but temperate climates. Englishmen will never go to India, excepting to make fortunes to be enjoyed in other lands, and under a milder sun. Landed estates would by such settlers be merely held as subsidiary to commercial speculations. Should they become numerous, the effects of the domination of race over race would

be exhibited on a scale to surpass, as is well remarked by the Indophilus of "The Times," all that is recorded of the Normans in England, or of the Orangemen in Ireland. In confirmation of this view, take the following passages in a letter addressed to the author, in the year 1854, by a most intelligent Hindoo gentleman in Bengal :—

"The fact is, that European traders have obtained, in many places in the interior of the Bengal Presidency, almost uncontrolled power,—a power which they are seldom sufficiently scrupulous not to exert to the injury of those with whom they come in contact. It is not exaggeration to say, each indigo factory, together with its surrounding estate, is a little kingdom within itself, wherein avarice and tyranny hold unlimited sway. The police is too feeble to render effectual aid in suppressing the lawless oppression of the factor."

Those who raise the cry for colonisation, and other kindred measures, are the original authors of the clamour commenced in Calcutta, and, though now dying out, for a while re-echoed in London against the present Governor-General and his councillors. These gentlemen, who undertake to teach the Governor-General his duty, and choose the most embarrassing moment for doing so, have, in fact, but one great object at heart, and that is, to get rid of the Civil Service, which stands as a protecting barrier between them and the people of the country. It is with this end in view that they have spread rumours of dissension in the Supreme Council, and sought to stir the gallant Commander-in-Chief into opposition to the Government, of which he is at once a member and the servant. The furious abuse of Mr. J. P. Grant springs from the same source, and tends to the same end. That gentleman's talents being unquestionable, he is taxed with presumption and vanity by a writer who, having served, as he tells us, under Sir Charles Napier, has caught not a few of the witty old General's foibles, among others, that of an outrageous antipathy to the Civil Service. To explain to the English reader the nature of Mr. Grant's mission, it is necessary to state that, as the enemy is expelled from the rich provinces of Upper India, it becomes actually necessary to provide for the resuscitation of something

like regular government, otherwise all the revenue now in abeyance would be lost, and the provision of food and carriage for the army would become almost impracticable.

Mr. Grant's mission has two objects; one is to put together, into something like working order, the fragments of our temporarily shattered system of internal government; the other, that of putting as speedy a stop as possible to the fierce measures of vindictive retaliation, burning of villages, and wholesale hanging, which, however natural under the circumstances of the time, could not but have a ruinous effect, if persisted in for a moment longer than stern necessity warranted. What those measures were, will be seen from the following passage, extracted from a letter written at Cawnpore by an intelligent young officer, detained at that station by wounds received in General Havelock's first advance towards Lucknow:—

"The English newspapers are frightfully bloodthirsty and revengeful. So are the people here; but I hope a stop will be put to wholesale hanging. I have seen a tree ornamented with nine or ten Sepoys in a few minutes by our men. They just tied feet together and hands behind back, rope round neck, and throwing the other end over a low branch, up the fellow went. But these were fellows caught with arms in their hands. The talk here is, 'Hunt down every Sepoy!' If they do, they will keep the flames alive for long. As to their massacres, I should like to come in upon them *àpropos*, to teach them manners; but our civilised officers and men would, if allowed, surpass them in horrors by way of reprisal, which I think as bad as the original." *

* The following is from a second letter from the same pen:—"People at home, as well as those here, seem to have gone mad about revenge. Half-a-year ago it was wrong, cruel, and tyrannical to hit a native, even if he were impertinent; and as to calling him a 'nigger,' oh, horror!! but now nothing is half punishment enough. The magistrate catches a nigger upon some sort of evidence, he is made out a Sepoy, or rebel, and of course ordered off to the gallows, and sometimes is previously flogged. The gallows are erected where the women were murdered, and the culprit is made to lick the ground where blood is supposed to exist, and every soldier or person gives the rascal a lick with a stick till the man's head bleeds. Some cram grease into his mouth, and if the wretch refuses to open his mouth, the most gentle means are not resorted to in order to compel

It is hardly necessary here to repeat the refutation of the silly story of the release of 150 mutineers by Mr. Grant, though, in spite of its manifest falsehood, it obtained credence in quarters supposed to be above the reach of vulgar delusion. Had editors been capable of cool reflection, a glance at the map might have assured them that the whole was a fabrication. Cawnpore is about 200 miles from Benares. If General Neill had taken any mutineers, red-hand, it was most unlikely that he, who had hung so many, should suddenly have hesitated, and referred their cases to Mr. Grant, who, without such reference, could not have had time to intermeddle. But the object was to get up a cry against the Civil Service; and so the tale was seized on, and written about, until the next mail came in, and the spiteful bubble burst. We are as yet without any information as to the limits of Mr. Grant's powers, but we may be assured that there will be no interference with the military authorities where martial law prevails, though much will doubtless be done in anticipation of the period when civil authority may with safety be re-established.

The destruction of all the records will make the re-adjustment of the revenue, and the recognition of landed tenures, a work of the first importance to individuals as well as to the state, and one which none but an experienced civil functionary can possibly perform. Let those who propose to leave all such matters in military hands reflect whether, if a similar storm had visited England, and swept away all the title-deeds and documents in the country, it is from the Horse Guards that they would have sought for the man to clear away the rubbish, and reduce the troubled mass into order.* The great danger that now threatens

him to do so; and many other like *practical jokes* are carried on. Now, I would hang the culprit myself and flog him too with pleasure, but as many natives come to enjoy the *entertainment*, I would read the crime and sentence, and nothing more should be inflicted; but here I am considered mad, because I see any harm in such reprisals. What a very just idea the natives must have of the atrocities they committed, when they see us now trying our utmost to vie with their ingenuity! It won't be many months before 'The Times' will turn round, and then we shall not have many confessing they assisted at the *fun*."

* It may here be allowed to say a word about the salaries of Civil servants. Those who think them too high should ask themselves this question. Would any man with 1000*l.* a-year, secured to him in London, go out to live under an

Upper India is dearth, perhaps famine. To avert this evil may be difficult, and, if the sanguinary politicians of Calcutta held the sway, would be impossible. Judging from the tenor of their writings, indeed, we may almost assume that they would exterminate the fifty millions of Upper India, and then rail at the Government for letting the land fall out of cultivation.

Of all the absurdities springing up in the course of this discussion, none is more extravagant than the attempt to link the mutiny in some way with the torture-story brought home from some remote province in Southern India, where, as was well remarked by the Earl of Harrowby, "it is difficult to protect the people, because they will not help you to protect themselves." It is ever necessary to remind the purely English reader that India is a country as large as Europe, and that what may be true of one province may never have been heard of in another. In the Gangetic portion of British India no such thing as authorised torture has ever been known; and this, indeed, was admitted in the House of Lords, and accounted for by the charitable supposition that the hardy character of the people in that quarter deterred the Court of Directors from sanctioning its introduction! As the author limits his remarks to the provinces connected with the Bengal Presidency, he must leave the members of the Madras Service to defend themselves, as they are well able to do. But though it is strange that the cruel practices of which a man of some note, not long since, told a farmers' meeting that he had inflicted a volume of official proofs on a happy party assembled at a country-seat, did not stir even the softer races of Southern India to some acts of mutiny, it is stranger still to know what actually did once provoke a rebellious movement in that very region.

In the year 1837 a rebellion broke out in the district of Mangalore, on the western coast of the Indian Peninsula. It

Indian sun, and lead a lonely life in the interior, for less than double, or even treble, that sum? Multiply a stay-at-home salary by three, and you will come near to the Indian equivalent. Moreover, where men are largely trusted, they must be largely paid; and no men are so largely trusted as the Civil and Political servants of the Indian Government.—See, on this point, Lord Macaulay's "Essays on Clive and Hastings."

spread like an epidemic, infecting every class, even the officers of Government of every grade, some of whom tried to dissuade the Collector from sending off the public treasure to a vessel that was luckily at hand, in order that it might be reserved for the insurgents who were then advancing towards the station. This movement was suppressed by the arrival of troops in steamers from Bombay, and with the aid of the people of the newly-conquered province of Caorg. Now, what was the cause of this insurrection? It was nothing more nor less than our humane substitution of the process of selling land, in realisation of public and private debts, for the simple coercive measures in use under Asiatic rulers, or what we should call torture. Now, no one would propose to allay the discontents on the Malabar coast by the re-introduction of the good old practice of subjecting the bodies of defaulters to a little suffering, and leaving their lands untouched; but such instances as the above should teach those whose knowledge of India is scanty, to beware of passing hasty censures upon the men by whom that extraordinary empire has been governed, with such undeniable success, from the days of Clive until the outbreak of the present disturbances, for which it remains to be seen who is responsible. A letter of the Duke of Wellington, dated 13th October, 1803, is full of instruction to censors of the class in question. Writing on the absurdity of trying to reduce things in India to the European standard, he thus expresses himself:—"In short, the only conclusion to be drawn from all reflection and reasoning on this subject is, that the British Government in India is a phenomenon, and that it will not answer to apply to it, in its present state, either the rules which guide other governments, or the reasoning on which these rules are founded." *

But the most serious, and certainly the most popular, as being the most easily-understood, charge against the Indian Government is, that of taxing it with religious indifference, and even hostility, to the diffusion of Christian knowledge throughout its dominions.

At the by-gone period, when that charge had some appear-

* Gurwood, vol. ii. p. 411.

ance of truth, it might have been brought against the Government of England, as well as against that of India. The early years of this century were certainly not years of religious zeal, and our public men in the East partook of the apathy which prevailed among our Gallios in office at home. As religious feeling revived in the mother-country, it was gradually communicated to the dependency. Bishops were appointed, churches built, the numerical strength of the clerical body was increased, the strict, at least the decorous, observance of the Sabbath was enforced, the utmost freedom was allowed to missionary bodies, American as well as British, whose agents traversed the length and breadth of the country at their pleasure; and, more than that, were, when well-mannered and good linguists, ever treated, not only with politeness, but with respect, by the natives, especially by the Hindoos. Higher testimony was never borne to the moral and intellectual merits of any body of men, than will be found in a speech delivered in the English language by a native gentleman in Calcutta, himself a Hindoo, on the 25th July last, in praise of the Christian missionaries in Bengal.

It is curious to observe how the disposition to carp at our Eastern administration veers round with the varying humour of the time. At the beginning of this century, the Bard of Hope winds up the first part of his poem with an apostrophe to the Hindoo Olympus, imploring its intervention to avenge the wrongs endured by the "children of Brama" at the hands of the "free-born Britons" of those days. Seriswattee, Canideo, and Gunesa, are invoked by name, and the "tenth avatar" is hailed by a Christian poet with more than Hindoo fervour. Now-a-days the tide is turned, and our countrymen in India are accused, with equal injustice, though less imagination, of undue deference to the scruples and feelings of the people over whom they were once said to tyrannise. Both charges may, in as far as the Gangetic provinces are concerned, be pronounced to be figments. The religious or superstitious feelings of our subjects have, in that part of our empire, never been either outraged or petted. Salutes to idols, or parades in honour of Hindoo festivals, are unknown on the banks of the

Ganges, whatever may be the case in the Southern Peninsula. All that can be alleged against the Company's government in that quarter is, that it has kept faith with those high-caste men whom it received into its service, and with religious establishments found by us in possession of endowments when we took the land from its former rulers. Even in this respect, the leaning of our administration has for the last thirty years been directly the reverse of what is often, with over-confidence, asserted. This will appear from the following passage taken from the pamphlet of Mr. F. H. Robinson, to which we have before referred:—

"The Government have of late years systematically resumed all religious endowments, an extensive inquiry has been going on into all endowments, grants, and pensions; and in almost every one in which the continuance of religious endowments has been recommended by subordinate revenue authorities, backed by the Board of Revenue, the fiat of confiscation has been issued by the Government."—(Page 17.)

Whether these confiscations, or resumptions, as they were called, were wise or just, is a matter of dispute; the fact of their occurrence is unquestioned; and that fact alone is a proof of no over-indulgence having been shown to establishments having the support of either the Hindoo or the Mahommedan faith for their object. It is remarkable also that the natives themselves coupled the idea of religious zeal in their Christian rulers with activity in carrying out these very measures. The author has more than once had the question put to him whether Mr. A. B., and Mr. C. D., gentlemen known for the strictness of their views, did not account it a duty to bear hard upon the Moosulman and the Brahmin, and the conjunction of these hitherto dissociable names struck him at the time as ominous. It may be recorded, as worthy of notice, that Hurdeo Bukhs, the landholder, to whose good offices Messrs. Edwards and Probyn, of the Civil Service, owed their escape from the fate which overtook the other fugitives from Futtehghur, is said to have declared, that in saving these Englishmen, at some hazard to himself, he was actuated by his grateful recollection of kindness shown to

his father by the very gentleman * from whose pamphlet the passage above cited is taken. Much stress has been laid on the case of the Brahmin native officer gently withdrawn from his regiment after his conversion to Christianity. This event happened nearly forty years ago, and yet it is spoken of and preached upon as if it were an act of the ruling power of the present day. Those concerned in it have long since passed away. Yet, in justice to the departed, let us consider what the circumstances of our empire were in the year 1819. Two great wars, that with Nepal on the East, and with the Mahrattas and Pindarrees on the West, had just been brought to a conclusion, but the passions excited by the struggle had not even begun to cool. Runjeet Sing, at the head of the Sikhs, stronger at that time than when they afterwards tested our mettle to the utmost, though his good sense had withheld him from taking advantage of our merely apparent difficulties, while engaged only with foreign foes, might have found, in such a falling-off of our own troops as we are now witnessing, an opportunity too tempting for even his prudence to have withstood. A mutiny in 1819 would have been a more serious matter than we find it now, for *then* there was no steam to shorten distance. Twelve months must have elapsed before any succours could have reached India from England. To assert that no mutiny was to be dreaded, is merely to beg the whole question at issue, and therefore we must conclude that they who blame what was done by the Government of the Marquis of Hastings, in 1819, would, if they had been in power, have followed a contrary course, and taken their chance for the consequences, even if the loss of the empire itself had been among the results to be apprehended. What would have happened in that case cannot, of course, be known, but what has happened we see and feel. The men of 1819 have transmitted to us an empire which has not certainly been brought into jeopardy by over-adherence to their principles of government, but which

* The late Mr. P. H. Robinson had held the office of Commissioner of the Futtehghur division not long before he left India. It is hoped that the above anecdote may draw attention to his clever and original pamphlet.

we are, nevertheless, now reduced to a struggle to preserve and hand down to our successors.

But in what form are we to transmit it? As an absolute conquest, to be ruled over in the manner most consonant with the wishes and passions of the dominant minority, or as a country held by an official tenure, where the duty of the Government, acting as trustee to the estate, is to endeavour to administer it for the benefit of the various races interested in its welfare? The first of these two modes of rule will be the most popular in England, and with what are called "the independent Europeans" in India. It will be popular with that more numerous than sagacious class, which hates the East India Company, it knows not why. It may allure the ministry of the day by the promise of a vast accession of direct power, freed from the harassing necessity of having often to contend with men of superior intelligence, whose counsels there is a pre-determination to overrule. To the Horse-Guards, also, the cry for a re-modelling of the Government of India, and the re-conquest of a country which has never revolted, must have an attractive sound, for it holds out a prospect of increased patronage, and the riddance of that standing perplexity—the Company's army. The absolute-conquest scheme will also command the suffrages of such proselytising societies as seek for the co-operation of Government, without distinctly declaring what the nature of that co-operation is to be. The same scheme will, of course, be in favour with the "independent European" class in India, for it is with them that it originates. Thus there is a formidable display of interests in support of a scheme which, nevertheless, appears to be fraught with both injustice and danger. It is unjust to visit millions with permanent humiliation on account of the misconduct of some thousands, whom we have ourselves detached from the bulk of the people and brought into an artificial state, more directly under our own influence than that of any other section of the community. It will be dangerous to attempt, with our numerical disparity, to introduce a system only to be sustained by an ever-present and ever-watchful superiority of physical force. Admit that we can conquer and scatter every enemy whom we may for the next three or four

years encounter in the field, still the question will remain of, How is the pressure to be kept up which, in the case supposed, will continually be required to suppress the heavings of discontent? A mighty force is now assembling on the Upper Ganges, —a force, perhaps, a little in excess to the means of feeding or moving; cavalry without horses, sappers who cannot work in the sun, and artillery to supersede, rather than to co-operate with, that noble corps of Bengal, pronounced even by Sir Charles Napier to be perfect. Of all this array, if deprived of the assistance of native troops in the discharge of duties involving continued exposure to climate, at least twenty per cent would, before a year is out, be dead, and few forthcoming to supply their place in what would then be considered an unattractive service.

It is necessary here to remind the English reader how almost incredibly small is the European machinery employed in the government of India. Excepting at about ten stations, far apart from each other, along a line of nearly 1200 miles in extent, there is not an armed European to be seen from the sea to the boundary of the Punjaub. These stations are mostly on the Ganges and the Jumna; while to the right and left of those rivers vast provinces, peopled by more millions than half Europe contains, are governed by little knots of English functionaries, sometimes only two or three, and seldom more than five or six in number, with nothing but native physical force to support them. In its very essence, such a system, resting mainly on moral influence, is of course one of compromise. The people yield their obedience to all the fair behests of their rulers, but expect in return to have their social freedom respected, and to be exempt from all authoritative intermeddling with their religion. They also calculate upon being subjected to no novel mode of taxation, and upon the bulk of what is levied on them being taken in the form of the portion of the produce of the land, assigned by immemorial custom to the ruling power to meet the exigencies of the state. Partial deviations from this course may be submitted to (though even to these fierce opposition has at times been made), but any such alteration of the whole revenue system, as is evidently contemplated by the advo-

cates of the "colonising" policy, would estrange from us the good-will of the now well-affected agricultural class. Two instances of open resistance to fiscal innovations may here be noticed; the one took place in the year 1809, when the townspeople of Benares, to the number of half-a-million, left their homes and bivouacked in the fields, until the Government yielded to their petition for the abolition of a recently imposed house-tax; the other occurred at Bareilly, in the year 1816, when a police-tax, eventually carried into effect, provoked on its first enforcement an armed resistance, which soon assumed a religious Mahommedan aspect, and was only quelled, with the loss to the insurgents of about 1500 killed and wounded, by the firmness of three companies of Bengal Sepoys.

The proposed substitute for the immemorial land revenue has not yet been distinctly stated, but, considering the quarter whence it may be expected to proceed, its tendency most probably will be to make the Indian Government pay for the cotton to be supplied to Manchester. This end will be virtually gained merely by reducing the assessment on land, and leaving it to the Eastern exchequer to find in new imposts an equivalent for that of which it will thus, for the first time in the history of India, be deprived.

It is impossible to read what daily appears in print without perceiving that the scheme of Colonial Government, once cried up as fraught with blessings to the people of India, is now built upon a studied disregard, or rather hatred, of their race. This, indeed, is openly avowed by the hasty, and is implied in the suggestions of the more cautious, advocates of the measure. To take a specimen of each:—A letter inserted in the "Morning Post" of the 26th November, and professing to come from India to a correspondent in Paris, contains the following passage:—"The hatred of the *Bengalese*, whatever his calling, is such, he will be treated like a ferocious wild beast; he is one, and we are to treat him, forsooth, as a mild and faithful Hindoo. Oh, this lovely country!—for in some parts it is a paradise —to think that the race of Ham should enjoy it under a mild Christian rule, and not appreciate the goodness of God! England must make the Government a Colonial one, and no

native of India, for many years to come, privileged to enjoy a share in its bounty, or hold an office of either trust or responsibility."

The use here made of the name "Bengalese" warrants a suspicion that the letter was written by a Calcutta cockney, unaware of the fact, that although our native soldiers in that quarter are called Bengal Sepoys, there is not a Bengalee among them. Bengalee is a name exclusively applied to the native of Bengal Proper. There are forty millions of this race, and it is hard to make that portion of our subjects the special objects of our hate; for to them the triumph of the mutineers would have been so fatal, that we may be assured of the sincerity of the prayers which they offered up for our success.

The Bengalee is a timid being, and may be dealt with at discretion; but it is as well to think how the other "children of Ham" will relish the scheme for reducing them to the condition of serfs in their own land. It is almost useless to waste argument on so wild a scheme as that for Helotizing all India, with its 170 millions of inhabitants, of whom one-fourth are not yet under our dominion. More consideration is, however, due to a graver project, lately presented to the public in the form of a letter printed in "The Times" of the 2d December. The project is detailed in six separate propositions, and these it may be useful to review *seriatim*:—

1. "India must be kept free from external war, and from further expansion."

A wise suggestion, doubtless, but the English public must be changed before conquest can be stayed. If they will be so blinded by the glare and glitter of successful battle as to be unable to see when a conquest is unjust, as in the case of Scinde, or unnecessary, as in the case of Pegu, how is it to be expected that men in power abroad, to whose "quick bosoms quiet" often "is a hell," will not be tempted to indulge in the enticing luxury of military expeditions?

2. "The high lands of India, north, central, and south, must be systematically filled with European colonies."

If the mountainous tracts in the Himalaya, Cossyn, and Neelgherry ranges are here alluded to, there is no objection to

the scheme, excepting as concerns the interest of the colonists, who, in those mountainous tracts, will find very pleasant places to reside at, but few spots to promise extensive profit to any great number of agricultural settlers. Should we ever reconquer the site of the ancient Bactrian kingdom, a colony in a country blest with an almost European climate may be feasible.

3. "English citizenship must be recognised in India as a distinct element, and be cautiously imparted as a reward to individuals, to classes, and to places."

An attempt to apply the policy of a continuous continental empire, like that of ancient Rome, to a detached dominion based upon maritime superiority, like ours in India, would probably in practice fail.* It carries with it a semblance of fairness, but is intrinsically one-sided and partial, as will appear from what is to follow.

4. "Well-defined political as well as social rights should be granted to all English citizens in India."

The real drift of this proposition is, that the Government of India ought to be placed in the hands of those "unofficial" Englishmen who may migrate to that country for a while, to make or to repair a fortune. This will appear more clearly in the sequel.

5. "The Indian Government must not fluctuate with English party, nor its policy be made subservient to the shifting politics of Europe."

This, like the first proposition, is a wise one, and furnishes the best possible argument for keeping the Government of India in the hands of a body like the Court of Directors, who, as the representatives of a separate constituency, with chartered rights, can alone effect what is here truly stated to be most desirable. The same chairman of that Court who protested against the Afghan war, in 1838, the late Mr. St. George Tucker, said on another occasion, what *then* was true, that "India is of no party."

* Egypt alone, of all the Roman provinces, bore any resemblance to British India, and there the "Equites," with their exclusive right of administration, seem to have stood in a position very like that of the Civil Service of the present day.

6. "The permanent burdens of India must, in the long run, be borne by India."

There is no objection to be urged against this. In fact, it only approves of what always has been, for the Home Treasury has little cause to complain of Indian importunities. It is, however, in the comment that follows, that the latent injustice of the whole scheme is disclosed. Taxes are to be voted in "Parliaments consisting of English citizens, and of none besides." There is a show of consideration for the native in the provision for "imparting English citizenship to him as a reward," but who, that knows anything of the bearing of the races towards each other, will fail to perceive that in such a motley parliament the voices of the dusky portion would be drowned by that of the robuster whites?

The concluding passage of the letter hints at the possibility of setting up one of our own Princes as King of India, which very idea has ere this occurred to two well-informed men of different countries and races, writing at the distance of half-a-century from each other. No. 31 of the "Edinburgh Review," published in the year 1810, contains the following speculation on the future Government of India:—

"A simple form of arbitrary government, tempered by European honour and European intelligence, is the only form which is now fit for Hindostan. But that government should be one, the interests of which are identified with the interests of the country, and arbitrary as it must be, such checks and influences might easily be applied as would render it mild and paternal in its exercise.

"It has occurred to us, then, that the only way to escape great evil, both to India and to England, is at once to give the former country a government to itself. Instead of sending out a Governor-General, to be recalled in a few years, why should we not constitute one of our royal family Emperor of Hindostan, with hereditary succession? The sovereign would then be surrounded by Britons, and the spirit of Britons would animate and direct his government. Europeans of all descriptions would be invited to settle in his country, and to identify their interests with those of the nation. The productive powers of European

industry, under the protecting hand of a British Government on the spot, would soon give new life and new riches to the state, and the commercial enterprise of Britons would find a field of boundless extent, every year presenting a more vast and precious produce from which to cull for the commercial aggrandisement of their country." *

The same opinion, supported by almost the very same reasoning, is expressed in the following passage, in a letter from an intelligent Hindoo at Indore, dated 23d June, 1857, of which the first part has been already given:—

"As I have always been allowed the indulgence of writing anything to you that comes foremost in my head, I hope you will excuse a question from me, how foolish soever I may appear in putting it. Pray, why does not England send out a King for India? Surely Her Most Gracious Majesty would have no objection to instal the Prince Royal to that high office. Sir Vernon Smith and Sir George Clerk may come out as wuzeers, and the Honourable Court of Directors may come out as the council of state. The princes, and the intelligent gentry and nobility of India, may furnish material to form a parliament, and India may be governed in India, and for India; I don't know who loses by this plan. This country has always been governed by monarchs. The difference of religion between the governor and the governed will not signify a bit, seeing how endeared the Hindoos had become to Mohammedan kings. But one great point will be gained. There will then be some one to think India his own, and, so far, to take interest in its actual prosperity. A Governor-General for five years cannot take a permanent interest; he may do something to secure a pension or a name, but very little for the country.

"But I am afraid I am rising from the foolish to the presumptuous, and will end here."

Climate, the great bar to every attempt at Europeanizing India, would stand in the way of this kingly project. To give it a chance of success, an English Prince, with a retinue of courtiers, must be found ready to take a life-long leave of England, to

* "Edinburgh Review," vol. xvi. p. 156.

become the denizens of a tropical country. This is as little to be expected as the emigration of the thousands of substantial Englishmen who would be wanted to thrust out, or crush, a corresponding number of native landholders, and become the basis of that democratic despotism so evidently desired by the more ardent advocates of colonisation.

Since, therefore, inexorable climate opposes every projected change, why should we quarrel with that official tenure proved by experience to adapt itself to the peculiarities of the reciprocal position of England and India better than any device that we now can hit upon? The still existing, though perhaps expiring, form of rule, gives as free a scope to the English progressive spirit as is consistent with a due regard for the stationary character of our Indian subjects. Electric telegraphs have overspread the surface of Upper India, and probably contributed to alarm what they bestride; railways are advancing steadily, and have had their share in startling the Brahminical directors of the Hindoo mind. Canals to command the admiration of all engineers have been completed, roads and bridges have been constructed, schools in villages, colleges in towns, dispensaries, attended by native practitioners educated in Calcutta, are yearly increasing in number in the interior.

The settlement of the land revenue for thirty years nominally, but in fact in perpetuity, is a blessing, their appreciation of which is shown by the general good conduct of the landholders in Upper India during our recent difficulties.

The labour attending that settlement was immense, and many a young civilian injured his health, about seventeen years since, by tarrying at the most trying season in tents, to carry on this most important, though not showy work.

The police and administration of justice in these Gangetic provinces will, if viewed with reference to the character of the people, not be found to merit all the reproaches bestowed upon them, mainly by that "independent* European class" whom it is often the painful duty of our judicial officers to reprove and restrain. The admission by Lord Brougham, that the Privy

* See ante, p. 27, Letters from a native of Bengal.

Council reversed in appeal more, proportionately, of the decisions of Her Majesty's judges of the Supreme Court than it did of those passed by the Company's judges, is a clear proof that the latter cannot be so very bad, notwithstanding what some other Law-Lords have declared. If those sages of the bench could be transported to the banks of the Ganges, and placed at the head of some troublesome district in Bengal, they would soon discover that an acquaintance with the native character and language is there of more use in the administration of justice than all the knowledge that can be imported from a land of complicated rights and artificial habits like England.*

If, turning from the subject of internal management, we look abroad to what is passing on and beyond our actual boundary, what a wonderful spectacle of administrative skill meets our eye! On this, however, as it has been stamped with the recent applause of our Sovereign, it is needless, and would be perhaps presumptuous, to dilate.

In one department only has there been any serious failure, and that one, as before remarked, is not under the East India Company's entire sway. The supreme command of our forces in the East has always been held by one of Her Majesty's generals, and to this circumstance, perhaps, may be ascribed that tendency to centralisation which is said to have weakened the authority and damped the zeal of commanders of battalions. Yet, if the regimental organisation of the army has proved faulty, how admirably have not its administrative departments worked! No cries have been heard from our armies before Delhi or Lucknow like those that reached us from the Crimea. Notwithstanding the prevailing disturbance, the commissariat, aided by the civil and political authorities, has proved equal to every emergency.

There is, therefore, but one great want to be supplied, namely, that of a good working native army.

In putting this indispensable force together, care will, of

* Reports of cases decided by the Sudder Courts used to be published annually. The series was begun by the late Sir W. Macnaughten. If still continued, its republication in England would probably furnish the best reply to much that is said against the Company's judicial officers.

course, be taken not to fill it with too many men of the same class. Geographical circumstances tended to introduce this evil into the now dissolving army.

The Bombay army, being drawn from the motley population of a sea-board, partook of the character of those from among whom it was raised. The Bengal army, on the contrary, was formed far inland, and drew its recruits mainly from the agricultural class. This may account for the sort of family feeling that pervades the whole body. Henceforward we must enlist from various classes, not, perhaps, mixing them promiscuously in the ranks, but forming them into separate battalions or companies, according to their tribe.

Goorkhas and Sikhs will, of course, be largely employed; yet we must not overdo this, lest, in extinguishing one evil, we should give birth to another. Every mercenary army has its dangerous aspect; and it is possible that even our own countrymen, if stationed permanently in large bodies on the Ganges, might catch the Prætorian cohort feeling, by some believed to have been at the bottom of our Sepoys' recent misconduct. A great, but not an extravagant, increase to the permanent European force will be desirable. In Oude, Rohilcund, and perhaps in Bundlecund, new stations for European troops will be wanted; but in the rest of Gangetic India (apart from the Punjaub), it will probably be thought enough to add the fortresses of Allahabad and Delhi, and the town of Dacca,* to the posts to be in future occupied by that description of force.

Leaving, however, the resuscitation of a native army on the Ganges to be discussed by those professionally familiar with the subject, let us now consider how the civil and political branches of the public administration are likely to be affected by the disturbing influence of the late explosion on the minds of our subjects abroad, and of our countrymen both at home and

* In the Cossyn hills to the east of Dacca, at an elevation of about 5000 feet above the level of the sea, there is, at a place called Myrung, a high table-land admirably suited for a European cantonment. The situation is a most commanding one, with Assam on the north and Sylhet on the south. There is water-carriage to the foot of the hills on both sides, and the spot is to be reached in three marches from Assam, and in two from Sylhet.

abroad. Of all the perils in prospect, none are so formidable as those to be dreaded from the last-mentioned of these two sources. If we could keep our countrymen within bounds, the difficulty of correcting or guarding against the suspicions and alarms of our native subjects would be wonderfully diminished. It is a hard thing to calm the minds of a very sensitive people, who are constantly told by Englishmen of authority and weight, that what the Local Government assures them will not be done, must, and shall, be attempted. It is true that these declarations are, for the most part, qualified by a disavowal of any desire to see coercion or bribery employed to effect the desired end. But when in the course of any discussion the mode of stating facts is calculated to make but one impression, it matters little whether the object be expressly acknowledged or not.

Detached declarations, disclaiming the only rational conclusion deducible from the premises, will, in such cases, only excite a suspicion that the real object is one that cannot, without inconvenience, be clearly and explicitly avowed.

The preceding remarks bear more immediately on the writings and speeches of the proselytizing bodies in England, who, though enjoying the fullest liberty of persuasion, are still discontented; but they may be often found to apply to those of political speculators also. Two specimens of startling lucubrations of the latter class have already been given, but as neither of these derive any weight from the quarter whence they proceed, it seems desirable to adduce another sample, having the sanction of the well-known name of the Member for Sheffield. This gentleman and his friends cannot be said to have courted discussion, for in the report of what passed at a meeting held in St. Martin's Hall, on the 17th December, it appears that all the speaking was on one side, and that a gallant captain who tried to make himself heard was, "by a unanimous vote of the meeting, expelled the room."

The speech thus guarded against any immediate contradiction opens with a fair and true description of the empire established in India; but goes too far in its adulation of the people of England, when it asserts the fabric to be one of their rearing. The people

of England as a nation, acting through its legitimate organs, the Parliament and Ministry of the day, contributed little to the completion of the work beyond furnishing the East India Company with a body of European troops, which that Company could, if permitted, easily have raised for itself. There is, of course, no question as to the power of the nation to deal as it likes with whatever may have been acquired by any of its members; but every argument adduced to defend the seizure of the imperial estate created by the East India Company through the agency of its own servants, may be used to justify the laying hands on all the property of every railway or joint-stock company in this kingdom. It was by an accident, rather than by any deep design, that a trading company was from the first interposed between Great Britain and its dependency; but to that accident is it mainly owing that the present generation has got any Eastern empire to dispute about. France started at the same time as England in the Indian race, but the French *ministry* directed the operations of the French officers; while a trading Company, presided over by men of the middle order, imparted their own homely vigour to the founders of the English dominion in the East.

Thus the great talents of Bussy, and other French officers on the spot, were neutralised by courtly influences emanating from Versailles; while Clive, with his coadjutors, were screened by the intervention of their commercial employers from what would have proved the equally baneful interference of the British Cabinet and Parliament.

All this is evidently perceived by the Member for Sheffield; but, in his anxiety to avoid ascribing any merit to the East India Company, he speaks of Clive as if he had received his mandate direct from the people of England.

The force of truth soon after extorts an admission that the British, which means the Company's, rule in India, has been a blessing to those under its sway, though the blessing might, it is urged, have been greater than it has been, if it were not for that double government, which seems to be the *bête noire* of all Indian reformers.

If, however, it be true that the President of the Board of

Control can "do exactly as he pleases," what would be gained in point of vigour by the transfer of his duties to a personage with another designation, to whom it would be impossible to impart more power than is already possessed by the functionary who is styled "the real ruler of India?"

As to responsibility, unless we mean to revive the terrors of Tower Hill, it is a term of little meaning. Will the author of any blunder in these days sleep the less soundly for knowing that he is personally responsible for the measure?

But why should a constitutional Englishman feel such a horror of a system of double government? Is it not by checks, sometimes a source of inconvenience but more often of safety, that all limited Governments must be carried on? To the despot or the democrat they may be odious, but no good reason can be shown for their proving hateful to the intelligent member of a really free community, even in the regulation of a conquered dependency. A few instances of the vicious working of the system in force would be of more avail here than any general declamation. Where any evil has been done, or good omitted, there never will be much difficulty in determining whether the controlled or the controlling authority is to blame. We may all, even now, find out, if he who caused an unjust and impolitic war has his seat in Leadenhall Street or in Cannon Row; and if the existing partition of power does not shroud him from detection, what would be gained by placing him in a more exposed position, while he is at the same time to be freed from the wholesome restraint imposed by the mere necessity of answering, even when determined to overrule, the objections of a body of able and well-informed men? Those who think such restraint to be of no use, need only peruse the correspondence that passed in the year 1833 between the Court of Directors and the Board of Control, on the subject of what was called the Dosses' claim upon the Nawab of Oude, to perceive into what fearful errors a home-bred statesman, if entirely unchecked, might fall in dealing with an Indian question. The sketch that follows of the character of our Indian subjects is too sweeping in its conclusions for the induction on which it rests. There is no good to be done by exasperating the hatred of

race against race. After an allusion to the barbarous acts of the Indian insurgents, it is asked whether Englishmen could "in their wildest fury have done such deeds?" Until we see order overthrown, the jails broken open, and St. Giles's let loose, we cannot say of what Englishmen may or may not be capable; but the passages cited below,* from Lord Normanby's recent account of a "Year of Revolution in Paris," show that other Europeans can be guilty of acts equalling in atrocity all that we read of the enormities committed by the Sepoys or the liberated convicts in Upper India.

The next topic touched upon is the capacity of the Hindoos for self-government. Here the Hindoos are spoken of as if they were the sole inhabitants of India, no account being made of the millions of Mahommedans residing in that land. The Hindoos are pronounced to be incapable of self-government, and perhaps, if tried by a European standard, they may appear to be so. Yet the people whose ancient system of village communities is thought to have contained the germ of our own municipal institutions, cannot be so entirely destitute of all administrative capacity as the Member for Sheffield supposes.† Long subjection may have deadened the governing faculties of

* "I am sorry to hear every hour fresh accounts of the barbarities committed by the insurgents upon those who fell into their hands; all tending to show that no savage tribe could have been more sure to abuse power, should they unhappily have obtained the upper hand. Every one of the Garde Mobile—many of them lads from sixteen to eighteen, who were taken by them, were frightfully mutilated." —Vol. ii. p. 67.

"All that has been said of the cruelties practised on the Garde Mobile is true. In one place they took four or five of these children, who had surrendered as prisoners, stuck a pike through their throat under the chin, tied their hands down, and placing them in front of a window, fired between their legs, thinking the soldiers would not return the fire when they saw the Mobiles. They cut also off a head from one, filled the mouth with pitch, lighted a match in it, and danced round to the tune of 'Les Lampions.' Having surprised a small Corps de Garde filled with Mobiles, they killed them all in cold blood; and some female monsters amused themselves with cutting out their tongues and stringing them upon a cord."—Vol. ii. p. 75.

† See on this subject, General Briggs's "India and Europe compared," p. 5, with the extract from Sir John Malcolm's letter on the subject of "Village Government," written during a day's detention on the banks of the Godavery, as he was proceeding to join the army in the field in 1817.

those under our rule, but many of the independent Hindoo states, both in Bundlecund and Rajpootana, exhibit every outward sign of being ruled with moderation and wisdom. The Hindoos being pronounced to be by nature placed in a state of pupilage, are of course to be provided with suitable curators and guardians, who, it may be presumed, are to be taken from among the "English traders and missionaries," these being the only individuals accounted worthy of trust in matters connected with India.

The members of the Company's service, both civil and military, are all lumped together under the name of "Old Indians," and to be cast aside as useless. Yet it may be well, with the accounts of their skilful management in the Punjaub, at Delhi, in Oude and Upper India, before us, to pause a little before we postpone them to either of the respectable classes to whom alone the people of England are advised to apply for information. Traders or planters, and missionaries, are both in a situation calculated to warp their judgment regarding the capacity and conduct of the officers of Government. Both must at times labour under a galling sense of subordination, for both carry about with them the feeling that their complexion alone entitles them to rank with their official countrymen, to whose authority they are, nevertheless, obliged often to submit. Both are liable to disappointments and failures, and these it is a relief to impute to the mismanagement of the local officers, under whose control they chafe. It is right, therefore, to listen to their statements, for their opportunities of acquiring information are great; but in weighing their testimony, the circumstances of their position should ever be kept in mind.

There was a time when the independent Europeans affected to make common cause with the people of the country; and though even then they never cried out about the natives being oppressed so loudly as when they had themselves been checked in some act of oppression, still their now openly avowed hostility to the whole dark-skinned race must greatly simplify the task of the legislator. No one can now deceive himself into a belief that he is promoting the happiness of the native population of India by subjecting it to the authority of legisla-

tive or other chambers, in which the unofficial European element is to predominate.

Let us hope, therefore, that whatever may be the changes to be made in the controlling authority at home, the administrative power in India may be allowed to remain in the hands of an official body, set apart from their youth for this special duty, and whose primary object it may be to administer the country for the benefit of its inhabitants, trusting thus best to promote the real interests of their own parent-land. It is immaterial whether the body into whose hands the internal government is to be intrusted shall be called the Civil Service, or receive any other appellation, provided the principle be maintained of employing in the territorial government of India those only who have been educated and trained expressly for that duty. If a knowledge of English law shall really prove to be a requisite for the efficient discharge of civil functions, the addition of a few years to the prescribed age of admission will probably bring what is wanted into the ranks of the Civil Service.

The prevailing impression at the present moment seems to be, that the mutiny, with the collateral insurrection in Oude, is suppressed. A careful revision of the last accounts received may warn us against being too hastily assured of this conclusion. Much, in a military point of view, remains to be done; and there will be still more of civil and political work to be performed before that province, wherein alone we have as yet encountered a hostile nationality, can be reduced even to the state of tranquillity enjoyed by it at the time when it was annexed to our possessions.

In one of those admirable letters signed "A Civilian," lately inserted in "The Times," we are told the secret of much of the resistance encountered in Oude.

Our first administrative act has there been to suppress the upper class of landholders, called the Talookdars, and thus to convert them into foes. It would be tedious to explain the nature of their tenure, and it may be enough to say, that it is not easy to reconcile the maintenance of the order of Talookdar with the preservation of those village communities, which present

the most pleasing feature in the old Hindoo system of rural polity. Still, as the whole of Oude seems to have been for a length of time divided into Talooks, under which, by some sort of compromise, the village proprietors still held their ground, one would have thought that the danger of abruptly reducing the former class must have been apparent from the first; yet such was the confidence felt in the inherent power of a favourite measure to command the assent even of those whom it injured, that no precaution whatever was taken against this most obvious risk. In Oude, moreover, it ought to be borne in mind, that all who oppose us are not rebels.

A letter, dated 23d November, and bearing in every line the true Calcutta stamp, tells the readers of the first "Times" of the opening year, that the three million opposed to us in Oude were composed of feudal retainers and bad characters, or what in Europe would be called adventurers.

"These," he says, "have nothing to lose, are fighters from boyhood, and detest the English, who prohibit plunder."

Instead of nothing to lose, it would be more correct to say that they have everything to lose — all upon which they prided themselves; and although it may not be consistent with our ideas of the general good that they should retain what they possessed, still, as they owe us no allegiance, they have an obvious right to resist our establishing ourselves in their country.

The hatred of all native independence that runs through this letter shows, that however great their ability, the unofficial Calcutta politicians would, if invested with power, soon involve us in a war of races.

Notwithstanding the fidelity under trying circumstances of the great bulk of the states to the west of the Jumna, the correspondent calls this part of India "a pestilent nest of rajahlings, nawabs, chiefs, independent zemindars, and titled vagabonds of every kind."

Let any one reflect on what the position of our army before Delhi would have been if the native chiefs in its neighbourhood had only applied the means at their command to stop supplies, and he will perceive how much was owing to the wise

policy which had made them our friends. It was a remark made by the two most intelligent Eastern potentates with whom we have of late years come into contact, Dost Mahommed and Runjeet Sing, that the secret of our power lay in our not having reduced the native princes of the country to despair. Let us take this saying to heart, and couple it with what both Wellington and Malcolm have said on the strength derived from a reputation for good faith, and our position may be improved by the very struggle through which we are passing.

The perils recently encountered have been fearful, but they are slight in comparison with what would have assailed us if the counsels of the more violent party among ourselves had in former years been adopted. The extinction of all native independence was, as may be seen from Malcolm's reflections (formerly quoted*), long since a favourite doctrine of one class of politicians, who maintained our dangers ever to have arisen from the armies of independent states. That occasional wars did arise from that source was true enough; but these wars only kept our troops in exercise, and averted the very perils to which we are now exposed. We must ever remember, that it is not only the reigning prince who is reduced to despair by our occupation of his country, but every man among his subjects who, from hereditary pretensions or personal character, is susceptible of the impulse of ambition, even in its most subdued and best-regulated mood.

If our conquests had embraced (as many desired) the territories of all those who have lately been standing by, or abstaining from injuring us, what a terrible addition would have been made to our embarrassments!

Even now the furious prejudice against colour, which prevents many of the English in India from discriminating between the rebellious Sepoys and the natives of the country, who have in many instances suffered as much as ourselves from their violence, is producing a most pernicious effect.

The people at large, it is said in many quarters, hardly know which to dread most, their own miscreant countrymen or the

* Ante. p. 13.

revengeful Europeans. It is for contending against this spirit, and striving to avert the consequent risk of arousing a nationality of many millions into hatred and active resistance, that Lord Canning and his coadjutors have been so fiercely and wantonly abused. Two classes combine to keep up the outcry against any pause in the career of vengeance. The vaguely vindictive, who, to use the words of the late Sir Charles Napier, "mistake rigour for vigour," and who, to ensure the punishment of every criminal, would make complexion the criterion of crime; and the more methodically sanguinary, who dread lest any relaxation of the estrangement resulting from indiscriminate severity should lead to the firmer establishment of government on its previous footing, and so balk their hopes of seeing their own favourite schemes speedily introduced.

Both these classes are urging the Government upon what it has not the power, and ought not to have the desire, to perform. Notwithstanding the many questionable acts our rulers have lapsed into since first they lent an ear to the counsels of those who array conquest, even when unprovoked and aggressive, in the garb of a moral and religious duty, there is still so much reliance reposed in our good faith that we as yet retain many powerful and valuable allies. Nepaul, with its army of 40,000 brave and well-trained soldiers, the lately conquered Sikhs, and the hitherto unruly borderers beyond the Indus, the wealthy protected chieftains of the Cis-Sutledge territory, almost all the warlike tribes of Rajpootana, and even the two Mahratta princes of Indore and Gwalior, have proved faithful to our cause in our hour of extremest need. But they who thus far have stood by us cannot but have many feelings in harmony with those of our own mutinous subjects.

Community of religion, and other sympathies binding the Asiatic family of mankind together, and disparting them from the European, must, on an occasion like the present, cause those thus connected by nature to gravitate towards each other.

This tendency has been hitherto counteracted by the prestige of our uniform success, by the reliance placed in our good faith, and by the diplomatic skill of those able members of the Indian

services who, under the name of Political Agents, have been the objects of so much silly abuse.* But the resistance to a natural impulse must have a limit, and should our conduct ever give real disgust to the great body of our own native subjects, they would certainly find sympathisers among our native allies; and thus a combination might ensue too strong for us, with all our prowess, to make head against. Now nothing is more likely to generate a contagious feeling of hostility to us, as a race differing in religion, in language, in complexion, in habits, from our allies, as much as from our subjects, than a continuance of such indiscriminating severity as, it is to be feared, is still in practice in Upper India,—not without direct encouragement from the press on both sides of the water. The greater part of the favourite measures of those who write in support of systematic vengeance, would have a tendency to shake the confidence of our neighbours in the safety of an alliance with us. An almost Judaical hatred of them as idolaters has come in, to add sternness to the feelings entertained towards the people of India by the British public at home.

Judging by the tone of their speeches and writings, we might imagine that our mission in the East is believed by some to be like that of Joshua, and that we ought to go forth accordingly to smite the obstinate worshippers of false gods wherever they are to be found.

To contend by argument against such an impression would be useless; and it is here alluded to, only because it may account for the very un-English apathy exhibited by the public in general on the subject of the "wholesale hangings" which, as has been shown in a preceding passage,† excite the disgust even of the youngest military men on the spot.

* It is instructive to observe how cordially the General Arthur Wellesley co-operated with the Political Agent John Malcolm, when both were employed together in the very early years of the present century. It is also instructive to notice how many of those whose wisdom and energy have saved the Punjaub, and with it all Upper India, were included in the late Sir Charles Napier's denunciations of the pestilent politicals who thwarted the plans of military commanders.

† See ante, p. 28.

The Gospel of peace has, it is true, often been heralded by wars and tumults, yet it is not by spreading terror and dismay among those whom we wish to bring under its benign influence that we ought to pave the way for its advance.

"Our prayer therefore," to use the words of one of the ablest officers in Upper India, in a recent letter to a friend, "should be, that God will overrule the passions of sinful men, not of one, but of all classes."

Let an earnest hope be added, that our rulers may not be tempted to hurry on a change in the administration of our Eastern empire at a moment like the present, when men's minds are unhinged, and each successive mail brings intelligence of varying and deepening import.

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THE MUTINIES AND THE PEOPLE

OR

STATEMENTS OF NATIVE FIDELITY,

EXHIBITED

DURING THE OUT-BREAK OF 1857-58.

BY

A HINDU.

N. i. 12

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THE Mutinies and the Rebellion have been officially announced to have terminated. The present time therefore affords the best opportunity for considering the question as to what part the bulk of the people played in the great drama of 1857-58. Its solution however can only be attained by a scrutinous reference to the contemporary records, or in other words the newspapers and personal accounts published at the time. In this enquiry it should be clearly borne in mind that the mass of the writers on whose statements we are forced to rely, were urged by feelings the reverse of dispassionate and impartial,—feelings the most to be distrusted when their promptings are looked to as evidence for the purposes of historical research. But under this special disadvantage even, the people at large are acquitted of all connection or alliance, reserved or open, with the insurgents, and not only acquitted but found to have done more than expected,—to have, in some cases by their well-judged neutrality, and in others by their active and spontaneous assistance, under circumstances the most depressing, saved the Empire. This, it is hoped, will be evident in the course of these pages.

It should also be stated that in the editing of these pages the writer followed no settled plan and could not carry out his wishes from the nature of his avocations which vexatiously interfered with the progress of this work. He made the notes at random, and, believing that those, if published in a collected form, may serve a great national purpose, has arranged them in the present shape. More than half the pages were printed before the amnesty was announced or its fruits were known, and if here and there remarks peep out inconsistent with the result of the moment, it is owing to this circumstance. The writer will however feel himself amply repaid if his labors, notwithstanding the many imperfections of which he is sensitively aware, be the means, as intended, of disabusing many of their errors who still maintain that the people did not only not aid the Government during the crisis but were privately leagued with the insurgents, and of leading the future historian of the revolt to a true appreciation of the character of the event.

"NOTHING," says a writer on the Sepoy mutiny in the April number of the *Edinburgh Review*, "has been more remarkable than the fact that, throughout its whole progress it has faithfully retained the character of a military revolt. It has involved the whole Native Bengal army; it has spread to the Northern contingents; it has reached some Bombay regiments; it has touched the Nizam's army; it has threatened the Madras army, but except in the newly annexed State of Oude, it has not been taken up by the population. Now it is this circumstance which has saved India to England. If, as at the Sicilian Vespers, the whole population of India, with its tens of millions, had at the first signal of resistance risen against the English, our rule in India might, perhaps, by great exertions and large expenditure, have been recovered, but we should only have recovered a population watching the next favorable opportunity for revolt and have re-established an empire on sand. It was the general good will of the population which rendered the suppression of the military mutiny both practicable and beneficial." (No. 218, 1858). And the London *Times*, which is universally esteemed as the exponent and leader of popular opinion in England, so early as July 1857, declared

the same sentiment. It was the first English journal which spoke out upon the military character of the revolt and attributed the salvation of the Indian Empire as a dependency of Great Britain to the fidelity, aid, and advice of the people of the country during the insurrection.

"From all sides we are assured," said the *Times*, "that the general population has exhibited rather good will than hostility towards us, and in many cases effectual protection has been afforded to fugitives from Delhi (and other scenes of mutiny)." Nearly a year has elapsed since those words were written, and they have been signally verified by the events that have so quickly and crowdedly followed. The time was certainly most troublous and tempting, and how admirable must be the moral courage of those, who, while the mutiny of a whole army was becoming partially successful, and the vestiges of authority and order were being swept away from most of the provinces of Northern India, did not only observe a peaceful neutrality by standing unmoved amidst the tide of insurrectionary feeling which then over-flooded Hindoostan Proper, but also, at the risk of their property, lives and family-safety, proved such ready and effectual instruments of salvation to many utterly helpless European fugitives, and acted as protectors and conservators of order at so unruly and perilous an occasion. The struggle was a sore trial of the nation's fidelity. It is difficult, if not impossible, to cite another instance in the history of a country, governed by a nation, foreign in language, in birth, blood and creed, of so remarkable an attachment and loyalty to its foreign rulers at such a crisis. This feature of the revolution which the Bengal soldiery has so ruthlessly attempted to force upon India, at once stamps the character of the insurrection as purely military. The acts of active Native fidelity, performed under the greatest difficulties imaginable, so much so as in the very scenes of the revolt, under the eyes of the insurgents, and with bloody threats from them

within the hearing of the actors, which it is intended to cite and embody in the following pages, will conclusively show that the feeling of revolt and disloyalty was not shared in by the mass of the people, even though the movement was headed by the House of Delhi and conducted by a body of soldiers whose bravery, discipline and skill had established British dominion from the Hymalayas to the Cape Comorin, and made the name of the Honorable E. I. Company respected and feared throughout the continent of Asia. But these instances are only a few among a host of those which have found entrance into the columns of contemporary journals, and which, the writer hopes will one day be presented to the public as a supplement to the history of this memorable event, and a monument to the memory of those who performed the duties of subject, man and brother in the face of the most appalling dangers that surrounded them. Such a work would be most befitting the patriot or philanthropist who takes an interest in the cause of Indian loyalty and humanity. If any of our readers has taken notes of the passing events of the mutiny, he will not be at a loss to observe the finger of Providence working in the minds of the people, and to solve the important problem of England's salvation from this overwhelming deluge of Indian insurrection. We need only add that the instances which we quote below are those that were recorded by men who have, since the breaking out of the mutiny, displayed the most rancourous animosity to the people of this country and whose testimony therefore must be taken as a contribution to Truth which they could not refuse. There are no doubt many instances which have not got into print, but the value of which nevertheless stands as high as that of those noticed by publicists and news-writers. We should also mention that the facts of the kind herein recorded, are so scattered and extend over so large an area that we have scant opportunities to give them entire. We

have not all the records before us for avail and we must content ourselves with what we have got. It is however hoped that the Commission of Enquiry into the causes of the mutiny for the appointment of which instructions from the Court of Directors have already arrived, will not fail, as they will have the best means and greatest opportunities for this important work, to record the instances of Native fidelity and service that may come to their knowledge during the investigation, and when the period arrives for them to give the history of the revolt, they will chronicle the deeds which have warded off the dangers of a popular revolution from attending the military outbreak, and prevented the antagonism of the Sepoys from proving successful as a crusade of extermination against the Europeans in India.

Whether this mutiny was a pre-concerted plan and had a previous deep organization, is yet an open question. The trial of the King of Delhi which was expected to clear the doubts, has left the problem as far from solution as before. But one thing is certain. It has taken the Government and the country equally by surprise. Whatever may the prophets after the event, contend as to the presaged moral certainty of the outbreak, none can deny that when the storm came, nobody expected it, and both the European and Native populations were equally surprised to find themselves in the midst of a bloody rebellion.

This unexpected burst paralyzed the efforts of the native population in the vicinity of the outbreak, who, though willing to offer every aid in their power to the Europeans thus threatened and pursued, and anxious to protect the old land-marks of order, were completely restrained in their wishes from the fear of the Sepoys. We read in the papers so many instances of villagers foregoing the (to them) most welcome duties of hospitality from an absolute dread of the mutineers, but still secretly rendering all friendly aid possible,

that we are tempted to ask whether the history of any nation under such difficulties, records such acts of pure benevolence and gratitude. Thus we find in Chambers' Historical Narrative of the Sepoy Revolt, repeated instances of this description, in which the villagers could do no lengthened acts of kindness from an overpowering fear of the insurgents. In a story of escape of four European fugitives from Delhi, it is stated that "they crept on the whole day, obtaining a little food and water from the villagers, who were however too much afraid to afford the fugitives the shelter of a roof." In another "kindness was accorded to them (the fugitives) for one whole day, after which the humane natives turned, lest the Sepoys should burn their village, if they heard of Feringees having been harboured, declared they could no longer afford shelter." Further, we perceive that the villagers, too much moved by the piteous condition of the same party, but scarcely able to show kindness openly, invited them to an "out-house containing twenty cows, the only roof that the owner dared to offer them." Another party, faint and hungered by a hot pursuit of a band of Sepoys, were eagerly searching for refuge when "a few Hindoo Peasants, discovering them, told them where they could hide in a tope of trees, and brought them chuphatees and milk," unable by the ever-present dread of the Sepoys, to receive them into their homes. We could multiply such instances without number, but we shall not go to an unnecessary length; these are sufficient to convince the reader of the terrible check under which the first success of the Sepoys held the love of hospitality, common to the people of this country. It is true that among those who were distinguished for conspicuous acts of protection and fidelity, there were some who joined the rebels when the Sepoy cause was in the full tide of success, but we should remember that that was the only alternative left to them. They were, as the Noble Earl of Derby has well put it, seduced from their allegiance by the

pressure of temptation, or compelled by the force of circumstances.

The mutiny commenced at Meerut, but Delhi was the focus and stronghold of the Sepoy disaffection. The following, which we quote from a letter published in the *Times*, written by an officer at Kurnal, describes the providential escape which that officer effected from Delhi, through the aid of the people of the neighbouring villages. Like every European who had the misfortune to dwell at that fatal time in the imperial city, he was unprepared for the struggle, but the love of life is too strong for man to conquer—and with his weak health he rushed forth to sell his blood as dearly as possible. Finding himself unequal to the contest he changed his policy and feigned death. This device succeeded and he was left for dead. We shall now leave him to tell in his own words the story of his salvation after this terrible episode in the history of his escape:

"About one hour after I came to, and managed to stagger on about a mile without shoes, where I secreted myself in a hut until day-break, when I resumed my dreary journey, and, after travelling about twelve miles, the latter part of which was in the broiling sun without anything on my head, arrived at Alleeporc. I managed to beg a little water, some bread, and a few old native clothes to cover my nakedness, but was refused shelter. Again I went on and on through the ploughed fields, barefooted, fearing to keep the road, on account of the robbers, and after being turned from mutinous villages, came to a village where the head man, much against the wishes of his labourers, offered to secrete me. This offer accepted, and I remained with him for five days, although I saw the Sirdars came there and wished to murder me, but seeing my helpless state and how ill I was, they refrained from doing so and went away; and a second time I was forced to flee to the fields and hide myself, as about 50 of the mutinous sepoys came and searched the village for Europeans, but after lying the whole day

in the sun my generous friend the Zemindar came and sheltered me."—*Times, July 20th*, 1857.

This officer's wife and child, with a knot of friends, were protected by a Ranee Mungha Dabee.

A boy of 19, writing from Meerut, makes mention of the following in an interesting story of his escape from Delhi :—

"It would be too long, my very dearest sister, to tell you of how for three days and nights we wandered in the jungles, sometimes fed and sometimes robbed by the villagers, till at length, wearied and footsore, with shreds of cloths on our backs we arrived at a village where they put us in a hut and fed us for four days, and moreover took a note from us into Meerut, whence an escort of cavalry was sent out, and we were brought safely in here."—*Times, 22nd July.*

The following just remarks and candid admissions of an experienced Anglo-Indian, deserve the particular attention of those who entertain any doubts as to the purely military character of the revolt and to the facts of protection and aid offered by the people, mostly under personal risks and difficulties, the appalling nature of which places their fidelity and the integrity of their intentions above suspicion. Many from whatever motives have averred that there is no gratitude in this land, but the invariable good conduct in hours of peril of native ryots, Ooryah bearers, and those villagers who owed the slightest benefit to the *Shaib loges* rescued by them as testified by the writer quoted below, and by others with the weight of national responsibility on their heads, such as Mr. Russell the *Times's* Special Correspondent and Mr. Layard demonstratively proves to the contrary. With regard to the fidelity and attachment of the Zemindars, Mr. Mangles the late Chairman of the Court of Directors, has well said that their universal good conduct forms a distinctive feature of this revolution.

Indeed instances of their firmness and allegiance are so numerous that many well informed Indian thinkers whose minds had hitherto strongly been set against them, have come to the opinion that the best safeguard of the British Government against calamities of the kind which has so terribly convulsed it, lies in the extension of the far-seeing and most statesmanlike land settlement system of Lord Cornwallis. The reader will find in these pages ample instances of the active fidelity of this important class of British subjects recorded not by contemporary journals only but also by Government Secretaries and other officials of note.

But in spite of the authentic statements of these high authorities, there is a class of writers who maintain that the Natives of India are not susceptible of kindness, and that the worst way of governing them is that through their affections. Baron Macaulay, though not a little ungenerous to their national characteristics, does not still refuse to record that the attachment of the Sepoys to Clive, was almost child-like, and that there is not an instance in which kindness, however scantily exhibited towards the Natives, was not appreciated with the utmost readiness, and returned at the shortest opportunity with the greatest pleasure. But the best answer to these allegations is contained in a remark which we observe among other very enlightened and truthful sentiments teeming in one of the best written articles on India, in the last number of the *Westminister Review*, which we remember to have read for a long time since. Alluding to the treatment of the Natives, the writer says, "Forsooth, Orientals are so accustomed to be ill-treated that they will despise and regret if you treat them well; just so our grandfathers and great grandfathers used to speak of the Irish; it is the universal doctrine of the tyrant." As to the future policy of England towards India—whether it should be one governing the country through the affec-

tions of the people or ruling it on autocratic principles,—it is irrelevant to the subject-matter before us. But we may be allowed to observe that the wisdom of the British Parliament has decided upon a policy of governing India for its teeming millions, and through their good will and love, and no interested views of Indian rule, prompted by a race-antagonism, and race-hatred, if not by other sinister motives, can now avail.

The writer alluded to above says :—

"With the exception of the Goojurs, who are hereditary marauders, the Zemindars have behaved well to us, which is a great encouragement to good government, for there cannot be a doubt, that it is mainly owing to the 30 years settlement which has secured them against the unlimited exactions of the old revenue system. The uniform fidelity of the native domestic servants, both male and female, has also been very remarkable, and the instances have not been few in which they have protected their masters and mistresses at the hazard of their lives. The poor *Ayas* have repeatedly carried off the infants intrusted to them amid a shower of balls. These things prove that the people are not insensible to just and kind treatment and indicate that there must have been something wrong in our management of the Sepoys, who in former days yielded to none in attachment to their English *Officers*."—*Times*, 22*nd July*, 1857.

The subjoined is an acknowledgment of the protection offered to the writer by the Rajah of Benares, on the occasion of the outbreak in that Jerusalem of India :—

"We did not take the direct road to Chunar on account of the mutineers who took that direction, but we crossed the river to Ramnuggur, a fort and palace belonging to the Rajah of Benares. There we bivouacked for the night. The Rajah himself, who was obliged to fly from Benares during the night, was very kind to us, and gave us provisions, &c. But, as he feared the responsibility of sheltering us, he sent us on with a guard of his Sepoys to Chunar."—*Times*, 5*th August*, 1857.

Sadly torn as the affections of the British people have been by the painful events of the mutiny, their feelings of indignation and revenge have been roused not against the mutineers only but against the whole Native population. We regret this inasmuch as it is unjust, unreasonable, and incompatible with the mission of England in India. But the language has been especially virulent against the Brahmins whose love of religious domination, it is said, led them to invent those absurd rumours of Government interference with the faiths of the people, which have occasioned these bloody horrors. What truth there is in this not unplausible charge, the solution of the causes of the revolt will disclose. But none can deny that if the Brahmins were more than reasonably zealous about their religion, still the history of their conduct during the insurrection, marks some of the most remarkable instances of humanity, hospitality, and, if we may use the expression, religiousness that have ever occured. It was not the love of power, love of sovereignty, love of revenge or of extermination which actuated the Brahmin Sepoys, but of God and of their peculiar mode of His worship, which they thought, however unreasonably, Government intended to destroy. But as a demonstration of the religious character of their movement they have throughout conducted themselves with religious rigor and punctuality. They did not murder, as far as we have read, their officers or stain their hands with the blood of innocent women and children. On the contrary they earnestly entreated in many cases their officers to leave the regiment, and often communicated to them the state of feeling prevailing among the corps. Some time they interposed their authority for the protection of ladies and children, and not unfrequently exhorted their brethren to desist from the brutal acts of the sword and fire. Every body has read the opportune and eloquent speech which the lamented Sir Henry Lawrence addressed to the wavering regiments stationed at

Lucknow after the intelligence of the Delhi outbreak had arrived, which had the wholesome effect of settling turbulent spirits, though for a time only. In it he mentioned the names of four men whose exemplary loyalty he earnestly recommended to their unfortunate brethren. The first three of them were Brahmins and the good Chief thus spoke of them :—"Now turn to these good and faithful soldiers—Subadar Sewak Tewaree, Havildar Heralall Doobey, and Sephai Ramru Doobey of the 48th Native Infantry, who have set to you all a good example. The first three at once arrested the bearer of a seditious letter and brought the whole circumstance to the notice of superior authority." To the common temptation the unfortunate 1st N. I., which was, at the date of the revolt, stationed at Cawnpore, yielded on the 5th June, 1857, and marched out of the lines at about three o'Clock in the morning, but "before doing so (says the writer of Chambers' History of the Revolt in India), the Sepoys, (most of whom were Brahmins) showed a lingering affection for the English officers of the regiment; these officers had, for some time, been in the habit of sleeping in the quarter-guard of the regiment, to indicate their confidence in the men; and now the men begged—nay forced them to go into the intrenchment as a means of personal safety." When the disarmed 26th Regiment of Light Infantry mutinied at Mean Meer, "the Havildar, Major, and Pay Havildar, and some others (Brahmins) lost their lives in the vain attempt to maintain order," (vide *Mofussilite*, August 11.) "It is but too true," says the *Quarterly Review*, April, 1858, "that several faithful Sepoys were bayoneted at their guns in the Bailey Guard Battery (Havelock's first relief of Lucknow) by the infuriated soldiers of the 78th Highlanders who confounded them with other Natives: none of them offered any resistance, and one (afterwards known to have been a Brahmin) whose name should never be forgotten, waved his hand, and with the words— 'It is all for the good

cause; welcome friend! expired!'"—And where they were not amongst the rebels they gladly received under their protection any number of European fugitives that fell into their hands, and their conduct as peaceful villagers is throughout marked by that spirit of hospitality and kindness which it is their religious obligation to exhibit to every human being.

An officer of the 38th Native Infantry gives this elaborate account of Brahmin fidelity and assistance by which he, with several friends, passed unscathed through some of the severest struggles on record:—

"Some Brahmins discovered us as they came to work, one took us to the village and put us in a tope (clump of trees) while he got us chuppaties (bread) and milk. On the way Mr. Marshall the auctioneer and merchant, met us. He had quitted the quarter guard immediately after the Colonel and me, together with three others, but in the morning Marshall alone remained, and where the others are, alive or dead, we know not. After giving us food our Brahmin friends took us over a ford of a branch of the Jumna, and concealed us in the long jungle grass on the other side. While there another came to me and said a party of fugitives like ourselves were in the grass at a little distance. I followed, and he led me some two miles, when I found a party of ladies and others concealed. The first person I saw was Proctor, and in my joy at seeing him, whom I had believed shot at the main guard, I saw no one else. After the first joy of meeting him, I looked about and found Mrs. Forrest, her husband and three girls, Mrs. Fraser (Engineers) Mr. Salkeld, Vibart and Wilson (Artillery.) I sent to the Colonel and Marshall, and this made our party 13: with guns and swords we thought ourselves a match for a chance straggling party of mutineers. The escape of this party from the main guard was wonderful. During the afternoon it was determined by Major Abbott at the Cashmere-gate to send what ladies were there to cantonments. There were no conveyances, and they were mounted on the carriages of the guns—who knows what spirit possessed our men?—they were suddenly dislodged, and a murderous fire commenced on all there assembled. There was a

rush up the ramparts into the main guard. Osborne was shot through the thigh; he said, I am not going to be murdered by these Sepoys and led the way throwing himself over the wall into the ditch below, others followed. Mrs. Forest was shot through the shoulder, but over they went, one after another, dropping down what in ordinary circumstances one would say endangered life and limb, yet they reached the ditch, scrambled up the scarp, and the party I mention reached Sir T. Metcalf's house, the servants gave them some beer and food, and led them to the river bank shortly before the house was fired. They passed such a night as we did with one narrower escape. As they lay concealed some men passed and saw a riband or a bottle, and saying 'Oh, they have been here, evidently, went on." They came to the same ford, and while concealed heard me descried by my eyeglass, sent for me, and thus we happily met. We could not stay in the grass, so that evening we started, the Brahmins conducting us to a ford over the Jumna. We travelled some two or three miles up stream before reaching it. Our hearts failed, and no wonder, where ladies were concerned, as we looked at the broad swift river. It was getting dark, too. Two natives went across. We watched them anxiously wade a considerable portion of the river; then their heads alone appeared above water. It was our only chance of life, and our brave ladies never flinched. It was so deep that where a tall man would wade a short man would be drowned. I thought it was all over when, on reaching the deep water with Mrs. Forest on my left arm, a native supporting her on the other side, we were shot down the river; however, by desperate efforts and assistance by another native, we reached the bank in safety. I swam back once more for another of our party, and so ultimately we all got safe over. It was a brave feat for our ladies to do. We passed another wretched night, suffering fearfully from cold, and crouching close to each other for warmth; there was no noise but the chattering of our teeth. Next morning we were discovered and led to a tope, where again the Brahmins temporarily proved our friends, but they turned us out shortly afterwards with news that there were sowers behind and sowers in front."—*Times, July*, 1857.

It appears that dangers pressed the party too closely to leave them time to breathe. But the Brahmins in this, as in the foregoing instances, were their saviours.

"We were taken to a large Brahmin village that night and concealed in a fakeer's hut. We were there three days, and I trust hereafter handsomely to reward our benefactors. While here we sent in a letter in French to Meerut asking for assistance. It seemed not to come, and from Bhekia we were taken to Hurchundpore at the request of an old Zemindar, who had heard of our whereabouts, and treated us royally."—*Ibid.*

Lieut. L. Tucker, late of the 15th Irregular Cavalry, after giving the details of his son's escape from Sultanpore, thus notices the services of the people of a neighbouring village, whose timely assistance and devotedness saved "Charlie" from imminent death:—

"Only fancy how dreadful it was for him to be wandering about in the heat of the day, not knowing where to go and getting people to give him water to drink at wells, and at last drinking it out of little streams he was so terribly thirsty. At last about four o'clock in the afternoon, he asked a man whom he saw for some water and also if he could protect him, for he and his horse were both getting knocked up. The man said he would, and took him into his village and afterwards to his master, who lived in a native fort, and who was the principal person in the place; and there Charlie stayed until the party from here went to fetch him. His escape was most providential, for he did not know the people about there. Soon after he had reached the native's house four others from Sultanpore arrived but one of them knew the way to the person who took Charlie in. He must be a most noble-hearted native, for what we took it half ruined him. He is to have quantities of presents from Charlie, St. George, Henry, and I believe from Government."—*Times*, 17*th Aug.* 1857.

The attentive reader will be struck with the thrilling interest of the stories of almost miraculous escapes which

the fugitives from Delhi and other places effected in the face of but too certain death. But he will not fail to mark the under current of a generous feeling, not noisy but gentle, not ostentatious but sincere, springing from a noble desire of rendering service when most needed, to the countrymen of their Most Gracious Sovereign, and also from an abstract love of doing good for good's sake, appearing in all offers of protection and aid made by the peaceably disposed and humane villagers, counterminous to the scenes of rebellion. The following lines taken from a narrative of the escape of Mr. S. H. Batson, Sergeon of the late 74th Native Infantry, instinct with so many incidents of romance that an English writer has been led to pronounce it not unworthy of Defoe, pointedly mark the affectionate simplicity and earnestness with which the villagers received fugitives under their protection :—

"I continued to run along the road towards Kurnaul. I was again stopped by some ironsmiths who were employed in the Delhi Magazine, when one of them said, "Sahib, don't fear, come with me to my village, and I will find you food, if you go on you will surely be murdered by the Mahomedans, who have turned out from the villages to rob and kill the Feringhees." I went with the ironsmiths to their house, and was most humanely and kindly treated, one giving me a dhottee, another a cap, another some milk and native bread. I felt my life was safe, I was much excited and could scarcely speak, they gave me a cot, on which I lay down, but could not sleep. I told these people I was a Doctor and in consequence met with much greater attention. On the following morning the Chowdrie of the place sent for me, when the whole village assembled to see the "Feringhee doctor" exhausted as I was, I had to answer a multitude of questions put by the people, but finding I was perfectly acquainted with their religion, languages, and manners, they began to take infinite interest in my life and said they would protect me. While I was staying at this village I heard Dr. Wood of the 38th Native Infantry, was in a village some 5 or 6 miles off, at one Summeypore, a man from this village came to me and said, "Dr. Wood Sahib is in my village. He re-

quires medicines, as you know all the native medicines, pray, tell me what should be given." I prescribed, but I know not whether the medicines reached him. I also heard while at this village that Colonel Riply was lying wounded at the Ice-pit, near the parade ground. I persuaded the villagers that he was a great personage, and that if they would take him food and water, they would be handsomely requited by the Government for their humanity, they took him food several days." A few days afterwards I was in the village of Badree, it was rumored that all the Feringhees of Meerut, Umballah and Calcutta, had been murdered, and that the king of Delhi had taken the Government, and that if any village concealed a Feringhee it would be death to the owner and general ruin. The proprietors of Badree village got alarmed at this proclamation, and I was removed at night from the village to a small mangoe tope where I was left night and day. I was visited at night by some one or other of the villagers, who brought me bread and water in a ghurrah. I am unable to describe my feelings during this trying time, I was all day in the sun, in the extreme heat, and alone at night, when the jackals, &c., came prowling about and crying. It is only God and myself know, what I have endured after five days and nights in this tope of trees, I was again taken back to the village and concealed in a Bhoosa-house, I was shut in here for twenty-four hours; the heat and suffocation I cannot find language to describe, I did not know which was the greatest misery, the tope of trees in solitude, or the bhoosa-kotree. A rumour now was set on foot that several sowars had been deputed to hunt for the Feringhees in the different villages and it was considered prudent that I quit Badree under the escort of a Fuqueer Joghee. This man came and offered to convey me anywhere, that I might please, but stated that it was not a safe moment for me to remain where I was, I then started for Bursooah, where I remained the night, this Fuqueer and his friends dyed all my clothes, and gave me necklaces of beads (Oodrach) &c., to assume the garb of a Fuqueer myself. After making all preparations to pass as a Fuqueer, I commenced my pilgrimage with him, he took me to several villages and passed me off as a Cashmere, "Dadoo Puntoe Fuqueer Jogee." In all the

villages that I passed I was cross questioned, but understanding their Jotish religion and oaths I met with every kindness, some giving me pice, others food. The Hindoos all expressed the most merciful feelings towards the Feringhees, while the Mahomedans could not disguise their murderous feelings. I was taken to a village to the house of a Sewak Doss, Sunt Fuqueer Kuberee, understanding his code of religion and being able to recite several Kubberee kubbits, he received me in every kindness. I told him I was a Cashmere, but the sage could not reconcile his mind that I was a Cashmeree with the blue eyes. He said your language, gesture, clothes, &c., are all complete, but your blue eyes betray you, you are surely a Feringhee. I disclosed to him what I was, nevertheless, as I had acquired the kubbera oaths, he continued to believe the same. While I was sitting at this Fuqueer's place, a sepoy came saying, he had letters he was taking to the Umballah force that was at Rau. He did not discover that I was a Feringhee, but I disclosed him that I was a Doctor Sahib, would he take my letter to the officer commanding the force. I gave him a letter soliciting assistance, which he most faithfully conveyed, but after waiting a day in hopes of getting assistance, and none coming, I thought it prudent to proceed towards Meerut; the beggar who had conducted me thus far, volunteered to take me on. Several people of this village accompanied me till we got to Hurchundpore, where a Mr. Francis Cohen, a Zemindar (originally a tussildar, in the Government employment,) resides. This old gentleman received me in all kindness, and showed me the certificates under the signature of Colonel Knyvett, Captain Salkeld, Lieutenant Holland, Mr. Marshal, Merchant of Delhi, and others setting forth that they had received every kindness from Mr. Cohen, who had kindly sent them on to Meerut. I then made arrangements to proceed to Meerut when a letter was brought from Kaykrah village to my address, telling me that a hundred men of the Jheend Rajah's force, commanded by Captain MacAndrews, was waiting at Kaykrah to take me on to Rau, where the Head Quarters were."—*Times*, 17*th August*, 1857.

A Lady writing from Agra, says that when the rising at

Gwalior took place, the fidelity of their servants only saved her husband, herself and family from falling into the hands of the rebels. If the mutiny has applied a too severe test to the loyalty of the people, it has also subjected to no less hard a trial the fidelity of domestic servants. And it is gratifying to observe that the issue has been honorable to both parties. Had it not been for their unswerving attachment, we may confidently say, half the European residents would, ere long, have been numbered with the dead. The aid which they offered, if not effectual for the purpose or adequate to the need, was yet too important to be forgotten by those who received it. While the country was strewed with corpses and raging with fire—while despair sat upon every brow and treachery the dread of the hour—one kind word—one hint to help—was a world of aid and benefit, and the value of it could be appreciated only by those who felt the anger of the season. Apropos to this we may mention on the authority of the *Times* that when two companies of Col. Troup's regiment surrounded his house to shoot him, he was warned by his bearer, fled through a back door, jumped on his horse and galloped off!

An Officer writing from Azimgurh thus describes how he and his party were treated by the people of Goruckpore:—

"We were in Goruckpore on Sunday the 19th, and took up thence the ladies of the station, consisting of the wives of three Civilians and of a Captain commanding there. There fortunately, were only a few more than hundred in number, but they formed part of the 17th Regiment who had been stationed here at Azimghur, and had plundered the treasury and left the district. There was a distrust of these Sepoys, who, had they not been overawed by some Irregular Cavalry and some armed men belonging to a Rajah, would have mutinied also. At Goruckpore, through the kindness of the people we were supplied with wearing apparel, sufficient to carry on for a few days. We left, as I said, on the evening

of Sunday, with an immense cavalcade, composed of baggage, carriers, carriages, sowars or Irregular Cavalry and a party of armed natives belonging to the Rajah. We travelled by torch light in dreadful confusion, as we are escaping for our lives through districts where the population was hostile, and where Europeans had been previously murdered. As yet however, we have got on extremely well, the escort of Irregular Cavalry, whom we feared more than an enemy from without, have hitherto behaved well and promise to do so."—*Times, 24th August,* 1857.

The gallant brother of Gordon Cumming the Lion-hunter, gives the following lively account of his men's fidelity.

"The men say themselves they would not trust their own fathers now-a-days. I got on with them very well, though my jemadar is a capital fellow, and Bappas is invaluable. Neither of them ever seems to tire, they are constantly moving about among the men, armed with double rifles, swords and pistols. When I was in the jungle, one or two of my party showed sign of warning, but the rest swore they would shoot down any man who attempted that kind of humbug. I have raised the pay of all the police and sowars and have sent fifteen men to Mhow to-day to get some muskets and ammunition which have been promised to me by Elliott."—*Times,* 31*st August,* 1857.

This interesting little story of the offer of assistance by a party of Bheels, is mixed up with a strangeness and simplicity of manner, characteristic of the doings of savages on occasions when their hospitable feelings are called into play:—

"A Bheel, who had observed what was going on, carried intelligence to the nearest town, a small place called Para, of the invasion by the Umghura people. Firing at the insult, a party started from Para to drive them away. Just as the gray of the morning appeared, we had the pleasure of being rescued by them, and thus did God raise up instruments for our delivery when death seemed near at hand. But had the villains not been such cowards nothing could have saved us, if they had attacked us in the night. This

fresh party carried us to Para, and were civil enough at first, and towards evening, for some reason or other, they began to get very insolent and commenced plundering us. We saw our position had but little improved and we prepared again to sell our lives as dearly as could be. But just as things appeared to be getting desperate, a party arrived from Jabua, 10 miles away, sent by the chief to our rescue, as soon as he had heard of our being at Para. They carried us to Jubua that same evening, and we reached the town early in the morning, having rested for some hours on the road. The young Chief, who is a very pleasing looking boy, of 16 or 17, received us very kindly. The managing authority, however, is an old lady, who is, I believe, grandmother to the Chief, and by her directions every thing that could be done for our safety or comfort was effected."—*Times*, 31*st August*, 1857.

Mr. J. P. Gubbins of Benares, thus brings forward prominently, through the medium of the *Times*, the conspicuous acts of loyalty of Rajah Soorut Sing:—

"Rajah Soorut Singh, a Sikh Chieftain, who was living at Benares under a slight surveillance at the time of the mutinies, and who was on intimate terms with my brother, used his exertions successfully to keep a company of his countrymen steady, who were on guard at the Mint, where all the ladies and children were collected and has since proved himself so brave and true that the Europeans have subscribed 100 *l.*, in order to present him with a handsome set of fire arms."—*Times*, 31*st August*, 1857.

Here is an instance of protection proffered by the peasants of Guraon, the interest of which is scarcely surpassed by the records of chivalrous gallantry of the Middle Ages, or the adventures in Italian and Spanish romances. Services rendered under ordinary circumstances, though valuable, cannot approach in importance to those which are offered under difficulties like the one under notice. Here was a young woman whose person was coveted by the Chief of the place. There was not a single European to look after her, but the good peasants, inspired as it were by Provi-

dence, espoused her innocent cause and at the risk of their lives and property, manfully stood in her behalf. If Mrs. Nun is still in the land of the living, which we earnestly hope to be the case, she should, as becomes her gratitude and moral sense, come forward and name the persons who so heroically saved her life and honor. The call is imperative and we trust it will be satisfied. The story is given by the officer to whose camp she was carried after three months of concealment and friendly protection.

"I was on the picket on the 31st of July, and had come back from my first patrol when, on reaching one of my videttes, he told me that he had just passed a European woman with two children escorted by some natives into my picket. I cantered on and overlook a country cart escorted by some villagers, one of whom carried a poor little boy about four years old on his shoulder. In the cart I found a nice young looking woman with a little infant. The poor creature seemed overjoyed to see a European face, and, in answer to my queries, told me that she was the wife of a Mr. Nun, son of the riding master of the first cavalry. Her husband was employed in the Customs Department, at a place near Guzgaon. When the outbreak at Delhi took place he was in the district with Ford, of the Civil Service. Guzgaon went with other stations, and this unhappy woman was left by herself, without a European near her. The instant the people of the village nearest her house heard that parties of Sepoys were coming in their direction, they carried off Mrs. Nun, with her children, and concealed them in their village. Parties of horsemen arrived and enquired for her, and on being told that she had gone off plundered and burnt her house. To make a long story short, these poor fellows at the risk of their lives, kept this unhappy family for three months, feeding and clothing them, and hurrying them off to other villages whenever they heard of the approach of any parties of the mutineers. I must tell you that the insurgents offered 100 rupees reward for Mrs. Nun, dead or alive, but nothing would tempt these simple ryots to betray their trust; and, finally, having seized an opportunity, they brought them safely into camp. The poor woman spoke

most gratefully of their kindness and devotion, and the little boy seemed to have the greatest affection for the grey-headed old man, on whose shoulder he was perched."—*Times, 2nd Oct.* 1857.

The friends of Mr. William Edwards of the Bengal Civil Service, whose name was returned in the list of casualties, in contradicting the statement, thus notice his escape :—

"The list of Casualties in your paper of this evening, copied from the Homeward Mail, contains the name William Edwards, Bengal Civil Service. The family of that gentleman have received letters by this mail of the 9th and 11th of August, informing them of his safety, along with Mr. Probyn, of the Civil Service, and his family under the protection of a friendly zemindar, by whom they were kindly treated, when the strictest concealment was requisite."—*Times, 2nd October*, 1857.

A Bengal Civilian, in reporting to the *Times*, the condition of the Behar Division of the Bengal Presidency, has the following about Chupra and Cheybassa :—

"There has been no outrage and no plunder there because of the spirit and loyalty of a Mahomedan resident, well known in those parts, and (hitherto) always doubted—a certain Cazy Ramzan Allee. He assumed the command on the departure of the Europeans, kept every thing quiet and loyal, and has since delivered over his charge, prisoners and all, in perfect order to the returned Civilians. He and others similiarly behaved well, you may be sure, be handsomely rewarded."—*Times.*

The details of the services of this loyal Mohomedan are given in the correspondence which passed between him and the Government of Bengal, extracts from which will be found farther on. This man, in the midst of his unswerving fidelity was calumniated anonymously in the public papers, but his sense of duty was so strong that he, regardless of the calumnies, went on in his useful career which has justly entitled him to the gratitude of the Government.

Among the many valuable communications on the Indian Mutinies which the *Times* has published, there are few which display such an acuteness and accuracy of observation, such marvellous correctness of fact, such faithful details of the history of the revolt, and so dispassionate and thoughtful an analysis of the causes of the rebellion—as the letter written by a military Officer from Umballa. In treating its readers with this masterly production, the *Times* prefaces that it is written by a "gentleman whose acquirements, experience and position admirably qualify him for the work of observation and review. Our readers, we are sure, (continues the leading journal,) will be deeply interested in the perusal of so lucid and comprehensive a memoir." Indeed an Indian Journalist, occupying no mean position in the roll of journalistic fame, once suggested that if the Government contemplated to give the world a history of the revolt, it should forthwith entertain the services of the gentleman whose eminent abilities displayed in that letter deservedly point him out for the work. We therefore need make no apology for the following from which the reader will perceive the exact nature of the rebellion and the position of the people in reference thereto :—

"In the evening of the day of the Delhi outbreak, the survivors in cantonments finding themselves gradually deserted by their men and without aid from Meerut, determined to fly. They had a number of carriages of different kinds, most of them took the road to Kurnaul, some few that to Meerut, and they generally escaped in safety. Other stragglers from various quarters had more difficult and perilous escapes, wandering fugitives from village, some were thus wandering for several weeks before they reached European relatives, and they endured most cruel hardships of want and weather. But generally the behaviour of the villagers was kind ; many sheltered and assisted—none actually attacked them. The Brahmin villagers in particular—there are a good many agricultural Brahmin villages scattered about that part of the country,

showed them the greatest kindness, and gave them active protection."—*Times, 26th October*, 1857.

The following is an extract from a letter from George Palmer, Esq., of the Bengal Civil Service :—

"I am living now in the house of the chief merchant of this town. It is lonely enough to have no English face to look at, or talk to, especially in these times, but still I am very thankful that I am as well in health as I am, notwithstanding hard work, exposure and sun. I am very fortunate, too, in having my old Punjaub servant and his brother with me. Though at a distance from their own houses, and though Mossulmans, and though subjected to every kind of temptation, they have served me most faithfully, and I trust them as my own kith and kin. If any thing should happen to me in these days, pray do not forget to do something for them. The eldest (my Zemindar) name is Syad Ameer, son of Sheik Rookeen-od-deene, of Kalmore, in the district of Gordaspore."—*Times, 9th November*, 1857.

Here is an interesting account of the good feeling and readiness of villagers to assist European fugitives :—

"We are still in a state of uncertainty and anxiety, but our hopes have lately been much removed by the discovery of one of the officers of his regiment (the 18th) Lieutenant Gowan, the Adjutant, who was one of the missing, a servant of his having found him concealed in some village. He sent a letter by him to Colonel ——, at Nynee Tal, giving an account of his escape, and how he got separated from the rest of the party after the few well-disposed Sepoys had saved them on the day of the outbreak. He had gone through a great deal, but expresses himself very thankful for the protection and kindness he had received from some Hindus, by whom he was still secreted. He had heard that several Europeans were in concealment in different villages, which native spies and others who are friendly to the English also confirm and say that a Banker at Bareily has secretly supplied them with money."—*Ibid.*

This party of nearly thirty persons, consisting of men, women and children, were protected, fed, and sheltered by

a Rajah at Gopalpore. The character of the service may well be imagined when we mention that he not only gave this protection, but with his men escorted the party to a place of security amidst brother Europeans :—

"We are now with a friendly Rajah at Gopalpore on the river, twenty-five miles from Goruckpore; he has promised to send us to Dinapore, which is distant 120 miles. I believe we are now quite safe, though we have been in danger, and suffered much discomfort and misery. Our party consists of Captain and Mrs. Reid, and 2 children; Captain and Messrs. Orr and sister, and 5 children; and Messrs. Thurburn and 1 child; Captain and Mrs. Dawson and 4 children; Mr. and Messrs. Bradford; Mr. and Mrs. Fitzgerald and child, and Mr. and Mrs. Hurst and child."—*Ibid.*

A letter from Captain Orr, dated Gopalpore, near Gograh, June 24th, mentions

"That he and his family, with Miss Troup and the rest of his party who escaped from Fyzabad, had reached Gopalpore in safety, and expected to be at Dinapore on the 29th. They were to proceed under the protection of the Rajah of Gopalpore, who has shown himself faithful to the British Government.

* * * * *

Mrs. Black, Mrs. Goldney, and Mrs. Strahan were brought into Allahabad, by that noble fellow Ajeet Singh, who saw Lieutenant Grant and the party of 37 Europeans, who accompanied him from his camp near Fyzabad."—*Ibid.*

A writer describing the mutiny of the 17th Native Infantry at Azimghur, thus gives the story of the escape of the party of Europeans who were then at that station. :—

"We were at breakfast, when we were surrounded by about 400 men, armed and unarmed, and with great difficulty we escaped with our lives, and for 14 long and weary days, were living in a Cow-shade, protected by the Zemindars of a large Hindu village; the people behaved to us with the utmost kindness, and gave us flour, dâl, meat, &c. to exist upon."—*Englishman, 2nd July,* 1857.

A Correspondent says:—

"I don't know whether it will be news to you, that the undermentioned officers, ladies, &c., arrived at Dinapore on the 29th June, from Fyzabad.

Captain Dawson and wife,
" Reid and wife,
" Orr and wife,
" Thurburn and wife,

with (15) fifteen children, some serjeants and their wives, they were nearly naked, starving and suffering from Opthalmia. They had been for some days under the protection of Rajah Maun Singh, who had treated them well."—*Englishman, 6th July,* 1857.

Of the services of Maun Sing, which were neither few nor small, we have spoken in detail in another place. We would here simply remark that these did not extend to the protection and sheltering of European fugitives only, an assumption of which has led some opponents of the Rajah to construe his position into a doubtful neutrality; his conduct is throughout marked by a complete isolation from the rebels and this, above all, shows that he cherished no sympathies for the cause of the insurgents.

The following is from a Correspondent in the Sagour and Nerbuddah Territories, dated the 25th June:—

"I have just heard from a person who has arrived from Benares, that whilst en route from Rewah to Myheeree, he saw a party of some twenty-five ladies and gentlemen, in a variety of costumes, from the elegant and simple night dress, to the ordinary shooting jacket. On enquiry, I learnt that the flying Brigade was from the direction of Nowgong and Banda. They had evidently to cut and run for it, judging from their appearance; I understand that had it not been for the kind assistance of the Rewah Rajah, they would have been in a fix. The Rajah, I believe, has placed a large party of horse under Lieutenant Osborne, a cousin, I am informed, of Lieutenant Willoughby, the officer who so gallantly blew up the Delhi Arsenal."—*Englishman, 6th July,* 1857.

The writer of the following was one of the fugitives from Fyzabad. From his statement it appears that he and his party were entirely indebted for their lives to the kind exertions of Rajah Kessenkissore Chand of Gopalpore and his people :—

"After this we went on land, and having met a fisherman, we found out that there was a well disposed native Rajah (Rajah Kessenkissore Chand of Gopalpore) not far off; that he had there some Europeans under his protection. We made for this man's place, and next day he gave us 25 men, and we and the other Europeans started for Dinapore. These Europeans had been attacked two days before by another Rajah, but were defended by Kessenkissore, and they told us that if we had landed two days before, we should certainly have been murdered by the other Rajah's people."—*Englishman, 6th July*, 1857.

A letter from Gorruckpore, 20th ultimo, says :—

"Colonel Lennox and family are safe; they have just left this, and many officers and ladies, with some of the non-Commissioned Officers, have proceeded in safety towards Dinapore, escorted by Maun Singh's own men. The country seems to be quiet. The Rajahs, almost all, are flocking in, with large bodies of men, to support Government, and we are daily expecting Nepaul troops to pass through; a few may remain to restore order."—*Englishman, 7th July*, 1857.

The following is from Ghazeepore, dated 7th July :—

"Colonel and Mrs. Lennox have been here some days, I believe they are from Fyzabad. Mr. and Mrs. Bradford from the same station came in yesterday, having gone through many hardships, and had narrow escapes, he is indebted to his tussildar for having saved him and Mrs. B."—*Englishman, 7th July*, 1857.

Again,

"Report says the Rajah of Lalpoorah has sent five hundred men to protect the station, 50 men from the 65th left this some days ago for Azimghur."—*Englishman, 7th July*, 1857.

The Bengal Army is gone, but its memory is associated with not a few names of proved loyalty and attachment which stand in bold and agreeable relief to the heartless conduct of the misguided majority. Instances not few in number are recorded of Sepoys who, deaf to the persuasions and entreaties of their brethren and true to the calls of duty and gratitude, became the most active agents in the salvation of many officers. These heroes distinguished alike by moral courage and physical bravery will each and all, we trust, receive the full meed of approbation from the future chronicler of the revolt and from the distant posterity. And a grateful government which has already rewarded the services of some of the faithful, will not forget the numerous others who, though they have not so prominently distinguished themselves, are yet entitled to every consideration which an unflinching conduct, through so dreadful an ordeal as the Indian insurrection presented, richly deserves. Mr. Russell, the *Times's* Correspondent, in one of his celebrated letters from the Seat of War, very properly remarks that the British Government has been "waging war against Hindoos and Mussulmans by the aid and with the consent of Hindoos and Mussulmans, just as Alexander was able to beat Porus by the aid of his Indian allies, and no European or other State can rule in India without the co-operation and assistance of a large proportion, of the races which inhabit the vast peninsula" Though the aid and fidelity of wealthy and influencial zemindars, allied Princes and of the people in and near the disturbed districts, and the quiet demeanour of the mass of the population, anxiously awaiting for the end of the struggle, which vexatiously interfered with the smooth career of their peaceful lives, have materially helped our rulers in overcoming this crisis, still the unswerving fidelity of particular men of every regiment was of no ordinary service. Coupled with the fact that though by blood and position these faithful men are

kinsmen and companions of those who raised the standard of revolt, yet they have remained true to their salt, their allegiance has been made doubly sure by acts which no hypocricy would condescend to, and which no motives short of sense of duty and gratitude could lead to. They have been also especially valuable as they have served reliable guides in many instances from the circumstance of their having attended the councils of mutiny, and having conversed with the feelings and motives of their unfortunate brethren, without of course participating in their plots. The following is a prominent instance of services of the kind under comment :—

"That there are some good and loyal men in every Regiment, I will admit, and the following little incident that has just occurred, will prove, I think, that the 73rd has one man at least true to his salt. Lieutenant Dandridge, who is the adjutant of the Regiment, sent up one of the Sepoys, an old Brahmin, in charge of his wife and property. This man was invited by some of the Hindu Native officers, attached to our Sebundees, to dine with them ; which invitation was accepted, and the Brahmin of the 73rd, dined with them. In the course of the after-dinner conversation, some seditious talk was entered upon as I have heard to the following effect:— That these native officers wished some others would join them in exterminating the Europeans, that they were but few themselves, and that the men of their corps would never join them, would rather assist the Europeans than otherwise. After this dinner was over, the Brahmin of the 73rd went straight off to the adjutant of the Depôt and reported the matter fully, and, yesterday these fellows were seized, a Court of Enquiry was immediately held, the result of which I have not yet learned, further than they are all there kept close prisoners in three different places, two of them under an European guard, and the third in the guard of his own lines. The old Brahmin should be rewarded."—*Englishman, 7th July.*

Numerous instances have transpired of such good men and true assisting their European Officers under difficulties before which ordinary humanity would most probably sink.

Some of these the reader will meet with as he will proceed. *En passant* we may mention here that when the mutiny at Fyzabad occurred, Captain Lennox and others were enabled through the fidelity of two friendly Sepoys, to effect their escape to the seat of a kind chieftain after a series of adventures the most serious and thrilling.

A letter from Mozufferpore, Tirhoot, dated 4th July, says:—

"The only officers who have bestirred themselves to any purpose, are the Magistrate and his assistant, the latter gentleman being particularly energetic and public spirited. Nor I must omit to mention the praiseworthy conduct of our second Principal Sudder Ameen who, at a great expense, entertained as guests, for several days, a large number of Planters assembled here for the protection of the Station, while those who had invited them for that purpose, held themselves aloof, and exhibited their usual amount of illiberal pride, obtuseness of judgment and narrow-minded parsimony."—*Englishman*, 10*th July*, 1857.

We extract with pleasure the following two paragraphs from the *Englishman*: they betoken a zeal for service to the British Government only surpassed by the effects achieved:—

"The Rajah of Keroula has issued a proclamation, warning his subjects, under penalty of death, not to join or assist the rebels, but to fight with fidelity under European Officers, whenever they may be called upon to do so."—*Englishman, the* 15*th July*, 1857.

The reader will not overlook the importance of the service noted below, because the intelligence is conveyed in two brief lines. :—

"The Maharajah of Rewah* has supplied Lieutenant W. Osborne with a detachment for the protection of Mirzapore."—*Ibid.*

* The position of the Rajah was peculiarly critical from almost the commencement of the mutiny, but with a courage, resolution, and judgment not common among Oriental princes, nursed on the lap of luxury, he passed through the crisis with honor to himself and advantage to the British Government.—*Compiler.*

The following is from Secunderabad, dated 5th July :—

"Shumshaool Oomrah is, I believe, his (the Nizam's) chief adviser, and a right good one ; he is well affected towards us, he will take good care in company with Salaar Jung that the Nizam is not tainted with any evil counsels. The minister most certainly deserves some substantial mark of regard from the British Government, for to him only we are indebted for the hitherto quiet keeping of the city. Wherever disorder has been inclined to raise its head, the Arabs have been slipped, and the instigators apprehended and punished. It is premature in these days of doubt and uncertainty to commit oneself to say too much, but unless any thing very unlooked for occurs. I think we may felicitate ourselves in having passed the crisis."—*Englishman, 17th July*, 1857.

We entirely concur with the writer of the above in the praise he accords to the English-educated Minister of the Nizam. We have dwelt at length in another place on the distinguished talents, unflinching courage and sterling statesmanship which he has displayed throughout the crisis in Hydrabad.

A letter from Meerut, dated the 20th June, says :

"All the Sirsa Europeans, with the poor Captain Hillard, and another officer who placed blind confidence in the savage natives, were obliged to flee from that place on the 30th of last month, and reached Putteeallah on the 12th instant. They were kindly treated by the Moharajah, who immediately on their arrival, procured clean clothes for them all, they having had the one suit of clothes on from the day of their escape to that on which they arrived at Putteeallah.

Were it not for the noble way in which the Maharajah acted, they would never have been able to have made their escape from the Sirsa district. From Putteeallah two of the party made a run into Umballah, to consult the Commissioner of that place on certain matters, and returned to Putteeallah again, from which place they were preparing to start, accompanied by their companions in danger,

and the Maharajah's Forces for Sirsa."—*Mofussilite,* quoted by the *Englishman.*

To this excellent ally of the British Government the success before Delhi throughout the memorable siege, which the *Times* characterizes as having broken the neck of the revolt, is in no small measure indebted. We have reviewed his services more fully in a separate place.

The following is a curious piece of romance not rare in the events of this memorable insurrection :—

"The Juldah Rajah, who was imprisoned at Hazareebaugh for 14 years, was liberated by the Sepoys; he made his way home, collected some 800 men and stopped the Sepoys, who were making off with the Poorooliah treasure 108,000 Rupees. It is not known if the Sepoys made a fight for it, but it is asserted the Rajah holds the money for the Government."—*Englishman, 11th August,* 1857.

The following is from Govindpore, dated the 23rd August :—

"On the 20th Instant a detachment of Seikhs, with an officer, halted at the Govindpore encamping ground. They are, I am told by the officer in command, going to Gyah, and will remain there until further orders. The Zemindar of Punchkote is, in this critical period, helping the Government, and has sent about 70 Sowars and some Sepoys to put down the disturbances at Manbhoom, where depredation is the order of the day.

* * * * * * * * *

The Rajah of Serakelah has saved the treasure of Singbhoom by his own men and has applied to the Bengal Government for 2,000 Rupees to raise and equip a Regiment to preserve peace on the Southwest Frontier.—*Englishman, 26th August,* 1857.

A correspondent in the vicinity of Patna, says among other things :—

"That Shah Kobuooddeen has proposed to place a body of cavalry at the service of Government."—*Englishman, 29th August,* 1857.

The following is anent the aid which the troops present at the Barrielly skirmish received from the neighbouring villagers :—

"We then went on till about 10 P. M., when half was called, some charpoys were got from a neighbouring village, as well as some food and water for the horses, we loosened their girths, which must have been a great relief to them, and having got men to hold our horses, we laid down to rest, with the intention of taking a nap for two or three hours but we had not been there an hour when it was determined to go on, so we mounted again."—*Ibid.*

If military revolutions are ever famed for levelling all distinctions of rank and fortune and forestalling all the sufferings of indigence and helplessness, the Sepoy outbreak has formed no exception to the universal rule. If it has occasioned a loss of life and blood unequalled in the annals of British India, it has entailed a loss of property equally unprecedented. In an uncontrolled play of the impulses of a Pretorian body like the Bengal Army, the marauding and predatory habits of the Goojur and other tribes of professional plunderers were naturally called into action, and the results, as was expected, have been quite distracting. It was then that the collected scoundrelism of the jails, the feelings of which had been long pent up under an effective Prison discipline, found a licensed vent to spread destruction over the country. It converted the crusade of the Sepoys against Europeans and Christians into a crusade against the wealth and property of the land holders. Thus every man, whether European or Native, under any circumstances calculated to awaken suspicion, was a prey to its rapacity. Hence during the most gloomy period of the crisis streams of fugitives, shorn of the last farthing and destitute of every earthly possession poured forth into this City, to awaken the sympathy of the people. Fellow-feeling and benevolence, without any loss of time,

led the citizens to band together and to raise voluntary contributions among themselves for the support and relief of the sufferers. And the Natives with their wonted liberality joined the movement. Persons in all ranks and stations of life have equally, each according to his own means contributed in aid of the Relief Fund. An organized Committée has been formed to employ the fund to its legitimate purposes, and it numbers four Native Gentlemen among its members. In distributing the aid of the fund the European portion of the Committee has limited it to Christian sufferers only, but the Native Members have, notwithstanding this invidious and unjust distinction, lent their active and cordial co-operation to the working out of this benevolent scheme. Princely contributions have been received from many Indian Princes and Chieftains, and altogether the amount of indegenous Indian aid forms a quite respectable sum and not unworthy of the fame of Hindoostan. In some instances too the princely donations of Indian Potentates have been respectfully refused, and a moderate sum at the suggestion of British Residents has been accepted. The following is a case in point :—

"We learn from the Madras papers, that the Rajah of Travancore has offered the sum of thirty thousand rupees to the fund for the relief of the sufferers by the Mutinies. The resident accepted only 5,000 five thousand."—*Englishman, 5th Sept.*, 1857.

The services of this Rajah were considerable and they will be found fully described in our extracts from the Parliamentary papers on the Indian Mutinies.

"A letter from Singhbhoom, dated 2nd instant, mentions that the Rajah of Serakelah kept all quiet and peaceable in that quarter. All workmen had returned to their labor, and it was evident that the natives were now beginning to think that the British would still reign supreme in India as heretofore."—*Englishman, 11th Sept.*, 1857.

A party from Cawnpore was thus protected and taken care of by a neighbouring Rajah :—

"When he had gone about 6 miles, firing on both sides ceased, and soon after we were hailed by some natives on the outside, who asked us to come on shore, and said that they would take us to their Rajah who was friendly to the English. We gave ourselves up and were taken six miles in land to the Rajah who treated us very kindly, giving us clothes and food. We stayed with him for about a month as he would not let us leave, saying that the roads are unsafe. At last he sent us off on the 29th July to the right bank of the river to a zemindar of a village who got us a hackery." —*Ibid.*

The following is taken from an account of the mutiny at Kolapore :—

"Government and the European Society of Kolapore have much reason to thank the Sowars of the Southern Marhatta Irregular horse for their bravery, gallantry and fidelity. One of the native officers of the horse has been promoted to the highest grade of Commissioned Officer, and a trooper to the highest rank of non-commissioned. Captain Kerr has been thanked by the Kolapore authorities, and we trust that Government will not forget the deep debt they owe him. It is satisfactory to know that the Rajah of Kolapore lent Colonel Maugham three guns to try and breach the walls of the enemies' position. They were two hundred years old, and the shot only a third of the calibre, hence useless. 200 rounds were fired, but all to no purpose. The Rajah and all the country are loyal."—*Bombay Telegraph and Courier*, quoted by the *Englishman*.

A letter dated Fort Agra, the 4th of September, says :—

"We have secured the co-operation of a loyal zemindar, who is at the head of a force of well disposed natives, including 2,000 horse, and the writer adds that we may now safely calculate the chances of success of the rebels in this quarter to be very small."—*Englishman*, 19*th September*, 1858.

The following is a marked instance of the promptness and

alacrity with which Natives in all parts of the country have come forward to assist Government with men and money at this unparalleled crisis, both political and financial :

"Small notes from one Rupee to five, have been issued by the Superintendent, we however have been more fortunate ; no such expedient was found necessary here, for Lord William Hay has filled the treasury of Simla from the purses of the Ranahs and Rajahs of the Hills, also from those of the Bunneahs and Mohajuns of the Bazar. These have all been called upon to lend their superfluous cash to Government on interest. This demand of course is not compulsory, still those who respond to the call willingly and liberally, will thus prove their friendship to Government and may expect favor in times to come. The Bunneahs of the Nalaghur Bazar, have contributed 8,000 Rupees. The Ranah of Bulson, the senior chieftain (the head of five generations now living) took the lead in forwarding the assistance. The Rajah of Sirmoor and Kilmoor, almost all of the minor chiftains, have likewise added to our public purse, as was the case during the Cabul campaign."—*Englishman, 25th September*, 1857.

We extract the following passages from the painfully interesting narrative of Lieutenant Jackson, 12th Regiment Native Infantry, regarding the escape of a Nowgong party after leaving Churrutpore :

"On leaving Mahobah, as abovementioned, it had been our intention to have halted at a village named Muddunpore (Chutterpore) but owing to the badness of the roads, and our being greatly incommoded with some ten or twelve carts (mostly containing the families of the Drummers, &c. We only found ourselves at sun-rise, on the morning of the 18th, at the village of Joorah (Mahola), where we halted for the day. Shortly after our arrival, we were joined by Mr. Corn, Collector at Mahobah, who brought with him one thousand Rupees, which had been lent us by the Rajah of Chircurrah, and with money the native officers and men with us were paid up in full for the month of May, 1857, in the course of the day.

"That night, the 20th, just at sunset, we arrived at a village on the road from Allahabad to Banda, which turned out to be the only one which we had seen, which had not turned out against us directly we were seen. We were treated with great kindness and on the morning of the 21st, again set off, having two guides to show us the way to Kallinuggur, where we had been advised to go to and thence to Nagode.

"A little before sunset we most fortunately arrived amongst some other villagers, eight in number, who had determined to stick by each other, and remain faithful to the Government. Had we not thus providentially fallen amongst friends at this moment, we could not have held out much longer as my horse was scarcely able to get along, as we must have come that day, I should say, forty-five miles, and a great deal of the distance at a hard gallop. We were treated most hospitably; the next day, the 22nd, removed to a stronger and a larger village from whence I despatched a letter to the Ranee of Ajeegurh, requesting protection, which was immediately granted, and we arrived at that place a distance of about 10 or 12 miles on the 23rd, being guarded on our way by matchlock-men provided from the village we had been stopping at. At Ajeegura we remained till the morning of the 28th June, as Mr. Kurschoff was unable to stand from fatigue, and both ourselves and horses required rest. On the 28th, we started for Nagode, the Ranee of Ajegurh having lent us elephants, and arrived there on the 29th June, 1857."—*Englishman, 28th September*, 1857.

The following passages are taken from an account of the experiences of the second party that fled from Nowgong, and which separated from the main body on their taking the Banda road, by G. Langdale, late clerk to Captain P. G. Scott, 12th N. I. Station Staff and in charge of Military treasure chest, Nowgong:—

"I had scarcely become resigned to my fate, when a man came to me as a Rajah's messenger, with an invitation to go to him. I was completely unprepared for such good fortune, and availed myself

of it most hopefully. The Rajah of Loogasie treated me very kindly, he asked numerous questions about the mutiny at Nowgong, and seemed very solicitous for the safety of the officers. He enquired if any of them had been killed, but I had to state my inability to satisfy any of his enquiries respecting the mutiny, through the circumstances under which I had been obliged to escape. He ordered me some food and directed his servant to have me accommodated for the night in a house in the village, particularly desiring no one to be allowed to molest me. He sent for me next morning to say that he was about to write to Major Kirke at Chutturpore and intended sending a spy to Nowgong, to see if the mutineers had deserted the place.

"On the night of the third day, we left Mohubba to go to Killengur. Our first march was to the village of Jorai. Here we met Mr Karne, the Assistant Magistrate of Hameerpore, who brought us 1,000 rupees, which had been lent by the Rajah of Chirkanee.

"The report about the villagers of Kubrai intending to assault us was evidently intended to drive us away, but I cannot explain by whom it was raised, probably the Sepoys tired of their work, prompted it. At all events I was told they advised the officers to leave.

"Some device must have been at the bottom, for the report turned out quiet false. We remained at that village for twelve or thirteen days, being supplied with food by the natives, but as the supply was very scanty, we used to get diet prepared for ourselves by the Bhuttoriwa, or man in charge at the Serai where we put up.

"After being turned out of Rubrai we bent our course in the direction of Mitown, on the way to Banda, we reached that village at six in the evening and were treated by the villagers with exceeding compassion, they met us on entering the village, led us into it, asking the usual questions and provided food and charpoys (Native beds). We asked the zemindar to allow us to remain four or five days, they hospitably answered, "stay as long as you like." The zemindars extended their kindness even to making us up a suit of clothes each, and presenting blankets to every one of us; the very Bunneas (grain dealers) who are proverbially a hard-hearted race, supplied us with grain and flour by turns, some of

the people gave tobacco gratuitously also, our small party being quite unanimous about the unadvisability of proceeding to Banda, owing to the accounts we heard of the murder of Europeans there, I wrote to Major Ellis, Political Assistant of Bundlecund, soliciting assistance to enable us to reach Nagode. The zemindars gave a messenger one rupee to convey this letter, and he returned in ten days, with a note for me from Captain Scott, and a native letter to the zemindars from Mr. Ellis, promising them a future reward for their care of us. We left Motown after a stay of nearly a month, on the 12th August, with a guard of fifty men for our protection to Nagode. Reaching Gowrecher, a distance of fifteen miles, we were pressed to pass some time there by Rajah Dhur, the Jagadar of that place. His invitation was so cordial, that we could not doubt his good-will by a refusal, and his subsequent liberality induced us to stay there for seventeen days, during which he sent to Banda for tailors to make us some clothes, and cloth to make them of; he also sent for plates, tumblers, basins, &c. for our use. The man despatched was unsuccessful, through a quarrel that had arisen between the Nawab of Banda and Dawa Saheb, the Kamdar of the Ranee of Ajeeghur, a neighbouring territory.

"The only thing the servant brought from Banda was shoes, which were too large for us and had to be returned. The Rajah munificently instructed his people to provide us with every thing we desired, irrespective of any reference to him. We left him with many expressions of our gratitude on the 28th August, 1857. He provided the females in our Company with his palkees, and mounted us on an elephant."—*Englishman, the 2nd October*, 1857.

From a letter received from Chuprah we have the following intelligence, dated 30th September. It will be seen that though the Rajahs were, as the Correspondent writes, unequal to Mahomed Hossein in strength, they were not wanting in zeal or devotion. We must look more to intentions than to effects, and it is sufficient for our purpose that good feelingfor the British Government predominated among the greater and best part of the population, and that that feeling was not unfrequently put to active demonstration, though

under considerable difficulties and sometimes to positive disadvantage :—

"To day I believe the Nogowlee Rajah marches to join his forces with the Gopalpore Rajah, when, with about 10,000 men, they go to attack Mahomed Hussien in Gorruckpore; but with their undisciplined troops I fear they will not have much chance against the Oude people, especially if they have any irregular Cavalry with them, which reports of spies say, some 40 or 50,000; and if these Rajahs get licked, they will be worse off than before, as Mahomed Hussien will then send out troops to attack their houses and we shall have the rebels close enough to us. The Tumkoi Rajah had a visit from the Puddrora Tossildar. He was ready with the Baboos to attack him, but as he had only 40 peons with him and was civil, they let him alone. Young Nicholson writes, that the Bansee Rajah had been severely reprimanded by Mahomed Hussien for having assisted the Saheb logues to get away, and a hurkura of the Bansee Rajah came to Nicholson, and told him the Rajah had written to him of his danger, that he had better leave the district for a while, but that this letter had been intercepted by Mahomed Hussien; this Mahomed Hussien also wrote to the Tumkoi man to know why he allowed a Saheb to remain in his Elaka? The Rajah replied the Saheb was doing no harm and was merely a ghrihust, collecting in his crops, altogether the Tumkoi man has taken every care of Nicholson and Bubnowlee."—*Englishman, 6th October*, 1857.

A writer from Jubbulpore, says :—

"I forget now if I told you in my last that Dumah had been made to the care of the Punnah Rajah, who is faithful to our Government and has ample resources for proving a most worthy ally."—*Ibid.*

The following is from the narrative of the escape of an officer, dated Erinpoorah, 29th August :—

"A few Sepoys also covered me with their pieces, I called out, what, are you all against me? Then some troopers rose up, and

got round my horse, and I took refuge in the Wurdu Major's house, and immediately sent off the two serjeants, who with their wives and five children, were foolishly attempting an escape on foot. Three Resildars, about forty troopers, now swore to protect or fall with me and I could have at this moment ridden off, but could not leave the wretched women and children, about whom no one seemed to care.

On the third day as I have said they marched, the cavalry riding round me, I had the satisfaction of seeing the women, Serjeants and children safely in the hands of a vakeel of the Rajah.

From Abboo the people have been most kind, sending me clothes, tobacco, and so on.

The name of the Resildar who saved me, is Abbas Ali, and I hope he may escape. I have written to the General Commanding and Political Agent in Marwarra, to try and save this brave man, he is in danger, and is almost a prisoner, but having a strong party in the cavalry, they can't do him any harm, without injuring their own cause."—*Ibid.*

The following is an extract from a letter from Rewah, dated 27th September :—

"As I wrote you, an incipient rebellion took place when the force was moving to attack the first lot of mutineers. An express was sent to the Rajah to come, telling him that by his following our Agent's advice, it might be nipped in the bud. The officers were withdrawn from the force, that they might not be mixed up with internal dissensions, unless their services were applied for by the Rajah. Out came the Rajah and notwithstanding great opposition from his bad advisers, and we soon had things square. The Rajah then went to Jahajee, re-collected the force, inspected it, saw it march down the ghauts and then returned to Rewah."—*Englishman, 14th September*, 1857.

The following is from Bubnoulee, 50 miles west of Gorruckpore, dated 7th October :—

"The Rajahs of Gopalpore, Sudasee, Bunsee, Mujhoulee, and Tumkhoome constitute a Punchait. They are ready and willing to drive out the Chuckledar, but require British bayonets to lead the way, and inspire confidence.

I am, you will observe, nigh the scene of action, being only 50 miles west of Gorruckpore, but as yet I have not quitted my post for a day, and have been enabled to keep my own, owing, in no small degree, to the good feeling existing between the factory zemindars and the staunch and loyal behaviour of Kunj Bahadur, the Rajah of Sumphoo, who deserves every praise for the measures he has hitherto taken, to preserve order in his Elaka."—*Englishman, 15th October*, 1857.

The following is from a narrative of an escape from Delhi :—

"About midnight the Rajah of Bullubghur came down and told us 50 sowars were after us, and advised us to change our clothes with our servants and get on to his fort as soon as we could, and he would try to protect us, whilst he went down and made all quiet. He sent a sowar out to meet us near the fort, and after waiting some time he returned, and we galloped into the fort, and were concealed; immediately after, down came some 50 sowars at a hard gallop, who were told we had gone on; they then dashed on, and we after a nap were sent on to a village, about six miles, in bullock carts used by women escorted by the Rajah's brother-in-law, where we remained five days in a small room at the top of the house, with only one small window and door. We started at night on camels, sent by the Rajah of Bullubghur under charge of a faithful man. We went down by the side of the Muttra road, passing around all the villages, until we came to the village of Euran, when our Camel-driver drove to the front and took us into the village, which we founded blockaded by a cart and were obliged to turn back; four got out safe, but he with Mr. Ben, remained behind.

I got up and staggered off, very weak from loss of blood; I this time took another road and came on a party of armed men who conversed together, when they made signs for me to be off, and

one offered to take me to a well to get water and was very kind in trying to pick a clear path for my shoeless feet and help me along.

Two villagers then came up and told me that two Sahib logues were gone to the next village, they gave me some water at a threshing station and showed me into the village when I found Messrs. Spencer and Cummings unhurt; the former kindly watched my wounds. They had offered the head man 500 rupees each to take them to Agra. After a long parley he refused to take them, but took their guns and 300 Rupees. We then received a note from Mr. Michell to follow the messenger and join him at a friendly village, two miles off, where he remained till evening, when our guide said it would be better to go on six miles farther to a large village able to protect us, and they did for eight or nine days, though threatened by Marattahs with an attack.

P. S.—Michell obtained from the Rajah of Bullubghur all the horses except one and the loan of two hundred rupees, before we left Hadul, which was a great assistance."—*Mofussilite, September 19th*, 1857, quoted by the *Englishman.*

It is impossible to over-estimate this service, but this Rajah being suspected of subsequent misconduct, was most brutally hanged. The State trials consequent to the Indian mutiny have few parallels in history for vindictiveness and hasty judgment. An European Correspondent of the *Englishman,* compares the Punjab officials to the Dantons and Robspierres of the memorable French Revolution, and says that the cruelties committed by them on pretence of the revolt, do not fall short of the horrors of the ignobly famous Black Hole of Serajooddowlah.* But whatever may be the character of the Punjab Officials, they do not surpass the North West Officials in this respect. The single instance of the Rajah of Bullubghur sufficiently distinguishes their disposition and doings. If others have the glory of recommending the policy of repression

* The details of the Punjab Black Hole will be given in a subsequent page.

and co-ercion, they cannot match the glory of those who stamped their peculiar genius upon its execution. Assurances have been repeatedly put forth that the protection of a single European would counter-balance all subsequent sins of omission and commission, but in the face of these assurances and in the presence of stubborn facts of aid and protection offered by the Rajah of Bullubghur, he was not deemed by the North West Officials worthy of pardon or of a punishment lighter than that of beheading. The future historian will not fail to see that his blood rests on the head of his judges. And we can scarcely conceive what posterity will think of the policy practised at such an emergency towards people who, whatever their subsequent conduct, will be known in history as saviours of Europeans. This serves to only embitter their affections, and deepen the difference of race.

The following is from Bhagulpore, dated 18th instant :—

" Lieutenant Rennie was saved by two Havildars, who brought him into Bhagulpore in a native marriage *dooly* which they hired, one man having forty rupees about his person. Poor Rennie was so overpowered from fatigue and hunger, that he could scarcely crawl, he had wonderful escapes, as the shots were flying in all directions.

" Mr. Gregor Grant was two days without food, on the third day he got to a village where they gave him some parched gram, *ookrah moree* and milk, he was very thankful for that. Shortly after he had been there, he heard that his kidmutghar was hiding in the village ; he sent for him, and they got a dooly, as poor G. was unable to walk, having a large bit of flesh taken off the sole of his foot, he had only his night clothes, no shoes, or socks, in fact what he had on was only left to him. He lost his fine horse and elephant, his clothes &c., were burnt, but all those things were nothing compared to his life being saved. He travelled in a covered dooly as his kidmutghar's wife, and came by a circuitous route ; at the villages they heard the head quarters

also mutinied, and killed some officers, so he says, he was in a dreadful state of mind, fearing he would be killed if caught, but he got into the station all safe, through the interposition of a kind Providence."—*Englishman, 23rd October*, 1857.

Here is an instance of right feeling for a right object:—

"The residents of Bhaugulpore have subscribed eight hundred Rupees to Havildars Daria Singh and Thakoor Dhobey of the 32d Native Infantry for saving the life of their Officer, Lieutenant Rannie, when the detachment of the Regiment at Deoghur broke out into mutiny."—*Englishman, 4th November*, 1857.

Extract from a letter from Mr. J. W. Sherer, dated Cawnpore, 3rd November, supplied by Government:—

"The Gwalior contingent, to the best of my information, have not advanced beyond Jaloun. The main body of the defeated (in the Futtehpore affair), passed through the Ghatunpore Purgunnah to-day, but through the firmness of Beharry Singh and others, to whom I have made over the Purgunnah, they were not permitted to commit outrages, and indeed whenever they straggled in small bodies, were themselves attacked."—*Englishman, 10th Nov.*, 1857.

The following is the petition of the Rajah of Wunurputty, volunteering his services and men in aid of the British Government for the Suppression of the Mutiny:—

"To THE RIGHT HONORABLE THE GOVERNOR GENERAL OF INDIA IN COUNCIL."

&c., &c., &c.,

MAY IT PLEASE YOUR LORDSHIP,

I the undersigned Rajah of Wunurputty, beg most respectfully to approach your Lordship with this humble address, earnestly hoping that it may meet with your favorable consideration.

With the deepest anxiety and horror have I heard and read of the barbarous and atrocious deeds of the mutineers of the Bengal Presi-

dency ; and their cold blooded and deliberate proceedings are of such a nature as to stamp them with infamy and brutality unknown in the histories of the most savage and uncivilized nations. Hence my sympathies towards the British have been roused, and my wrath against the rebels has been kindled; so that if the offer herein made is accepted, I am resolved to revenge the atrocities committed on the subjects of the Crown of England with an unsparing hand.

I beg to assure your Lordship in Council of my loyalty, affection and attachment to the British Government, to whose kind and paternal protection I owe my life, my liberty, my safety and my all, and it would be disloyal in me not to tender my services at this painful crisis to aid in quelling the disturbances and in destroying and dispelling the mutineers. On a former occasion I proposed to go to the Crimea with a force to join the allied armies against the Russians, but the proposal was declined by Lord Dalhousie, on the score that the force was ample, and that my services were then not required. Permit me to refer your Lordship in Council to the Governor General's letter No. 122, dated Ootacamund, 21st April, 1856.

With all due submission I take the liberty to intimate to your Lordship in Council, that I am resolved and prepared to start and join the English Army before Delhi, where the mutiny is concentrated, and to bring with me two complete Regiments of Infantry, one of Cavalry, and one Company of Artillery, which shall form a brigade under my command. I am well aware that my presence will unquestionably inspire the men with valour and confidence not easily to be shaken or intimidated. The body I intend raising, shall consist chiefly of Hindoos of my country, Seiks, Beloochees, &c. If your Lordship in Council should be pleased to acquiesce in the proposal now offered, I beg that the necessary instructions may be forthwith issued to the British Authorities, to afford me all the facilities I need towards the achievement of my design, and that preparations be made for the embarkation of my troops with the least practicable delay.

It may not be irrelevant here to inform your Lordship, that the

country of Wunurputty and its dependencies in the Hyderabad, Deccan, were held by ancestral and hereditary right and succession for nearly six centuries and that since the treaty between His Highness the Nizam's Government and that of the British, the country has been more firmly established and greater security has been extended to life, property and freedom throughout my country. It is a source of unbounded joy and gratification to learn that the friendship, alliance and good feeling existing between the English and H. H. the Nizam have been unshaken and undisturbed, and the series of years that has revolved, tends incontestably to prove that the object of the treaty has been realized, matured and confirmed. H. H. the present Nizam, H. E. Salar Jung Bahadur, the Dewan than whom the State has never had a more equitable and able Minister, and all the leading noblemen of Hyderabad Deccan, are well affected towards the British Rule in India, and are deeply interested in their welfare, success and prosperity. They view with disgust and abhorrence the conduct and proceedings of the rebels, and can in no manner justify them from whatever cause they may have originated. I can speak from experience, that when required, the Hyderabad Deccan, is ready to put forth its colossal power in action against the insurgents and to crush the very name of mutiny.

In concluding this address I beg to assure your Lordship in Council, that we Hindoos and all the British Subjects in the Hyderabad Deccan, are deeply indebted to Colonel Davidson, British Resident, for the security of our lives, property and persons, owing solely and chiefly to his unwearied exertions and to the timely and suitable preparations he has made to meet any outbreak or rising, and we repose the utmost confidence in his judgment and prudence, and in all the plans and measures he has been pleased to adopt at this dreadful and critical juncture.

With sentiments of respectful submission, &c., &c.

Englishman, 20th November, 1857.]

No. 4282.

From

G. F. EDMONSTONE, ESQUIRE,

Secretary to the Government of India,

To

HIS HIGHNESS W. RAMASWAR BULVENT BHYREE BAHADUR,

Rajah of Wunurputty,

Dated Fort William, 21st October, 1857.

SIR,

I have received and laid before the Right Honorable the Governor General in Council, your letter to the address of His Lordship, dated the 12th ultimo, praying to be allowed to render the British Government some Military aid in quelling the present insurrection in its dominions.

2. In reply I am directed to acquaint you that, His Lordship in Council feels assured that your Highness's troops would, if called into the field, do excellent service. But the retaking of Delhi, and the arrangements that have been made for punishing the mutineers in all directions, renders it unnecessary for the Government to accept the aid of your troops. The Governor General in Council desires me, however, to express to you the thanks of the Government for your offers, and its approbation of your feelings of loyalty, and attachment to it.

I have the honor to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient Servant,

(Sd.) G. F. EDMONSTONE,

Secretary to the Government of India.

Englishman, 15th Dec., 1857.]

In reading the above correspondence we feel a thrill of pleasure matched only by the importance of the subject. Here is a Native Prince, with an ancestry of six centuries antiquity, and master of a principality in the heart of Central India Proper, volunteering his services with an earnestness, the very expression of which was a source of comfort, not to say strength, to the British Government when many other Native Potentates were in a doubtful neutrality. We scarcely remember having read an Oriental composition breathing such enlightened feelings and sentiments as the volunteering letter of the Rajah Wunurputty. Government must have had good reasons for declining the offer. One of the reasons which Mr. Secretary Edmonstone assigns, is the circumstance of the recapture of Delhi, but the important reason which influenced the mind of the Governor General was perhaps the rumour of an uneasy feeling about the tranquility of Hydrabad. Be it what it may, the good and earnest feeling of the Rajah was decidedly a great thing. We believe that similar letters have also been addressed to Government by other princes with the same object. We may say that imperial Rome was not more lamented and sympathized with by her dependant princes at the hour of her decline and fall than has Great Britain been during the sepoy revolution. If the termination of this struggle had been different from what it is, we think the British nation would have had this pride that their fate like that of the glorious Romans was universally lamented by Asiatic princes and people alike.

The following is a brief account of the services rendered by the Rajah of Benares :—

"And it seems as unnecessary for me to give proofs of the Rajah's undoubted loyalty, for which he received a letter of thanks from the Governor General. What few troops and armed men

he has, have all along from the beginning of the disturbances, been at the service of the authorities; numbers of whom have been, and I believe still are employed at the Kotwallee, the thannahs and other places. He has done his best to prevent the mutineers from passing through his districts. His elephants, camels, horses, boats &c., have been at the entire disposal of Government, he has given supplies,—his two large houses, called the New Mint, have been occupied since May by British troops and others, for which he neither has received nor intends to receive any remuneration. And he has lately lent another large house, rent-free for Government purposes, formerly occupied by the late Major Stewart, Agent to the Governor General.

I think now, Sir, that you and your readers will agree with me, that, while others talk a great deal of loyalty, His Highness the Rajah of Benares has given proofs of it; and that all attempts to impugn his loyalty are futile and absurd.

P. S.—It may be well to add that in August the Rajah received a proclamation from Kower Singh, stating that the King of Delhi had arrived at Agra or Allahabad with a large army, and that the Rajah of Benares had joined him. The very next day after the receipt of this paper, the Rajah published another, entirely contradicting it, and calling upon all people to adhere to their allegiance to the English Government."—*Englishman, 25th November*, 1858.

Here is a noteworthy instance of fidelity, exhibited under the most trying circumstances:—

"A trooper, named Sunker Singh, who has been invalided and was a private servant of mine, came running to me from the cavalry lines and said that the Sepoys of the 29th Native Infantry had mutinied and were firing on their officers. On my telling him that it was my intention to gallop to the Fort, he begged that I would not do so, as I would be killed by some of the men who occupied the only road (in the station) to the Fort, but he said that he would again ride to the lines and see what was going on. This he did, and on his return told me that the Sepoys were murdering

the officers of their respective regiments, all of whom had been in the lines, until the moment of the mutiny. He remarked, as they were killing all the officers, I had better conceal myself somewhere and on my suggesting my garden, he accompanied me there, and I was followed by all the women and children belonging to the servants of my establishment, and joined by my native Doctor and his family and some servants belonging to officers whose premises adjoined mine. We remained in the Garden until the guns of Captain Hungerford battery opened upon the mutineers with grape and canister. At the report of the second gun, the whole body of mutineers took to flight across the Race Course at the back or to the westward of the Dâk Bungalow. When this occured, Sunker Singh and some of my servants came to me in the garden and told me all that the mutineers had run away to Indore, and that I might return to the bungalow and sleep there with safety. I immediately proceeded with the rest of the people in the garden towards the bungalow, where I was stopped by one of my servants saying that he saw some Troopers at my doorway; on this, I again retreated to the garden and had been there about fifteen minutes when one of my servants came from the bungalow, saying, that there were eight Troopers there and that they wanted some valuable native swords, knives and daggers which I had been collecting for many years: the whole of these they took, and two suits of chain armour with headpiece and gauntlets complete, and a second time they sent to me in the garden to say that they wanted some money: they took 800 Rs. cash, broke open boxes containing my full dress and undress uniform, and several silver caps and other large and valuable pieces of silver plate, presents from friends, some on account of professional services rendered; and others, Souvenirs of friendship. The troopers deprived me of these, and six valuable horses, two pairs of bullocks, cows, goats and a four wheeled-waggon to carry the spoil: they threatened some of the syces and cajoled the rest, making them believe that I was dead: four of my sweepers carried 7 of my dogs and were with the rest of the servants who decamped, very active in robbing me. After my servant had made his second visit to me in the garden

I concluded that the troopers must know that I was close at hand, as their wishes were so immediately complied with, and considering myself not safe I left this place of concealment, followed by all the people that were with me ; the Native Doctor and his family went to the Hospital and the rest scattered themselves in different directions : I came suddenly on two mounted troopers after leaving the garden, and hid myself in a drain and remained there the whole night. At day-dawn I again got into my garden, and lay down in the hedge nearest to my Bungalow ; here I saw troopers in uniform riding about and 4 syces and grass-cutters on their Tattoos going on the Indore road until about seven o'Clock A. M. I also saw the two regimental standards carried off by two men of the 3rd troop on grey horses. My Mallee and Chokeydar became acquainted with my place of concealment and assisted me materially ; and the wife of one of my syces, who also became aware of my being alive, went towards the Fort for assistance and fell in with the party of officers and the men of the artillery who had come out to seek for the bodies of the missing officers, they did not expect to find me alive, but on discovering me they carried me with the bodies of the three murdered officers to the Fort."

It was most gratifying to me to perceive the general satisfaction that my safe return produced. The European Artillerymen received me at the gate of the Fort with an unanimous "Hurrah," influenced by some little kindness I had shewn the Company at Cawnpore in 1853. As my Bungalow was so far from the Fort and no one to protect it, I was robbed of every thing by the villagers and the people in the Bazar. I have not recovered a single suit of cloths ; every article of dress has been carried off, and every article of use either destroyed or taken away. I was dependant on my friends in the Fort for a change of linen for the first month of my residence in the Fort."

H. J. THORNTON, SURGEON,

1st Regiment, Bengal Light Cavalry.

Mhow, 20th October, 1857.

Englishman, 21st November, 1857.]

The Revd. Mr. Long kindly gave us the two following instances which occurred to him while on a conversation with us on this subject :—

" A young lad, employed on the Telegraph line in Benares, on the day of the Mutiny, was not aware of the state of things till he heard the noise of sepoys rushing into the compound and calling out for the Saheb ; on this his syce seized him, thrust him under a heap of dung in the stable and told the mutineers the Saheb was gone away."

" An Ayah of a Futtyghur Civilian allowed herself to be cut to pieces rather than give up the Civilian's baby when demanded by the mutineers."

The following touching passages are from the narrative of an eye witness of the mutiny at Allahabad :—

" In the morning I got to the Bangalow, and found most of my people absent and the horse and buggy also, but a Rajpoot peon and two chokeydars were present, who helped to hide me in a fowl house. I was now getting weak from hunger, and I think delirious or mad, I don't know which, and during the Thursday afternoon, hearing some footsteps among the men of the bungalow, I ran out and saw one old Mussulman ; I ran up to him, got hold of him, and breaking off one of my shirt-studs, gave it to him, and told him to go to the village close by and tell my syce, naming him, that his master wanted his horse, and promised him the other two, and come besides, if he did so. I thought that if my syce heard that I was alive he would devise some plan to help me. But after the man had gone, I dreaded that he would perhaps play me false, and bring some of his cursed countrymen to punish me, so I went out at dark and crept along the hedges till I got into the stables of a neighbouring bungalow, and stopped there, awoke nearly the whole night, expecting a relief, but it came not and about day-light I fell asleep. I fancy it was about 7 o'Clock on Friday morning, when I was awoke by some noise, and looking up, found three men standing over me with lattees. I now gave up all for lost. I was so weak I could hardly raise myself

on my elbow as I lay on the ground. I looked at them and then told them, if they had come to kill me, to do so at once, and make an end of it. But it seems my syce had either seen the man the day before or heard him talking in the village, and dropped some hints to these men who, though all servants of Sahebs were all professional dacoits. Directly they mentioned the syce's name, I forgot hunger, fear, and all, and begged them to give me some food and a disguise to go into the Fort; offering them one hundred rupees each. They agreed to this course, brought me some food (which tasted deliciously,) and a lot of dirty old blankets which I was obliged to wrap all round me, and cover my head, to conceal my white skin, as well as white clothes, and then with a basket on my head, to help the disguise, I trudged away on Friday night to their village."—*Ibid.*

The following is from a letter from Simlah :—

"Though no lover of the Moslem, I cannot refrain from making known the promotion of our Kotwal, Wuzeer Khan, to the Kutwalship of his native city, Delhi. He is a man well known to the residents and visitor of the last 10 years, for his urbanity of nature and civility, without obsequiousness, to the European community. He has had a meritorious rise from that of Chuprassee to his present position, and for his good conduct, has, on more than one occasion, deservedly received marks of approbation from several of his superiors, in the shape of handsome presents. His tact was eminently displayed during our panic, his promotion, though a loss to Simlah, is still gratifying to those who wish him well."—*Englishman*, 1*st December*, 1857.

The subjoined is a copy of a statement, made by the Moonsiff of the suburbs of Bareilly, relative to the massacre of Mr. Robert, Judge of Bareilly, Dr. Hay, and Deputy Collector Orr. It is a brief narrative of the outbreak of which it treats. The perusal of it will excite in the reader a painful interest, but we think it is impossible to suppress the sense of gratitude and admiration invoked by the heroic and devoted exertion of the Moonsiff:—

"I was sitting in my house, getting myself shaved when Mr. Robertson came to me, and in a state of much excitement, told me that the Native Infantry Regiments were in open mutiny. That Major General Sibbald and several other officers were murdered, that the Sepoys were setting fire to the Officer's Bungalows and destroying the public buildings, that they had liberated the prisoners, and that they were ransacking the treasury.—That he had heard the Native Infantry Regiments would march out of the Sudder Station so soon as they had taken all the treasure. That as the Irregular Cavalry was loyal, he thought peace and order would be soon restored through their assistance. In the meantime he asked to be allowed to remain in my house, I complied with his wishes, remarking at the same time that I was not aware of the mutiny, and candidly informed him that I had not sufficient men in my service to protect him, but that he was welcome to remain in my house as long as he liked. I had scarcely done speaking to this gentleman, when the two latter officers also came to me, and being curious to ascertain the nature of their errand. I asked Deputy Collector Orr what he wanted. I was told in reply that he had ordered his buggy to return certain visits, that his Kidmutgar came and told him that the Sepoys were in open mutiny, and had murdered some of their officers; that they were taking the guns to knock down the jail and liberate the prisoners, that they would pass by the house, and for him to leave the house immediately, and he forthwith got into his buggy, and drove off to the Major General's Bungalow; that on his way he was informed that the Major General was killed, that he went then to the house of the Commissioner, and found that he had fled: that he then went off to the residence of the Collector, and found he had also fled with the Joint Magistrate to Nynee Tal for refuge, that he next resolved to see Mr. Robertson, the Judge of Barielly; that on his way he met Dr. Hay whom he took up into the Buggy and both proceeded to the residence of Mr. Robertson, finding that the mutineers had proceeded him he turned his buggy and put the horse in gallop, that the horse being frightened by the report of fire arms, became ungovernable and knocked against

a tree and was much hurt, and that his buggy broke down; he heard that Mr. Robertson was in my house and so he wanted to see him. Shortly after this interview with the Judge Mr. Robertson desired me to send for the Kotwal of the city. I thought it an imprudent request, because it would lead to the discovery of their place of concealment. I remonstrated with him, but he repeated his orders; finding that he would not benefit by my advice, agreeably to his wishes I went up to my gateway, and seeing a Burkundaz of the Kutwallee standing there, I told him to call the Kotwal; in reply he told me that the Kotwal had concealed himself; that Newab Khan and Bahadur Khan had come in person to the Kuttowallee, and demanded the three gentlemen whom I had concealed in my house; that if I refused to comply with the Chief's request, he would put me to death and knock down my houses. I told the Burkundaz that I had concealed nobody; and he returned to the Kotwalee. On returning to the gentleman, I informed them of the messages brought to me by the Burkundaz of the Kotwalee from the chief. They seemed to be much alarmed, and asked me to remove them into some other house. I could not do so, as all the city was up. Messrs. Hay and Orr resolved to go away, but the Judge Mr. Robertson, made up his mind to remain in my house at all hazards. To the two former gentlemen I folded my hands and begged of them not to expose themselves in the middle of the day in the streets of the city: they succumbed to my entreaty and made up their minds to stop in my house. As they appeared to be much frightened, I asked them to take refuge in my zenana, among the female members of my family; that they declined to do, stating that the zenana afforded them no greater security. However I concealed the Judge in a small room, giving him a small knife to protect himself in case his place of concealment should be discovered, and locked up the door. Messrs. Hay and Orr I concealed in another room, giving each of them a sword and pistol. I then locked up the gate and went off to the roof thereof. The budmashes now surrounded my house, and called upon me to deliver up the refugees into their custody, I swore to them by every thing that was sacred,

that there were no Europeans concealed in my house. I was menaced and very offensive language was used towards me; they set to work with hatchets to break open the gate; but were foiled in their endeavours to do so. By means of a ladder they jumped into my brother's apartments; my brother resides in the same house with me. On seeing how they had effected an ingress, I came down from the roof to the gateway, and was unfortunately made a prisoner. By the same ladder they jumped into my house, and now commenced the bloody deeds; by a blow from a club I had a finger broken, and my toes bruised, the doors were burst open, the gentlemen dragged from their roofs, and were most barbarously murdered by the Newab's emissaries. The guard placed over me, now released me and I saw the fiends carrying away the ladies of the deceased officers. I then went to the Kuttowallee and asked them to bury the bodies. I was refused them by the Newab, who was greatly vexed with me, and made use of the most opprobious terms which human ingenuity could devise. I then turned home, and found it was no longer a home for me. My property plundered, the female inmates of the house had fled for their lives, that my hardships are better conceived than described, and I trust to a generous Government to give me redress. In trying to save the life of my employer, I have lost my all and my losses are irreparable. The following residents of Barielly will bear testimony to the truthfulness of my statement, viz., the principal Sudder Ameen of Barielly, Messrs. Brojonauth, Gooroodyal Khettree, the Sub-Assistant Surgeon of Barielly, and Moonshee Nittanundo; besides several other Hindu citizens whose names it would be too tedious to mention, are eye-witnesses to the fact."—*Englishman*, *2nd December*, 1857.

We should observe that the above statement has other merits than as a story of the personal sufferings of the narrator. The Moonsiff was a Government servant, and his influence as such, gave him considerable influence within his jurisdiction. The circumstances in which he was placed were also exceedingly tempting, and if he had displayed the least wavering or infirmity of mind,

all would have been over—with British interests in that part of the country, and the rebels would have obtained in him a large accession of strength. But his moral courage swayed the chances that surrounded him. He not only presented a bold front to the insinuations and threats of the mutineers, but placed himself in the thick of the struggle by undertaking the protection of his European superiors and friends. He opened to them the Zenana of his house, fed them, afforded them every shelter, and kept them informed of all the passing events. Though his exertions subsequently proved ineffectual, he spared nothing that could be of any use to them at the moment. To quote his own words; he lost his all for their safety; we hope with him, that a generous Government will give him redress.

The following extract is from a letter, dated Noakhally, the 25rd November:

"Intelligence of the mutiny was received in this station on the night of the 20th idem, and as the intended route of the mutineers was not then known here, our Magistrate, Mr. F. B. Simson, ere break of day, had nearly two thousand stalwart and brave men, armed to the teeth, ready for action, in case the mutineers paid us a visit; most of our men was supplied by the Bhulloah Rajahs, and the rest constituted the Jail and Treasury guards, the local battalion and the brave portion of the inhabitants of the stations—the few timorous ones having run away into the villages. Our little fortress was the Bhulloah Zemindary Cutcherry; a pucca building, encircled by strong brick walls; placed at the disposal of the Magistrate by Baboo Jossodacoomar Pyne, local Naib of Rajahs Pertaup Chunder and Issur Chunder Singh."—*Englishman, 3rd December*, 1857.

These Rajahs have their estates over all the Bengal Presidency, whether in the Upper or Lower Provinces, and have suffered in consequence of the mutinies perhaps more than

any other Calcutta Zemindars. But wherever within their estates any disturbance took place, prompt aid was offered to the authorities there by their agents and servants. Government has more than once formally acknowledged their assistance, and we have lately read in the papers of one of their Naibs having been rewarded by Government for conspicuous exertions when the Government officers failed to mend matters.

" The Saugur rebels, with the mutineers 52nd B. N. I., lately attacked and looted Dumoah, releasing the prisoners from the Jail. A nephew of the Punna Rajah, with 12 guns and eight thousand men, some of them supplied by the Rewah Rajah, have advanced to take Saugur, but the Rajah of Saugur had fled to a Hill Fort, in the jungles, named Soorae, with four guns, so the natives say."—*Ibid.*

This sort of service is not rare in the history of Native exertions for the sustenance of British Supremacy. Natives, by scores voluntarily undertook to defend and keep places in the name of the Company Bahadoor though there were no representatives of the Government in the vicinity to give the necessary orders. We think this the more meritorious as the acts were entirly voluntary.

The following intelligence is extracted from a letter from Tipperah, expressive of the feeling that prevailed in that district on the receipt of an express from Chittagong, announcing the mutiny of the Sepoys there. It appears the Express reached Tipperah on the night of Friday, the 20th instant, and created a general panic. The ladies and most of the gentlemen left the station without loss of time for Dacca, and the natives with their families to the villages on the opposite shores of the Goomtee River. The only gentlemen who continued in the district were Messrs. Metcalfe, Judge; Sandford, Assistant to the Magistrate and Collector; Barbar, uncovenanted Deputy Collector; Martinelly, head clerk of the Judge's Court; Bruce, accountant

to the Judge's Court. They were led to stay behind, it was generally understood, from a hope that in case of any disturbance, they would be assisted by the Maharajah's forces. There were also good grounds for this hope as the Rajahs' men were kept in preparation for the purpose.

"On the morning of November the 30th, the Maharajah of Tipperah sent in a report, I presume to the Judge, to the effect that the mutineers who had entered his Hill Territory, were at Odoypore, and intended attacking Augurtollah, the seat of the Rajah. Should the mutineers put their intentions into execution, the Rajah's forces, joined by his Hill subjects, will, there is no doubt, soundly drub them."—*Englishman, 9th December*, 1857.

It appears that when the mutiny at Chittagong first broke out, the only fighting people that could be had, were those supplied by the Mootagachee Zemindars. A Correspondent says:—

"He (Mr. Lance, the Magistrate) was just at day before the panic began in the Mofussil, heard of it the same night and immediately arrived at the station to encourage the people. But with only some lattyals provided with some fire-arms from the Mooktagachee Zemindars."—*Englishman, 14th December*, 1857.

A Correspondent of the *Mofussilite* at Nagode, Central India, says:—

"A Sepoy of the 37th at Benares, took a letter from the Havildar of the 34th to the Rewah Rajah, offering the support of 2,000 men if he would rise against the English. The Rajah on the contrary, seized the Sepoy and sent him into Nagode where he is now under confinement."—*Phœnix, 11th May*, 1857.

These extracts are from a Government Message:—

"The Putteewallah Rajah, and the Jheend Rajah, have sent troops and some guns to Kurnaul, there to join the 75th and 9th Lancers who were expected in Kurnaul yesterday."—*Phœnix, 18th May*, 1857.

"The Gwalior troops are marching there to assist the British troops."—*Ibid.*

The following relates about the measures adopted by the people of Meerut for the restoration of order on the breaking out of the insurrection :—

" A troop of cavalry, with a proclamation, were to go out on the 12th yesterday, and another Contingent Rissalah, and strong body of Police, the first raised on the spot and the second strengthened with extra men, were to be sent out with volunteer (Canal) Officers and others to sweep the country round and check depredation. An old Afghan, named Jan Fishan Khan, was raising men, aided by the Deputy Collector and Principal Sudder Ameen, and would soon give a good account of straggling scoundrels."—*Phœnix, May* 19, 1857.

The following is the intelligence received this day (date of the extract) in Calcutta. It is of a very cheering nature :—

" Three Officers (names unknown) belonging to the Delhi Regiments, have been brought into Meerut by a Syud who had protected them. Thirteen Europeans who had escaped from Delhi, had been protected by the Zemindars of a village near Bagput, and a troop of cavalry have been sent from Meerut to bring them in.

The Syuds and Jats in the neighbourhood of Meerut have declared themselves on the British side."—*Phœnix, May 20th,* 1857.

" Intelligence from Rohilcund is to the effect that the troops there are quiet, and that the Nawab of Rampore has written to the Magistrate, offering his horsemen for the service of the State."—*Phœnix, May* 21st, 1857.

The following is from one of the Telegraphic Messages, supplied by Government :—

" The Bhurtpore and Gwalior Rajahs are all sending their troops. Fifteen hundred horse and foot, with six guns, under Captain Munbee Bombay Engineers, Captain Nixon, 25th Bombay Native Infantry. Assistant Governor General's Agent in Rajpootanah, and Mr. Young, Assistant Revenue Surveyor, have advanced from Bhurtpore. All the chiefs and Rajahs around Delhi and in Rajpootana, are shewing their fidelity, and will doubtless be rewarded."—*Ibid.*

" The apprehension of danger from the immense number of prisoners that made their escape from Meerut are reported to be groundless, as the majority of those released jail-birds are said to be most anxious to return into custody, and only waiting to do so as soon as arrangements can be made for their reception. Some of the prisoners have actually returned, while many men have left their name and address with the Jailor and the Police, so that they may be informed at once " when the Jail is ready for them." A better behaved set of prisoners it is impossible to conceive.

" Here is a story about the Jhind Rajah :—" It is said that the King of Delhi sent some of the insurgents, Native Cavalry to the Rajah of Jhind, asking his assistance against the English :—the Rajah of Jhind happened to be out shooting or parading his regiment, and immediately he found out on what errand the cavalry had come, he turned round to his men and ordered them to cut down every man of them.

" The Rajah of Putteewallah, it is mentioned, has forwarded to the Commissioner all seditious letters that were sent to him."—*Phœnix, 20th May*, 1857.

The above paragraphs disclose facts which are the best demonstration of the feeling of fidelity which actuated the authors of those proceedings. These princes are the representatives or heads of confederacies which were once the bitterest and strongest enemies of British Government. But with the position inverted, their feelings have assumed a character perfectly unexpected by the most sanguine minded. If however the friendship and good will of the Native Princes be historically interesting, the little romance of the Jail-birds will not fail to adorn a good many tales and to point their piquant morals.

The following is taken from a private letter, written by a lady, residing at Simlah, dated the 20th May:

" We are housed here in a comfortable little hut and are quite safe. We receive every kindness from the Rhana. Our party of

refugees, besides ourselves, consists of eight ladies, five children and one gentleman."—*Phœnix, 9th June*, 1857.

The Bombay *Telegraph* and *Courier* gives the latest intelligence from Surat, which we subjoin :—

"The Moharajah has written to the Governor General, placing the 3,000 horse of Baroda brigade and all his resources at our disposal, and he offers to head them."—*Phœnix, 12th June*, 1857.

A Correspondent of the *Phœnix* writing from Benares, under date the 10th June 1857, says that he, with some of his friends, were indebted for their safety to a friendly Zemindar on the occurrence of the mutiny there.

The following intelligence was received from Government last evening :—

"The Rajah of Rewah has placed two guns and two hundred Sowars at the disposal of the Government for employment against the mutineers between Mirzapore and Rewah."—*Phœnix, June 17th*, 1857.

The following was issued as a *Gazettee Extraordinary* :—

"The following report by Lieutenant DeKantzow, of the 9th Regiment N. I., on the good conduct of some of the native officers and sepoys of the Corps at the recent outbreak at Mynpooree, and the order issued thereon by the the Hon'ble Lieutenant Governor, North Western Provinces, are published for general information.

(Copy.)

Mynpooree, 26th May, 1857.

Sir,

In compliance with the injunctions contained in His Honor the Lieutenant Governor's letter of the 23rd, and in that of Captain Greathead, A. D. C. to His Honor, dated the 24th instant, I have the honor herewith to give the following account of those men of the late detachment of the 9th Regiment N. I., at this station,

whose conduct I approve of during the late mutiny, and to whom I venture to think, reward and promotion should, according to their respective merits, be granted; I also append a list of those unconnected with mutiny, who were sick in hospital, or otherwise absent at the time the revolt took place.

1.—Sheikh Kadir Buksh (Kote Havildar of the 6th Company and Senior Havildar of the Regiment), was present throughout the whole affair, but refused to join the mutineers, I heard him refuse to join three distinct times, and he was in consequence obliged to leave for a village for safety. He joined me after the mutineers left, and has been with me ever since.

2.—Ousan Sing (Kote Havildar, Light Company,) a most worthy and faithful man, protected me at the Magazine and was the very last man to return to cantonment. He behaved nobly throughout, and I strongly recommend him to notice; his exertions in repressing the mutineers, and endeavours to save the Magazine, endangered his life; and I therefore, though much against his inclinations, ordered him to leave for safety.

3.—Noor Khan, Sepoy 6th Company, a most meritorious man, saved my life at the Magazine, kept off the mutineers from attacking me when endeavouring to save the Treasury Room gate from being broken down: he behaved very gallantly during the whole affair, and gave me every assistance, I trust his services will meet with the notice they deserve.

4.—Ajoodiah Doobey, Sepoy 6th Company, I recommend this man as a faithful Sepoy and one who did his best to prevent bloodshed and the releasing of the Jail prisoners.

5.—Bullie Singh, Sepoy 3rd Company; one of those who remained with me during the whole affair, afforded me good service, and is a faithful and good man.

6.—Mukkhun Singh, Sepoy 6th Company; was on duty at the Post Office during the mutiny, but subsequently joined me, and has remained with me eversince.

7.—Khoosial Singh Sepoy, 6th Company; Sick in hospital, when the mutiny took place.

8.—Khurrum Khan, Sepoy 6th Company ditto.

9.—Chadey, Sepoy 6th Company, was with the mutiniers, but refused to join them and has remained with me ever since.

10.—Chandey Chobey, Sepoy, 6th Company, ditto.

I have, &c.,

(Sd.) C. ADOLPHUS DE KANTAZOW,

Lieutenant,

Late in charge 6th Company, 9th Regiment, Native Infantry."

With reference to the foregoing report and to the authority conferred by the General Order of the Right Honorable the Governor General, No. 698 of the 19th instant, the Lieutenant Governor, North Western Provinces, was pleased to make the following promotions in the Native Army :—

" Seikh Kadir Buksh, Pay Havildar of the 5th Company, and Senior Havildar of the 9th Regiment, to be a Subadar in the army.

Orisan Singh, Pay Havildar of the Light Company, to be a Subadar in the Army.

Noor Khan, Sepoy of the 6th Company, is promoted to the rank of Havildar in the Army, and further is admitted to the order of merit. The promotion is given for gallantry, and the decoration for saving his Officer's life.

Ajoodia Dobey, Sepoy 6th Company; Bulie Singh, Sepoy 3rd Company, to be Havildars.

Chadie, Sepoy 6th Company, Chandry Chobey, Sepoy 6th Company, to be Naicks.

By order of the Hon'ble the Lieutenant Governor of the North Western Provinces.

(Sd.) C. B. THORNHILL,

Mofussilite, June 2nd, 1857. *Offg. Secy. to Govt, N. W. P.*"

Phœnix, 28th June, 1857.]

Conspicuous as the above acts of loyalty were, rewards of them were equally prompt. But this only enhances the im-

portance of the services. If other Officers and Europeans had come forth with the accounts of their deliverance and of Native fidelity as they saw it, we think the most sceptical would not then hesitate to attribute in some measure the safety of British India to the fidelity and exertions of the indigenous Indians.

The following from Meerut and Roorkee, dated 25th May, had reached the *Mofussilite* :—

"The Nawab of Sirdhana caught a spy from Delhi yesterday morning. He received intimation on Saturday evening, that such a person had come with several letters to different Mahomedan people in the city, calling on them to be prepared to join the Delhi insurgents on their arrival here, which would be very soon; the Nawab was all night searching for this man, and only succeeded in finding him in the morning after he had delivered all the letters but one, which, together with the spy, were immediately brought before the Military Authorities."—*Phœnix, 20th June,* 1857.

A Benares Correspondent says, under date the 20th June:

"News has come that Lieutenant Tucker is in hiding somewhere in Oude. A party of native volunteers (composed of rich Natives only) have gone out to find him and bring him in."—*Phœnix, 24th June,* 1857.

The following was received from Government:

"At Hyderabad and Saugur, all was quiet on the 18th. At the former place on the 20th, a large number of Mahomedans had assembled at a mosque, and were dispersed by the Minister Salaar Jungh and his Arabs. Both he and the Nizam are staunch to the British Government."—*Phœnix, 27th June,* 1857.

"A writer describing the mutiny of Juanpore, says that the Europeans were protected by a Lalla of that place who took them to his own house and kept them in safety till the arrival of an escort. The party consisted of Messrs. Fane, Paske, Tuttle, Brynon, Unsworth, Reuther, Bradford and Julius Cæsar, and Mrs. Paske, Mrs.

Reuther and children, Mrs. Cæsar and Miss Robinson."—*Phœnix, 3rd July*, 1857.

The following reports and orders were published for general information in the *Government Gazette* of the North Western Provinces, under date the 12th June, 1857 :—

"FROM

LIEUTENANT H. SWINHOE,

In charge of the late Detachment, 30th Regiment, N. I.,

To

C. B. THORNHILL, ESQUIRE,

Officiating Secy. to Govt., N. W. P.

SIR,

I have the honor to report for the information of His Honor the Lieutenant Governor, North Western Provinces, that the 7th Company, 30th Regiment Native Infantry, under my command, mutinied on the morning of the 3rd instant.

2. It was reported by the Jemadar to me the 2nd instant, that some of the Sepoys exhibiting signs of discontent, I immediately went to the Sepoys on guard and asked them the cause of their discontent; they said that they had not received their pay for two months and were consequently unable to procure food.

3. I then went to the palace and petitioned the Rajah of Jeypore for the sum necessary for the payment of the Detachment under my command, for April. This request was graciously granted me, and the amount was distributed among the Sepoys.

4. I experienced great difficulty and even risk of life on entering the City Gates for the pay of the Company, on the afternoon of the 2nd instant, as orders had been issued by the Maharajah for the non-admittance of strangers. I applied for the pay of the Company at 5 P. M., and it was forwarded to the men at 9 o'Clock that same evening.

5. As I was unable to obtain the pay of the Company until night I apprehended that were I to leave the Palace, I should not again obtain admittance during the night, should necessity require my so doing. I therefore determined to delay visiting the men till the following morning.

6. Early in the morning of the 3rd instant, Lieutenant H. Hawkins, 30th Regiment Native Infantry, who was passing through Jeypore on his way to Nusseerabad, met the Jemadar of the 7th Company with a few sepoys conversing with the native officer; he learnt that out of his guard, three Havildars, two Naicks, and 38 Sepoys had deserted him during the night. Lieutenant Hawkins urged upon those that were present to remain faithful to their posts. They asserted that they were willing to do so, and expressed their utter unwillingness to join the mutineers. The above report was made to me personally by Lieutenant Hawkins on his gaining admittance into the palace.

7. It was subsequently reported to me that 38 Sepoys had deserted with their arms and had proceeded towards Ajmere to join the insurgents, who, it was rumoured, were then within 12 miles of Jeypore.

8. I am happy to state the Jemadar is still present, and has with him one Havildar, 1 Drummer and 18 Sepoys; he has also protected the stores and ammunition belonging to the Company, which were deposited in the Kote, from being carried away by the mutineers.

9 I have received every possible assistance and support from the Maharajah of Jeypore in procuring the books and papers belonging to the Office at the Residency.

10. The conduct of the Jemadar Khoda Buksh Khan and the Sepoys who have remained by me, I would wish to bring to the notice and favorable consideration of Government, to whom I venture to hope reward and promotion may be granted.

11. I have forwarded a copy of the above report to Colonel Campbell, commanding the late 30th Regiment Native Infantry, but as I am not confident of any communication reaching my Commanding Officer, I have thought it advisable to forward an account of those men of the late detachment 30th Native Infantry, who in no way took a part in the late mutiny.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) HENRY SWINHOE, *Lieutenant,*
In charge of the late detachment 30th Regt., N. I.

Ibid]

This Jemadar was promoted to the rank of Subadar.

"FROM A. O. HUME, ESQ.,
Offg. Magistrate, Etawah and others,

To C. B. THORNHILL, ESQ.,
Offg. Secy. to Government, N. W. P.

SIR,—As we find that the faithful and well-behaved men of the 9th Regiment N. I. at Mynpooree, have at once been reported for promotion to Government, we think it only fair to those of our Troops that remained true to us, under very trying circumstances, to do the same for them. We had intended to delay our report in regard to this matter, till peace was entirely restored, but to do so now, after the prompt acknowledgement of the services of the Mynpooree men, would be an injustice to ours.

2nd—One Jemadar, two Havildars, one Naick, one Fifer, and 30 Sepoys (as by Appendix 1) stuck by us from first to last. Of these the Jemadar Sheodeen Sing Rajpoot was throughout conspicuous for his fidelity; when at the first, many of the men, making paltry excuses of one kind and another, refused to march, and endeavoured to dissuade him from accompanying us, he said at once that, if he went alone, he would go, that he would never prove false to the oath he had sworn; that they might kill him if they pleased, but go he would. This he said aloud in the presence of his officers, and manfully he bided by what he said. There are other good men amongst those who accompanied us no doubt; but it is very questionable if more than half would have dared to remain true to us, but for the example set them by Sheodeen Sing. When we were in the greatest difficulties and before we had received intelligence of reinforcement from Gwalior; when, in fact, we had ceased to hope for any, and when the Natives totally disbelieved in the possibility of any coming (for Mr. Harvey had written on the 17th, that such were being sent, and we had announced it, and notwithstanding for six days further nothing had been heard of them) this Jemadar remained staunch and true, never presuming on our supposed weakness, and steadily promising of his own accord that come what might, he should remain faithful to his salt. We cannot praise this honora-

ble Native officer too much and we sincerely trust that he may receive some very marked reward.

3rd.—Hunnooman Singh and Nund Loll Tiwaree, Havildars, and Hunker Singh, Naick, are all deserving of great praise, being the only three out of eleven Non-Commissioned Officers of whose fidelity there could be no doubt. The men that remain with them withstood great temptation, and preferred the performance of their duty, under arduous circumstances and at a time when they really had no prospect of a reward, to the certainty of a share in the plunder of the Treasury.

4th.—The Duffadar of the detachment of the 7th Irregulars is another deserving man. It is really difficult to say which of the two men, Sheodeen Sing Jemadar, or Meer Hossein Ali Duffadar, behaved best throughout the whole affair. We cannot but feel that, with reference to the temper of the troops and the inhabitants of the district, that it was mainly the determined staunchness of these two men that preserved us from further injury. We propose to nominate him Rissaldar of the new corps here, on a salary of Rs. 100, to commence with; but he is deserving of something more. Of the 16 men under his command (See Appendix 2) Roshung Singh, Innayut Hossein, Nuthee Khan, Makhun Sing, are particularly deserving of honorable mention and promotion, though several of the rest also did fairly, and all openly at least remained true.

5th.—There are a few more with regard to whom we may hereafter have to report favorably, but of whose good conduct we cannot be certain without an enquiry into which, from circumstances already reported by the Magistrate, it is at present impossible to enter.

We have, &c.,

(Sd.) A. O. HUME,
Officiating Magistrate,

(Sd.) H. R. CORFIELD,
Lieutenant.

(Sd.) C. D. R. ROSS, *Captain,*
Offg. Assist. Genl. Supdt.

Etawah, 4th June, 1857.

With reference to the foregoing report, and to the authority conferred by the General Order of the Right Honorable the Governor General, No. 698, of the 19th May, 1857, the Lieutenant Governor, North-Western Provinces, is pleased to make the following promotions :—

9th Regiment Native Infantry, Jemadar Sheodeen Singh, 4th Company, 9th Regiment N. I., to be a Subadar in the Army, and his name to be forwarded to the Supreme Government for the first vacancy for the honorable grade of Bahadoor.

Havildar Hunnooman Singh, 1st Company, and Havildar Nund Lall Tiwaree, 1st Company, to be Subadars in the army.

8th Irregular Cavalry, Duffadar Meer Hossein Ally, 3rd Troop, to be Rissaldar; and Sowar Makhun Singh, 4th Troop to be Kote Duffadar; Sowar Roshum Singh, 4th Troop, to be Kote Ditto; Sowar Innayut Hossein, 3rd Troop, to be Kote Ditto, Sowar Nuthee Khan, 3rd Troop, to be Kote Ditto, in the Irregular Cavalry.

By Order of the Hon'ble the Lieutenant Governor, North Western Provinces.

C. B. THORNHILL,
Officiating Secretary to Government, N. W. P."

Ibid.]

The following is an extract of a letter from one of the sufferers in the neighbourhood of Azimghur, received viâ Ghazeepore. :—

" On the night of the 3rd ultimo, the 17th N. I., in conjunction with the Sepoys that had arrived from Gorruckpore, mutinied, killed one of the Officer and wounded the Quarter Master Sergeant, released the prisoners from the Jail, helped themselves to all the treasure in the Collectorate, and then marched off with their booty towards Oudh, plundering and committing the greatest atrocities beyond any description. Whilst about sitting to breakfast at 11 A. M. of the following day, we had to run for our lives, leaving every thing untouched on the table, and in the hurry of the moment left behind three little bundles containing a few suits of clothes, &c., which had been kept in readiness in case of an emergency, as

our servants had told us that the rebels were within sight, approaching our Bungalow Mrs. ——— and Miss ——— were supported on either side by our servants who dragged them to a village close by to prevent their falling into the hands of these wretches where we found refuge in the house of one of our Kidmutgars. Here we saw our property being carried off in all directions; after an hour or two, we were taken into another house which we were told would be more secure, but I suspect it was to prevent our seeing what was going on. Here we were locked into a wretched small place with two dirty charpoys and a gurrah of water. For three days and two nights we were in this miserable plight, with nothing but chuppaties to eat of which we took very little. They looted our Bungalow even to the very doors and hinges, and then set fire to it. They likewise burnt the factory and all that they could carry was taken away; the treasure chest containing 2,000 Rs. in cash was brought to a tope of trees close by our place of concealment, they endeavouring to break it open in which they failed. On the morning of the 3rd day after our flight, it was rumoured that we were to be murdered, but a kind Hindu by whose aid and protection, we set off to another village, saved us. On the following morning by his advice we went to a Rajpoot village, three miles further, where we were informed 2,000 Rajpoots would protect us from Mahomedan enemies. Here for 14 days we were pent up in a cowshed, living on such miserable food as was given us by our protectors, till the arrival of some elephants, twenty-two sowars and some matchlockmen sent to our rescue by the Commissioner from Benares."—*Phœnix, 13th July,* 1857.

Here is a note-worthy instance of loyal service. The Rajah of Joypore has not only the credit of saving European lives, but of preserving order and tranquillity in the absence of all emblems of authority.

Camp Sonah, District Goorgaon, June 7th.

"Mr. Edward Hall, Mrs. Hall, Mrs. Barry, and her three children have been released from a most painful residence amongst

the Mewattees by the force of His Highness the Rajah of Joypore, commanded by Newab Fyz Ali Khan, accompanied by the Resident at the Joypore Court, Captain Eden in his political capacity. This force, consisting of Artillery, Cavalry and Infantry, is in every way well conducted and reflects credit on the state to which it belongs.

In our rout yesterday from Jowrassee, we had a brush with the Mewattees, who showed an intention ofimpeding our march, they surrounded us on all sides, and it was found necessary to fire upon them, our men acted steadily and drove them back into the hills on our right. Our loss being two men and two horses wounded, that of the Mewattees is supposed to be about thirty men killed, it is to be hoped this example will do much good in chastising the marauding spirit in this district, the presence of the Maharajah's force has undoubtedly saved this town from pillage."—*Ibid.*

The following news reached Benares on the 10th instant:—

"All well at Gorruckpore, the Rajah of Gopalpore has assisted Mr. Pepper in destroying the bazaar of Muhadabar, where some of the refugees from Fyzabad were murdered."—*Phœnix, 22nd July*, 1857.

For the following items of intelligence from the Madras Presidency, we are indebted to the *Examiner*:—

"Our Correspondent at Mhow writes, on the 17th instant that all was safe there on that date, that Holkar was as staunch as ever and doing all he can to assist the authorities, but that he is in great danger himself as the few troops who have remained with him hitherto are not to be depended upon, especially since the return of some of the mutineers who are greatly incensed with him for his conduct in the outbreak. Intelligence had reached Mhow that the Bhopal Contingent which accompanied Colonel Durand and others to Sehore had mutinied and attempted a massacre of the survivors, who have been obliged to fly in all directions. Two officers and two ladies were taken prisoners by the Rajah of Jarah and were ordered to be put to death, but by

the interference of Holkar were released, not without considerable trouble on his part and brought safe into Mhow about 9 o'clock on the night of the 16th instant ; this circumstance places beyond doubt the fact that there has been a mutiny at Sehore, though our correspondent has not heard fuller particulars."—*Phœnix, 12th August*, 1857.

The following is an account of the exodus from Gorruckpore :—

" The station and all its property, &c., having been made over to the protection of the Rajah of Gopalpore, who has hitherto proved friendly to the English, the party crossed the Rabte and encamped for two or three days on its further bank, after which they moved forward towards Azimgurh."—*Phœnix, 27th August*, 1857.

The following intelligence was received from Government :—

" A party of the Dinapore rebels were reported to be proceeding westward (having passed south of Mirzapore) and Colonel Hinde, with the troops of the Rajah of Rewah, is supposed to be pursuing them."—*Phœnix, 27th August*, 1857.

"Our eccentric friend at Oolagunge," as the *Phœnix* has it, writes as follows, on Sunday, the 30th ultimo :—

" There was a strong talk, it is true, that the Rajah of Doomrao had been killed by Koar Singh, whom he tried to apprehend and place in Government hands. This is not the case, for I have since learned from, but why give up names ? that the Rajah is still in the land of the living. - He has retired to the interior of his district, to escape being captured by the rebels, who were of course, his enemies, for he was ready to assist Government, when his means failed him entirely."—*Phœnix, 4th September*, 1857.

Many are the conflicting opinions about the fidelity of the Rajah of Doomrao, but we are disposed to believe from all that has been written regarding this Rajah that he

remained true to his allegiance, and that if he ever wavered in his conduct, it was more apparent than real. The communications of Patna and Behar "Newswriters" are so notoriously prejudiced and one-sided that they cannot command faith, and even *they* are not unanimous about the bearing of the Rajah during the outbreak.

"Mr. Williams the Commissioner of Meerut, has reported that the Hindoos of Bijnour had attacked and beaten the Newab of Nujeelabad and had petitioned for the return of the Civil Officers to their posts, adding that they were holding and would hold their country for the Sirkar against all comers."—*Phœnix*, 15*th September*, 1857.

We wish that all such facts had been reported to Government, or if reported had been communicated to the public to allay the fever of excitement which was brought on by inflammatory exaggerations and interested inventions of the non-official class.

While we are prepared to give every praise to British patriotism, energy, endurance, skill and bravery, which have done so much to wrest British India from the iron grasp of the Sepoys, we still cannot blink the fact that all the resources of Great Britain, not to say of British India, would have availed little to crush the danger, had not the mass of the people rendered the most active and unflinching aid to the cause of order, and, where no assistance was offered, had not they remained singularly passive and to all appearances antagonistic to the revolt, and, what is equally important, did not the Native Princes and Potentates continue unflinchingly faithful in their alliance and firm in their attachment.*

* In the last number of the *Quarterly Review*, there is an article on India the authorship of which is generally attributed to the Neniveh Layard, the following passages occur :—

"It is principally to the fidelity and prudence of native princes and native statesmen that we owe the tranquility of a great part of Central and of Southern India, as it is to the courage and faithfulnes of two Sikh Chiefs, the Rajahs of Puttialla and of Jheend, that we owe the opportune aid of our first Sikh

Though the conduct of the British Government towards the Native States has been of late not very friendly or complaisant, and though against their independence and sovereignty successive Governors General, excepting at some rare intervals, have been intently engaged, still the chiefs, with true instinct and faith, have firmly remained by the English even when the chances were clearly and indubitably against the British. It is notorious that these princes have been from the day of their connexion with the British Government, subjected to a surveillance unknown in their history, which always barred the developement of their genius and policy, and the reins of which were relaxed only when particular Residents were open to pecuniary inducements or distinguished by a disposition which the higher civilization of Europe and enlightened international law ought to foster. They have had however the magnanimity to pass by the best opportunity that ever offered to avenge their grievances. They could have now easily retaliated their injuries and insults, practically demonstrated the

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levies. Salar Jung, the Minister of the Nizam of the Dekhan, acting under the able guidance of Colonel Davidson, the Resident at the Court of Hyderabad, restrained, at the imminent risk of his own life, a fanatical Mahommedan population eager for Christian blood. The steady devotion of Scindia and Holkar left the Mahrattas without a leader of skill or influence, and has hitherto rendered harmless that formidable race."

"No one acquainted with the course of recent events, will be inclined to doubt that we owe the maintenance of our rule in India to the fidelity of certain of the native princes such as the Nizam of the Dekhan, Scindia, Holkar, and the Rajah of Puttialla. Had either of them openly declared against us, no Englishman would probably have remained in the Peninsula. The Nizam would have carried with him the wavering populations of Southern and Central India, in either Scindia or Holkar the formidable Mahrattas would have found an hereditary chief of great influence, of youthful activity, and of no inconsiderable military abilities; the hostility of the Puttialla Rajah would have left us without those Sikh allies, by whose aid alone we have been able to subdue the rebellion in the north. These four princes, the Rajpoot chiefs who have remained for the most part neutral or indifferent spectators of the struggle, and one or two petty Rajahs are the only native rulers to whom we have left any shadow of their former independence, or over whom the doom of annexation is not actually pending. We do not include Nepaul, which is scarcely an Indian state, although the result of a wise policy and friendly relations with a native power have, in this instance, been remarkably illustrated."

morale of the annexation policy, which unfolded its terrible magnitude with the secession of every year and plucked the roots of their respective dynasties wider and wider, but no, their religious teachings and political convictions have directed them to a quite different course, contrary to the expectations of all political reasoners, but perfectly in keeping with the principles of Asiatic friendship. But the conduct of the Native allies were not simply neutral; were it such alone it would have been a tower of strength to the British Government. It was marked by as signal acts of assistance and protection as the emergency of the times required. "The Rajahs or Native Princes of the country," says the *Times*, "have shown a signal attachment to the British Government, and have supported promptly with their followers while the great land-holders themselves equivalent to the territorial lords, have without exception, been firm in their allegiance." Indeed if we take but a summary glance at the events of the last fifteen months, we shall find that there was scarcely a place saved or a victory won without some assistance in men, money or in provisions, of some neighbouring or distant Native potentate or some princely landowner. In the glory of the world-renowned triumph before Delhi which is said to have "broken the neck of the rebellion" the contingents of the Rajahs of Puttiallah and of Jheend had no mean share. Their fidelity, gallantry, and devotedness have been noticed in the highest terms of applause, both by Sir Archdale Wilson and by the Governor General in Council. The services of Jan Jishan Khan and Sirdar Meer Khan Shaib on that important occasion, were also of a character which justly elicited the admiration of Lord Canning. The promptness and unswerving good-will of the Maha Rajah of Gwalior saved Agra in the most critical period of the crisis. The friendship of this Prince has been subse-

quently tried by the hardest test known, and he has, as our readers are aware, wonderfully well stood the fiery ordeal. The Rajah of Rewah, though not subjected to equal difficulties, has given numerous proofs of fidelity and attachment under circumstances each of which was calculated to deter a less determined and firm spirit. Both the Nizam and the Holkar have continued admirably steady in attachment and have framed their policy with a tact and wisdom equal to the importance of the times. The services of the Minister of the Ghoorkhas, whom an officer serving with the besieging army in Delhi, calls "the truest and bravest soldiers in the British army" are so well known that any elaborable delineation of them would be a work of super-erogation. But it is not only as friends, supporting the British with aid and influence, that the Native allies will be mentioned by the future historian. Their own domestic administration, in this universal crisis, will be a lasting monument of their administrative skill, genius and wisdom. Our readers are aware that the effects of the Sepoy revolution were felt in all the corners of India. The Native States experienced this shock the greatest. These contained the elements of rebellion and disorder in a condition ready to burst. Both the people and the contingents belonging to some of the principal Native States, from whatever cause we shall not wait to consider, were not well disposed to the British Government. Their sympathies with the Rebel cause were also forestalled by the ties of blood, birth, and religion with the Sepoys. Mr. George Campbell calls the Sepoy revolt a Hindustani movement, and the best illustration of this theory is met with in the state of feeling among the contingent troops of the Native princes. Hence Hyderabad was during all the anxious period of the crisis a burning volcano, ready to throw up its liquid lava at the least commotion. More than once it approached to convulsion, but the superior mind, energy,

tact, and courage of Salar Jung, who has been justly characterized as the type of the educated natives, seconded by the friendly wishes of the Nizam and the Hydrabad Court generally, got over the crisis and restored the wonted calm. In *Chamber's Chronicle* of the Indian Revolt we find the following connected narrative of the position of affairs in the Nizam's territory :—

" The three Presidencies were all anxiously watching the state of feeling in the large and important country of Hyderabad, the dominions of the Nizam ; for that country borders on Nagpore on the north-east, while on the south-east and on the west it is conterminous with districts belonging to Madras and to Bombay respectively. Its two largest cities, Hyderabad, in the south-east portion, and Aurungabad in the north-west, contained many English families belonging to Military and Civil Servants of the Company ; or at least the families were at stations far not from those cities. By the turns of various treaties between the Nizam and the Company, the latter had the right of maintaining a large Military cantonment at Secunderabad a few miles north of Hyderabad city. This cantonment was three miles in length, and was well provided officer's bungalows and mess houses, European Barracks, Sepoy lines, Horse Artillery lines, Foot Artillery Barracks, Native Bazars, Parade ground, Hospitals, Arsenal, and all the other requisites for a large Military Station. The Cavalry lines are two miles north of the cantonment at Bowenpilly. The Military Station for the troops belonging to the Nizam and independent Sovereign was at Bolarum, somewhat further away from Hyderabad, but still within easy reach of Secunderabad. At the time of the Mutiny the British Resident at Hyderabad was placed in a position of some difficulty : At length there was collected a large force at Secunderabad, it comprised scarcely any British troops ; and therefore, if trouble arose, he could only look to defence from natives by natives. The capital of the Deccan, or the Nizam's territory, comprised within itself many elements of insecurity. The government and a large portion of the inhabitants were Mahome-

dans, the rabble of the city was numerous and ruthless; the Nizam's own was formed on the same model as the contingents which had so generally mutinied in Hindustan; the Company's own forces, as just mentioned, were almost entirely native; and the city and province were at all times thronged with predatory bands of Rohillas, Affghans, Ables, and other mercenaries, in the pay of the nobles and other Jagheerdars of the Hyderabad Court. It is almost certain that if the Nizam had turned against us, Southern India would have been in a blaze of insurrection; but he as faithful and his chief minister Salaar Jung, steadily supported him in all measures calculated to put down disturbance. The news of the rebel triumph at Delhi was set in tumultuous, the turbulent Mossulmans of Hyderabad; and it has been all observed that a single moment of indecision, a single act of impolicy, a single false step, or a single admission of weakness, might have turned Hyderabad into a Lucknow, and made a second Oude of Deccan. The Nizam, his prime Minister and the British Resident, brought all sagacity and firmness to bear on the duties of their respective offices, and thus the Deccan and Southern India were saved. What might have been the case under other circumstances was foreshadowed by the events of the 17th July. On the preceding day, intelligence was received at the Residency, which stands clear of the city, but at the distance of some few miles from the British cantonment at Secunderabad, and the mob in the city was much excited, and that a scheme was on foot to press the Nizam to attack the Residency. Notice was sent from the Residency to Salaar Jung, and preparations were made. Early in the evening on the 17th, a Rohilla rabble stole forth from the city, and made for the residency. An express was at once sent off to cantonments for aid; and in the meantime the guard, with three guns; and when Cavalry and Horse Artillery arrived at Secunderabad, the Rohillas received a total discomfiture. This was almost the only approach to a mutiny that occurred in the portion of the Deccan near the Carnatic frontier.

Aurungabad on the Bombay sides of the Nizam's dominions, was, in regard to mutinies less important than Hyderabad, because more easily accessible for European troops; but more important in

so far as the Sepoy Regiments of Malowah and Rajpootanah were nearer at hand to be affected by evil temptation. The city is about seventy miles distant from Ahmednuggur, and a hundred and seventy fromBombay. Uneasiness prevailed here so early as June. The 1st Cavalry and the 2nd Infantry of the Corps called the Hyderabad Contingent, were stationed at Aurungabad, and of these the former skewed signs of disaffection : Captain Abbot commanding the Regiment, found on the morning of the 13th, that his men were murmuring and threatening, as if unwilling to act against mutineers elsewhere; indeed they had sworn to murder their officers if any attempt were made to employ them in that way. Fortunately the Rassaldars—each being a Native Captain of a troop of Cavalry, and there being therefore as many Rassaldars in a regiment as there were troops or companies, remained faithful; and Captain Abbot with Lieutenant Dowker were enabled to discuss with these officers the state of the regiment. The Rassaldars assured the Captain that many of the troops had begun to talk loudly about the king of Delhi as their rightful ruler. The Resident at the Court of the Nizam, through the Military Secretary Major Briggs, advised Captain Abbot, seeing that no aid could be expected from any other quarter—to speak in as conciliatory a tone as possible to the men, and to promise them that they should not be required to act against the insurgents at Delhi, provided they would be obedient to other orders. Quiet was in this way restored, but it being a dangerous precedent thus to allow troops to decide where and against whom they would choose to fight. Major General Woodburn, who had been placed in command of a moveable column from Bombay, marched through Ahmednuggur to Arungabad. This column consisted of the 28th Bombay Native Infantry, the 14th Dragoon, Captain Woolcombe's battery, and a pontoon train, when Woodburn arrived, he found that the ladies all left the Arungabad Station, that the officers were being barricaded in the Mess-room, and that all the Nizam's troops exhibited unfavourable symptoms. The first Native Cavalry when confronted with Woodburn's troops, behaved in a very daring way; and about a hundred of them made off, owing to the unwillingness of the general

to open fire upon them, although Abbot and Woolcombe saw the importance of so doing.

In the country North of Bombay and between it and Malwah many slight events occurred, sufficient to show that the native troops were in an agitated state as if oscilating between the opposite principles of fidelity and treachery. It was worthy of note, however, that the troops thus affected were, in very few instances those belonging to the Company's Bombay Army; they were generally contingent corps, or Mahrattas or Rajputs, or men imbued with the same ideas as the Hindustanis and Oudians. Towards the close of July, a few troopers of the Gugerat irregular horse endeavoured to incite their companions to mutiny, they failed and then decamped; but were pursued and captured, and then hung in presence of their own Regiment."—*Chambers' Chronicle of the Indian Revolt.*

But the whole history of the Hyderabad crisis has been given in a well-written article in the *Friend of India*, from which we quote the following passages :—

"All who were in India in May, June, and July of 1857, recollect the intense anxiety with which our position at Hyderabad was viewed and watched. It was by far the most influential Native State in India, and there the Mahomedan element was known to be most powerfully predominant. The means of striking a deadly blow at our power, were not only present, but more united than elsewhere in India. It was not only that the population of Hyderabad estimated at 300,000 might at any moment rise, but that the movement might be aided by Arabs, Rohillas, Patans and other mercenaries, whose power had been known long before the rebellion, and who had always been closely watched by our own Government. The jealousy of our existence in India which was felt by those tribes, had often been openly manifested, and at any time was barely concealed. Would they resist such an opportunity as the rebellion in the North of India offered? Would the Hyderabad Contingent be safe? Might it not join, as other Contingents were joining, the general sedition? and if it did, was it not from its superior orga-

nization and power in Cavalry (the best in India), specially to be dreaded? If Hyderabad went, would not the Deccan—the Southern Mahratta country, and the Madras Presidency go too? That any disaffection, however slight, would have added immense complication to the general affairs of the period was but too evident. We had no European Troops with which the Deccan could be reinforced: there were but too weak battalions of European Infantry in the Madras Presidency: and if disorganization had followed the events of May, or mutiny had broken out at Hyderabad, it is evident that it might have extended to the people of the Bombay and Madras Presidencies, and possibly, in a great measure, to the armies of both. Not a mail then arrived from England, in which there were not the most fearful anticipations of evil from Hyderabad: and who can say that they were light or unfounded? We, who weekly recorded the simple fact that Hyderabad was as yet safe, did so, we own, with deep misgivings, which we dared hardly to have expressed openly.

In addition to the city, there were four large districts representing a population of upwards of three millions of people, which had been lately ceded to British management. The cession had been an unpalatable measure to the late Nizam, and it was an additional cause of dread therefore, as to whether the people would even continue to obey their few and sparely scattered officers, and whether disturbances might not arise in them to distract attention, and impede that concentration of power which was needed elsewhere.

Let us therefore review how these elements of profound danger were controlled: and how they were not only controlled, but changed in character; and eventually became, under the able guidance of one man, elements of positive strength to the British cause in India. The Punjab, a British province, administered by an English Officer of vigorous character, became, as we have already shewn, an active and powerful means of strength. Hyderabad could not be so entirely turned to account. It was a native state and its physical resources were not available: but its partially active exertion, its entire tranquillity, and direct moral influence in our favor, constituted together an element of strength, which is entitled to its full meed of recognition and acknowledgment, and may stand fairly in its own

degree, beside the more brilliant, though scarcely more vital aid derived from the Punjab.

The conduct of this Court was the hinge on which the whole of the events South of the Nerbudda turned; and we may say now that the danger is past, that had a Jehad or holy war been proclaimed by the people, or by the head of the State: had the young sovereign been deluded by the Priests of his faith, or been dazzled by the prospect of enlarging his power for an hour, nothing could have averted that outbreak from Hyderabad, eastwards, westwards and to the south, the prospect and effect of which we have already contemplated.

At an early period after the outbreak of the 10th May, and when it was apparent that a powerful rebellion was organized in Hindostan: when Delhi had once more assumed importance as well from the position of the King as from temporary strength: when for a time, murder was successful to a degree hardly anticipated by the most sanguine of the Delhi party, when troops, treasure, and material of war were abundantly provided—it was clear that the Deccan largely sympathized with the movement. At Poona and Bombay, at Belgaum and Kolapoor, at Bangalore and Kurnool, as well as at Hyderabad, intrigue and sedition were actively busy: and the consequences of any contemporary success, anywhere within this area, would have been most momentous. It is true, that owing to the fearless bearing, the sagacity, and the precautions of Lord Elphinstone, the intrigues in the Bombay Presidency were crushed as they appeared; but his exertions, able and remarkable as they were, would have availed little, had the Hyderabad Durbar been avowedly hostile. We may briefly notice the chief local native authorities at Hyderabad on whose conduct events in a great degree hinged.

Just as the rebellion commenced, the present Nizam Afzul-oo-Doolah ascended the Musnud. Hitherto, like all princes of his race, he had lived in the Zenana. He was utterly unversed in public affairs of any kind, and was known to be susceptible to the advice of intriguing Fakeers, precisely the classes from which the most dangerous counsel was to be apprehended. Europeans were personally unknown to him except by repute, which was perhaps un

favourable. His personal character was unknown, because untried, and his feelings and those qualities or impressions which his advisers could turn to loyal account, had to be ascertained, or were to be developed by circumstances. Here therefore was no solid ground for action, or for supposing that he would withstand the temptations of the period, beyond an hereditary conviction that in alliance with Europeans lay the safety of his dominion.

Fortunately there were others on whom dependance could be placed. The Nizam's maternal grand uncle Shumsh-ool-Oomra, an aged man, possessed influence with his nephew. His counsels now were to preserve good faith and amity with the British Government. They were exerted with the happiest effect, not only on the Nizam himself, but on the most bigotted and fanatical party in Hyderabad, of which, from religious motives, Shumsh-ool-Oomra was the ostensible and acknowledged head. It was fortunate too, that from a friendship of many years' duration, he had a high personal esteem and respect for the Resident Colonel Davidson; and this, by the Resident's tact was admirably turned to account. Notwithstanding that disaffected persons thronged to his palace by day and night, and used threats, entreaties, and even imprecations to induce him to turn against the English cause :—notwithstanding that members of his own family were avowedly bitterly opposed to him in this crisis,—he never swerved : his answer to all was, "you know not what you are proposing : after an experience of more than fifty years, I tell you that there is no person in India that can resist the British power, nor does the Almighty render aid to those who massacre women and children. Formerly the men of Hindostan waged war only with men."

The Minister of the State was Salar Jung, a young man, well educated, whose sympathies by education, and we may perhaps add, interests also, were on the side of the British. For this position he was hated, nay execrated by the revolutionary and fanatical party. His assassination was meditated as an enemy to the State and to the Mussulman faith. Subtle intrigues were laid against his power, and in local affairs he was opposed by Shumsh-ool-Oomra and his sons. But in his line of conduct from first to last there was no wavering

or tottering. The Jehad or holy war against infidels, was an object scarcely concealed by highly influential parties in the capital, and on several occasions was proclaimed by the rabble. At any time an impulse difficult to control, it was rendered doubly so by reports of the discomfiture, ruin, and massacre of the English in Hindostan which were proclaimed with insulting exultation. Thus sorely pressed, the Minister never flinched from his duty, or wavered in his truth. He held the Arabs with him, or a large section of them. With them he guarded the city, prevented tumultuous assemblies, and controlled the populace. Finding that open violence would not succeed, the disaffected conspired in secret, and the result was the outbreak and attack on the Residency of the 17th July, which if successful would have involved the destruction of the Minister as well as of the Resident.

It was thus by the firm conduct of two individuals of the Hyderabad nobility, that an outbreak of an universal character was averted. Had they been treacherous, or lukewarm in their course of conduct,—had both, in their several degrees of influence, not acted so as to shew the Nizam unmistakeably his true policy, had not both possessed commanding influence with the Arabs and other mercenaries, we cannot doubt that the attack of the 17th July would have only been the prelude to scenes like those of Cawnpore and Lucknow.

It boots not now to enquire whether the Native regular Troops at Hyderabad were then staunch or not. The impression was, that disaffection very strongly pervaded the whole of the subsidiary force, and only required a leader, or temporary success anywhere to break into open violence. There is no doubt they were actively canvassed and tempered with by emissaries of sedition. On one occasion of a non-official visit to Shumsh-ool-Oomra by the Resident, men of the escort openly shouted to, and harangued the most dangerous and fanatic portion of the city populace then assembled at Shumsh-ool-Oomra's house. Emissaries from the city were busy in the Cantonments, and for a long time it seemed doubtful whether the troops would resist the corrupting influence so freely, and so constantly exercised. Can it be said, or hoped, they would have done so, had the Nizam and his nobles, the mercenaries and

the Moulvies with their rabble risen en masse, and raised the Jehád and the country with it ? We fear not. That an impression, false or true, prevailed that the Troops were *not* staunch ; that the Resident's escort would fraternize with an *actual* movement, there seems little reason to doubt. Had this not been the case so small a force would never had attacked the Residency. The result undeceived the conspirators. The detachment on duty at the Residency under the command of Major Briggs was staunch, the local arrangements by that officer were excellent, and the attacking party of Rohillas, led by Toora Baz Khan, the most notorious ruffian of the Deccan, was repulsed by grape. Expecting assistance it was staggered by the cool reception it met with, and there was no further attempt at violence.

But apprehension did not cease here, on the contrary, it was most probable as times wore on that this was only the prelude to a further and better organized attempt. Reports of successful atrocities in other places were frequent, nor had we as yet assumed any attitude, or begun any operations, suited to the emergency, or calculated to stem the tide of opinion against us. It was argued and with apparent truth, that the Nizam's Government might have prevented the attack had it chosen to do so : that the Minister and the Nizam could not, even if they desired it, control their own people and that the disaffected party in the city were stronger and bolder than before. Toora Baz Khan was apprehended and tried, but a decree of death could not be obtained against him, because he had undertaken a Jehád against Infidels ! and he was not executed. All these were additional subjects for anxiety and apprehension.

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The firm attitude of the Resident gave the Minister new heart. He brought up his own troops into the city in large numbers, and took up positions to overawe and crush any seditious disposition or attempt during the Mohurrum. These troops were faithful *because confidently directed*, and if there had been hope, or intention of insurrection, the opportunity was allowed to slip. The local arrangements in the cantonment were admirable—and the dreaded Mohurrum passed off even more quietly than usual.

Thus reviewing the whole course of local events from May till the fall of Delhi, we consider that the prevention of seditious outbreak at Hyderabad by the patient fortitude, political sagacity, and calm resolution of the Resident Colonel Davidson, ranks as high in the scale of eminent and useful service in the time of trial, as those more outwardly brilliant and apparently more noticeable actions in the field which fell to the lot of other officers. It will not do, now that, as we trust, all danger is past, to lessen the obligations attached to those services, by saying there was but trifling excitement at any time.

Nor would we be thought indifferent to the claims of those who so nobly and so disinterestedly seconded the efforts of the Resident. The Nizam, the Minister Salar Jung, and Shumsh-ool-Oomra each in their several degrees deserve the grateful acknowledgment of their services, which we trust will be specially conveyed to them by the Queen herself. If there be any mode more cordial, more effective than another, personal decoration, or in the Minister's case guarantee of power, estates and office, for which we have many precedents, we shall gladly see it bestowed. In any case official silence, or cold indifference would be inexcusable."—*Friend of India.*

We are however not in a position to affirm the extent to which the courage, prudence and tact of the Political Resident contributed to the preservation of order and the quietting of the turbulent elements in Hyderabad. If we are to weigh in the scale the mass of proofs and reflections which almost the whole Madras Press has produced against Col. Davidson, with the glowing passages of the *Friend of India,* we should naturally qualify our opinion of the Resident. He may have displayed extraordinary courage, abilities, self-control and promptitude of thought and action, but where opinions are so conflicting and where there are no sufficient data before us, we cannot express a different judgment from what we have done. It is however, exceedingly gratifying to observe that with regard to the noble feeling of the Nizam, the statesmanlike

conduct of the Minister, and the friendly advices and exertions of Shumsh-ool-Omrah and other Courtiers, there is but one opinion—viz., that they have by their energy, decision, promptitude, and friendliness conducted Central India safe through a too imminent crisis which would have terminated with the dismemberment and desolation of whole Hindoostan.

With regard to Gwallior and Indore, the Chronicler gives the following narrative :—

"Still further northward lies the country which, under the various names of Scindias' territory, Holkars' territory, Malwah, and Bhopaul, has already been described as the chief seat of the Mahratta power, and which corresponds pretty nearly with the region marked out by the Company's Officials as Central India. We have seen in former pages that Scindia, chief of the Mahratta State of which Gwallior is the capital, offered the aid of his Contingent army to Mr. Colvin, in May ; that Lieutenant Cockburn, with half a cavalry regiment of his Contingent, rendered good service in the region around Agra, until the troopers deserted him ; that the fidelity of Scindia to the British alone prevented his troops generally from joining the rebels, for they belonged to the same Hindustani and Oudian families, though serving a Mahratta prince in a Mahratta State, that after certain detachments had mutinied at Neemuch and elsewhere, the main body rose in revolt at Gwallior on the 14th of June, murdered some of the English officers, drove away the rest with their families, and formally threw off all allegiance to the Company, all that Maharajah Scindiah, under circumstances of great difficulty and peril, managed to keep peace at Gwallior—retaining and feeding the troops at that place and yet the discountenancing the mutinous tendencies against the British. If he had not acted with much tact and judgment, the Gwallior Contingent would have marched to Agra in a body, and greatly imperiled the British Rajah. Not only did he keep those troublesome troops near him during the remaining half of June but also during July and August. Scindiah's special army,

entirely under his own control, were chiefly Marhattas who had little sympathy with the soldiers of the Contingent; but they were too few in number to put down the latter, and therefore he was forced to temporise—partly by persuations and promises—partly by threats. Major Macpherson, the British Political Agent, and Brigadier Ramsey, the Military Commandant, ceased to have influence at Gwallior, it was Scindias' good faith alone that stood the British in stead.

Holkars' Marhatta territory with Indore for its chief city, we have, in like manner, seen to be troubled with a mutinous spirit in the Contingent troops, partly owing to temptation from other quarters. We have briefly shewn in the chapters lately cited, that on the 28th of May, the 15th and 30th Bengal Native Infantry revolted at Nusseerabad, that on the 2nd June influenced by this pernicious example, the 72nd Bengal Native Infantry, the 7th Regiment of Gwallior Contingent Infantry, and the main body of the 1st Bengal Native Cavalry, mutinied at Neemuch, that on the 1st of July a portion of Holkars Contingent rose against the British at Indore, without his wish or privity, and that he could not get even his own special troops to act against those of the Contingent; that on the evening of the same day, the 23rd Bengal Native Cavalry mutinied at Mhow; and that numerous British officers and families were thrown into great misery by these several occurrences. It now remains to be stated that during July and August, Holkar adopted, nearly the same course as Scindiah, he remained faithful to the British, and endeavoured to quell the mutinous spirit among his troops. Holkar possessed, however, less influence than his brother-Chieftain; most of the mutineers from Indore and Mhow marched to Gwallior, and were only prevented by the shrewdness of Scindia, from extending their march to Agra.

Among the troops in Rajpootanah were the Deesa Field Brigade, commanded towards the close of August by Brigadier Creagh, who had under his control the troops at Deesa, those at the Sanitarium on Mount Abboo, and those at Erinpoorah and other places in the neighbourhood. These places were thrown into confusion during the last two weeks of the month, by the mutiny of the Jhodepore

legion, consisting partly of Cavalry and partly of Infantry. Such of these men as were stationed at Erinpoora about 550 in number, rose on mutiny on the 22nd. They suddenly threw off their allegiance off; seized the guns; made prisoners of Lieutenant Conolly and the European Serjeants, plundered the bazar and some of the native villages, burned all the Officers' Bungalows, and destroyed or appropriated all that they found therein; lived in tents on the parade ground for three days and then marched off in the direction of Nusserabad. The Cavalry, although forming part of the same legion, and sharing in the movement, protected the Europeans from the Infantry. Among the latter, it was only the Hindustanee portion which revolted, there were some Bheels in the legion who remained faithful. On the preceding day, 21st, about 100 men of the legion had mutinied at Mount Abboo, but as there was a detachment of H. M. 83rd, there the mutineers did nothing but hastily escape. A native Chieftain the Rao of Sihori, was prompt to render any aid he could to Captain Hall at mount Abboo. Another portion of the Jhodepore legion was at Jhodepore itself, where the mutiny placed in great peril. Captain Monck Mason, British resident at that native State, by his energy he provided an asylum for many ladies and children who had been driven from other stations, but he himself fell by the swords of a body of mutinous troopers, under circumstances of mingled cowardice and brutality.

The state of this part of India during July and August may be summed up in a few words. By the revolt of the Contingents of Scindia, Holkar, and Bhopaul, and of the Jhodepore legion, English residents were driven from station to station in much peril and suffering, and English influence became for a time, almost a nullity; but the native Chieftains for the most, remained faithful, even though their troops revolted; and there were hopes of ultimate success from the arrival of relieving columns belonging to the Bombay Army. Of that army a fragment of regiments occasionally displayed mutinous symptoms but not to such a degree as to leaven the whole mass. What the Officers felt through the treachery of the troops, and what their families suffered during all

these strange events, need not again to be described, both phases of the revolt have received many illustrations in former pages ; but this Chapter may fittingly close with two short extracts from letters relating to the mutinies at the stations of Mhow and Indore. An Artillery Officer commenting on the ingratitude of the Sepoys towards Commanders who had always used them well, said : I must not forget to mention that Colonel Platt was like a father to the men ; and that when he had opportunity of leaving them and joining a European Corps last summer, the men petitioned him to stay. He had been upwards of thirty years with them, and when the mutiny took place he had so much confidence in them that he rode up to their lines before we could get out. When we found him next morning, both cheeks were blown off, his back completely riddled with balls, one through each thigh, his chin smashed into his mouth, and three sabre cuts between the cheek-bone and temple, also a cut across the shoulder and the back of the neck. The following few words are from the letters of a lady who was among those that escaped death by flight from Indore : " I have already given you an account of our three days and three nights of wandering, with little rest and not much food, no clothes to change, burning sun, and deluges of rain, but————and I, perhaps, could bear these things better than others, and suffered less. We found kind friends here and I am in Messrs.————clothes ; every thing we had being gone. The destructive wretches, after we left Indore, commenced doing all the damage they could—cutting up carpets with their tulwars, smashing chandeliers, marble tables, slabs, chairs &c., they even cut out the cloth and lining of our carriages hacking of the wood-work. The residency is uninhabitable and almost all have lost every thing. I might have saved a few things in the hour and a half that elapsed between the out-break and our retreat ; but I had so relied on some of our defenders, and left so secure of holding on, that flight never for a moment occured to me."—*Chambers' Chronicle of the Indian Revolt.*

But subsequent events show that the rebellious spirit of the contingent troops were too powreful for all that

the Scindiah could devise to allay it. His Highness was obliged to quit his capital, and the wretched Nana succeeded, happily for a time only, to seat his brother on the Guddee. British arms have afterwards regained the kingdom, but the event marks the friendly disposition of the Maharajah, with a force bordering romance. The following article from the *Friend of India* which is a well-written commentary on the friendship of Scindiah, gives a succinct history of the preparations for restoration made by His Highness's faithful subjects and the British Government, pretty well indicating the feeling with which this important event was viewed by them.

"GWALLIOR.—The storm in Central India so long expected has burst at last, and we have for the moment lost a State as powerful as Oude. Serious however as is the occurrence there are considerations which seem to be forgotten, and when if they do not remove at least diminish the danger of the event. The facts, omitted from the bulletins, and not very carefully collated in the papers, are still sufficiently distinct. Sir Hugh Rose who had been instructed to attack Culpee from the Gwallior side found himself compelled to attack from the direction of his march. The main body of the rebels therefore when all hope had ceased fled towards Gwallior, outmarching our troops at the rate of about twenty-five miles a day. Their leader Tantia Topee moved even more rapidly, and appears almost unattended to have arrived in Gwallior by the 26th May. There he drew round him the dicontented, announced the pretensions of the Nana to the Peishwahship and succeeded in organizing a formidable intrigue. How he escaped the vigilance of the Durbar it is not difficult to guess. Scindiah's fidelity so often questioned has, it is true, at last been proved by his misfortune. Whatever his desire he certainly did not wish for deposition, or to contest his hereditary sovereignty with a Marhatta parvenu. He must however have been deceived, and we should regard with extreme suspicion any stories of compulsion put upon such of his officers as remain. On the 30th the rebels, about 5,000 strong, were reported in full

march upon the capital, and Scindiah sending off an urgent requisition for Europeans, moved at the head of his own forces to the attack. He had with him apparently two regiments of Infantry, twelve hundred Cavalry, his Paigar or personal guard, and some guns. The force was sufficient for victory, but almost in the commencement of the action the intrigues of Tantia Topee became apparent. The left division threw down their arms and fled. The right followed their example, the guns were surrendered, and the battle was left to the Body Guard alone. As in the almost similar circumstances at Indore, the Guard never wavered, they charged three times, and if as reported they left six hundred of their number dead upon the field, their courage was only surpassed by their fidelity. The odds however, were too great. They were outflanked, cut up, and scattered, and the Maharajah was at last compelled to fly. With only 50 followers he fled towards Agra, which he reached on the 3rd instant, escorted by a troop of British horse. The rebels then marched on Gwallior which was surrendered without a stroke, and proceeded to organize a Government on the spot. The Nana was proclaimed Maharajah, and acknowledged at a general parade. The green flag has been unfurled,—an odd ensign for the Hindoo usurper of a Mahratta State—the treasury plundered, Rao Ram, a disgraced official, appointed premier, and the bankers and more respectable inhabitants placed under a reign of terror.

Efforts were also made to strengthen the fort. This place though naturally strong, being built on the top of an isolated rock is partially in ruins. The walls are crumbling down while the enormous extent of the works renders their defence at all points almost impossible. It is not moreover like Dowlutabad absolutely impregnable when defended by brave men, the ascent being still practicable for elephants. All round, the plain affords every facility for the operations of Cavalry, and if the rebels venture to stand a siege, escape will be almost impossible. They must die there or evacuate the fort before the arrival of the British now hard upon their heels.

Eight hundred of the 3rd Europeans, 300 of Meade's horse and four guns have been despatched from Agra, while the Culpee force is in full march in the same direction. By the 4th it was at In-

doorkee, waiting for the first Brigade which had been detained at Jaloun, and on the junction of the three detachments, the force will comprise nearly three European Regiments, the 14th dragoons, a strong body of Hyderabad and Irregular Cavalry, some European Sappers, a siege train, and three troops of Horse Artillery. Sir Hugh Rose who was lying sick at Cawnpore, has recovered his strength, and his arrival doubles the strength of the besiegers. Effective resistance to such a force would appear to be almost impossible. The enemy will be shelled out of their fort, and cut to pieces by the Cavalry without a hope of retreat.

Even however should they succeed in making good their defences for a time, the evil, serious as it is, is not without compensation. The instinct of the scoundrels now swarming in Bundelcund, Etawah, and the districts nearer Agra, is to converge to any centre which promises a momentary immunity. If the contest last they will swarm out of our territories, leaving us a free base of action, and those means of re-organization so cruelly required. It is not the concentration but the dispersion of our enemies which is dangerous, and their accumulation in Gwallior where they can be attacked from four sides at once would be a movement rather favourable than embarrassing. It is the more advantageous because in Gwallior we have the allies so greatly missed in our own provinces. Scindiah, though taken by surprise, is not yet powerless. A strong party are still decidedly in his favour, and his Mahratta Sirdars are said to be arming in his behalf. The villagers in Gwallior bring in supplies with a readiness not exhibited in Oude, and on their assistance depends the accurate and minute information our quarter masters so perpetually fail to collect. The extortions already practised, the excessive cruelty displayed by Tantia Topee throughout Bundelcund, and the constant sense of insecurity must ultimately alienate the population. With their assistance, passive though it may be, the force now advancing ought in the very worst case to reinstate Scindiah in too months."—*Friend of India.*

On receiving this gloomy intelligence the public mind in Great Britain was also much affected. England bemoan-

ed the deposition of perhaps her greatest and truest Indian ally with a feeling which was honorable to both. We take the following from the *Times*, which without exaggeration speaks out the national mind with regard to this sad occurrence :—

When the mutinies broke out Scindia and Holkar, whose territories are conterminous and closely adjacent to the disturbed districts, remained faithful to our cause, and the former, who was by far the more powerful of the two, displayed considerable judgment as well as loyalty in the policy he pursued. In virtue of the arrangements subsisting between himself and the British Government, he maintained from the revenues of his principality a compact and well-disciplined force of more than 5,000 men as a "Contingent" available in aid of the Bengal Army. This force now so notorious under the name of the Gwallior Contingent, was organized and officered exactly like our own Sepoy Regiments and proved true to its model in all respects by joining in the mutiny at a very early period. At that time when the safety of British India for the moment trembled in the balance, the proceedings of the Gwallior Contingent were of the utmost consequence, for the march of so strong and well equipped a body upon Delhi, Agra, or Lucknow, might have given a disastrous impulse to the course of affairs. Scindia's measures were taken with great ability. Like other native princes in his position, he retained in his pay, and under his independent control, a certain military force over and above the contingent due to the Bengal establishment and this force he played off against the mutineers. In strength and organization it was decidedly inferior to the contingent, but he augmented it as effectually as the crisis admitted, and as the traitors were vascillating and irresolute, he succeeded for some time in paralyzing their movements, though he never hazarded an engagement with them. In the end the mutinous contingent marched away and took post, as our readers know, at Calpee, but the moment of peril was now past, and the formidable Gwallior force never gave us any trouble, except in the attack made upon

General Windham at Cawnpore. The sequel however, of these proceedings, as now announced, is not a little extraordinary.

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It is by no means probable that this fortunate piece of audacity will yield the rebels any material advantage, but the event may well be regarded as bringing definitely under notice the merits of the Prince whose loyalty has now caused his actual expulsion from his capital. We can well afford to recompense with a liberal hand such examples of fidelity. If these mutinies have given us any lesson at all, they have taught us that Native Princes, instead of being our natural enemies in India, are likely to be our best supporters, nor is their support any the less desirable because it may be based on motives of self-interest.

* * * * * *

Holkar, also, like Scindia, though in a less conspicuous degree, has been our steady ally, and the Rajah of Puttiallah rendered us services of such critical importance that it would be hard to exaggerate them. Delhi, the scene of our life and death grapple, stands midway between Puttiallah and Gwallior, and while Scindia was neutralizing the treason of the contingent, the Puttiallah chief, on the other side, was contributing his utmost to the sustenance and reinforcement of Sir Archdale Wilson's army. It is to this Rajah, and to others in the same district, that we are indebted for our supplies during the seige, and for the facilities of communication which enabled the requisite succours to come down from the Punjaub. To remunerate these chieftains with becoming munificence, would be an act not only of justice but of prudence, for they have shown themselves able not only to appreciate British rule, but to support it sagaciously and courageously in times of peril."—*Times*, 21*st July*, 1858.

It is gratifying to state that the restoration of the Scindiah was as prompt as the political and moral effects staked in it were weights. The Governor General's notifi-

cation announcing the event, is a worthy of record of the achievement :—

"*Fort William, Foreign Department, the 25th June*, 1858.

Notification.—The Hon'ble the President in Council is pleased to direct the republication of the following General Order by the Right Hon'ble the Governor General :—

No. 1855.

GENERAL ORDER BY THE RIGHT HON'BLE THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Foreign Department, Allahabad, the 24th June, 1858.

The Right Hon'ble the Governor General has the highest gratification in announcing that the Town and Fort of Gwallior were conquered by Major-General Sir Hugh Rose, on the 19th instant, after a general action, in which the rebels, who had usurped the authority of Maharajah Scindia, were totally defeated. On the 20th June, the Maharajah Scindia, attended by the Governor General's Agent for Central India, and Sir Hugh Rose, and escorted by British Troops, was restored to the palace of his ancestors, and was welcomed by his subjects with every mark of loyalty and attachment. It was on the 1st June that the rebels, aided by the treachery of some of Maharajah Scindia's Troops, seized the Capital of His Highness' Kingdom, and hoped to establish a new Government under a Pretender in His Highness' Territory. Eighteen days had not elapsed before they were compelled to evacuate the Town and Fort of Gwallior and to relinquish the authority which they had endeavoured to usurp. The promptitude and success with which the strength of the British Government has been put forth for the restoration of its faithful Ally to the capital of his territory, and the continued presence of British Troops at Gwallior to support His Highness in the re-establishment of his administration, offer to all a convincing proof that the British Government has the will and the power to befriend those who, like Maharajah Scindia, do

not shrink from their obligation or hesitate to avow their loyalty. The Right Hon'ble the Governor General, in order to mark his appreciation of the Maharajah Scindia's friendship, and his gratification at the re-establishment of His Highness' authority in his ancestral dominions, is pleased to direct that a Royal Salute shall be fired at every principal Station in India.

By order of the Right Hon'ble the Governor General of India.

(Signed) G. F. EDMONSTONE,
Secy. to the Govt. of India,
with the Govr. Genl.

By order of the Hon'ble the President in Council.

CECIL BEADON.
Offg. Secy. to the Govt. of India."

The following relates about the services rendered by the Nawab of Kurnaul :—

"Mr. LeBas, the Judge of Delhi, after undergoing the greatest peril, escaped from that city to Kurnaul. Soon after his arrival during the interval that preceded the advance of our troops from Umballah viâ Kurnaul, and just as the defection became known when we had no military force near Kurnaul, and all men watched anxiously the conduct of each local chief, the Nawab of Kurnaul came to Mr. LeBas and addressed him to the following effect :—

"Sir, I have spent a sleepless night in meditating on the state of affairs : I have decided to throw in my lot with yours. My sword, my purse, and my followers at your disposal."

So well did he act up to the engagement thus made, that after the fall of Delhi, a testimonial was put into his hand by Mr. LeBas, equally honorable to both. As a mark of regard, the Judge gave the Nawab his favorite horse, and a letter of thanks for his public services.

Amongst other marks of devotion to our cause, the Nawab had raised a troop of one hundred horse, armed and equipped on the model of the Punjaub mounted Police Corps. I can speak for

their efficiency, as some of these men escorted me, under a Native Officer, connected with the Nawab, from Kurnaul to Benares.

I consider the conduct of this Mahomedan Nobleman to deserve special commendation, and I trust that he has received suitable reward. Other Mahomedan talookdars no doubt professed loyalty, and in some instances, did good service, but few so entirely identified themselves with the cause which in May, 1857, was generally considered by the people the losing one. Many who have received great credit for loyalty, were mere watchers of the event—as polite to the mutineers as to us, or as the natives expressed it, keeping their feet in both stirrups. My old friend at Kurnaul was an honorable exception."—*Raiks' Revolt of the North West Provinces.*

We have already alluded to the services of the Maharajah of Puttiallah, and we quote the following from the *Lahore Chronicle*, giving a very gratifying account of the fidelity of His Highness which was of a more distinguished character than the reader would be prepared to credit :—

"The services of the Chiefs of the Cis-Sutlej States, which were noticed in our columns the other day, deserve at our hands some thing more than passing acknowledgment, and when we have had to record time after time, acts of perfidy and black villainy on the part of too many whom gratitude or interest should have bound to our cause, it is a pleasing task to turn from such scenes to the contemplation of the fidelity and zealous friendship displayed by the Chiefs of the Sikh nation at the present time.

The steady alliance and hearty co-operation of the Maharajah of Puttiallah is not now recorded for the first time. It is a matter of history how faithfully his ancestors have adhered to the treaty drawn up between Sir C. Metcalfe and the reigning chief of the time. This fidelity, though sorely tried, has never been shaken. Lord Dalhousie has recorded in his letters to Sir Charles Napier his opinion of the staunchness of our ally which was shewn in the most unmistakeable manner, and from the commencement of the present rebellion, his acts have been such as we might from his antecedents have confidently expected.

Immediately on the news of the Delhi massacre reaching the Commissioner of Umballah, he at once sent for the Rajah of Puttiallah, with whom he held consultation which resulted in the united forces of Puttiallah and Jheend being pushed forward almost to the gates of Delhi, thus saving the country between Umballah and the rebel city from falling a prey to anarchy and plunder. His soldiers have been called upon to render service in Saharunpore. They have aided in recovering the lost territory of Hissar and Sirssa, whilst throughout the length and breadth of the Cis-Sutlej States properly so called, his horsemen and foot soldiers are to be seen in every direction. Whilst aiding us with men, he has not been backward in supplying the real sinews of war, and we hear that he has placed several lakhs of rupees at the disposal of our Government. We have heard too of his princely liberality to the unfortunate fugitives who were rescued mainly through his exertion, from the murderous clutches of the Hissar villains. He fed and clothed and entirely equipped them and gave a general order throughout his dominions that they were to be treated with utmost respect and kindness.

Such facts as these deserve prominent notice and require some recognition at the hand of the British public who will only require to understand the position he holds with regard to us, fully to appreciate the services rendered. That strenuous endeavours were made to corrupt the fidelity of the Maharajah of Puttiallah, we have good authority for believing, and at the outset he had grave doubts of the fealty of some of his own soldiers. But that he himself never entertained one iota of hostility we have equal good authority for asserting, and the remarkable alacrity which he displayed in our cause, speaks sufficiently for itself and requires no further comment. The importance to the British rule of the fidelity of this Prince cannot be overrated. Had he proved untrue, the whole of the country between the Jumna and Sutlej would have risen *en masse*, and if the European force at Umballah had not been annihilated, it would at best have only been able to fight its way back to the Punjab. And if the Sikhs in the Cis-Sutlej had turned against us, who dare say what the result would have been. Suffice it to point out that the

road to Delhi would have been closed to our reinforcements, and if this were all, the evil would then have been considered small to what might be expected. But we rejoice to record the fidelity of our ally and would desire prominently to bring forward such instances as this of friendly co-operation, in the hope that they may receive some suitable acknowledgment.

It is not our desire or province at present to urge on the Government the consideration of the reward which is to be given for faithful service rendered. This may be safely deferred till Delhi is taken, but we trust that the British public and our gracious Queen will not be slow to recognize the aid rendered to Englishmen in the hour of need. There are other things dear to men of high feeling, besides lands and money, and we will venture to affirm that an honorary title and the thanks of the British Parliament could not be more suitably bestowed, or more gratefully appreciated by any than the Maharajahs of Puttiallah and Jheend.

In putting forth prominently the services of the Maharajah of Puttiallah we only do justice to our ally. He is at the head of the Sikh confederacy, is confessedly the most powerful of the Chiefs, and his force now employed in our service cannot number less than 10,000, numerically equal to the contingent furnished by Sardinia in the Crimean war; but infinitely surpassing that force in the moral influence which its presence amongst our rank bring to bear.

But though the Rajah of Jheend has furnished fewer men because his resources are smaller, yet his services are not less important. With a small but well trained band he personally took the field at the commencement of the campaign and has gallantly mixed in the thick of the fight and endured with his men the burning heat and the drenching rain. The record of these facts will be quite sufficient to secure their own reward."—*Lahore Chronicle, August* 12.

For comments on these displays both politically and morally important, we shall avail ourselves of the brilliant pen of the *Times*. That great journal thus speaks of the conduct of the Native Princes, after having received intel-

ligence of the forwardness with which they came to the aid of the British Government:—

"The most comprehensive, however, of the inferences suggested by the last despatches relates to the conduct of the Native Princes of India. The general reader may hardly be aware, perhaps, of the extent to which States of this character are still preserved under the supremacy of the British Government. We are usually supposed to have pursued the policy of annexation with some degree of rigour, but, although the dominions under our immediate control have certainly been augmented by escheats and confiscations bringing large territorial acquisitions to the Supreme Government, the number of chiefs still enjoying a qualified independence, and secured in the undisturbed possession of very considerable domains, is quite large enough to prove the general tolerance or confidence of our rule. In the North-Western Provinces alone, and in the districts directly adjacent, the Princes, established in Governments of greater or less importance, with armies of more or less significance at their command, were numerous enough to at once turn the scale against us at the commencement of the insurrection. It must be remembered that when the traitorous Sepoys, after breaking out into overt mutiny at Meerut, raised the standard of military rebellion at Delhi, our force in those parts, disproportioned in itself to the strength of the enemy, was still further weakened by its almost complete isolation. The troops forming the only British army in the field against the insurgents had been drawn from Umballah and Simla, and were joined by the Meerut division as they marched by way of Kurnaul to Delhi. But for these necessary operations there was at that time hardly any sufficient or practicable base. Neither Umballah nor Meerut could answer our demands in this respect; for, though the latter place represented a considerable military station, it offered few resources, and, in fact, the great North-Western arsenal of the Government was Delhi itself—the very city we were besieging. At the moment it was not known that the Punjab would be secured to our cause, and moreover, its authorities and its garrisons were mainly at the remotest extremity of the province, on

the Affghan frontier. The Punjab itself, too, is by no means conterminous with our North-Western Provinces, where the rebellion was evidently localized. Between these districts and the Sutty, which forms the eastern frontier of the Punjab; a system of small States was interposed, known in Indian nomenclature as the Cis-Sutlej States, and governed by Native Princes of Sikh extraction. It is obvious that on the loyalty and friendship of these chieftains our communications with the Punjab would depend. To the North, again, were the Hill Rajahs, each with his quota of power, to be exercised for our benefit or disadvantage, while in the more immediate vicinity of Delhi, and throughout Rohilcund and the Doab, a considerable body of Hindoo and Mahomedan Princes disposed of more or fewer resources in their respective domains.

It is not a little interesting to observe the almost uniform fidelity with which these chiefs preserved their allegiance to the British Government. Had it not been, in fact, for their signal and active sympathies we could never have established or maintained our position in the face of the mutineers at Delhi. That we should eventually have reconquered the territory is true enough, but except for the aid of Native Princes at that critical moment we must, in all probability, have lost Upper India for the time. The communications with Calcutta, it should be recollected, were then interrupted, and, indeed, Calcutta had no succours to despatch. Reinforcements from the Punjab could only arrive after some suspense, and then through the co-operation of these native States, so that the force before Delhi depended virtually for its resources on the Nawabs and Rajahs of the country. That in some instances these chiefs should turn against us in our adversity was of course to be anticipated; but, as a rule, and in the great majority of cases, their behaviour left nothing to be desired. The Rajahs of the Cis-Sutlej States threw themselves at once into our cause, lent us the aid of their retainers for forage and escort duties, kept open our communications with the Punjab, brought provisions in abundance to the camp, effectually protected our rear. The Rajah of JHEEND not only added his handful of troops to ours, but actually

marched at the head of his own men. The fidelity and good offices of the Rajah of PUTTEALLAH are deservedly eulogized, as our readers will observe this evening, in a communication on the best authority, and intelligence we have ourselves received, enables us to confirm this testimony to his extraordinary services. He has relieved us of an infinity of duties, and discharged them with marvellous success. His country intervenes directly between Delhi and the Punjab, and its resources, very considerable in extent, have been placed unreservedly at our disposal. "In fact," says one of our correspondents, writing from the spot, "whatever we have not "got, or don't know how to get, we ask him for, and he must some- "how or other supply the deficiency." Even money has been advanced to us largely by these Cis-Sutlej chiefs, though if the truth is to be confessed, our previous dealings with them in such matters were not characterized by very great generosity.

If we extend our view to territories somewhat more removed from the principle scene of action we find the same prevalence of sympathy and the same rarity of disaffection. In Rajpootana the Native Princes are certainly giving no countenance to the insurgents, and, to all appearance, are faithful to the British Government. The Mahratta Princes, SCINDIA and HOLKAR, have pronounced for us, and are to be credited, perhaps, with the tranquility still announced from Central India. In Bundelcund, also, we have received the aid of the native Lords, while from Cashmere our ally the late GHOLAB SINGH, whose policy is maintained by his successor promised us some 3,000 troops and 750,000*l.** In direct contrast with these features of loyalty and good service we ought to place the general treachery of the "Contingents," or forces raised from the resources of these native chiefs, but organized and officered by ourselves. These troops have in most cases mutinied and joined the insurrection against us, while their immediate masters remain faithful. Wherever, in fact, we created battalions like Sepoy battalions, they behaved in the same manner; wherever the native chief appealed to his own private retainers, they followed him to our side. They

* The subsequent services of the Nepalese are too well known to be alluded to here.—COMPILER.

might not present specimens of high military excellence, but their services to us as auxiliaries have been invaluable. It was a "Contingent" force which has just given the most recent example of mutiny in the little Mahomedan principality of Bhopaul."—*Times.*

With reference to the good feeling and eminent services of the Native Princes and their people, the local journals have maintained a discreditable silence which could only be attributed to that morbid jealousy which has been fanned by the so-called antagonism of race. There have however been exceptions which, we are sorry to say, are very few. In the following article on the subject which we quote from the *Bombay Telegraph and Courier,* the reader will find that while the writer cordially records the good offices of the great landholders, also notices with the same readiness but not the less regret the reward which many unfortunates among them have received from the spirit of vengeance which mostly ruled at the time the actions of the officials invested with the power of trying the State offenders.

"When the storm of rebellion burst at Meerut and Delhi last year, and when regiment after regiment threw off their allegiance, men turned with anxiety and trembling to discern, what part the Native Princes of India would take in the terrible struggle about to ensue. Amongst our allies, tributaries, and independent states, we had at the commencement of the revolt :—

	Population.
The Raja of Mysore	3,000,000
The Nizam	10,000,000
The Guickwar	2,000,000
Bhopal	5,000
Kotah	6,500
Boondee	2,500
Travancore	6,000
Cochin	2,000
The Rajpootana Princes viz. :—	
Joudpore, Jeypore, Oodepoore, Bikaneer, Jeysulmeer, and numerous other principalities, Holkar, Kattiawar Guzerat, and Mahratta Princes and chiefs &c. &c.	15,000,000
Scindia's Dominions	4,000,000
Total.....	34,022,000

Our situation was therefore one of extreme peril. The Nizam was doubtful; we had annexed Oude, and his Dominions had been again and again threatened. The Guickwar had been frequently slighted, if not insulted. The Rajpootana princes had many wrongs to redress, and in fact, almost every Rajah and Chief, controlling a population of thirty-four millions and a quarter, had grievances for which they had been in vain seeking redress for the last fifty years. Their petitions had been spurned, their memorials "burked," and their agents, when they presumed to call at Leadenhall Street, snubbed. It was, therefore, but little wonder that with the Moghul empire proclaimed at Delhi, Oude in arms, and 80,000 sepoys in open revolt, we should turn with apprehension and anxiety, to watch the part the Rajas, we have mentioned, would take in the impending conflict. Had they ranged themselves against us, they would have driven us into the sea; but, strange to say, the leading Kings of Hindoostan remained faithful to the last. Out of the whole population of thirty-four millions and a quarter, we do not think more than fifty thousand joined the ranks of the insurgents, and these were headed by chiefs of small note. The Ranee of Jhansi, Tantia Topee and other petty princes of Central India were incited to rebellion, principally through ignorance and a desire to support the pretensions of Dhundoo Punt, commonly called the Nanna Saheb. Their petty disaffection however is more than a thousand times counterbalanced by the services rendered by the Puttialla Raja, at the siege of Delhi and of Salar Jung, the Dewan of the Nizam at Hyderabad. Even princes who were in London, when they heard of the crisis, forgot their grievances and hurried out to the scence of danger for the purpose of placing their services at the disposal of the Indian Executive;—amongst the foremost of whom was the Nuwab of Surat and the Ameer of Khyrpore. Chiefs came forward with offers of assistance who had been most unjustly subjected to the operation of the East India Company's regulations in their own capitals. As an example we may mention the name of the Thacor of Bhownuggur, who offered to equip and place at the service of Government 500 Horse and 500 Foot—a Contingent which would have

been of great service to us now in Guzerat. The offer was, however, declined, and this decision of Government acted as a damper upon others, who were compelled to remain passive spectators instead of actors in the struggle. That there were some chieftains who only waited to see which way the balance went to throw themselves against us cannot be doubted; but after a careful examination we are of opinion that the Princes of India, were upon the whole favourably disposed towards us, and that if Lord Canning had hoisted the English standard and marched in person through Oude on his way to Delhi, proclaiming that all who were not for us were against us, almost every Raja in the land would have joined him and the rebellion would have been crushed in a day. He however, lost the golden moment, and the princes of India isolated and without unanimity of action, could do nothing but remain passive. Their own people in many instances rebelled, and some were absolutely drawn into the vortex of Revolt against their own inclination. Others again fortified their castles, manned their ramparts and gathered together their retainers; so that in the event of the mutineers paying them a visit, and in the absence of British troops, they might be prepared to receive them. But even this measure of necessary and commendable precaution has been the means of placing in great peril some chiefs of unswerving loyalty and undoubted fidelity. Advantage has been taken of these preparations of designing men; and chiefs who never dreamed of treason have been denounced as conspirator against the State. Their very loyalty has been made the pitfall of their ruin, and unless government exercise great judgment and discernment, the most fatal mistakes may be committed. As it was in Ireland in 1798, so will it be in India in 1858, unless great caution is used. The Spy and the Informer will tread upon the necks of the nobles of the land, and honest men will fall victims to the machinations of knaves and scoundrels. There are native gentlemen now pining in prison, who have been denounced to government by personal enemies as being guilty of treason against the State, and who are as innocent of any thing of the kind as Sir Colin Campbell or

Sir James Outram. They have been made the victims of foul conspiracies, and although the charges upon which they are arraigned, would not stand for a moment before either a judge or jury, yet they have had to swelter in a crowded prison, during all these hot months, and even now see no immediate prospect of a trial. There is no doubt that the times are emergent, that we have passed through great perils, and that the hands of the Executive should be vested with great powers, but at the same time the subject let him be prince or peasant, should have stern and impartial justice. We have no wish to offer any adverse criticism upon the measures of Government. In this Presidency the acts of the administration have been admirable in the extreme. We merely wish to put Lord Elphinstone and those around him upon their guard. Evil-minded men are taking advantage of the times to satiate old feuds, and we are sure there is not an Englishman in these parts who would not regret, were even one innocent man to perish or fall a victim to the machinations of the Spy and the Informer.

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Several men of note have lately been tried by a military commission, but this is not we think the best tribunal which might be constituted. Upon men taken red-handed like the King of Delhi and Raja of Shorapoor, military men are the best qualified to sit in judgment; but where the case is complicated, where perjury has to be dealt with and a multitude of native witnesses examined, men accustomed to analyze evidences ought to form the Court. It is in our power now to determine whether we shall rule India for a day or for centuries. A nice discrimination and a noble clemency towards all who are worthy of it, will do more towards consolidating our sovereignty in the East than a million of bayonets. A great distinction should be made between a mutinous soldiery and a rebellious people. While we would visit every village with punishment that refused a shelter to our wandering countrymen, and their helpless wives and children, yet we would spare those inhabited by misguided men against whom no other crime could be urged, save disloyalty and

disobedience. The eyes not only of India but of the whole of Asia are upon us, and by the line of conduct which we now pursue, will it be determined whether our rule is to be loved or detested. Justice forbids us to be cruel, and while we are stern we can also be humane. In the immediate vicinity of Lord Canning, Sir John Lawrence or Lord Elphinstone, the sternest justice will be administered—but in remote districts unless the strictest vigilance is exercised—to reward the innocent and punish the guilty, will be a work of very great difficulty.

* * * *

It is quite beyond the power of man to judge of the intent, and until he is gifted with omniscient powers, he ought to be careful how he deals with others upon mere suspicion. It is at all times difficult to condemn upon circumstantial evidence, and at the present time to do so would be both an injustice and a crime. We would hold all men guiltless, who had not committed some overt act, and against whom the strongest and most incontrovertible proof of treason could not be obtained. Such is the course which the enlightened statesmen of England would recommend, and such is the line of conduct which will no doubt be eventually followed in India. Even the most prejudiced are beginning to perceive, that the hour of blind vengeance is passed. A hundred lives have been destroyed for every one that was taken by the murderers at Cawnpore and Delhi; the dark day of retribution is over; the fallen have been avenged; the Eternal is satisfied, and his Rainbow of Mercy is set in the sky!"—*Bombay Telegraph and Courier, May* 31*st*, 1858.

The following is from the narrative of escape of a Delhi fugitive:—

"You will be surprised to learn that Mr. and Mrs. Hollguette have been miraculously saved in Delhi, together with Mr. A.'s family. Mr. A.'s girl died of cholera. The Roman Catholic Padre and Mr. Pereira, late Printer of the *Delhi Gazette*, are also in existence there. Mr. Hollguette in his note, dated the 20th instant, states that he and his wife with other Christians, 14 in number, were dragged to the Kotwalee, where they were kept in durance for some days, after which some good Samaritan of a Hindoo sheltered them;

and they had to beg for their daily food from the Hindoos; they are now living with the Padre, but are in very distressed circumstances."—*The Phœnix, November* 18, 1857.

The following is a gratifying picture of Native feeling in Agra on the reception of the intelligence of the Fall of Delhi. The houses of the Native inhabitants were richly illuminated and the rejoicings went as merrily as a marriage bell. We are of opinion, (despite the writer we quote) that these public demonstrations are significant of great facts the moral effects of which will not have failed to be duly judged by those, who ever reflected on the destinies of the empire in those days when Delhi, the stronghold of the Sepoys, remained unwrested, and Hindustan Proper was a wide sea of disaffection and treason.

"Yesterday the Agra native community anxious to testify their loyalty towards the English Government, resolved to illuminate the city and indulge in other festivities in honor of the fall of Delhi. Mounting a diminutive Tat I wended my way to the gala scene and soon mingling amongst the sable mob, became one of the most interested and amused of the numerous spectators that had assembled. The mild Hindoo was there in his Sunday vest and evidently enjoyed the scene and no wonder considering several months have elapsed since, they have been permitted to congregate in such large numbers so close to the vicinity of the Fort. Many followers of the Prophet likewise attended, but it was very evident by their sullen demeanour, &c., that the illuminations were none of their getting up. Had the Agra European population suffered the fate of their poor countrymen at Cawnpore we should have had every Mussulman in the city illuminating his house, emulating in fact the zeal of the London trade people and citizens during the great peace rejoicings. The Agra sight seers conducted themselves in a very orderly manner; no row whatever took place, and no doubt when the country people hear of the *tamasha* they will follow the example of their Agra brethren.

Doubtless many of your readers consider these native tokens of loyalty as all humbug, and as far as sincerity is concerned I'm of their opinion; but no matter what are the motives that induce the natives to express their joy at our successes, still the effect upon the low classes is good and all in our favor. A Seikh Gooroo many years resident in this city appeared very anxious that the affair should go off well, he gave a large nautch in the evening, and throughout the whole proceedings a smile of triumph played upon his countenance."—*Delhi Gazette quoted by the Phœnix, November* 23, 1857.

Here is a brief record of the success which attended the efforts of a Native Chief in fighting on behalf of British Government with a party of mutineers:—

"The Keraolee Rajah's troops have attacked a party of the Indore mutineers, who attempted to cross the Chumbul into his territory. Some were cut up, some drowned, in trying to swim across the Chumbul, and some were apprehended and are now in custody."—*The Phœnix, Nov.* 25, 1857.

The following is taken from the depositions of Quarter Master Serjeant Bradshaw, of the late United Malwa Contingent, giving an account of his sufferings on the outbreak at Mehidpoor. He says

"After leaving Oujein by great difficulty, arrived at Indore on the 10th, where His Highness the Maharajah showed him (Bradshaw) the greatest kindness and provided him with clothes, shoes, food and plenty of wine and did his best to make him as comfortable as he could,—his behaviour is beyond praise He arrived at Mhow at half eleven A. M. on the 11th, accompanied by one Subadar and thirty-five men of all ranks belonging to the Contingent. They behaved most gallantly and admirably well; they are Hindoos, and their conduct in such times is beyond all praise.—*Poona Observer quoted by the Phœnix, Nov.* 30, 1857.

NARRATIVE OF THE ESCAPE OF MR. BROWN OF THE DELHI GAZETTE PRESS.

The narrative is full of the incidents common during those days of fights and dangers. But if it gives a painful account of the sufferings to which Mr. Brown was exposed, it also pointedly marks the good will and friendship of the non-military Natives, especially the Hindus, towards the Europeans, and the gratitude of servants and others towards those who benefitted them, which have been so remarkably illustrated in the foregoing pages :—

"On Monday May 11th, 1857, all the Christian Compositors were present at the Press in consequence of a message having been received about 6 A. M. from the Electric Telegraph Office, to the effect that the mutineers of Meerut were coming on to Delhi, and might be expected in about two hours, this was printed; and circulated in the station by the usual office chuprasies. The clerks and natives also had apparently fled to the office for protection. People were in great alarm on account of this news. About 8 or 9 o'Clock the mutineers did arrive, but it was not till midday that the Bazaar people and the rabble of the town entered the *Delhi Gazette* Press. We still believed that there was more safety in the "Press" than elsewhere. We could not resist them when they came in, as with the exception of the usual guard of nujeebs, four in number, we had not any arms, and the assailants had a very large party of Goojurs with them, who, as well as themselves, were armed, some of us had, before they got into the places, caused our heads to be shaved and put on portions of native dress that the native Compositors lent us, some of us hid in the Tykhannas (apartments under ground used for their coolness in the hot weather.) The rabble commenced with clubs and iron-bound lattees to break every thing they could lay their hands on, demo-

lishing, as far as they could, the Iron Presses, and breaking every thing they could, each man took as much type of all kinds as he could, they pulled out the chokats of the windows and doors, and after doing as much harm as they could, set fire to the cases, the library, the house, and destroyed every think, the roof (pucka) of the house subsequently fell in. They did not seem at all inclined to hurt the natives of the establishment, who generally said if they had been armed they would have defended the property. I heard that some of the Christian Compositors were killed. But I and three others escaped by the gate of the Tykhanna into the river, and wandered to the north until we arrived at Sir Theophilus' garden, and hid ourselves in some ruined out-houses belonging to the estate; here we remained for two or three hours, and then returned to the river, close to the office, hiding ourselves as well as we could in it, and the sandbank, until night, when we got under the Dhobie's large gumlahs which are used to boil the clothes in. On Tuesday morning we woke early and saw the houses, occupied by the Christians, in flames on every side; they were blazing in every direction, and as the noise was great, we had no alternative, but to remain, hungry as we were, for we had not had a mouthful to eat since we escaped, under the gumlah; in the course of the day we saw the native book-keeper and some of the natives on the walls of the city on which the Press is built, we dared not speak to them for fear of attracting notice from the sepoys on the walls elsewhere. Thus passed Tuesday the 12th May, we were very fortunate that the Dhobees did not come to work, we suppose there was none for them. On Wednesday, we would scarcely sustain ourselves, the pangs of hunger were so strong, and to appease them we constantly drank water, it was necessary to do something, so we left the gumlah and getting into the river passed up towards cantonments with the view of swimming to the opposite bank. I had 10 rupees, to my three companions amongst whom was Mr. Pereira, the printer, I gave a rupee each, and tying up the remaining seven rupees twisted them between my toes; we accomplished our desire and crossed the river, but no sooner had we landed than we were attacked by a party of Goojurs, they stripped us of our

clothes, and threw us each a small piece of cloth, in their fright my companions had dropped their rupees into the river. Again we crossed the river, returned to our gumlahs and thought ourselves fortunate, even starving as we were, to save our lives, but at dusk I mustered courage to get into the Tykhanna and passing into the house and through the compound, went away to my house not very far from the Press. The others did not accompany me. I knocked at my door, this aroused some natives who hailed me and asked, "who was there," I replied "Gholam Navees," but as soon as they heard my voice, they cried out "Ferringhee uya."—I then ran away into the main-road, and about 40 Mussulmans soon surrounded me, I recognised two men among them who were relations of the Compositors and friends of mine and said "have you been so long my neighbours and would now kill me?" They carried me to the Thanna of the Cashmere gate, and gave me up to the Daroga, he was friendly to me and got rid of the crowd, by telling them that I should be sent to the King who would judge me. He put me into an inward room, and when all was quiet, about half an hour afterwards, he sent two men with me and told them to convey me to some distance so that I might have a chance of escape. I accompanied them in far about half a mile, when we met a Hindoo Sepoy coming towards us, these two men pointed out that I was a Ferringee and the Sepoy brought up his musket to my chest and was searching for a percussion cap in his *cummerbund* when I cried out in Bengallee and said I was a petty merchant from Calcutta lately arrived in Delhi. I gave an oath on the cow and on Kalee and was not harmed, they had left me and the Mussulmans said that as the Sepoy had not killed me they would not. I then went on towards the Magazine and met with one of the Mussulman apprentices of the Press, and as I was almost dead with hunger, and having all this time supported myself with water—I cried bitterly to him and asked him to save me for the night; he took me to a mosque and told the Cazee that the king had ordered me to be converted to Islamism at once and that no one was to harm me. The Cazee bathed me and made me repeat the Kulma and the apprentice brought me bread and wine, a pajama and koortee.

Not the least attempt was made to circumcise me; had that been the case, I could not have resisted for my weakness. I was named Shaik Abdoola. The apprentice slept by me in the mosque, and early in the morning he returned home to prepare breakfast for himself, promising to send me some. In the meantime lots of people came into the mosque, asking "where is this Christian who has been converted? Others said "kill him, he has only become Mahomedan to save his life." The Cazee replied, "To kill him will be no gain to us, he is now of us," others said "still it is better to kill him for if the Feringees come, he will betray us." I managed to pass out of the mosque in the crowd as soon as I could, and in the street met our jemadar pressman, we recognised each other, and he, though a Mussulman, did not betray me, but advised me to go off to Calcutta, for said he "I cannot protect you and intend getting to Calcutta as soon as I can," he was a native of Calcutta. Again I returned to the gumlahs and found my companions, still there walking about, this was on Thursday morning and we agreed to separate same distance from one another, so as not to be so distinctly seen, and got at last over the bridge of boats on to the Meerut road. I arrived first at some walled place the name of which I do not know, and waited a long time for my companions, but they did not arrive, I thought they had been arrested, perhaps murdered, so I went on towards Gazeedeenuggur. I was again stripped of every thing I had by the Goojurs and arrived at Gazeedeenuggur at six in the evening stark naked I went to the Jemadar and represented myself as a Mussulman who had been plundered of every piece I had, besides my clothes; he gave me bread and dholl and allowed me to sleep there. The next morning I went on to Boolundshuhur where I met James Bambert Jones an Eurasian, and the head Clerk of the Magistrate's office, he had some relations at Delhi, who had been massacred, he asked me many questions to convince himself that my story was true; when he found it to be so, he gave me to eat and went to the Magistrate to tell him; the Magistrate, he said, did not believe my story, but the Clerk still protected me and giving me two annas piece and a piece of cloth, set me on my road,

he did not give me more for fear of my attracting notice and of being robbed. I begged my way to Agra, as the people would not admit me in the serais,—they would not admit any strangers. On the 8th day or thereabouts I got to Agra, and was almost immediately employed by Mr. Longden, the Superintendent of the Orphan Press. (He did not go to the *Delhi Gazette Branch*, being a Calcutta man and quite unacquainted with its position or the people belonging to it, but he knew some of the "hands" at Secundra.) When Mr. Longden went into the Fort, the Compositors, &c., remained there armed to protect the Establishment at Secundra, so we did not go, we were a great many and thought ourselves quite secure. When the battle took place, and the Establishment was destroyed, I got refuge in an old mosque and my servant fed me for three days, after which I left Secundra, disguised as a Mahomedan, I feared to go to the Fort as a Christian for fear of the Mussulmans, nor into the Fort in a Mahomedan dress, lest the European sentries should shoot me!

I got out of Agra on the 11th July and reached Cawnpore in safety, still in a native dress; on the 18th a soldier of the 64th Queen's, when marching to Bithoor, captured me, believing me to be a sepoy, and took me to an officer, with whom I spoke and read English, he was soon convinced that I was a Christian and advised me to report myself to General Havelock. I did so in the evening when we arrived at Nuwabgunge, and after enquiring about the roads for, he dismissed, giving me two rupees and telling me to remain in Camp. I went and lived with the European soldiers who were very kind to me. I accompanied the Camp in the battle of Mungulwarra, Oonow and Bussoorgunge, and afterwards returned to Cawnpore and Bithoor. Subsequently I came on to Allahabad with the sick and wounded, under the charge of Apothecary Price, and subsequently to Benares where I am employed by the Lieutenant Governor and where I found out my old employer yourself."—*Friend of India quoted by the Phœnix, December* 5, 1857.

ESCAPE OF MR. JAMES CAVANAGH.

The "escape" of Mr. Cavanaugh has a tinge of romance befitting the days of knight-errantry which Walter Scott has immortalized in his memorable pages. The public, with a deserving generosity, has awarded the full meed of its approbation on this unrivalled piece of personal heroism, and the Government, with a worthy liberality, has rewarded Mr. Cavanaugh's gallant and conspicuous services. But there was a rival in the field—a collaborateur in the race,—one who underwent with the Christian hero the same sufferings and bore with the same glorious patience the stupendous difficulties which surrounded their perilous journey, and who displayed a greater moral courage inasmuch as he acted against his instinct and allied himself with a representative of foreign blood and a follower of an "infidel" creed,—and unto this man we ask his dues fully and without stint to be rendered. Kunonjolal and Cavanaugh are twins in this respect, and they deserve equal rewards and equal treatment. An iota less of this to one will be held tantamount to an insult to the other. We believe Kunonjolal has been rewarded for his services but we have reasons to think not *fully* and adequately. There can be no doubt that without Kunonjolal, without his unflinching courage, his fertility of resources to protect his co-partner, his unshaken fidelity, and his strong intelligence, the heroism of Cavanaugh would have remained a dream in the author's mind. Inasmuch therefore as the public and Government value Cavanaugh's services they should consider and weigh Kunonjolal's contribution to them. We trust the heathen hero will be distinguished by a Government which looks with an equal eye upon the merits and

services of a black man and white in the same degree as has the Christian hero been :—

"Narrative of my escape from the British entrenchment at Lucknow to the Camp of Sir Colin Campbell, near Bunnee, for the purpose of acting as his guide in his advance for the relief of the besieged garrison.

While passing through the entrenchment of Lucknow about 10 o'clock A. M., on the 9th instant, I learnt that a spy had come in from Cawnpore, and that he was going back in the night as far as Alum Bagh, with despatches to his Excellency Sir Colin Campbell, the Commander-in-Chief, who, it was said, was approaching Lucknow with five or six thousand men. I sought out the spy, whose name is * * * * * * and who was in the Court of the Deputy Commissioner of Dariabad before the outbreak in Oude. He had taken letters from the entrenchment before, but I had never seen him till now. I found him intelligent, and imparted to him my desire to venture in disguise to Alum Bagh in his company. He hesitated a great deal at acting as my guide, but made no attempt to exaggerate the dangers of the road. He merely urged that there was more chance of detection by our going together, and proposed that we should take different roads and meet outside of the city to which I objected. I left him to transact some business, my mind dwelling all the time on the means of accomplishing my object.

I had some days previously witnessed the preparation of plans, which were being made by direction of Sir James Outram, to assist the Commander-in-Chief in his march into Lucknow for the relief of the besieged, and it then occurred to me that some one, with the requisite local knowledge, ought to attempt to reach His Excellency's camp beyond or at Alum Bagh. The news of Sir Colin Campbell's advance revived the ideas and I made up my mind to go myself at 2 o'clock after finishing the business I was engaged upon. I mentioned to Colonel R. Napier, Chief of Sir James Outram's staff, that I was willing to proceed through the enemy to Alum Bagh if the General thought my doing so would be of service to the Commander-in-Chief. He was surprised at

the offer, and seemed to regard the enterprise as fraught with too much danger to be assented to, but he did me the favor of communicating the offer to Sir James Outram, because he considered that my zeal deserved to be brought to his notice.

Sir James did not encourage me to undertake the journey, declaring that he thought it so dangerous that he would not himself have asked any officer to attempt it. I however spoke so confidently of success, and treated the dangers so lightly that he at last yielded—and did me the honor of adding that if I succeeded in reaching the Commander-in-Chief my knowledge would be a great help to him.

I secretly arranged for a disguise so that my departure might not be known to my wife, as she was not well enough to bear the prospect of an eternal separation. When I left home about 7 o'clock in the evening, she thought I was gone on duty for the night to the mines, for I was working as an Assistant Field Engineer by order of Sir James Outram.

By 7½ o'clock my disguise was completed, and when I entered the room of Colonel Napier, no one in it recognised me. I was dressed as a Budmash or as an Irregular soldier of the city, with sword and shield, native-made shoes, tight trowsers, and yellow silk koortah over a tight fitting white muslin skirt, a yellow colored chintz sheet thrown round my shoulders, a cream colored turban, and a white waistband or a *kumurbund.* My face down to the shoulders, and my hands to the wrists were colored with lamp-black, the cork used being dipped in oil to cause the color to adhere a little. I could get nothing better, I had little confidence in the disguise of my features, and I trusted more to the darkness of the night; but Sir James Outram and his staff seemed satisfied, and after being provided with a small double-barrelled pistol, and a pair of broad *pyjamahs* over the tight drawers, I proceeded with Kunonjee Lall to the right bank of the river Goompty, running north of our entrenchment, accompanied by Captain Hardinge of the Irregular Cavalry.

Here we undressed and quietly forded the river, which was only about 4½ feet deep and about a hundred yards wide at this

point. My courage failed me while in the water and if my guide had been within reach, I should perhaps have pulled him back and abandoned the enterprise. But he waded quickly through the stream, and reaching the opposite bank, went crouching up a ditch for three hundred yards to a grove of low trees on the edge of a pond where we stopped to dress. While we were here a man came down to the pond to wash, and went away again without observing us.

My confidence now returned to me, and with my Tulwar resting on my shoulder, we advanced into the huts in front where I accosted a matchlockman, who answered to my remark, that the night was cold, "It is very cold, in fact, it is a cold night." I passed him, adding that it would be colder by-and-bye.

After going six or seven hundred yards further we reached the Iron Bridge over the Goompty, where we were stopped and called over by a native officer, who was seated in an upper-storied house and seemed to me in command of a cavalry picquet whose horses were near the place saddled. My guide advanced to the light and I stayed a little back in the shade. After being told that we had come from Mundeon, (our old cantonment and then in the possession of the enemy,) and that we were going into the city to our homes he let us proceed. We continued on along the left bank of the river to the Stone Bridge, which is about eight or nine hundred yards from the Iron Bridge, passing unnoticed through a number of sepoys and matchlockmen, some of whom were escorting persons of rank in palankees preceded by torches.

Re-crossing the Goompty by this Stone Bridge we went by a sentry unobserved who was closely questioning a dirtily dressed native, and into the chauk, or principal street of Lucknow, which was not illuminated as much as it used to be previous to the siege, nor was it so crowded. I jostled against several armed men in the street without being spoken to, and only met one guard of seven sepoys who were amusing themselves with some women of pleasure.

When issuing from the city into the country, we were challenged by a Choukeedar or watchman, who, without stopping us, merely asked who we were. The part of the city traversed that night by

me, seemed to have been deserted by at least a third of its inhabitants.

I was in great spirits when we reached the green fields, into which I had not been for five months. Every thing around us smelt sweet, and a carrot I took from the road side, was the most delicious I had ever tasted. I gave vent to my feelings in a conversation with Kunoonjee Lall, who joined in my admiration of the province of Oudh, and lamentation that it was now in the hands of wretches whose misgovernment and rapacity was ruining it.

A further walk of a few miles was accomplished in high spirits, but there was trouble before us. We had taken the wrong road and were now quite out of our way in the Dilkooshah Park, which was occupied by the enemy. I went within twenty yards of two guns to see what strength they were, and returned to the guide, who was in great alarm and begged I would not distrust him because of the mistake, as it was caused by his anxiety to take me away from the picquets of the enemy. I bade him not to be frightened of me for I was not annoyed, as such accidents were not unfrequent even when there was no danger to be avoided. It was now about midnight. We endeavoured to persuade a cultivator who was watching his crop to show us the way for a short distance, but he urged old age and lameness, and another whom I peremptorily told to come with us, ran off screaming and alarmed the whole village. We next walked quickly away into the Canal, running under the Char Bagh in which I fell several times owing to my shoes being wet and slippery and my feet sore. The shoes were hard and tight and had rubbed the skin off my toes and cut into the flesh above the heels. In two hours more we were again on the right direction, two women in a village we passed having kindly helped us to find it, about 2 o'clock we reached an advanced picquet of sepoys who told us the way after asking where we had come from and whither we were going. I thought it safer to go up to the picquet than to try to pass them unobserved.

Kunoonjee Lall now begged I would not press him to take me into Alum Bagh as he did not know the way in, and the enemy were strongly posted around the place. I was tired and in pain from

the shoes, and would therefore have preferred going into Alum Bagh, but as the guide feared attempting it, I desired him to go on to the camp of the Commander-in-Chief which he said was near Bunnee (a village 18 miles from Lucknow) upon the Cawnpore road. The moon had risen by this time, and we could see well ahead.

By 3 o'clock we arrived at a grove of mangoe trees, situated on a plain in which a man was singing at the top of his voice. I thought he was a villager, but he got alarmed on hearing us approach and astonished us too by calling out a guard of twenty-five Sepoys, all of whom asked questions. Kunoonjee Lall here lost heart for the first time, and threw away the letter entrusted to him for Sir Colin Campbell. I kept mine safe in my turban. We satisfied the guard that we were poor men, travelling to Umroula, a village two miles this side of the Chief's Camp to inform a friend of the death of his brother by a shot from the British entrenchment at Lucknow, and they told us the road.

They appeared to be greatly relieved on discovering that it was not their terrible foe, who was only a few miles in advance of them. Who went in the direction indicated by them and after walking for half an hour we got into a jheel or swamp, which are numerous and large in Oudh, we had to wade through it for two hours up to our waists in water, and through weeds, for before we found out that we were in a jheel, we had gone too far to recede. I was nearly exhausted on getting out of the water having made great exertions to force our way through the weeds and to prevent the color being washed off my face. It was nearly gone from my hands.

I now rested for fifteen minutes, despite of the remonstrances of the guide, and went forward passing between two picquets of the enemy who had no sentries thrown out. It was near four o'clock in the morning, when I stopped at the corner of a tope or grove of trees to sleep for an hour, which Kunoonjee Lall entreated I would not do, but I thought he overrated the danger, and lying down I told him to see if there was any one in the grove who would tell him where we then were.

We had not gone far when I heard the English challenge "who

comes there" with a native accent. We had reached a British Cavalry outpost; my eyes filled with joyful tears and I shook the Seikh officer in charge of the picquet heartily by the hand. The old soldier was as pleased as myself, when he heard whence I had come, and he was good enough to send two of his men to conduct me to the Camp of the advance guard. An officer of Her Majesty's 9th Lancers who was visiting his picquets, met me on the way, and took me to his tent where I got dry stockings, and trowsers, and what I much needed, a glass of brandy, a liquor I had not tasted for two months.

I thanked God for having safely conducted me through this dangerous enterprize, and Kunoonjee Lall for the courage and intelligence with which he had conducted himself during this trying night. When we were questioned he let me speak as little as possible. He always had a ready answer, and I feel that I am indebted to him in a great measure more than to myself for my escape. It will give me great satisfaction to hear that he has been suitably rewarded.

In undertaking this enterprize I was actuated by a sense of duty, believing that I could be of use to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, when approaching for its relief, the besieged garrison which had heroically resisted the attack of thirty times its own number for nearly five months, with its weak and irregular entrenchment; and secondly because I was anxious to perform some service which would ensure to me the honor of wearing our Most Gracious Majesty's Cross.

My reception by Sir Colin Campbell and his Staff was cordial and kind to the utmost degree, and if I never have more than the remembrance of their condescension and of the heart-felt congratulations of Sir James Outram and of all the officers of his garrison on my safe return to them I shall not repine, though to be sure having the Victoria Cross would make me a prouder and happier man.

JAMES CAVANAGH.

Camp Allum Bagh,
24th November, 1857.

The Phœnix, December 18, 1857.

A letter from Nynee Tal, dated the 26th of October, gives us the following :—

"The Nawab of Rampore has behaved very well indeed during these troublous times, he is the only man that has given us any assistance from the plains. The Gurhwal Rajah, like all Paharies, has aided us to his very utmost. When we were last threatened by the 5,000 rebels, from Bareilly, all the Paharies as far as Palee flocked in. Thousands volunteered and came without pay, and actually brought their own grub, and went wherever they were ordered without a grumble. All the headmen of Gurhwal and Kalee Kumaan offered to come to our aid.

These assurances of loyalty have not been few during the mutinies. That there existed an imperative need for them few will now deny, though the crisis has past. When the general character of the rebellion first came to notice, the public mind in Calcutta and in the neighbourhood was seized with such a fever of panic that the most self-possessed Europeans, evincing a great confidence in Natives, suspected the latter every hour of treacherous intentions. The excitement was so violent that during the night many used to leave their homes and sleep with their family and friends on board the ships and sloops. The leaders of Native Society therefore wisely resolved to record publicly their feelings and views of the conduct of the mutinous soldiery, and to acquaint Government with the same. The first meeting for this purpose was held in the hall of the Hindu Metropolitan College, which was attended by the highest members of the Native Community. The British Indian Association, on the part of the Natives generally, published resolutions expressive of their abhorrence of the conduct and acts of the mutineers, and also of their allegiance to Government. Then followed a train of loyal assurances more or less fervid and all directed to the promotion of the noble

object of removing every impression that the revolt was sympathized with by the Natives of Bengal. All the addresses with the replies of Government thereto, have been published in the Blue Books on the Mutinies, some of which we have selected for these pages. Those addresses have an historical importance. They were the signs of the times and the manifestations of the feelings which predominated among the Native Community at the time in regard to the British Government. Through them the future historian will perceive the then temper of the Native mind, both Hindu and Mahomedan. Clamours are still rife that those assurances were hollow and had no intrinsic merit, but we may be allowed to say that they are mere "clamours." Our readers will remember with what rancour and insolence was the conduct of Government impeached for drawing a line of distinction between the rebels and the vast body of the people, and for following a discriminating policy. The reigning Ministry with an advanced intelligence justly dreaded the consequences of a popular outbreak and the advisers of Lord Canning possessing a sufficient knowledge of the Native character recommended a policy which would not irritate the bulk of the population. The Calcutta Europeans could not however see the justice of this policy, and they accused Government of weakness, want of judgment and courage, and of distrust of English character and resources. The time was thus ripe for an active demonstration on the part of the Natives of the feelings which worked in them, and they did not mistake it. Their loyal addresses defined the character of the revolt and gave effect to the policy of the Government. Then it was that the military aspect of the outbreak became distinct, and the relative position of the State and the people became settled. There have been European residents here, as we have said above, who question the motives of such movements. But

the acts and services recorded in these pages, will remain standing proofs of the integrity of the intentions of the movers of these projects. That they fulfilled some purpose may be perceived by calling to mind that translations of these addresses in Hindee, Urdu and Bengalee were extensively circulated among the population to re-assure confidence where it was weakened, to dissipate errors where it might gain ground, and to defeat the machinations of the evil disposed, where they could take effect. The historian, we believe, will not miss the real character of these proceedings of our countrymen, and we are morally certain that they will be valued by posterity as the true picture of the popular mind during the crisis.

To the Secretary to the GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

Calcutta, May 15th, 1857.

Sir,

As Chairman of a Public Meeting of the Native community convened this day, pursuant to a requisition published in the Daily Journals, I have the honor to forward to you a copy of the Resolutions passed on the occasion, for the information of the Governor-General in Council.

I have, &c.,

Radhacant, Rajah Bahadoor,

Chairman.

RESOLUTIONS.

1. That the Meeting has, with deep concern and sorrow, learnt of the disaffection manifested by a portion of the native army, and of the atrocities committed by them in some parts of the

country, and that it views their mutinous conduct with extreme disgust and horror.

2. That this Meeting contemplates, with the highest and most sincere satisfaction, that the sepoy disaffection has met with no sympathy or encouragement from the civil population of any part of this vast empire, nor has it been shared in by the major portion of the native soldiery; but that the same feelings of loyalty and attachment to the British rule, which they have hitherto been inspired with, still continue to animate them with unabated fidelity.

3. That this Meeting contemplates, with the deepest concern, the lamentable delusion which some of the sepoy regiments appear to be labouring under, and that it desires to record its firm and sincere conviction that the malicious reports which have given rise to such a delusion are not founded upon truth.

4. That this Meeting is of opinion that, should occasion require, it would be the duty of the native portion of Her Majesty's subjects to render the Government every aid in their power, for the preservation of civil order and tranquility.

5. That, with a view to give an extensive circulation to the proceedings of this Meeting, it be resolved that translations of the same into the vernacular dialects of the country, be printed and distributed amongst the native population.

6. Resolved that a copy of the Resolutions adopted at this Meeting be forwarded, under the signature of its Chairman, to the Governor General in Council.

(Appendix (A) to further Papers (No. 5, relative to the Mutinies.)

THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA TO RAJAH RADHACANT BAHADOOR.

Fort William, May 26th, 1857.

SIR,

I have the honor, by direction of the Governor-General in Coun-

cil to acknowledge the receipt of the letter which, as Chairman of a Public Meeting of the native community, you yesterday addressed me, forwarding a copy of the Resolutions passed at the meeting.

2. These Resolutions his Lordship has perused with unmixed satisfaction, and he highly appreciates the loyalty and good sense of the native community of Calcutta, which have led them, at the present juncture to assemble together for the purpose of expressing their abhorrence of the mutinous conduct of some of the native regiments of the Bengal Army; their confidence in the fidelity and attachment of the Native Army in general, and of the people of India, to the British Government; their utter disbelief in the falsely alleged intention of the Government to tamper with the religion of its Hindoo and Mussulman subjects; and their sense of the obligation imposed on the native public to support the Government in the preservation of order and tranquillity.

3. For this manly declaration of their sentiments, the Governor-General in Council returns his sincere thanks to the native community, and he reiterates the assurance so often given, and so steadfastly fulfilled, that the policy of the British Government in India has been, and ever will be, to preserve a position of strict neutrality in matters of faith, to respect all scruples of caste, and to leave its subjects of every creed and class to the free and uninterrupted enjoyment of their religious opinions and observances.

4. The most decisive steps have been taken for the suppression of the revolt, and for the due punishment of guilty men, who have swerved from their allegiance, and disgraced human nature by acts of the most brutal cruelty.

The Governor-General in Council entirely approves of the intention to print the Resolutions in the vernacular dialects of the country, and circulate them among the native population.

I have, &c.,

CECIL BEADON.

FROM THE HONORARY SECRETARY OF THE BRITISH INDIAN ASSOCIATION TO THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

May 23, 1857.

SIR,—I have the honor to request the favor of your laying the accompanying address of the Committee of the British Indian Association before His Lordship the Governor General of India.

I have, &c.,

ISSURCHUNDER SINGH,

Honorary Secretary.

TO THE GOVERNOR GENERAL OF INDIA.

MY LORD,—We, the Presidents, Vice-Presidents, and Committee of the British Indian Association, beg leave to approach your Lordship with the accompanying copy of resolutions which we felt it our duty to record, on hearing of the deplorable events which have lately occurred at Meerut and Delhi. We have also resolved to circulate these resolutions among our countrymen in the interior, and to make known their purport generally by means of their translations. Were we permitted to add any thing to these resolutions it would be an expression of our admiration for, and confidence in, your Lordship's conduct of affairs at this crisis.

We have, &c.,

RADHACAUNT RAJAH BAHADOOR,

RAJAH KALLY KRISHNA BAHADOOR, V. P.

PERTAB CHUNDER SINGH, *and others.*

Extract from the Proceedings of a Meeting held of the Committee of the British Indian Association, held May 22, 1857.

The Committee of the British Indian Association have heard of the disastrous events which have lately occurred at Meerut and Delhi with deep concern and sorrow.

The Committee view with disgust and horror the disgraceful and mutinous conduct of the native soldiery at those stations, and

the excesses committed by them, and confidently trust to find that they have met with no sympathy, countenance, or support from the bulk of the civil population of that part of the country, or from any reputable or influential classes among them.

The Committee of the Association record, without hesitation, their conviction of the utter groundlessness of the reports that have led a hitherto faithful body of the soldiers of the State to the commission of the gravest crimes of which military men or civil subjects can be guilty, and the Committee deem it incumbent on them, on the present occasion, to express their deep abhorrence of the practices and purposes of those who have spread these false and mischievous reports.

The Committee earnestly hope for the restoration of peace and good order, which they doubt not will be soon re-established by the vigorous measures which the government have adopted in this exigency.

The Committee trust and believe that the loyalty of their fellow-subjects in India to the Government under which they live, and their confidence in its power and good intentions are unimpaired by the lamentable events which have occurred in the detestable efforts which have been made to alienate the minds of the sepoys and the people of the country from their duty and allegiance to the beneficient rule under which they are placed.

(Appendix (A) to further Papers, (No. 5) relative to the Mutinies.)

THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA TO RAJAH RADHACAUNT AND OTHERS.

Fort William, May 25th, 1857.

GENTLEMEN,

1. Your Address and the Resolutions passed by the Committee on the 22nd instant, which were communicated to me in your Honorary Secretary's letter of the 23rd, having been laid before the Governor-General in Council, I am directed to inform you, that his Lordship in Council has received this expression of the sentiments of an influential and intelligent body of Hindoo gentlemen,

as to the recent conduct of some of the native regiments, and the motives of those who instigated it, with the highest gratification.

2. The Governor-General in Council is well assured that the rash and criminal acts of which these misguided men have been guilty meet with no sympathy or countenance from the people at large, and that they are viewed with special abhorrence by those who can appreciate the character of the British Government, and who rightly understand the principles by which that Government is guided in the use of its vast power and resources; a signal proof of this has been afforded by the Maharajah Scindia and other chiefs, who, unsolicited, have given prompt and powerful support to the Government, and by the zemindars of the disturbed districts, who have protected British officers from violence, and exerted themselves loyally to check disorders.

3. For a hundred years under British rule, every one has been left at full liberty to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and to do such things as his religion enjoins, and to abstain from those which it forbids. The experience of a century has been lost upon those who can now believe the gross and wicked falsehood that the Government intends or desires to pursue a contrary course; a course by which it could gain no advantage, and which could not fail to excite the indignation and hatred of its subjects.

4. The Committee of the British Indian Association have declared their attachment to the British Government, and their confidence in its power and good intentions; and they propose, that the Resolutions they have passed, shall be circulated among their fellow-countrymen in the interior. His Lordship in Council has no doubt that these proceedings are well calculated to restore confidence where it has been shaken, and to lead to the best results.

5. The forces at command of the Government are enough to put down all opposition. They have now been brought to bear on the men of the mutinous regiments who are assembled at Delhi; and the Governor General in Council confidently expects, that, in a few days, the mutiny will be entirely suppressed, tranquillity again established, and condign punishment inflicted upon

those who have disturbed the public peace, and aggravated rebellion, by crimes of the most horrible atrocity.

I have, &c.,

CECIL BEADON.

MEMORIAL

To

F. R. COCKERELL, ESQ.,

Magistrate of Hooghly.

SIR,

We, the undersigned zemindars, talookdars, and inhabitants of Ootorpara, Bhudderkally, Kotorung, Konenuggur, and other adjacent villages, have heard with deep sorrow the melancholy effects of the sepoy mutiny. We have to thank Government for the strong and adequate measures adopted to put down that mutiny. The disarming of the sepoys of the Presidency division has tended greatly to allay the fears of the populace. But though disarmed, still they continue disaffected, and the fear of being visited by the deserved punishment of their crimes has made numbers of them desert their posts. These, as well as the men of the 19th and 34th Regiments of Native Infantry, will not, for manifest reasons, go to their homes at present; and private individuals will not entrust their lives and property to men who have proved unfaithful to their best masters they could have served, and have been audacious enough to rise against the authority of Government; the consequence will be that, out of necessity they would be obliged to commit plunder and robbery, and other crimes, to support themselves. With the utmost respect to yourself, as the head of the local police, we beg to observe that the police of the whole district, could it be collected together in one place, would be useless to cope with even a straggling party of fifty disbanded sepoys; but it is well known that this force is scattered over an area of 800 square miles. The vicinity of Barrackpore and Calcutta, and the total inadequacy of the police force in thannah Bydabatty, where there are a single Darogah

and a few miserable burkundauzes to guard about 100 square miles of country, cannot but increase the alarm of the inhabitants of this part of the district. Even the thannah police, incapable as it is, is ten miles distant from this place and we have neither a military nor municipal force to apply to in case of a sudden attack, of which the probability is increasing every day, from the daily increasing number of disarmed and disbanded sepoys roaming in the country, uncontroled and in despair, joined with those who had come down from the Upper Provinces, as their relations and comrades of regimental vacancies. To these attacks we can only oppose the nugdees and durwans in the employment of the zemindars and other wealthy men; unfortunately, however, most of these are either relations or intimate acquaintances of the Barrackpore sepoys, who would not, we are certain, hesitate to fraternize on a dangerous crisis. It is not good policy to discharge these nugdees at present, nor can we, in the present disturbed state of the country, collect a large pyke force to cope, not only with the sepoys, but with our own nugdees also; on whose good conduct we had hitherto relied for safety, but which the recent circumstances have proved to be confidence reposed upon undeserving and treacherous men. We would, therefore, pray that you will be good enough to bring these circumstances to the notice of Government, that prompt measures which may appear proper and adequate in the wisdom of Government, may be taken for the safety of our lives and properties from the present imminent danger which threatens us.

But if we are permitted to suggest, we would propose that for immediate safety, a company of European Infantry be stationed at Serampore, from which patrolling parties of twenty-five men, each may be sent to southward and northward to watch over the conduct of the disbanded and deserted sepoys, who have crossed over to this side of the river, and to prevent further crossings.

2ndly. That a local militia or police battalion of 500 men may be raised in this district as well as in Burdwan, composed of Agoories, Gowalas, Bagdees, and Domes, &c., under the controul of an European officer, and a few drill serjeants, together with

two educated native officers, taken from respectable ranks. Those among us who own zemindaries, hereby tender our services in procuring serviceable men for the purpose of being enlisted, but the mere procuring of men will do little good unless those men receive a sort of military organization, and be kept under proper discipline. We are quite confident that by the prompt and decisive measures pursued by Government, the sepoy mutiny will be very shortly put down in the Upper Provinces; yet it must be recollected, that with the mere putting down of the mutiny, a major portion of the sepoy army will be annihilated, a circumstance which will embolden all the budmashes and bad characters of the country, who have been hitherto kept down by the fear of the native troops stationed in different districts; these being joined by the disbanded men and others who will come down from the Upper Provinces in the hope of plunder, will entail upon Government, at least for some years, the necessity of maintaining a local militia or police battalion in several parts of the country. The course recommended will, it is hoped, as an experiment, be found to be of considerable service hereafter.

We have, &c.,

JOYKISSEN MOOKERJEE,

And Forty-Seven Others

June 17th, 1857.

(Appendix (A) to further Papers, (No. 5) relative to the Mutinies.)

THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF BENGAL TO THE MAGISTRATE OF HOOGHLY.

Fort William, June 22nd, 1857

SIR,

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 20th instant, giving cover to a memorial from certain inhabitants of Ooterpara and other adjacent villages, wherein they express much apprehension, in consequence of the desertions from the ranks of the disarmed sepoys at Barrackpore, and recommending the entertainment of an additional police force, consisting of 600 men,

of the Agoorce and Gowala classes, for the maintenance of order in your district in the event of any disturbance arising.

2. In reply, I am desired to observe that, under Act 17 of 1857, you are employed to arrest the deserters, the number of whom, however, appears to be greatly exaggerated by public apprehension.

3. Under the circumstances represented by you, the Lieutenant-Governor authorizes, as an experimental measure, the organization of a central police force at the sudder station of Hooghly, consisting of people of the classes described in your letter; and should the experiment prove successful, His Honor will be prepared to authorize its extension to other parts of the district.

I have, &c.,

A. R. YOUNG,

(Appendix (A) to further Papers (No. 5) relative to the Mutinies.)

Meetings and addresses of this description were also held in, and presented from other parts of the country. Resolutions were passed to the same effect and documents of the same character were addressed to the Governor General in Council or to the provincial representatives of Government as circumstances required. The following is a list of the parties who made these loyal demonstrations :—

Inhabitants of Bally Dewanguuge.
„ of Bancoorah.
„ of Noakhally.
„ of Sylhet.
Zemindars and other inhabitants in the Zillah of Rajshaye.
Inhabitants of Noakhally.
„ of the Town and Zillah Barasat.
„ of Santipore.
„ of Bhowanypore.
The Mohamedan Community of Calcutta.
The Mohamedan Association of Calcutta.

Some of the Native regiments also presented loyal addresses, and with a few exceptions, remained true to their words.

THE BENGALEE'S ADDRESS.

To the Right Hon'ble CHARLES JOHN VISCOUNT CANNING,
Governor General of India, &c., &c.

My Lord,—We, the undersigned Rajahs, Zemindars, Talookdars, Merchants, and other Natives of the province of Bengal, take the earliest opportunity, on the retaking of Delhi, to offer your Lordship in Council our warmest congratulations on the signal success which has attended the British arms, under circumstances unparalleled in the annals of British India.

The establishment of British supremacy was considered to have been completely effected a century ago, when Clive led a few ill-trained battalions against the preponderating and well equipped force which represented the Mogul power on the plains of Plassey. But whether the inadequacy of the means or the magnitude of that achievement, were more deserving of admiration, has not yet been determined by history.

No difference of opinion, however, can exist, as to the recapture of Delhi, the details of which have recently been published for general information. Though no one capable of forming a judgment on the subject ever doubted for a moment of the speedy reduction of Delhi, yet some little misgiving might have been felt by those who knew how well furnished was the place with the munitions of war, and occupied by what an immense number of men, whose fiendish animosity was excited to the utmost by that resolution, discipline, and acquaintance with the art of war, which they had acquired by long training in the ranks from which they had basely revolted. But there can be no question of the admiration with which the world will learn by what a handful of men the arduous work has been achieved,—in a brief period,—with the limited resources, a most unlooked for exigency afforded,—and amid discouragements arising from the unhealthiness of the season, that were all but overwhelming.

Such a result under such circumstances never could have been hoped for, but from the well grounded confidence of brave hearts,

heroically devoted to the service of their country, and sustained by a sense of hereditary and indomitable prowess.

Happily remote from the scene of the outrages, which have darkened the aspect of the land, and tarnished that reputation for fidelity for which the native soldiery were once pre-eminent, we have derived sincere consolation from the reflection that in Bengal Proper there has been no disturbance, not even a symptom of disaffection; but that, on the contrary, the people have maintained that loyalty and devotion to the British Government, which led their ancestors to hail, and as far as they could to facilitate, the rising ascendency of that power.

Under the fostering influence of that Government, the population of the country has increased, its agriculture has extended, security has been given to life and property, and the value of land, both at the Presidency and in the interior, has been very considerably enhanced.

Such, indeed, has been the confidence of the people throughout Bengal in the security of the British rule, that these benefits have gone on progressively, even during the height of the disturbances and alarms that have prevailed in the North Western Provinces.

Sensible of the benefits they have enjoyed under British administration, the people could not but cordially sympathise with the embarrassing position in which their Rulers had suddenly been placed, and sincerely long for the speedy and entire re-establishment of British supremacy in the disturbed districts. So entirely have they identified their interests with those of their Rulers, that the natives of Bengal, men, women, and children, have in every part of the scene of the mutinies, been exposed to the same rancour, and treated with the same cruelty, which the mutineers and their misguided countrymen have displayed towards the British within their reach.

While we review with exultation the benefits our countrymen at large have derived from their connection with and steadfast adherence to the British power, and while we congratulate your Lordship in Council on the success of the British arms against the mutinous soldiery, and on the happy prospect before us of the early

restoration of tranquillity, we cannot fail to advert, and with no less satisfaction, to the administrative abilities which have conspicuously marked this part of your Lordship's career, and which have indeed been fully equal to the crisis. No sooner had the disloyalty of the sepoys been distinctly exhibited, than your Lordship took measures, with equal foresight and energy, to obtain reinforcements of British troops, as well from the neighbouring Presidencies and dependencies of the British Crown, as from the expedition then known to be on its way to a wholly different sphere of operations, and to hasten them to the disturbed districts.

Such measures at once assured the public of the speedy restoration of tranquillity throughout these territories. But not satisfied with these prospective advantages, your Lordship made such prompt use of the means that were within your immediate reach at the moment, as to ensure the reduction of the stronghold and rallying point of the mutineers, long ere the arrival of any considerable portion of the succours which Her Majesty's Government were prepared to send out to India, for the restoration of this empire to its former condition.

In your anxiety to dispel those clouds which have troubled the political horizon, your Lordship has not been inattentive to measures which would have appeared as of subordinate importance to minds of less perspicacity, foresight, and comprehension. It has been a prominent object with your Lordship both effectually to crush the disaffected and rebellious, and to protect and re-assure the loyal and obedient. Accordingly, the extensive powers of legislation vested in your hands have been employed to punish crimes of every form and magnitude against the State with promptitude and rigour; to check vigorously the progress of sedition and disloyalty; and to give a guarantee to the people at large that those powers would be wielded with justice and discrimination, so as to guard as far as possible against faithful and innocent subjects being confounded with the disseminators of sedition and the perpetrators of open mutiny or secret treachery.

Permit us to hope that your Lordship in Council will receive our heartfelt congratulations on the eminent success which has crowned

the British arms, and the warmest expression of our confidence from the opportune display of those signal talents which have distinguished your administration in times of unexampled difficulty, and have largely contributed to the safety of the British empire in these regions and the re-assurance of the peaceful and loyal.

We have the honor to be, my Lord,

Your most obedient and faithful servants,

(Signed) MAHARAJAH MAHATAB CHUND BAHADOOR, *of Burdwan,*

RAJAH RADHAKANT BAHADOOR,

RAJAH KALIKRISNA BAHADOOR,

And others, inhabitants of Bengal, upwards of Two Thousand Five Hundred.

REPLY.

No. 2699.

FROM CECIL BEADON, ESQ.,

Secretary to the Government of India.

To MAHARAJAH MAHATAB CHUND BAHADOOR *of Burdwan,* RAJAH RADHAKANT BAHADOOR, RAJAH KALIKRISNA BAHADOOR *and others.*

Dated the 17th December, 1857.

GENTLEMEN,—I am directed by the Right Hon'ble the Governor General in Council to thank you for your address of congratulation upon the success of the British Arms in the North Western Provinces.

Home Department.

The honor which you give to the brave men who recaptured Delhi, is richly deserved. The Governor General in Council agrees with you in believing that when the difficulties and discouragement by which Major General Wilson and his troops were beset, shall be fully known, their achievement will call forth the admiration of the world.

It is a pleasure to the Governor General in Council to be able

to confirm the praise for unbroken loyalty, which you have claimed for the province of Bengal Proper. Excepting places where the inhabitants have suffered violence from a mutinous soldiery beyond the reach of English troops, there has been no disturbance in that province; the wealthiest, the most richly cultivated, and the most thickly peopled, of India, and yet the one which for many years past has had least share of protection from European troops.

The Governor General in Council receives with great satisfaction the expression of your confidence in the Government. No man living have a deeper stake in its measures and its policy than yourselves. If peace, order, and security are valuable to any, they are so to those who, like the foremost amongst you, hold high rank, large hereditary possessions, accumulated wealth, and respected social positions. You do rightly regard your interests, as bound up with those of your rulers, and you may be certain that your rulers will do nothing to sever them. Justice, policy, and the duty of England to India forbid it.

In conclusion, the Governor General in Council desires me to thank you for the spirit of attachment and loyalty to the British Government, which has dictated your address.

I have the honor to be, &c.,

CECIL BEADON,

Secy. to the Govt. of India.

Fort William,
The 17th Dec., 1857.

TO THE RIGHT HON'BLE CHARLES JOHN VISCOUNT CANNING,

GOVERNOR GENERAL OF INDIA IN COUNCIL.

MY LORD,—We, the undersigned Rajahs, Zemindars, Talookdars, Merchants, Tradesmen, Agriculturists and other natives of the provinces of Bengal, Behar and Orissa, beg leave to approach your Lordship in Council with this address expressive of our deep sense of gratitude for the several measures of security adopted by your Lordship in Council since disturbances have broken out in the

Upper and Central Provinces of British India, and of our admiration for the wisdom, justice and foresight which characterize those measures.

The difficulties which beset the government of an empire so peculiarly constituted as that of British India, must, under any circumstances, be great and calculated to task the most practised statesmanship. But at a time like this, when the most momentous crisis that can occur in the history of a country is passing over ours, the successful conduct of affairs ought to entitle those entrusted with the public safety to the most unbounded praise, and to inspire the utmost confidence in their measures.

We, the undersigned, on our part and on the part of our countrymen generally, beg leave most respectfully to affirm that such praise is emphatically due to the administration of which your Lordship is the head, and such confidence is most worthily reposed by your countrymen in its justice, capacity and wisdom.

Such an expression of opinion as we intend this address to be, might, under ordinary circumstances, be liable to be considered as uncalled for, and even, perhaps, presumptuous. But under existing circumstances we feel it a duty to our countrymen to adopt the course we have done. It has become notorious throughout this land that your Lordship's administration has been assailed by faction, and assailed because your Lordship in Council has refused compliance with capricious demands, and to treat the loyal portion of the Indian population as rebels; because your Lordship has directed that punishment for offences against the State should be dealt out with discrimination, because your Lordship having regard for the future has not pursued a policy of universal irritation and unreasoning violence, and finally because your Lordship has confined coercion and punishment within necessary and politic limits.

Whatever may be the motives that influenced those who have joined in these proceedings, we entertain no apprehensions whatever of their representations having the effect which they desire to produce. We have observed with pain, but without misgiving, the incessant, though happily harmless, endeavours made by them to thwart the action of authority, to impeach its views and to em-

barrass its councils. But now that, My Lord, they have ventured to carry their mis-statements to the foot of the Throne, it is time,—and justice to ourselves and to our countrymen demands,—that a national protest against these most unjustifiable proceedings should be thus placed upon record.

We beg permission to subscribe ourselves,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient and faithful servants,

(Signed) MAHARAJAH SUTTISH CHUNDER ROY,

And more than 5,000 *Natives of the Provinces of Bengal, Behar and Orissa.*

REPLY.

No. 2700.

From CECIL BEADON, ESQ.,

Secretary to the Government of India,

To MAHARAJAH SUTTISH CHUNDER ROY BAHADOOR,

Of Nuddeah,

RAJAH PERTAUB CHUNDER SINGH BAHADOOR,

„ PRASONONATH ROY BAHADOOR,

BABOO JOYKISSEN MOOKERJEE, *and others,*

Dated the 17*th December*, 1857.

Home Department.

GENTLEMEN,—The Right Hon'ble the Governor General in Council directs me to thank you for the address which he has received at your hands.

The Governor General in Council sees amongst the numerous signatures to that address the names of men of ancient lineage, of vast possessions, and of great wealth; of men of cultivated intelligence, who have been foremost in measures of beneficence in the encouragement of education, and in works of material public improvement; men whose influence with their fellow-countrymen is deservedly great, and whose interest in the peace and well being of India, it would be difficult to exaggerate.

No person will hold chiefly the opinions of such a body, and the

possession of its confidence and good will would be a source of strength to any Government.

Therefore the Governor General in Council desires me, in thanking you for your address, to add emphatically that he receives it with much satisfaction.

The motives which have induced the presentation of the address are stated by you. Upon these the Governor General in Council desires me to say a few words.

In times of heat and violence, when the hearts of individuals have been torn, and the feelings of classes inflamed, the judgment which men pass upon each other and upon events around them are seldom dispassionate; especially their judgments upon those whose high and solemn duty it is, whilst repressing crime and averting danger, to guide the measures of the State in the straight path of justice.

In such times there lies upon every loyal man the obligation so to govern his acts and words so as to prevent or allay irritation; not to excite or heighten it. The Governor General in Council calls upon you, each in your sphere, to be mindful of this duty.

The Governor General in Council wishes you to rest assured that the Government of India will not forget, that England will not forget that if unhappily the mutineers and rebels of India are to be reckoned by thousands, the peaceful and loyal subjects of the Queen in India are numbered by millions. You may be sure that by no act of the Government, by no general proscriptions or sweeping condemnations of race or creed, shall these last men be classed with the first.

The course of the Government of India has been, and will continue to be simple and clear; to strike down resistance without mercy; but when resistance ends to allow deliberate justice to resume its sway; justice stern and inflexible, but patient and discriminating.

I have the honor to be, Gentlemen,

Your most obedient servant,

(Sd.) CECIL BEADON,

Secy. to the Govt. of India.

Fort William, 17th Dec., 1857.

We take the following remarks from the *Times* on the foregoing addresses as expressive of English opinion in respect to them :—

"The gentry, the landowners and the capitalists of Bengal and the neighbouring provinces have not been insensible to the prudent impartiality of Lord Cannings's language and conduct. In two well-written addresses they have thanked him for his resistance to the clamour against the natives and congratulated him on the success of the English arms at Delhi. More than 2,000 memorialists remind Government of the fact, often stated in our own correspondence that "the natives of Bengal men, women, and children—have, in every part of the scene of the mutinies, been exposed to the same rancour and treated with the same cruelty which the mutineers and their misguided countrymen have displayed towards the British within their reach." They recognized as equal merits the determination to crush the disaffected and rebellious, and the resolution to protect and re-assure the loyal and obedient. Every civil and military official, every soldier, almost every Englishman, may claim to share the credit of the vigour which has been displayed, the honour of steadily discriminating between the rebels and the peaceful community is assigned by the common voice of bitter enemies and of ardent friends principally to the Governor General. Another memorial bearing 5,000 signatures more directly refers to the demands put forth in the well known Calcutta petition. "It has become notorious," it is said, "throughout this land that your Lordship's Administration has been assailed by faction, and assailed because your Lordship in Council has refused compliance with capricious demands, and to treat the loyal portion of the Indian population as rebels: because your Lordship has directed that punishment for offences against the state should be dealt out with discrimination; because your Lordship having regard for the future has not pursued a policy of universal irritation and unreasoning violence; and finally, because your Lordship has confined coercion and punishment within necessary and politic limits."

The importance of such declarations by no means depends on the

justice of the reasoning or the accuracy of the statements which they contain. The Calcutta Opposition will probably complain that the wishes and opinions of suspected aliens should be placed in competition with their own; but the Government of India, after all, ought to remember that its subjects are principally Indians. Rajahs and Zemindars, Talookdars and Merchants may possibly be perfidious and are certainly heterodox; but it would be inconvenient if their influence over their countrymen was employed to embarrass the Government. According to one familiar test of respectability the memorialists may well be thought entitled to courtesy and consideration. Their collective wealth would probably buy up Lombard Street; the extent of their landed estates might in some instances be admired even by an English Duke. One of the gentlemen who sign the address represents the ancient Hindoo dynasty, which reigned in Southern Bengal before the Mahomedan conquest. The Moharajàh of Burdwan pays land revenue to the amount of more than half a million sterling a year. A Rajah with an unpronounceable name at one time subscribed 5,000 *l.* to the Native Hospital. Another has founded between 40 and 50 schools. Shamachurn Mullick's loyalty may perhaps be partially explained by the statement that he is the largest holder of Government promissory notes in Bengal; but every serious politician will admit that the wealthy leaders of a highly civilized society are worth conciliating, especially when they simply demand justice and protection to which they are entitled.

It may be said that the Brahmin Sepoys were as smooth and plausible as the members of their caste at Calcutta; but the question is not whether the Bengalese should be armed and drilled. The Government is not responsible for their existence or social position, and it is placed there for the very purpose of securing to them peace and justice. Five years since there was a premature clamour for the advancement of natives to high offices in the administration. The opposite demand, that their interests and feelings should be sacrificed to the claims of a superior race, will be even more transitory. The experiment in which Lord Canning has refused his co-operation was tried long since in Central and

Southern America. Two ancient, though inferior, forms of civilization were rudely trampled out by the conquerors of Mexico and of Peru. The Spaniards put themselves in the place not of the Government, but of the nation, and exercised their power ostensibly as well as really for the exclusive benefit of the dominant race; but from that time to the present day they have degenerated towards the level of the subject population which they had at first degraded. The English Government of India has undertaken the nobler task of wielding the sceptre of Akbur and of Baber for the benefit of the native population as well as of their conquerors. The interests of England are best promoted by the prosperity of her Imperial dependency, and by the gradual elevation of the Indian races to a higher standard of civilization. The Governor-General has understood this true policy of his country; and, if he has occasionally seemed to incline too much to a system of conciliation, it must be remembered that his error was on the side of prudence and that he had not only to suppress the mutiny but in doing so *not* to render our future tenure of India impossible."—*Times, Feb.* 4.

We republish the above addresses of confidence in the Administration, and the remarks of the *Times* thereon without comment. The doings of the "Calcutta Malcontents" in the way of enhancing the difficulties and helping the continuance of the struggle by irritating race-prejudices and fostering race-hatreds are notorious, and the remarkably good temper, calm courage, grasping mind and unerring instinct displayed by Lord Canning and his Council in resisting what M. Montalembert in his celebrated *Debate on India* calls the "hateful promptings and sanguinary incitements" of the independent British community here, have become equally famous to call for especial remark. But we may be permitted to observe that while the character of our countrymen was being most fouly calumniated, and the bitterest aspersions were being made on them as members of society,—that while a series of legislative measures was

passed, untying to a very serious extent the joint of social tranquillity and happiness, which have been justly characterized by a remarkable writer in a remarkable article* in the last number of the *Calcutta Review*, as "unequalled since that of Draco, for every line is written in blood, and all protection to life, liberty and property was removed"—that while hundreds of their fellow-countrymen were perishing violently, without enquiry and with no formality of justice, and blood was most recklessly being shed, which to quote the same feeling writer, "which the waters of the Ganges will not wash and the memory of which years will not efface"—that in the midst of this revolutionary storm, calculated to uproot the deep-seated affections of the most cool-tempered people, the leaders of our society,—conscious of their position from the mistaken hostility of the sepoys and of the good will of the higher class of the European community here, and of the earnestness and anxiety of the Supreme Government to see justice done and the usual tone of the state machinery restored,—publicly and with perfect cheerfulness offered their good wishes to the success and prosperity of the British cause, expressing their highest confidence in the Administration, and this at the time when its acts were calumniated and impeached. What effects these demonstrations have achieved are signally marked by the increasing intelligence displayed by the British public in appreciating Lord Canning's policy and measures. Begoted and hostile Contemporaries may impugn the motives and trifle with the aim of these loyalists, but the future historian of the revolt will, we confidently hope, do them justice.

We will conclude this part of our labors with one more instance. Here is a testimony to the conduct of the general

* A DISTRICT DURING A REBELLION, *Calcutta Review*, No. LXI. This is one of those papers which will elucidate to the future historian of the Indian revolt some of its gloomiest features.—*Compiler.*

body of Bengali Uncovenanted Servants in the North West accorded by a worthy eye-witness, we mean the writer in the *Calcutta Review* quoted above. "Be it recorded (says the Reviewer) to the honor of the Natives of Bengal Proper who have monopolized the English offices in the North Western Provinces, that timid and pusillanimous as they notoriously are, NO ONE INSTANCE OF THEIR HAVING FAILED IN LOYALTY IS ON RECORD."

The public has of late heard much of the "Fighting Moonsiff." The Reviewer thus speaks of him :—

"In one remarkable instance the native Civil Judge—a Bengal Baboo by capacity and valor—brought himself so conspicuously forward, as to be known as "the fighting Moonsiff." He not only held his own defiantly, but he planned attacks, he burnt villages, he wrote English despatches thanking his subordinates, and displayed a capacity for rule and a fertility of resource very remarkable for one of his nation."*

We gather from the *Hindoo Patriot* that this native gentleman is Baboo Pearymohun Banerjee of the Woterparah Banerjeas. He was educated at first in the Woterparah school and afterwards in the Hindoo College. He was Moonsiff of Allahabad at the time of the mutiny. As an acknowledgment of his valorous and conspicuous services he has been made Deputy Magistrate and Deputy Collector of Banda."

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* The *Friend of India* calls the last two lines the offspring of a "laughable prejudice." "We are not slow (says the *Friend*,) to scold Bengalees when required, but if in India there is a race to whom God has given capacity, real clearness of brain, it is the Bengalee. Take the most timid quaking wretch of a Kayust you can find, put him in any district in India with a shadow of authority, and if he does not make Punjabee and Sikh, Marhatta and Hindostanee, work themselves to death for his benefit, and think all the while it is for their own, he is no true Bengalee."—*Compiler.*

Place.	*Person.*	*Authority.*	*Services.*
Secunderabad..	The troops of the 2nd Cavalry, Hydrabad Contingent, and the Resildar.	*Madras Spectator*, July 25, quoted by the *Bengal Hurkaru*, August 11, 1858.	The troops of the 2nd Cavalry of Hydrabad Contingent, which was in guard at the Residency behaved most gallantry during the whole affair: (The repulsing the attack of a Rohillah body.) The conduct of the Resildar was so conspicuous, exposing himself as he did to find out all that was going on, that it is understood that the resident was resolved to promote him.—*Madras Spectator*, *July* 25, 1858.
Gopalparah...	The Rajah of Gopalparah.	*Hurkaru*, June 27, 1858.	An Officer of the 22nd Regiment which mutinied at Fyzabad, after stating the inconveniences he with others was put to thereby, writes to the *Hurkaru*: "The Rajah has taken compassion on us here, and is going to send us to Dinapore."
Mhow.....	The Native Officer of the 23rd Native Infantry.	*Mofussilite* June 16, quoted by the *Hurkaru*, July 8, 1858.	A budmash attempted to incite the sepoys stating that the European Artillery were ready to fire and blow them away. The Native Officer of the 23rd Native Infantry refused him ingress into the place where the arms were and stopped him. The writer in the *Mofussilite* adds, "it has gone abroad that the Commanding Officer of Artillery saved a rise, but it is no such thing, it was the Native Officer's fidelity and pluck that did it."

Place.	*Person.*	*Authority.*	*Services.*
Budaun.....	Newab Ahmud Yar Khan	*Mofussilite*, June 16, quoted by the *Hurkaru*, July 9, 1858.	The fugitives from Budaun were cordially received and hospitably entertained by theNewab
Marwar	Maharajah Tukhut Sing of Marwar.	*Hurkaru*, July 14, 1858.	The *Hurkaru* writes: "We have been informed that besides some of the Rajpoot chiefs, Maharajah Tukhut Sing of Marwar, has promised to send two thousand cavalry sewars and as many infantry men with an adequate number of Sirdars or officers to aid the British Government in quelling the insurrection of the sepoys."
Serampore and Calcutta ..	The Gossaines of Serampore and Baboo Samachurn Mullick...	*Hurkaru*, July 18, 1858.	The rich Gossaines of Serampore offered some of their houses for the accommodation of soldiers free of cost to Government. Baboo Shama Churn Mullick, a rich millionaire of Calcutta, also offered his splendid mansion meeting the Chitpore Road for the accommodation of the Hindu School, when the Hindu School building was occupied by newly arrived soldiers.
Fyzabad ..	Maun Sing of Oude.	*Hurkaru*, July 21, 1858.	Mrs. Busher, Mrs. Matthews, and Mr. Edwards with lots of children were rescued from Fyzabad by Maun Sing.

Place.	*Person.*	*Authority.*	*Services.*
Cawnpore	The Subadar of the Cawnpore Regiment.	*Bombay Times*, July 10, quoted by the *Hurkaru*, July 22, 1858.	The Agra correspondent of the *Bombay Times* states that when the sepoys mutinied at Cawnpore, the Subadar lost his life in attempting to protect the treasury.
"	The Rampore Newab.	*Ibid.*	The same writer says: "It is related on tolerably good authority that when the 29th native infantry were passing the Rampore Jageer on their way to Bareilly, the Rampore Newab disarmed them and took from them all the treasure. The same Newab, it is said, assisted English Refugees at Nyne Tal with supplies.
Nuzufghur, ..	The Rajah of Nuzufghur.	*Hurkaru*, September 5, 1858.	One of the survivors of the Cawnpore massacre, after describing the celebrated Boat episode says, "when we had got down about 6 miles, firing on both sides, ceased, and soon after we were hailed by some on the Oude side who asked us to come on shore, and said they would take us to their Rajah who was friendly to the English. We gave ourselves up and were taken six miles in land to the Rajah who treated us very kindly, giving us food and clothes. We stayed with him for about a month but he would not let us leave, saying the roads were unsafe."

Place.	*Person.*	*Authority.*	*Services.*
Agra	The Hindoos of the City.	*Hurkaru*, September 8, 1858.	The writer says "the Hindoos seem to cling to us and however come down with loans to Government."
Fyzabad	A sepoy of the 21st Native Infantry.	*Ibid.*	The sepoy communicated to the writer who was an officer of the Regiment, of the designs of his comrades and thereby saved the lives of some of the Europeans of the station.
„	An inhabitant.	*Ibid.*	This inhabitant served as a guide to a party of fugitives from Fyzabad.
„	The Rajah of Gopalpore.	*Ibid.*	The writer says that in course of their journey the above party of fugitives reached the place of the Rajah of Gopalpore who treated them like gentlemen, gave them food and clothing, and offered them money and most other things which they required.
Bhagulpore ..	The people of Bhagulpore.	*Ibid.*	The party were next served by the people of Bhagulpore.
Kolapore. ...	Two Havildars of the 27th Regt.	*Bombay Telegraph and Courier* quoted by the *Hurkaru*, September 10, 1858.	These Havildars escorted Mr. Rolland across the country to the Residency.

Place.	*Person.*	*Authority.*	*Services.*
Kolapore..	The Rajah of Kolapoor.	*Bombay Telegraph and Courier.*	In the suppression of the outbreak at Kolapore, the Rajah assisted Col. Maughan and lent him three guns.
Sealkote ..	Sepoy Bhowany Sing.	*Ibid.*	This Sepoy escorted European children from Sealkote on the occurrence of the outbreak there.
„	Sooban Khan Havildar and two troopers.	*Ibid.*	The Sobadar and Troopers escorted to the Fort, Col. Campbell, his wife, Mrs. Graham the widow of Dr. C. Graham, Mr. Gray and the children.
„	A trooper.	*Ibid.*	Escorted Miss Graham, the daughter of the Superintending Surgeon.
Sealkote ..	Tilluck Pandy ...	*Bombay Telegraph and Courier,* quoted by the *Hurkaru,* September 10, 1858.	"This was an extraordinary Act of fidelity. When the mutiny first broke out, the Soobadar of the guard was asked by several men to join it which he declined but subsequently finding the rising general, they (the guard) all went off after helping themselves to ammunition. One sepoy alone, Tilluck Pandy, on some pretence remained behind and stationed himself at the Quarter Guard, where he seems to have been left undisturbed till the afternoon when two troopers and one khalasee came to explode the

Place.	*Person.*	*Authority.*	*Services.*
Sealkote..	Tilluck Pandy.	*Bombay Telegraph and Courier*, quoted by the *Hurkaru*, September 10, 1858.—*(Continued.)*	magazine. Tilluck Pandy told them not to trouble themselves about that, as he had remained there for that purpose and would do it, whereupon they went away to the Artillery magazine which soon after blew up in a dense black cloud. Tilluck Pandy was no more disturbed, except by villagers whom he frightened by pointing his musket towards them, and when the first party (Europeans) from the Fort came into cantonments, the next morning this faithful Pandy was found guarding his post. It was afterwards discovered that he had thus saved in the magazine 80,000 ball cartridges, nearly as many caps, the clothing of the regiment and much officers' property and "messplate."
	The washerman of Major Drake and his wife.	*Ibid.*	Protected Major Drake's property.
MeeanMeer	The Havildar Major, the Pay Havildar and a few others of the 26th Regiment Local Infantry.	*Mofussolite*, Aug. 11, quoted by *Hurkaru*, Sept. 17, 1858.	Lost their lives in attempting to maintain order among their regiment.

Place.	*Person.*	*Authority.*	*Services.*
Comillah..	Baboo Bungshee Lochun Mitter.	*Hurkaru,* December 7, 1858.	When the mutineers in Eastern Bengal advanced towards Tipperah, the Judge and other Christian inhabitants with their wives and children were housed, fed and protected by Baboo Bungsee Lochun Mitter, who entertained for their protection a guard of about forty Burkundazes. The Baboo afterwards escorted the party to Dacca.
Some Village near Chirkaree.	Some Brahmin Zemindar.	*Hurkaru,* November 10, 1858.	Offered shelter and protection to Mr. H. V. Sturt.
Cherkaree..	The Rajah of place.	*Ibid.*	Ditto.
Calcutta..	Baboo Sreekissen Sing.	*Hurkaru,* November 25, 1858.	As a token of his loyalty offered a present to Government of a large and beautiful elephant for the service of the State.
Singhbhoom	Rajah of Serakhillah and the Thakoor of Khersherwah.	*Hurkaru,* November 27, 1858.	Offered personal services and a supply of some 700 or 800 retainers.

Place.	*Person.*	*Authority.*	*Services.*
Bhooloah..	BabooJoshodaCoomer Pyne, the Naib of the Rajahs Pertaub Chunder and Issur Chunder Sings, Zemindars of Bhooloah.	*Hurkaru*, December 5, 1858.	The newswriter writes, "The news of the outbreak at Chittagong, on the night of the 19th, reached the Authorities here at about 10½ P. M. on the night of the following day by Express Dâk. That very moment the Magistrate accompanied by Mr. Peacock, proceeded to the strong-built cutchery house of the Zemindars of Bhooloah, Rajahs Pertaup Chunder and Issur Chunder Sings of Calcutta, and after a consultation with their able and well informed naib or agent Baboo Joshoda Coomar Pyne, ordered him immediately to collect there a body of fighting lattials with sufficient quantities of food, and issued purwannahs or orders on the Police Darogahs and employed horsemen to bring intelligence of the movements of the enemy. The activity and zeal with which these orders were performed may be understood, when I inform you that the very next day a body of five hundred fighting men with arms in their hands, was collected in and around the cutchery house referred to, while another body of more than that number were divided into parties and located at the most favourable points along the road leading to Sodharum, &c. &c.

Place.	*Person.*	*Authority.*	*Services.*
Patna....	The late Nazir of Patna.	P. P. E. I. Mutinies, No. 7.	"The late Nazir of Patna had by his exertions contributed much to this state of things (restoration of tranquillity) and had sent in a large number of prisoners." Narrative of events by A. R. Young, Esquire, Secretary to the Government of Bengal, dated October 10th, 1857.
Paneehatee	Baboos Prankissen Roy Chowdry and Juggut Chunder Roy Chowdry, Zemindars of Paneehatee.	Appendix P. P. E. I. Mutinies, No. 5.	Explained to the people of their zemindarees (about 50,000 in number) the Govt. Proclamation, dated 16th May, 1857, assuring them that Govt. never interfered or intended to interfere with their religious beliefs and customs, and exhorted them to loyalty by setting forth the advantages the country has derived from the British rule.
Hazareebag.	Teeluck Das of Nyaghur and the Rajah of Talchere & Koenghur.	P. P. E. I. Mutinies, No. 7.	Arrested and sent in certain convicts and prisoners.
Ramghur..	The Zemindar of Ramghur.....	*Ibid.*	Acted on behalf of the British Government.

Place.	*Person.*	*Authority.*	*Services.*
Sahabad..	Maharajah Mohessur Buksh Sing.	P. P. E. I. Mutinies, No. 7.	Assisted the Government with men and money.
Behar....	Some Zemindars.	*Ibid.*	Aided the Government with the amount of their revenues in gold coins and sicca rupees, though they could not collect their rents from their royts.
Patna.....	Rajah Bhoop Sing.	*Ibid.*	Aided the Government and continued in his loyal services.
Sarun.....	Maharajah Chutterdharee Sahage Bahadoor.	*Ibid.*	Took active measures on behalf of the British Government.
Singhbhoom	Native Officers of the Sen. Asst. Comis. Office.	*Ibid.*	Rendered loyal services.
Beerbhoom and Manbhoom...	Zemindars of Beerbhoom and Manbhoom.	*Ibid.*	Assisted Government in the restoration of order. The following zemindars also rendered the same services. Mokundonarain Deo of Manbhoom, Rajah Radakisto Deo of Burrabhoom, Rajah Suttroghun Deo, zemindars of Patcom, Rajah Reegonauth Sing, zemindar of Hogmondee, and the zemindar of Saelpore, Rajah Chuttrepur Deo of Ghasellah.

Place.	*Person.*	*Authority.*	*Services.*
Santipore ..	Baboo Issur Chunder Ghossal, Deputy Magistrate.	P. P. E. I. Muti- No. 7.	Offered himself to go anywhere for the service of Govt. and received thanks for the same.
Behar.....	Shah Kerbeer Oddeen Ahmed.	*Ibid.*	Rendered various services to Government, and proved of especial usefulness on the rising of Koero Sing at Arrah.
Kalabundy.	Sree Adit Pertaup Deo.	*Ibid.*	Ditto.
Moorshedabad.	The Newab of Moorshedabad.	*Ibid.*	Stood firm in his attachment to British Government and rendered good services.
Jawnpore.	Ramprosad Sing.	*Ibid*	Sheltered and protected the Europeans who fled from Cawnpore and rendered other loyal services.
Mynpooree.	Bhowany Sing Rao.	*Ibid.*	Rendered services to Government.
Futtehghur.	A Brahmin.	*Ibid*	Sheltered and protected a fugitive from Futtehghur.
Cawnpore.	Moonshee Sheopershad.	*Ibid.*	Exerted himself conspicuously on behalf of the British Government under great personal difficulties.

Place.	*Person.*	*Authority.*	*Services.*
Jalaun....	The Rajah of Samptur	P. P. E. I. Mutinies, No. 7.	Supplied the Deputy Commissioner of Jalaun with a great number of men, guns and ammunition.
Bhind ..	A faithful servant	*Ibid.*	Saved the lives of a number of European fugitives by preventing them from proceeding to Gwalior.
Benares ..	Hingun Laul late Tehsildar of Derra Dhoon	*Ibid.*	Saved the lives of Mr. France and his party and restored order in Pergunnah Keerakut.
Chuprah..	Ramzan Ali.	*Ibid.*	Mr. Samuells the Commissioner of Patna says "Had it not been for his exertions the same scenes would have followed the abandonment of the station of Chuprah as were exhibited on a similar occasion at Goya."
Sewan ..	Mahomed Wajed.	*Ibid.*	Kept order at Sewan in conjunction with the Hutwa Rajah.
Muzufferpore ..	Baboo Nundulaul Mohtoe.	*Ibid.*	Exerted himself most conspicuously for the preservation of order.

Place.	*Person.*	*Authority.*	*Services.*
Muzuffer-pore. ..	Hydur Buksh.	P. P. E. I. Mutinies, No. 7.	Rendered good services to Government.
Ditto.....	Mohes Lall.	*Ibid.*	Was recommended for a reward of Rs. 200 in consideration of his loyal services.
Ditto.....	Mohamed Tokee.	*Ibid.*	Was staunch and rendered some service to Government.
Sewan ...	Burrowley &Luchmon Sahoye.	*Ibid.*	Saved Messrs. Lynch and Donell.
Ditto. ..	Errayut Hossein.	*Ibid.*	Rendered good services to Government.
Ditto ..	Shah Khyrut and Ahmed Hossein.	*Ibid.*	Offered protection to European fugitives.
Jahanabad	Mohamed Furreedoodeen, Moonsiff.	*Ibid.*	Preserved order.
Bhugulpore	Rajah Jymunt Sing.	*Ibid.*	Rendered material assistance to the authorities.
Ditto	Mahindernarain of Geddhour.	*Ibid.*	Behaved himself creditably.

Place.	*Person.*	*Authority.*	*Services.*
Bhaugulpore	Fetah Ali Khan Zemindar of Sheekhpoor	P. P. E. I. Mutinees, No. 7.	Assisted Government.
Ditto	Mahomed Rajah.	*Ibid.*	Exerted himself loyally.
Benares ..	Lall Bunkey Laul	*Ibid.*	Rendered loyal services.
Dacca....	Zemindars.	*Ibid.*	Messrs. Anund Kissore Roy and Ram Chunder of Mymensing, and Moulvie Ally and Moulvie Rajah Abdool Gunney of Dacca, supplied Government with elephants, &c. free of cost.
Maghubee.	The Rajah of Maghubee.	*Ibid.*	Rendered loyal services.
Singramon.	Rundhur Sing.	*Ibid.*	Afforded assistance to Government.
Purneah.	The Rajah of Purneah.	*Ibid.*	Was staunch and rendered loyal services.
Kuttinque.	Havildar Hatta Tewarree, and Privates Ram Churn and Sheik Oman.	*Ibid.*	Rendered conspicuous and gallant services.

Place.	*Person.*	*Authority.*	*Services.*
Behar....	Several Rajahs and landholders.	P. P. E. I. Mutinies, No. 1.	The following Rajahs and landholders are described by the Patna Commissioner, to have vied with each other in the display of their loyalty. Rajahs of Bettiahee Hutwah, Sera Khillah, and Ramghur and Rajah Joymungul Sing and Shah Kulbeeroodeen.
Punnah, ...	Maharajah of Punnah.	*Ibid.*	The Fort Kullengur was recovered from the rebels entirely by the zeal, loyalty and good judgment of the Maharajah.
Hazareebag	Some Officers.	*Ibid.*	These men remained staunch and assisted the commander when their comrades had mutinied.
Fyzabad ..	Dhulleep Sing Subadar of the 28th N. I.	*Ibid.*	This man though he was forced to join his rebellious comrades, still exerted himself conspicuously for the safety of Col. Lennox and other officers of the regiment.
Ditto.....	The Nazim of Goruckpore and his nephew.	*Ibid.*	Sheltered and protected the party of Col. Lennox and contrived every possible means for their safety in which they happily succeeded.
Ditto	Teg Allikhan.	*Ibid.*	Assisted a party of Fyzabad fugitives.

Place.	*Person.*	*Authority.*	*Services.*
Fyzabad..	A village Jamadar.	P. P. E. I. Mutinies No. 7.	Assisted a party of Fyzabad fugitives.
Ditto ..	A Tuhsildar.	*Ibid.*	Afforded protection to the party and supplied them with money.
Ditto	A Brahmin.	*Ibid.*	Afforded shelter and protection to Serjeant Busher, a fugitive from Fyzabad.
Ditto	Brother of the rebel Bully Sing.	*Ibid.*	Interceded with Bully Sing for the life of Busher & succeeded.
Banda ...	The Newab of Banda.	*Ibid.*	Afforded protection to Christian fugitives and supplied them with money.
Rubrai ..	An old and retired Subadar.	*Ibid.*	We gather from a letter of Capt. Scott to Major Reid that this Subadar and a retired Native officer did good service during the crisis.
Perneah..	The Rajah of	*Ibid.*	Rendered loyal services to Government by furnishing the authorities with men and supplies, &c.
Agra and Banda ..	Subadar Utter Sing and Uttun Sing of the Shik Battalion.	*Ibid.*	Rendered distinguished and gallant services.

Place.	*Person.*	*Authority.*	*Services.*
Bettiah ..	The Rajah of	P. P. E. I. Mutinies, No. 7.	Assisted the British Government and acted on its behalf.
Allyghur..	Rajah Thackoor Govind Sing.	*Ibid.*	Ditto.
Ghatiapore Pergunnah	Beharee Sing.	*Ibid.*	Mr. Sherer to Mr. Muir, "Order was preserved at Ghatiapore Pergunnah through" the exertions and firmness of Behary Sing and others."
Behar....	The Rajah of Durbangha.	*Ibid.*	The late Commissioner of Patna says, "The Rajah of Durbangha offered assistance and the more respectable natives of the town showed a disposition to aid and support the authorities. Rugunundon Sing has offered 30 Rupees for the apprehension of each mutineer and deserter. Chumun Chund Day 15 Rs. and Bagbehary 10 Rs."
Tekaree..	Baboo Mohendi Narain.	*Ibid.*	Assisted the authorities.
Behar ..	Rajah Jay Perkas Sing.	Appendix P. P. E.I.MutiniesNo.5.	Ditto.

Place.	*Person.*	*Authority.*	*Services.*
Muzuffer-pore ..	Fuzl Hug.	Appendix P .P. E. I. Mutinies, No. 5.	Assisted the authorities.
Ramghur .	Cowar Ram Sing.	*Ibid.*	Ditto.
Arungabad	Jhumum Laul and two Chowkey-dars.	*Ibid.*	These persons protected the station in the absence of all Civil Officers.
Tirhoot ..	Moonshe Iradut Ally.	*Ibid.*	Rendered loyal services to Government.
Agra ..	Thesildars, Thanna-dars.	*Englishman*, 6th January 1858.	Assisted Captain Alexander in his attempt to escape to Agra (received handsome reward from Government.)
Saugor ..	200 men 31st Regt.	Saugor Correspon-dent of the *Englishman*, 6th Jan. 1858.	Detachment of 200 men under Capt. Finch, 31st Regiment Native Infantry, advanced and took the Town Bopyle from the mutineers amidst heavy fire.
Luthern-wallah..	Jamar.	*Moffusilite*, Dec. 4, quoted by the *Englishman* of 6th Jan. 1858.	Protected Serjeant Callow & Jarvis on their perilous escape from Sepree.

Place.	*Person.*	*Authority.*	*Services.*
Joypore ..	Rajah of	*Moffusilite*, quoted by *Englishman*, 9th January, 1858.	Assisted the Government on the application of the Political Agent Capt. W. F. Edens, in quelling the disturbed district of Goorgaon. The troops he furnished were also entrusted with the escorting of number of a English Officers, women and children, from Nusseerabad to Agra.
Bousie ..	Rajah of	Service Message vide *Englishman*, Jan. 11, 1858.	Intercepted a party who attempted to escape towards Oude.
Nepaul ..	Guardsmen of the Resident of Nepaul.	*Englishman*, Jan. 15, 1858.	Apprehended three disaffected persons who had been attempting to tamper with and excite the men to acts of insubordination, (received from Government a reward of Rs. 1,000.)
Gopaulpore	Rajah of	Gorruckpore Correspondent of the *Englishman* 27th January, 1858.	Captured the Rebel Mushrufkhan and his Companions.
Petturia in the district of Chota Nagpore. ..	Preonauth Jogul Paul.	*Englishman* Jan. 28, 1858.	Government invested him with a Khelat, a life pension of 313 Rupees per annum and the title of Roy Bahadur for the devotedness he evinced to the cause of the British Government during the disturbances.

Place.	*Person.*	*Authority.*	*Services.*
Lucknow.	Old Subadar of the 13th Regiment.	*Englishman*, Jan. 28th, 1858.	Remained attached to a fugitive Captain and interceded for his safety with the rebel sepoys.
Cachar.	Kookies and Ryots and especially a Kookie Chief, named Manjeehows.	*Englishman*, Feb. 2nd, 1858.	Rendered useful services by attacking the mutineers in the jungles.
Sekawatees.	Sekawatee.	*Englishman*, 2nd Feb. 1858.	Behaved most gallantly.
Goonda.	Rajah of	*Englishman*, 10th Feb. 1858. Service Message.	Under him the Goorkhas attacked the enemy ten thousand strong.
Bustee.	Mabon Sing.	*Englishman*, Feb. 11, 1858.	Mr. William Osborne sub-deputy Opium agent says that Maunsing lately saved several Christian fugitives from Lucknow. The fugitives say that Maunsing treated them with every consideration.

Place.	*Person.*	*Authority.*	*Services.*
Gopcegunge	A Pundit.	*Englishman*, 17*th* Feb. 1858.	Saved a certain government treasure.
Cherkari.	Rajah of	*Englishman*, 18th Service Message.	Through his assistance Mr. Carne, Deputy Collector of Punna who was shut up with the Rajah in the fort of Cherkari—was able to effect his escape on the 7th March 1858.
Mooshabags. Darogah.	Meer Maped Ally	*Englishman*, 22nd March 1858. Service Message.	Gave shelter to 10 European with whom he was subsequently captured by the Calpee rebels.
Tirhoot...	Rajah Joymungal Sing & other Zemindars.	*Englishman*, 9th April, 1858.	Rendered distinguished services to Government.
Benares..	Soorut Singh.	*Englishman*, 17th March 1858.	Received from the Government for himself and his legitimate heirs (male) an allowance in perpetuity of 400 Rupees per month, and a Khillut of 5,000 Rs.
,,	Takoor Buldeo Singh.	*Englishman*, 25th June 1858.	Received from Government for conspicuous services a reward of certain confiscated land worth 1,000 Rs. per annum, rent free.
Madhoppore Bas-	200 Zemindars...	*Englishman*, 10th July 1858.	Raised people to withstand the rebels. A correspondent of the *Englishman* from Mozufferpore thus speaks of them :—

Place.	*Person.*	*Authority.*	*Services.*
gareeah Ghaut...	*(Continued.)*	*(Continued.)*	"Were it not for the demonstration made by these men, it is more than probable that Tirhoot would have been infested with the presence of the Mutineers."
Resteet...	Zemindar.	*Englishman*, 12th Dec. 1858.	Drove out the rebels.
Simlah...	Oozurkhan.	*Englishman*, 15th Sept. 1858.	Proved useful in keeping the Bazar people in order.
Ditto.....	Meer Kanure Sing, Nephew of the Rajah of Nataghur.	*Englishman*, 15th Sept. 1858.	Succeeded in preventing a band of mutinous Sepoys who had fled from Jullundur from coming into the Hills.
Sari Sidoo.	Thesildar.	*Delhi Gazette Extra*, quoted for *Englishman*, 20th Sept. 1858.	With police force pursued some 300 Mooltan rebels.
Belliah...	Maha Rajah of	*Englishman*, 7th Dec. 1858.	Aided with all his means the authorities during the disturbances.
Agra	2 Jat Villagers.	*Englishman*, Jan. 1, 1858.	Served and aided an European gentleman and his family in their escape from Delhi.

LIST OF PERSONS REWARDED FOR ACTS OF LOYALTY.

Names.	*Nature of Reward.*
Two Subadars ...	The Title of Bahadur.
Three sepoys of the Behar Station guards ..	200 Rupees each.
Gomastah of Kootee Etawah ..	Undefined.
Shah Kubbeerooddeen Ahmed and Sujjadeh Nushen of Sasseram ..	Khillut of the value of 10,000 rupees and a Sunnud.
Widow of Syedooddeen, a Kotegusht Darogah ..	Pension.
Chuckdun Sing, Rajah of Seraikillah, in Singbhoom ..	Khillut.
Seikh Heydayet Ally ..	Rank of Subadar Bahadur and the first class Order of Merit.
Rampergas Sing ..	Present of 1,000 rupees and a commendatory Perwannah.
Hingun Loll, ex. Tehseeldar ..	Life pension of rupees 100 per mensem, with the honorary title of Deputy Magistrate and Deputy Collector; the pension may be extended to a second life in consideration of his advanced age and impaired constitution.
Seikh Syedooddeen, Kotegusht Darogah of Patna ..	300 rupees and promotion from the 3rd to the 2nd Grade.
Subadar Major Kassim Ally Khan and Subadar Gunness Doobay ..	First Class of the order of British India with the title of Sirdar Bahadur.
Havildar Futteh Mohamed, 5th Co.	Promoted as Jemadar.

LIST OF PERSONS REWARDED FOR ACTS OF LOYALTY.

Names.	*Nature of Reward.*
Drill Havildar Sheik Ismail, 2d Co.	Promoted as Jemadar.
Private (Lance Paick) Sheik Ruheem Buksh, 5th Co. ..	Ditto as Havildar.
Jemadar Cassim Sahib, of the 1st Regiment Infantry, Nagpore Irregular Force ..	Promoted to 3rd Class of the Order of Merit.
Ressaldar Meer Bemda Ally and Woordie Major Meer Burkut Allee ...	Ditto to 3rd Class of the Order of British India.
Havildar Pirthee Sing, of the 31st Regiment Native Infantry ...	Rank of Subadar.
Subadars Buctawar Sing, Issuree Buccus Sing, Bhawany Buccus Tewary and Daveedeen ..	Promoted to 3rd Class of the Order of Merit.
Subadar Buctaur Misser, of the 8th Regiment of Infantry, Oude Irregular Force ..	Ditto to 3rd Class of the Order of Merit.
Havildar Khoosial Sing, of the 36th Regiment Native Infantry	Ditto to the rank of Subadar.
Subadar Muthora Pursaud, of the 22nd Regiment Bombay Native Infantry ...	Ditto to the 3rd Class of the Order of Merit.
Havildar Sunkehadeen, of the 2nd Infantry, Hyderabad Contingent	Ditto to the rank of Subadar.
Naicks Sheik Barry and Sheevapersad of the 2nd Infantry, Hyderabad Contingent ..	Ditto to the rank of Jemadar.
Havildars Sohoi Sing and Cussim Khan, of the 8th Regiment Native Infantry. ..	Ditto to the rank of Jemadar.

LIST OF PERSONS REWARDED FOR ACTS OF LOYALTY.

Names.	*Nature of Reward.*
Ressaldar Munowur Khan, of the 12th Irregular Cavalry. ..	Promoted to First Class of the Order of British India with the title of Bahadur.
Mohamed Buksh Khan of the 12th Irregular Cavalry. ..	Promoted from the 3rd to the 1st Class of the Order of Merit.
Ressaldar Ismail Khan, of the 2nd Cavalry, Hyderabad Contingent.	Promoted to rank of Ressaldar Major.
Havildar Adjoodhia Misser, Naick Goojar Khan and Sepoy Dhuttoo Singh. ..	Promoted to the ranks of Subadar, Jemadar, and Havildar respectively.
Havildar Gunga Besun, No. 12 Light Field Battery. ..	Promoted as Jemadar.
Two men of the 6th Regiment Native Infantry .	Ditto as Havildar and Naick.
Havildar Muttra Pattuck, 21st Regiment Native Infantry. ..	Ditto as Jemadar.
Sepoy Tague Ally Khan, of the 22nd Regiment Native Infantry.	Ditto.
31st Regt. N. I.—1 Havildar.	Ditto as Subadar.
„ 11 Naicks.	Ditto as Havildar.
„ 12 Sepoys.	Ditto as Naick.
Two Havildars of the 32nd Regiment Native Infantry. ..	Ditto as Jemadar.
Sepoy Sheik Phultoo of the 34th Regiment Native Infantry. ..	Ditto as Havildar.
Havildar Gungadeen Chowbee of the 35th Regiment Native Infantry. ..	Ditto as Jemadar.

LIST OF PERSONS REWARDED FOR ACTS OF LOYALTY.

Names.	*Nature of Reward.*
Havildar Sing Khoosial of the 36th Regiment Native Infantry.	...Promoted as Subadar.
Two Naicks of the 37th Regiment Native Infantry.	.. Ditto as Havildar.
Twelve Sepoys of the 37th Regiment Native Infantry.	.. Ditto as Naick.
Four Havildars of the 37th Regiment Native Infantry.	.. Ditto as Jemadar.
Sepoy Kehurree Sing of the 63rd Regiment Native Infantry.	.. Ditto as Naick.
Sepoy Sewbuccus Doobey of the 70th Regiment Native Infantry.	Ditto as Jemadar.
Naick Oajurh Lullut of the 70th Regiment Native Infantry.	.. Ditto as Havildar.
Two Sepoys of the 70th Regiment Native Infantry.	.. Ditto as Naick.
Havildar Bindabun Tewarree of the 73rd Regiment Native Infantry.	.... Ditto as Jemadar.
Nineteen Privates of the Gun Lascar Detail, attached to the 1st Company 3rd Battalion Arty.	.. Promoted to the Third Class of the Order of Merit.
Jemadar Moossum Allee of the 6th Company 9th Battalion Arty.	.. Promoted as Subadar.
Havildar Bhola of ditto ditto	.. Ditto as Jemadar.
Twenty Privates of ditto ditto	.. Promoted to the Third Class of the Order of Merit.
Subadar Sheik Golam Ghose of the 4th Punjab Infantry	.. Ditto to the Third Class of the Order of Merit.
Subadar Heera Sing of ditto ditto...	Ditto to the Second Class of the Order of Merit.

LIST OF PERSONS REWARDED FOR ACTS OF LOYALTY.

Names.	*Nature of Reward.*
Two Subadars, two Havildars, eight Naicks and twenty Sepoys of the 4th Punjaub Infantry ...	Promoted to the Third Class of the Order of Merit.
Jemadar Golam Hossein Khan of the 1st Cavalry Hyderabad Contingent ...	Ditto to the Third Class of the Order of Merit.
Trooper Rahmut Oollah Khan of ditto ditto. ..	Promoted as Duffadar.
Two Naib Ressaldars Gholam Nubee Khan and Ahmud Saeed Khan of the 4th Regt. Irregular Cavy..	Ditto as Ressaldar.
Duffadar Duraz Khan of the do. do..	Ditto as Kote Duffadar.
Nine Sowars of ditto ditto ..	Ditto as Duffadar.
Subadar Sheikh Khoda Bux of the 56th Regt. Native Infantry .	Promoted to the Third Class of the Order of Merit.
Havildar Kesseree Sing of the 1st Light Cavalry ..	Promoted as Subadar.
Sepoys Mothoora Pandy and Matubbar Khan of the Ramghur Light Infantry ..	Ditto as Havildar.
Subadar Major Oomur Khan of the 47th Native Infantry ...	Promoted to the First Class of the Order of British India with the title of Sirdar Bahadur.
Three Havildars of the 47th Native Infantry ..	Promoted as Jemadar.
Naick Daem Khan of the 47th Native Infantry ..	Ditto as Havildar.
Two Sepoys of the 47th Regiment Native Infantry ...	Promoted to the 3rd Class of the Order of Merit.

LIST OF PERSONS REWARDED FOR ACTS OF LOYALTY.

Names.	*Nature of Reward.*
Jemadar Mahomed Akram Khan of the 4th Punjab Cavalry	.. Promoted as Ressaldar and to the 3d Class of the Order of Merit.
Sowar Abdoola Khan of do. do.	.. Do. as Duffadar and to the 3rd Class of the Order of Merit.
Ressaldar Allee Woordee Khan and Kote Duffadar Gollam Allee Khan of the 17th Irregular Cavalry, British Troop 1st Brigade Horse Artillery	.. Promoted to the 3d Class of the Order of Merit.
Jemadar Emam Buksh	... Promoted as Subadar.
Three Havildars	.. Ditto as Jemadar.
Naick Wuzeer Khan	... Do. as Havildar and to the 1st Class of the Order of Merit.
Subadar Emam Buksh	... Promoted to the 1st Class of the Order of British India with the title of Sirdar Bahadur.
Two Jemadars	.. Do. to the 2d Class of the Order of British India with the title of Bahadur.
66 Men	.. Do. to the 3d Class of the Order of Merit.
19 Men	.. Promotion undefined.
Four men of the 6th Company 9th Battalion Artillery	.. Promoted to the 3d Class of the Order of Merit.
Havildar Meer Hyder Ally	.. Promoted as Jemadar.
Three Naicks	.. Ditto as Havildar.
Fifteen Privates	.. Ditto as Naick.
Three Lance Naicks of the 1st Company 5th Battalion Arty.	.. Promoted as Havildar and Member of the 3d Class of the Order of Merit.

LIST OF PERSONS REWARDED FOR ACTS OF LOYALTY.

Names.	*Nature of Reward.*
Twelve Privates of the same Corps. ..	Promoted as Naick.
Naib Ressaldar Nubbee Buksh Khan, 12th Irregular Cavalry ..	Ditto as Ressaldar and to the 3rd Class of the Order of Merit.
Four men, ditto ditto. ..	Ditto as Naib Ressaldar.
Seven men, ditto ditto. ..	Ditto as Jemadar.
Six Sowars, ditto ditto. ...	Ditto as Kote Duffadar.
Three Sowars, ditto ditto. ..	Ditto as Nishanburdar.
Sowar Khas Buksh Khan, ditto ditto. ..	Ditto as Pay Duffadar.
Twenty-three Sowars, ditto ditto...	Ditto as Duffadar.
Six Sowars, ditto ditto. ..	Ditto as Lance Duffadar
Subadar Mahan Singh, Regiment of Ferozepore ..	Ditto as Subadar Major and to the 1st Class Order of Merit.
Jemadar Bhoop Singh, ditto ditto..	Ditto as Subadar and to the 1st Class Order of Merit.
Havildars Gohon Shah and Heera Sing, ditto ditto. ..	Ditto to the 2nd Class Order of Merit.
Jemadar Secundar Khan, ditto ditto. ..	Promoted as Subadar.
Sixteen Havildars, ditto ditto. ..	Ditto as Jemadar.
Sixteen Naicks, ditto ditto.	Ditto as Havildar.
Two hundred and sixty-eight Sepoys, ditto ditto. ..	Ditto as Naick.
Jemadar Peer Buccus Khan, 1st Regiment Oude Local Infantry. ..	Ditto as Subadar and to the 2nd Class Order of Merit.
Havildar Putram Misser, do. do. ..	Ditto as Jemadar.
Five Sepoys, ditto ditto. ..	Ditto as Havildar.
Sewdenee Misser, ditto ditto. ..	Ditto as Naick.

List of Persons Rewarded for Acts of Loyalty.

Names.	*Nature of Reward.*
Subadar Seosahæ Singh of the 40th Regt. Native Infantry ..	Promoted to the 2nd Class of the Order of British India with the title of Bahadur.
Havildar Naick Singh 40th Native Infantry. ..	Promoted as Jemadar.
„ Issurrie Singh, ditto ditto.	Ditto as Subadar.
„ Sooroojbullee Ram ditto ditto. ..	Ditto as Jemadar.
„ Ramphool Singh, ditto ditto. ...	Ditto ditto.
Three Naicks, ditto ditto. ..	Ditto as Havildar.
Three Sepoys, ditto ditto. ..	Ditto as Naick.
Subadar Major Deen Mohamed 2nd Company 8th Battalion Artillery. ..	Promoted to the 1st Class Order of Merit.
Subadar Rampersaud, ditto ditto...	Ditto ditto
Two men, ditto ditto. ..	Promoted as Jemadar. [Class.
Two men, ditto ditto. ...	Ditto as Jemadar and to the 3rd Order of Merit.
Five men, ditto ditto. ..	Ditto as Havildar.
Thirteen men, ditto ditto ..	Ditto as Naick.
Two Sirdars of D. Company Ordnance Drivers, attached to No. 2 Light Field Battery. ..	Ditto to the 2nd Class Order of Merit.
Twelve men of the same Corps. ..	Ditto as Sirdar.
Khan Sing of No. 1 H. Light Field Battery, ...	Ditto as Jemadar and 2nd Class Order of Merit.
Two men of No. 2 Light Field Battery. ...	Ditto as Subadar and do. do.
Seven men of the same corps. ..	Ditto as Jemadar.

LIST OF PERSONS REWARDED FOR ACTS OF LOYALTY.

Names.	*Nature of Reward.*
Two men of H. Light Field Battery.	Promoted as Havildar.
Five men of Drivers, attached to No. 2 Battery	Ditto as Sirdar.
Two men of No. 3, H. Light Field Battery	Ditto as Subadar and 1st Class Order of Merit.
Doyal Singh of the same Corps.	Ditto as Jemadar.
Three men of ditto	Ditto as Havildar.
Two men of Drivers No. 3, Battery.	Ditto as Sirdar.
Subadar Khalsa Sing of the Reserve Company of Artillery.	Promoted to the 3rd Class Order of Merit.
Sepoy Kullian Sing of the 42nd Native Light Infantry.	Restored to the service without forfeiture of pay and promoted to the rank of Naick.
Jemadar Oodaraj Sookul of the 74th Native Infantry.	Promoted to the Rank of Subadar and 2nd Class of the Order of British India.
Subadar Nehal Sing of the Bengal Police Battalion.	Ditto to the 1st Class of the Order of Merit.
Trooper Ullee Mahomed of the 5th Troop 1st Brigade Horse Arty...	Ditto to the 3rd Class of the Order of Merit.
Ressaldar Boolund Khan of the 8th Regiment Irregular Cavalry.	Ditto to the 1st Class of the Order of British India, with the title of Sirdar Bahadoor.

List of Persons Rewarded for Acts of Loyalty.

Names.	*Nature of Reward*
Ressaldar Hoossain Ali Khan, of the 17th Irregular Cavalry. ..	Promoted to the 2nd Class of the Order of British India, with the title of Bahadoor.
Three Subadars of the Sylhet Light Infantry Battalion. ..	Ditto to the 2nd Class of the Order of British India, with the title of Bahadoor.
Naick Oree Misser of the late 7th Infantry Gwalior Contingent. ..	Promoted as Havildar.
Four men of the same Corps. ..	Ditto as Naick.
Sowar Mohamed Zuman Khan of the 1st Punjaub Cavalry. ..	Ditto to the Rank of Duffadar.
Subadar Doolaram of the 2nd Assam Light Infantry. ..	Promoted to the 2nd Class of the Order of British India, with the title of Bahadoor.
Rajah Jyperkash Singh of Deo, in the Zillah of Behar. ..	Title of Maharajah with a suitable Khelat.
Private Dyal Sing and Jemadar Heerah Sing of No. 3, Horse Battery, Oude Irregular Force. ..	Promoted as Havildar and Subadar respectively.
Havildar Shaik Mokhum of the 50th Native Infantry. ..	Ditto as Jemadar.
Two Naicks of the same Corps. ..	Ditto as Havildar.
Eleven Sepoys of the same Corps..	Ditto as Naick.
Jemadar Muhasee Lall of the Kotah Contingent, Infantry. ..	Ditto as Subadar.
Duffadar Sheikh Ruheem Oolah of the Kotah Contingent, Cavalry..	Ditto as Naib Ressaldar.
Four Duffadars of the same Corps..	Ditto as Jemadar.

LIST OF PERSONS REWARDED FOR ACTS OF LOYALTY.

Names.	*Nature of Reward.*
Five Sowars of the same Corps.	.. Promoted as Duffadar.
Subadar Rugbeer Sing, Infantry	
Ressaldar Dulail Khan Woordie Major.	.. Ditto to the 1st Class of the order of British India with the title of Sirdar Bahadoor.
Two Duffadars of the Jaudpore Legion.	.. Ditto as Jemadar and 3rd Class of the Order of Merit.
Three Subadars of the Simoor Battalion.	.. Ditto to the 2nd Class of the Order of British India, with the title of Bahadoor.
Jemadar Buddul Tapah of do do.	.. Ditto to 2nd Class of the Order of Merit.
Twenty men of ditto ditto.	.. Ditto to the 3rd Class of the Order of Merit.
Ressaldar Ameer Ally Khan of the Behar Irregular Horse.	.. Ditto to the 2nd Class of the Order of British India with the title of Bahadoor.
Subadar Unjore Tewrary of the 1st Regiment Native Infantry.	.. Ditto to the 1st Class of the Order of British India, with the title of Sirdar Bahadoor.
Three men of the Southern Mahratta Irregular Horse.	.. Promoted to the 3rd Class of the Order of Merit.
Havildar Mothura Pandy of the Ramghur Light Infantry Battalion.	.. Ditto to the 3rd Class of the Order of Merit.

LIST OF PERSONS REWARDED FOR ACTS OF LOYALTY.

Names.	*Nature of Reward.*
Ressaldar Mir Umjid Ali of the 2nd Regiment of Cavalry Scindhia's Contingent. ..	Promoted to the 1st Class of the Order of Merit.
Duffadar Mir Koorshiad Ali of the same Corps. ...	Ditto as Jemadar and 2nd Class of the Order of Merit.
Seven Sowars of the sam Corps. ...	Ditto as Duffadar and 3rd Class of the Order of Merit.
Nineteen men of the same corps...	Ditto to the 3rd Class of the Order of Merit.
Three men of the 6th Irregular Cavalry. ..	Ditto to the 3rd Class of the Order of Merit.
Havildar Major Kunjul Sing of the 25th Bombay Native Infantry...	Ditto as Jemadar and 3rd Class of the Order of Merit.
Naique Doorga Tewaree of the same Corps. ..	Ditto as Havildar and 3rd Class of the Order of Merit.
Private Punnoo Loll of the same Corps. ..	Ditto as Naique and 3rd Class of the Order of Merit.
Subadar Major Jowahire Tewaree of the 43rd Native Infantry. ...	Ditto to the 2nd Class of the Order of British India with the title of Bahadur.
Havildar Dilkurn Thapa of the Artillery Company attached to the 2nd Assam Light Infantry..	Ditto as Jemadar.
Havildar Thelookdarrie, Syce Driver of the U. Company. ..	Ditto as Jemadar.
Two Gun Lascars of the 2nd Troop 1st Brigade Horse Artillery. ..	Ditto as Jemadar.

LIST OF PERSONS REWARDED FOR ACTS OF LOYALTY.

Names.	*Nature of Reward.*
Three Gun Lascars of the 2d Troop 1st Brigade Horse Artillery ..	Promoted as Naick.
Jemadar Sadhoo Sing, and Duffadar Jewan Sing, of the 1st Cavalry, Hyderabad Contingent ...	Ditto to the 2nd Class of the Order of Merit.
Trooper Koodrut Ally Khan, do. do.	Ditto as Duffadar and 3rd Class of the Order of Merit.
Trooper Shah Meer Khan, and Trooper Shah Noor Khan, do.do.	Ditto as Duffadar.
Two Havildar the 3rd Infantry Hyderabad Contingent ..	Ditto as Jemadar.
Two Privates ditto ditto ..	Ditto as Havildar.
Ressaldar Abdool Raimen Khan of the 1st Cavalry Hyderabad Contingent. ..	Promoted to the 2nd Class of the Order of British India with the title of Bahadur.
Two Ressaldars of the 3rd Seikh Cavalry. ..	Ditto to the 2nd Class of the Order of British India with the title of Bahadur.
Six men of the same Corps. ..	Ditto to the 3rd Class of the Order of Merit.
Jemadar Durion of the late 34th Native Infantry. ..	Ditto as Subadar and 3rd Class of the Order of Merit.
Ressaldar Jowaher Sing of the 1st Seikh Cavalry. ..	Ditto to the 1st Class of the Order of British India with the title of Sirdar Bahadur.
Naib Ressaldar Unnoop Sing of ditto ditto ..	Ditto to the 3rd Class of the Order of Merit.

List of Persons Rewarded for Acts of Loyalty.

Names.	*Nature of Reward.*
Havildar Utter Sing of the Regiment of Loodianah.	.. Promoted as Jemadar.
Havildar Chur Sing of the Regiment of Loodianah.	.. Ditto as Subadar.
Six Havildars of the Regiment of Loodianah.	.. Ditto as Jemadar.
Five Naicks of the Regiment of Loodianah.	.. Ditto as Havildar.
Thirty-six Sepoys of the Regiment of Loodianah.	.. Ditto as Naicks.
Duffadar Secunder Ally Khan of the 3rd Regiment Irregular Cavalry.	... Ditto as Jemadar.
Four men of the 13th Regiment Irregular Cavalry.	.. Ditto as Jemadar.
Kote Duffadar Delaur Hossein of the 13th Regiment Irregular Cavalry.	.. Ditto as Ressaldar.
Three Duffadars of the 13th Regiment Irregular Cavalry.	.. Ditto as Jemadar.
Thirty-three Sowars of the 13th Regiment Irregular Cavalry.	. Ditto as Duffadar.
Two Duffadars of the 1st Cavalry Hyderabad Contingent.	.. Ditto as Jemadar.
Two Havildars of the 1st Infantry Nagpore Irregular Force.	.. Ditto as Jemadar.
Two Naicks of the Nepaul Residency Escort.	.. Ditto as Havildar.
Three men of the Nagpore Irregular Cavalry.	... Ditto as Jemadar.
Havildar Boolakie Khan of the Ramgurh Battalion.	.. Ditto as Jemadar.

List of Persons Rewarded for Acts of Loyalty.

Names.	*Nature of Reward.*
Sepoy Doorgah Misser of the 8th Regiment Oude Infantry. ..	Promoted as Naick.
Duffadar Kurrum Shair Khan of the 5th Regt. Irregular Cavalry.	Ditto as Jemadar.
Three Sowars of the 5th Regiment Irregular Cavalry. ...	Ditto as Duffadar.
Two Naicks of the 2nd Infantry Hyderabad Contingent. ..	Ditto as Jemadar.
Havildar Sirdar Khan of the 4th Company 9th Bengal Artillery..	Ditto as Subadar.
Private Seetaram of the 4th Co. 9th Bengal Artillery. ..	Ditto as Havildar.
Two Havildars of the 8th Regt. Native Infantry. ..	Ditto as Jemadars.
Four Sowars of the 2nd Irregular Cavalry. ..	Ditto to the 3rd Class of the Order of Merit.
Sepoy Gobin Sing of the 56th Regt. Native Infantry. .	Ditto as Jemadar.
Subadar Meer Jaffer of the 1st Punjaub Infantry. ..	Ditto to the 2nd Class of the Order of Merit.
Havildar Shajadah of the 1st Punjaub Infantry. ..	Ditto to the 3rd Class of the Order of Merit.
Naick Sheer Ali of the 2nd Punjaub Infantry. ..	Ditto to the 3rd Class of the Order of Merit.
Two Sepoys of the 2nd Punjaub Infantry. ..	Ditto to the 3rd Class of the Order of Merit.

LIST OF PERSONS REWARDED FOR ACTS OF LOYALTY.

Names.	*Nature of Reward.*
Four Sepoys of the 4th Punjaub Infantry.	.. Promoted to the 3rd Class of the Order of Merit.
Subadar Doolar Tewarry of the 12th Regt. Native Infantry.	.. Ditto to the 1st Class of the Order of British India with the title of Sirdar Bahadur.
Subadar Sheick Heydayet Ali of the Bengal Police Battalion.	.. Ditto to the 1st Class of the Order of British India with the title of Sirdar Bahadur and the rank of Sub-Lieut.
Subadar Sheodeen Singh of the 9th Regt. Native Infantry.	... Ditto to the 2nd Class of the Order of British India with the title of Bahadur.
Subadar Major Meer Ameer Ally of the 32nd Regiment N. I.	.. Ditto to the 2nd Class of the Order of British India with the title of Bahadur.
Four Subadars of the 11th Regt. Native Infantry	.. Ditto as Subadar Major.
Eleven Havildars, ditto ditto.	.. Ditto as Jemadar.
Eight Naicks, ditto ditto.	.. Ditto as Havildar.
Sixty-nine Sepoys, ditto ditto.	.. Ditto as Naick.
Two Subadars and one Jemadar of the 11th Regiment Native Infantry.	.. Ditto to the 2nd Class of the Order of British India with the title of Bahadur.
Two Naicks of the 11th Regiment Native Infantry.	.. Ditto to the 3rd Class of the Order of Merit.

LIST OF PERSONS REWARDED FOR ACTS OF LOYALTY.

Names.	*Nature of Reward.*
Subadar Gunga Sing of the 2nd Grenadier Regiment Bombay Native Infantry.	.. Promoted to the 1st Class of the Order of British India with the title of Sirdar Bahadur.
Ressaldar Jye Sing of the 1st Regt. Punjaub Cavalry.	.. Ditto to the 1st Class of the Order of British India with the title of Sirdar Bahadur.
Jemadar Suffer Ali Beg	... Ditto as Ressaldar.
Duffadar Kullian Singh.	.. Ditto as Jemadar.
Duffadars Abas Ali Beg.	.. Ditto as Jemadar.
Trooper Rohomon Beg and Trooper Golam Abas.	.. Ditto as Duffadar.
Major Captain Shree Bhukut Khauka, Commanding the Ramdul Regt., Captain Dercidass Opadiah of the same corps, Capt. Kooloopursad Sing Bushnial, Commanding the Goorka Regt...	Thanked by the Governor General.
Maharajah Jung Bahadur, Brigadier Junga Dage, Colonel Lall Singh and Capt. Sugan Singh and the other Goorka Officers.	.. Thanked by the Governor Genl.
Subadar Major Mehtab Khan, of the rural Police, and Ressaldar Ali Mahomed of the mounted Police of Sikrampore.	.. Promoted to the 3rd Class of the Order of Merit.
Jemadar Narain Singh of the Regiment of Loodianah.	.. Ditto as Subadar.

LIST OF PERSONS REWARDED FOR ACTS OF LOYALTY.

Names.	*Nature of Reward.*
Abdoolrazack Khan, Trooper 1st Troop 4th Cavalry.	... Promoted to the Order of Merit as Jemadar.
Gya Dutt Sing Tewarree, Sepoy of the 67th Regt. Native Infantry.	.. Ditto as Havildar, Order of Merit.
Subadar Gokul Sing of the 4th Punjaub Infantry.	.. Ditto to the 2nd Class of the Order of British India, with the title of Bahadur.
Lieut. Colonel Indra Sing, Commanding the Napalese Troops.	.. Thanked by the President in Council.
Jemadar Hurnauth Sing of the Ramghur Light Infantry Battalion.	.. Promoted to the 3rd Class of the Order of Merit.
Subadar Meer Jaffer of the 1st Punjaub Infantry.	.. Ditto to the 1st Class of the Order of British India, with the title of Sirdar Bahadur.
Havildars Omed Khan. Hoonumaun Sing, Bugle Major and Emambuccus.	.. Ditto as Jemadar.
Colonel Shum Shere Sing and the Troops under his command.	.. Thanked by the Government of India.
Havildar Paunchum Sing, and Naick Punch Cowriz, of the 20th Regiment Native Infantry.	.. Promoted as Jemadar.
1st Company Subadar Major Ummul Ali Shah, 2nd Company	

LIST OF PERSONS REWARDED FOR ACTS OF LOYALTY.

Names.	*Nature of Reward.*
Subadar Major Jugroop Singh and Subadar Nehal Singh.	.. Promoted to the 2nd Class of the Order of British India with the title of Bahadur.
1st Co. Jemadar Dhull Singh and Jemadar Matah Singh.	.. Ditto to the 3rd Class of the Order of Merit.
Havildars Wuryam Singh and Emam Shah of the 1st Comy., and Havildars Rae Singh and Futteh Khan	... Ditto as Jemadar.
Naick Gear Sing and Sepoy Jean Singh, 2nd Co.	.. Ditto as Havildar.
Sepoy Seccundur Khan, Sepoy Gourmookh Sing and Eseree.	.. Ditto as Naick.
Jemadar Kunnie Singh of the Punjaub Infantry.	.. Ditto as Subadar.
Havildar Peer Khan.	.. Ditto as Jemadar.
Sepoys Ramdyal Singh, Thakoor Singh and Doorga Singh	.. Ditto as Havildar.
Subadar Sew Lal of the Artillery of the Bhoopal Contingent.	.. Ditto to the 3rd Class of the Order of Merit.
Havildar Moonalaul Pandy of the Bhoopal Contingent.	.. Ditto as Jemadar.
Havildar Ramloll Messer.	.. Ditto ditto.
Naicks Bhowany Deen and Mahomed Yar Khan.	.. Ditto as Havildar.
Thirteen Gunners of the same corps	Ditto to the post of Naick.
Subadar Hubeeb Khan of the 1st Punjab Cavalry.	... Ditto to the 2d Class of the Order of British India.

LIST OF PERSONS REWARDED FOR ACTS OF LOYALTY.

Names.	*Nture of Reward.*
Two Subadars, three Jemadars, six Sepoys, three Havildars and thirteen Naicks of the 1st Punjaub Cavalry.	Promoted to the 3rd Class of the Order of Merit.
Jemadar Lochun Pandee of the 11th Regt. Native Infantry	Ditto to the 2nd Class of the Order of British India with the title of Bahadur.
Three Naicks of the 11th Regiment Native Infantry.	Ditto to the 3rd Class of the Order of Merit.
Jemadar Dunnyee of the Gun Lascar Detail attached to the 1st Company 3rd Battalion Arty. ..	Ditto as Subadar.
Havildar Culloo of ditto.	Ditto as Jemadar.
Private Sheick Madar Bux of ditto. ..	Ditto as Naick.
Two men of the Lucknow Magazine ..	Ditto as Jemadar.
Two men of the 4th Company 1st Battalion Artillery ..	Ditto as Jemadar.
Two men of the same corps ..	Ditto as Havildar.
Two men of the P. Company Syce Drivers. ..	Ditto as Naick.
Five men of the same Corps.	Ditto as Havildar.
Subadar Major Ummer Sing, 13th Native Infantry. ..	Promoted to the 1st Class Order of Merit.
Ten Subadars, dittto ditto. ..	Ditto to the 2nd Class Order of Merit.
Three Havildars, ditto ditto.	Ditto as Jemadars and 3rd Class Order of Merit.

List of Persons Rewarded for Acts of Loyalty.

Names.	*Nature of Reward.*
Fourteen Havildars, 13th N. I. ..	Promoted as Jemadar.
Twenty-three Naicks, ditto ditto ..	Ditto as Havildar.
Fifty-five Sepoys, ditto ditto ...	Ditto as Naick.
Nineteen men, ditto ditto	3 month's pay.
Subadar Sewraj Sing, the new Cawnpore Cavalry.	Promoted to the 3rd Class Order of Merit.
Three Naicks, ditto ditto.	Ditto as Havildar.
Three Sepoys, ditto ditto. ...	Ditto as Naick.
Subadar Major and Bahadur Madhey Khan, 7th Light Cavalry...	Promoted to the 1st Class Order of Merit.
Two Subadars, ditto ditto.	Ditto to the 2d Class Order of Merit.
Shaick Emam Bux, ditto ditto.....	Ditto to the 1st Class Native Doctor and 500 Rs.
Seven men, ditto ditto.	Undefined.
Ten men, 41st Regt. Native Infantry	Undefined.
Gyand Sing, 48th N. Infantry ..	Promoted as Sirdar Bahadur and 1st Class Order of Merit.
Seven men, ditto ditto.	Ditto as Subadar Bahadur and 2nd Class Order of Merit.
Herah loll Misser, ditto ditto.	Ditto as Subadar.
Twelve men, ditto ditto.	Ditto as Jemadar.
Eighteen Naicks, ditto ditto. ..	Ditto as Havildar.
Two men, ditto ditto. ..	108 Rupees.
Rambuccus, ditto ditto ..	78 Rupees.
Four men, ditto ditto.	66 Rupees.
Five men, ditto ditto	30 Rupees.
Subadar Sew Sing, 71st N. I.	Promoted to the 1st Class Order of Merit.

LIST OF PERSONS REWARDED FOR ACTS OF LOYALTY.

Names.	*Nature of Reward.*
Four men, 71st N. Infantry ..	Promoted as Subadar and 2nd Class Order of Merit.
Fourteen Havildars, ditto ditto. ..	Ditto as Jemadar.
Jemadar Ramchurrun, do. do. ..	Ditto to the 3rd Class Order of Merit.
Twenty-one Naicks ditto ditto. ..	Ditto as Havildar.
Drum Major Edward Hughes, ditto ditto.	68 Rupees.
Subadar Jungah Sing, 1st Regt. Irregular Infantry.	Promoted as Sirdar Bahadur, and 1st Class Order of Merit
Jemadar Mokhun Sing, do. do. ...	Ditto as Subadar.
Havildar Sunnath Pandee. do. do...	Ditto as Jemadar Bahadur, and 2nd Class Order of Merit.
Two Havildars, ditto ditto.	Ditto as Jemadar.
Three Sepoys, ditto ditto.	Ditto as Naick.
Sepoy Khoolyer Doobey, Local Infantry.	Promoted as Havildar.
Sepoy Poorun Doobey.	Ditto as Naick.
Five Sepoys.	Undefined.
Naib Ressaldar Shere Sing of the 1st Oude Irregular Cavalry.....	Promoted as Ressaldar and the 2nd Class of the Order of British India with the title of Bahadur.
Subadar Runbeer Sing of the Nusseree Battalion	Ditto to the 3rd Class of the Order of Merit.
Ressaldar Major Mahomed Oomur Khan of the 4th Cavalry Hyderabad Contingent.	Ditto to the 1st Class of the Order of British India with the title of Sirdar Bahadur.

LIST OF PERSONS REWARDED FOR ACTS OF LOYALTY.

Names.	*Nature of Reward.*
Two men, 71st N. I.	24 Rupees.
Three men, ditto ditto.	18 Rupees.
Ressaldar Seetul Sing of the late 3rd Oude Irregular Cavalry.....	Promoted to the Ressaldar and the 1st Class of the Order of Merit.
Lehna Sing, Seikh, Zemindar of Thannessur.	Ditto to the rank and position of Jemadar in the 8th Regiment Irregular Cavalry.
Ressaldar Soobhan Khan of the 3rd Irregular Cavalry. ..	Ditto to the 2nd Class of the Order of Merit.
Subadar Devey Deen of the 31st Native Infantry. .. .	Ditto to the 2nd Class of the Order of Merit.
Subadar Pertee Sing of the 31st Native Infantry	Ditto to the 3rd Class of the Order of Merit.
Three Subadars, two Jemadars, eleven Havildars, four Naicks, and thirty-six Sepoys of the 31st Regiment N. I. ..	Ditto to the 3rd Class of the Order of Merit.
Jemadar Mahomed Khan of the 6th Regiment Light Cavalry. ..	Promoted as Subadar.
Jemadar Sundial Sing of the Bengal Police Battalion, 31st N. I. transferred to Light Infantry Regiment.	Ditto to the 3rd Class of the Order of Merit.

LIST OF PERSONS REWARDED FOR ACTS OF LOYALTY.

Names.	*Nature of Reward.*
Bhooray Sing of Bettara.	500 Rupees and proprietary right in a village paying an annual revenue of 1,000 Rs.
Sheo Gholam Sing & Hurjoo Sing..	1,000 Rupees.
Luchee Kuhar of Tilla, Boodhoo Sais, Jodhun Sais, and Moosa Dhobey.	100 Rupees each.
Two Jemadars and seven Havildars of the 3rd Light Cavalry...	Promoted as Subadar.
Naick Rugnauth Sing of ditto. ..	Ditto as Jemadar.
Thirteen Troopers of ditto.	Ditto as Havildar.
Subadar Ram Churn Sing of ditto.	Ditto to the 2nd Class Order of Merit.
Two Subadars of ditto. ..	Ditto to the 3rd Class Order of Merit.
Two Sepoys of the 1st Irregular Infantry.	Ditto as Havildar.
Subadars Bindadeen Tewaree and Achaiba Lolla of the 73rd Regt. Native Infantry.	Ditto to the 1st Class of the Order of Merit.
Havildar Shaik Khoajbux and Naick Ramjun Khan of the 8th Regt. N. I.	Ditto to the Rank of Subadar and Jemadar respectively.
Havildar Thackoor Sing of the Bengal Sheikh Police Battalion..	Ditto as Jemadar and 200 Rs.
Syud Kheir Shah, Kardar of Jacobabad in Upper Sinde ..	Title of Khan Bahadur.
Naick Sewdeen Doobe of the 63rd Regt. N. I.	Promoted to the Rank Jemadar.

LIST OF PERSONS REWARDED FOR ACTS OF LOYALTY.

Names.	*Nature of Reward.*
Havildar Mehurban Tewarree of the Bengal Police Battalion. ..	Promoted to the 2nd Class of the Order of Merit.
Jemadar Sewdial Sing of the same Corps.	Ditto ditto.
Five men of the same Corps.	Ditto to the 3rd Class of the Order of Merit.
Ressaldar Mirza Ahmed Beg of Hodson's Horse.	Ditto to the Rank of Ressaldar.
Subadar Banee Sing of the 1st Company Hyderabad Contingent.	Ditto to the 2nd Class of the Order of British India with the title of Bahadur.
Havildar Major Syed Meeun of the same Corps.	Promoted as Jemadar.
Subadar Major Tucketram of the 4th Company Hyderabad Contingent.	Promoted to the 2nd Class of the Order of British India with the title of Bahadur.
Acting Havildar Major Tacoor Persaud of the same Corps.	Promoted as Jemadar.
Ressaldar Major Mirza Zoolficar ..	Promoted to the 2nd Class of the Order of British India.
Ali Beg of the 1st Cavalry Hyderabad Contingent.	With the title of Bahadur.
Duffadar Kullundur Beg of the same Corps.	Promoted as Jemadar and Member of the 3rd Class of the Order of Merit.
Two Duffadars of the same Corps..	Ditto as Jemadar.
Trooper Syed Russool of the same Corps. ...	Promoted as Duffadar.

List of Persons Rewarded for Acts of Loyalty.

Names.	*Nature of Reward*
Bargheer Syud Shureef of the 2nd Cavalry Hyderabad Contingent..	Promoted as Duffadar and to the 3rd Class of the Order of Merit.
Ressaldars Fazil Khan of and Deedar Bux Khan of the 4th Cavalry, Hd. Qrt. ..	Promoted to the 3rd Class of the Order of Merit.
Trumpeter Futeh Khan of the same Corps.	Promoted as Trumpet Major.
Havildar Tilluck Pandy of the Regiment of Lucknow ..	Promoted to the 3rd Class of the Order of Merit.
Subadar Shaik Ibrahim of the 19th Regt. Madras Native Infantry..	Ditto ditto.
Two men of the Keman Battalion...	Ditto ditto.
Naick Shaik Loll Mahomed of the 6th Company 9th Battalion Arty..	Promoted as Havildar and to the 3rd Class of the Order of Merit.
Woordie Major Meer Burkulelly of the 1st Regiment Irregular Cavalry. ..	Promoted as Ressaldar and to the 1st Class of the Order of British India with the title of Sirdar Bahadur.
Three Ressaldars and two Naib Ressaldars of the same Corps. ..	Promoted to the 2nd Class of the Order of British India with the title of Bahadur.
Two men of the same Corps. ..	Ditto to the 2nd Class of the Order of Merit.

List of Persons Rewarded for Acts of Loyalty.

Names.	*Nature of Reward.*
Four Duffadars of the Joudpore Legion. ...	Promoted as Jemadar.
Ressaldar Mahomed Wuzir Khan of the Bengal Police Battalion..	Ditto to the 2nd Class of the Ordor of British India with the title of Bahadur.
Ressaldar Meer Mohamed Ali of the Guzerat Irregular Horse ..	Ditto to the 3rd Class of the Order of Merit.
Naib Ressaldar Meer Shamsad Allee of the Guzerat Irregular Horse...	Ditto ditto.
2 Jat Villagers of Agra. ..	100 Rs each.
Thakoor Govind Sing of Allyghur.	A palankeen carriage and a pair of horses.
The Native Establishment and the Nizam Guard of the Opium Factory of Allygunge	Six month's salary.
Subadar Gobind	1,000 Rupees.
Salamut Roy, Deputy Collector of Allyghur.	Khelat of thousand Rupees.
Gungaram Misser and Chundun Persad of Bajheyara. ..	The proprietary right of a confiscated village or villages assessed at 2,600 Rupees per annum, and for their lives the remission of ¼ to the assesssed revenue.
Bhoorary Singh of Bettara, Shahjehanpore. ...	The proprietary right of a village or villages assessed at 1,000 Rupees per annum and for his life the remission of ¼ the assessed value.

List of Persons Rewarded for Acts of Loyalty.

Names.	*Nature of Reward.*
Bhobaney Sing of Mooneypore....	Title of Rajah, a Khelat and the confiscated estate of Jye Singh.
Setaram Misser of Bangeon.	The proprietary right of a village assessed at 200 Rupees per annum with the above remission.
Bhorary Singh.	Compensation for the losses suffered by him.
Sheogolam Singh and Harjo Singh.	1,000 Rupees each.
Luchee Kahar of Tilla, Bhoodo Sais, Jodhan Sais and Mosho Dhobey.	100 Rupees each.
The Rajah of Bansee. ..	Khelat of Rupees 5,000 and a portion of the confiscated estates of the rebel Rajah of Nuggur.
Nawab Jahn Firh Khan Bahadur of Sirdhina.	Pension of 1,000 Rupees to be perpetuated to the lineal male heirs and a perpetuity in confiscated villages assessed at Rupees 1,000 with certain conditions.
Rajah of Berkewer. ..	Most cordial thanks of the Governor General and a Jagheer of more than one lakh of Rupees.
Ramchunder Baboo ..	Khelat of five pieces and Co.'s Rupees 2,000.
Rampersaud Zemindar of Bossealle.	A handsome present.
Meer Bahad Sing.	Title of Rajah.

List of Persons Rewarded for Acts of Loyalty.

Names.	*Nature of Reward.*
Ramperkas Sing.	.. 1,000 Rupees.
Ramnarain Sing of Agra.	... Received pardon for his son Bhagoo Singh who was sentenced to transportation for life in 1834 for affray.
Rajah of Gorruckpore.	.. Appellation of Nizam of Gorruckpore.
Two Mahomedan Zemindars.	.. A Gold Watch and chains each.
A Hindu Darogah.	.. A splendid sword.
Some Sheiks	. Medals.
Parties who protected Captain Gowan in Rohilkhund.	.... Confiscated estate of a certain rebel chief.
Golab Khan, a rebel spy.	.. Handsome presents.
Sepoys, who rendered good services to Lieut. Owen on his route from Jounpore.	.. Handsome rewards and sunnuds.
Rajah of Nabath.	.... A Jagheer of Rs. 1,15,000 per annum.
Rajah of Sismoor.	.... A Khelat of 5,000 Rupees.
Keonthul Rannah.	..... Sunund of Rajah & a present.
Takhoor of Khota.	... Sunund of Rajah and a Khelat of 1,000 Rupees.
Rannahs of Bhoogol and Joobul.	.. Thousand Rupees each.
Rannah of Dhamee.	.... A moiety of his tribute remitted to him for his lifetime.
Jye Sing.	.... A Khelat of 600 Rupees.
Kooer Luchmon Singh.	.. Promoted to the 2nd grade Deputy Collector of Etwah and received a Khelat of 2,000 Rupees.

LIST OF PERSONS REWARDED FOR ACTS OF LOYALTY.

Names.	*Nature of Reward.*
Rajah Gudeladhur Narain Sing of Keonghur.	Received personal thanks from the Governor General.
Rajah Teekhun Singh of Allyghur.	Certain valuable lands.
Mahomed Ali and family. ..	A certain Zemindary.
Havildar Nursea and Jemadars Bhagootoo and Nutherana of the Police Zemindary. ..	Silver Bangles, &c.
Four Artillery men who accompanied Capt. Bouggs in his expedition against Meuloung	A handsome donation.
Certain women of Allahabad for rescuing a European girl ..	Undefined.
A Mahomedan who protected Mrs. Jervis.	Ditto.
Lalla Joteepersad ...	Valuable Jagheer lands.
Baboo Pearymohun Banerjea, *alias* the "fighting Moonsiff" ..	Some Jagheer lands.
A Mahomedan of Delhi ..	Some handsome rewards for saving the lives of fifty European fugitives.

Numerous other persons have also received handsome rewards whose names we have not seen published, or if published have not met our eyes. Several Rajahs and Chiefs are, it is said, coming from Upper India to receive Khelats and other honors on account of the eminent services rendered by them during the mutinies. We think the moral effect of these rewards will be great if the Government publish a list of the persons thus rewarded, and cause them to be proclaimed throughout the length and breadth of the country. When Scinde was conquered Lord Ellenborough ordered a Convention of the Chiefs and Sirdars commanding them to thus meet together to pay *salaams* to the Sircar Bahadoor before its then Governor Sir Charls Napier. If in the same manner,

an assembly of the loyal Chiefs, Rajahs and Sirdars had been called on the day of the Queen's Proclamation to receive in the gracious presence of the Noble Viceroy and Suite, the rewards which their distinguished services have so eminently deserved, the proceeding would not only have added to the *eclat* of that most momentous occasion, but would have also had the advantage of so installing the affection and esteem of the people for Her Majesty's direct rule thus assumes as to last, which any one acquainted with Asiatic feelings will readily understand, for centuries to come. The opportunity however is not entirely past, and we hope something will be made of the rumoured durbar of the Rajahs and Chiefs to be rewarded. The true statesmanship for Europeans in Asia consists in the adaptation of European ideas of civilization and progress to Asiatic notions of society and government and in the working of them together as a harmonious whole, and in all public measures it is of the highest importance for our rulers to bear this truth in mind.

We are sorry to observe that persons whose antecedents and known habits of thought give them claim to public attention, still acquiesce in the senseless cry raised at the height of the panic days, by a portion of the Calcutta Europeans, better known as the Leaguers, viz., that the quiet people of Bengal were the enemies of Government, and that whatever loyalty they expressed or evinced was confined to words and never wooed action. Mr. Bruce Norton, we are mortified to find, echoes the same cry. His knowledge of Indian matters, the just and generous spirit with which he used to treat of Indian subjects in the columns of the *Madras Athæneum* and his accurate appreciation of the native races, their feelings and virtues, indicated in his previous writings on India, fairly led us to hope for justice to the Indians at his hands, especially now when the mists which hitherto shrouded Indian questions, have been cleared away

by the light of the Sepoy revolution. But we have been disappointed. Mr. Norton, in his recent work entitled, "Topics for Indian Statesmen" takes a most unjust view of the part which the people of Bengal played in that momentous drama. He denies that they were sincere in their expressions of loyalty and that they rendered any services to Government in its difficulty. We hope these pages will convince Mr. Norton that neither of his statements regarding the Bengalees is correct. We are also glad to find that the *Indian Field* takes the same view of the subject, and we believe that nothing exposes so witheringly the injustice of Mr. Norton's remarks as the following lines written from an intimate knowledge of the actual facts which the writer in the *Field* evinces :—

"Mr. Norton is most unjust in his condemnation of the Bengalees ; he says :—"I see a few natives here and there have offered 'us their hollow and cheap lip service, but where have they stood 'forward with their persons and their purses to help us at our 'extremity ? What instance is there of the Bengalee who insulted 'the English inhabitants of Calcutta as a faction in a memorial, 'for which Lord Canning thought it not unbecoming to record his 'cordial thanks, having lifted a little finger in our behalf. They 'have shared in no peril, they have volunteered no services, they 'have not lent us their cattle without an Impressment Act, and 'expressions of loyalty, after the fall of Delhi, may be as good 'policy as they are racy of expression. But the truth is, that 'these memorials and addresses are the merest sham conceivable." We believe all memorials and addresses, whether European or Native, to be very often the purest shams possible, but as regards the loyalty of the Bengalees, 'we have no hesitation in asserting that Mr. Norton is entirely wrong : they did come forward with their cattle, and if they had not we should not have been able to have procured one single hackery in spite of fifty Impressment Acts. If Mr. Norton were to go into a Bengalee village armed with an Impressment Act, he might find a few broken wheels and a halt and blind bullock or two, but he would not find a single ser-

viccable cart. Government knowing this made no use of an Impressment Act; they appealed to the zemindars, and the zemindars responded loyally, guaranteeing payment to the unwilling owners of hackeries and promising protection to their families, advancing them money to purchase bullocks and using all those inducements which the zemindar alone can use. The result was that the Government had, in a few days, 7,000 carts collected at Raneegunge. What did the Caulcutta Europeans do? Their loyalty of course cannot be questioned. Did they come forward with their carriage-horses for the guns, or their spare hacks for the cavalry: we never heard that they did, although they talked considerably about doing so. The only instance that we recollect of any man's offering his carriage horses to Government, without payment, was a native zemindar. Every elephant in Bengal was placed gratuitously by the native zemindars at the disposal of the Government, although we know instances in which they were refused by Europeans. None of these men have asked for their elephants again, although they have been gone nearly two years; every one knows how the zemindars came forward to assist the magistrates with men when the Dacca mutineers broke out. The Bengalees are not fighting men, so we could not expect them to clatter about the town of Calcutta for the consideration of a pair of boots, but what was in their power they readily and voluntarily performed. Government never asked them to assist with their horses, but if it had we are quite certain that they would have responded as readily as their British follow-subjects. To say that they have shared no peril is equally a mistake; they have been treated by the mutineers with little less severity than Europeans. That they insulted the English inhabitants of Calcutta as "a faction" is also a mistake; they, in their memorial, alluded merely to a faction, and a very insignificant faction as events have shown. We sincerely trust that Mr. Norton may never have any practical knowledge of what a popular rebellion in India is; this is certain, that if he does he will never be able to write about it."—*Indian Field, 12th Feb.*, 1859.

5

THE

INDIAN MUTINY:

ITS CAUSES AND ITS REMEDIES.

A LETTER

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

LORD VISCOUNT PALMERSTON, K.G. & G.C.B.,

FIRST LORD OF THE TREASURY,

&c., &c., &c.

BY R. J. R. CAMPBELL, ESQ.,

M.P. FOR WEYMOUTH.



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To the Right Honourable
Lord Viscount PALMERSTON, K.G. and G.C.B.,
First Lord of the Treasury,
&c., &c., &c.

MY LORD,

The flattering reception which you gave to the suggestions I had the honour to offer to your consideration, upon the occasion of a recent interview, induces me to address you more at large upon what must be regarded as a matter of vital importance to the grandeur and prosperity of this country, namely, the future Government and security of our Eastern Empire. The position which your Lordship holds as the Prime Minister of Great Britain, would alone entitle you to be regarded as the fittest person to whom any comprehensive plans in reference to this subject could be submitted; but when to this is added the reflection that your political life has been consecrated to the exaltation of this country in the eyes of foreign States and the increase of her moral influence throughout the world, I

entertain a confidence that any rational scheme of amendment affecting so vast and valuable a portion of the British possessions will receive at your hands a full, fair, and statesmanlike examination preparatory to the adoption of that organic change which has become indispensable, and which your Lordship alone is in a position to carry into effect, and which, carried into effect, must materially add to the heavy debt of gratitude you have already established at the hands of your country.

It is unnecessary to exaggerate to your Lordship the melancholy importance of the recent military rebellion in India. Its details, in all their hideous deformity, are now fully before you. Neither is it needful to trouble you with propositions for the suppression of the wide-spread revolt. What the authorities abroad may have accomplished, combined with what the wisdom of Her Majesty's Councils at home has devised, will, we must hope, under God's blessing, meet the immediate difficulty.

It is with reference to the future Military administration of India, in view to the total prevention of the recurrence of such frightful calamities, that I venture to engage your Lordship's serious attention.

Experienced professional men have agreed that, as a preparative to the adoption of a remedy for any disease, it is particularly advisable to ascertain the cause and quality of the affection. Impressed with the truth of this proposition, as applicable alike to moral and physical diseases, I have, after consulting the best authorities, sketched a history of the origin, progress, decline, and fall of the Bengal Army; but as its introduction in this place might interfere with the more pressing and immediate purpose of devising a scheme for the future Military

government of India, I have placed the narrative in the Appendix to this letter for reference, if your Lordship should find illustration necessary. For the perfect accuracy of the sketch I may venture to vouch.

The inferences to be inevitably drawn from the detail of the events of the past thirty years may be summed up in a few paragraphs.

1st. That the grand source of the serious mischief England has now to deplore has been the centralization of all power in India, even to the adjustment of Military detail, in the person of the Governor General, neutralizing the authority and weakening the dignity of the Commander-in-Chief for the time being, and, in a still greater degree, diminishing the natural and just influence of Commanding Officers of Regiments. It is made manifest in the history given in the Appendix, and is further within my own personal knowledge, that differences have continually arisen relative to simple matters of discipline between Governors General and Commanders-in-Chief, leading to the premature resignation or recal, in three or four instances, of the latter functionary, and the consequent introduction of deleterious changes in the organisation of the Indian Army.

Secondly. That this perpetual interference, originating generally in the pernicious influence of Secretaries to Government in the Military department, has tended to lower the Officers in the eyes of the Sepoys, and consequently to weaken their authority.

Thirdly. That the abolition of Corporal punishment in the Native Army has, by removing an instrument of Military government peculiarly adapted to the Sepoy, rendered him bold, independent, careless, and insolent,

and supplied a premium on crime for which no chastisement was available but a discharge (often desired by the man himself) from the Company's Service.

Fourthly. That the partial return to flaggellation, after its suspension for ten years, was an acknowledgment of weakness and an error in Military legislation of which the Sepoy has been ready to take advantage.

Fifthly. That the European Officers of the Indian Army have of late years failed to fulfil the trust reposed in them; constantly aiming at Staff or Civil or Political employ, they have looked upon their Regimental duties as an irksome probation, and have carefully abstained from identifying themselves with the Sepoys in any manner whatever. No man contributed more to this issue than the Earl of Ellenborough. He derided the Civil Service, and taught the Officers to look to extra Regimental employment as their true mission. Numbers were by him withdrawn from their Corps to fill police and other appointments. This was during the *furor* of his gratitude for the success of the Army in Affghanistan. Nothing was too good for the Soldiers of Nott and Pollock.

"Are the gentlemen who now come to India"—asked a Sepoy of Colonel Hodgson—"of a different caste to those of former days?"—a question full of significance.

Sixthly. That the effect of this indifference of the European Officer has been to throw the power into the hands of the *Native* Commissioned Officers, men who have invariably risen from the ranks, grown old and imbecile, and either become the tools of the Soldiers with whom they formerly associated on equal terms or the listless spectators of all that passes around them. The testimony of every one who has attentively observed the conduct of

the Native Officers supports the assertion that they are among the primary causes of the dilapidated discipline of the Bengal Infantry.

Seventhly. That avarice being the leading vice of the Indian, whether Hindoo or Mahometan, the cupidity of the Sepoy once excited he acknowledges no other principle of action than "pay and allowances." Hence the numerous mutinies which have taken place when the opportunity of extortion has presented itself. "The idol of avarice," writes an experienced Bengal Field Officer, "has been raised by those who should have known better, and the Sepoy has sacrificed at the debasing shrine until he recognises no other worship. Gold has become his God under the guise of extra allowances. The chink of rupees is now-a-days more delightful music to his ears than the martial strains of the Grenadiers' March." A Soldier, who is moved by no higher principle of action than pecuniary gain, is at once a worthless and a dangerous mercenary. The hope of plunder alone inspires him in action, and the same base thirst of lucre makes him a savage mutineer and a relentless robber on the first convenient occasion.

Eighthly. That the perpetual concessions to the Sepoy in reference to allowances and indulgences, the withdrawal of the power to punish him effectually, the deference that has been paid to his assumed prejudices of caste, the indiscriminate conferment of rewards for services, and the gradual limitation of his duties, have had the same effect on the Sepoy which indulgence produces on children—for the Sepoy, though illiterate and most unwilling to be taught, is after all but a child in mind and morals. Want of occupation makes him a lounger in the bazaars, and

idleness has brought its usual results. Petted and pandered to he has become indolent, capricious, treacherous, and ungrateful.

Ninthly. That the plea of caste prejudice is in too many instances a mere excuse for immunity from the claims of duty, and a valve for hatred and ill-humour. It can be shewn that in this respect the Sepoy is most inconsistent, for, while he daily and hourly violates the laws of caste from long habit, he seizes upon any new and innocent innovations, as a pretext for raising fresh demands and evincing his own importance. "Our religion is in danger" has been the rallying cry of discontent for the last seventy years, and is at this moment the alleged foundation of rebellion. Is it possible to rely at any time upon Soldiers who can always advance such a plea for the evasion of duty and the exaction of allowances? Nothing short of insanity could induce a Government to tolerate the existence of a Force in whose hands such a weapon as caprice remains to be wielded at pleasure, and with the most frightful consequences to the peace and welfare of society.

Tenthly. That unhappily the Recruiting for the Bengal Army has been chiefly carried on in those parts of India where the Brahminical caste is the most numerous and Mahometanism most rampant. The majority of the Soldiers being thus composed of the loftiest and most intractable races, they have acquired a power hitherto unknown to a mercenary Army, and the consciousness of this power has rendered them formidable to their masters. Nothing but the presence of a considerable European Force, in the proportion however of 1,000 Englishmen to 4,000 Natives, has held in subjugation the

ambitious yearnings of the latter after independence, or coerced them into obedience.

Eleventhly. That, fortunately for the temporary safety of the Empire, the civil population of India has not taken part in the Military rebellion, but there is no knowing how or when it may be moved to insurrection, especially if the religious war cry be raised; and therefore it becomes of the deepest importance that so powerful a nucleus of revolt as an armed body of some 300,000 men shall not be suffered to exist.

Even if the material of the Bengal Army were the best, instead of being nearly the worst in the world, it must be an exceedingly dangerous experiment to place such a Force in the heart of a population always susceptible of dangerous excitement.

We may congratulate ourselves that the mutiny we now deplore has presented itself in the comparatively mild form of a Military revolt, instead of being the armed expression of popular hostility to British rule. The purely Military character of the movement is an answer to those members of the House of Commons who would seek to establish a case of interference with the religion of the people. In no one instance have the non-Military classes arisen, excepting where the very lowest of the rabble—the wretched dregs of the people—have taken advantage of tumult to plunder the dwellings of the Europeans and the more respectable Natives.

It cannot be pretended that the disaffected spirit of the Native Army has come upon us unexpectedly. Warnings against the consequence of over indulgence of the Sepoys, and of centralizing the Military control in the person of

the Governor General of India, have continually been offered by sagacious and experienced men.

We now come to the vital question of permanent REMEDY and future Security, and although the ideas which I may present to your Lordship's consideration may not all wear an aspect of originality, seeing that within the last few weeks many able pens have been employed to suggest practicable methods of averting the dangers of the future, I must be permitted to observe, that in April last I predicted, in conversation with a distinguished General Officer, a member of the House of Commons, the mischiefs which have overtaken us, and immediately on receiving news of the outbreak made known my sentiments in a letter to the *Times*, signed M.P.—sentiments which anticipated events; sentiments which have been fully borne out by the occurrences reported from India, and to which (in respect to the remedies proposed) I still firmly adhere.

The first step which appears to me essential as the basis of future security is the total disbandment of the Bengal Native Regiments, and the substitution, for the present, of an equivalent in European Troops.

Those Sepoys, however, who had given unmistakeable proofs of loyalty and fidelity during the present insurrection should be immediately re-enlisted *upon precisely the same terms, and acknowledging exactly the same obligations*, as European Soldiers. New denominations should forthwith be given to the Corps so reconstructed, and SWORDS *served out to the men instead of muskets*, for which they can have no further use under the altered condition of our frontier, and in the presence of a largely increased European Force. In the construction of such Corps as may be necessary in substitution of those which

have been disbanded or have deserted, great exertions should be used to recruit only low caste men, or Goorkhas, Beloochees, and Punjaubees, for they are infinitely better adapted to the duties of Soldiers than the races who affect an attachment to the prescriptions of caste. To those men, who might be formed into "Irregular Corps," the musket might safely be given, for they understand its loyal use, and in all encounters with the enemy have proved themselves more formidable than the Bengal Regular Sepoy. A great advantage, too, of their employment would be found in their entire segregation from the masses of the people, and their antipathy to the men they would displace.

The absence of any frontier foes from whom irruptions might be dreaded, and the facility with which European Regiments can be moved to any menaced point, reduce the Military utility of the Sepoys to so narrow a compass that they might hereafter be much, if not exclusively, employed in the civil and police duties of the country, under rigid European surveillance. In camps the men could mount the guards and perform all the fatigue duties; in the civil districts they might become efficient constables under a new organisation. The existing police force, excepting in the Punjaub and Scinde, is notoriously costly, inefficient, and corrupt. Too much left to itself, it has become the agent of domestic tyranny and oppression.

The new organisation might comprehend the formation of Police Battalions (Horse and Foot) each 1,000 strong, with a Commandant, a second in command, and an Adjutant, with the addition of an European Non-Commissioned Officer to each one hundred men as a local superintendent on detached duty.

These Police corps would more than effectually take the place of the Native Army, for they could, under their proposed organisation, perform double the service of that Army, at half the cost. I contemplate, of course, the extension of the Police system to the entire wants of the Bengal Provinces. Ultimately, if it answers expectations, it might be introduced generally throughout India.

The Battalions, separated into small Detachments, should be scattered over each district, having their Head Quarters at a central station, and from time to time it would be desirable to assemble them for purposes of drill, or inspection. Great care should be taken that the men be not stationed in any of the districts in which they may have been enlisted, for the contiguity of a Police Soldier to his home would prove a certain source of collusion and corruption.

The costume of the Battalions should be carefully considered. I do not think it would be advisable to make it European. The Oriental costume, besides being better adapted to the climate, is more agreeable to the feelings of the Native—a certain uniformity, however, would be desirable.

The selection of the European Officers for the Battalions requires the greatest circumspection. Quality in this respect is of more moment than numbers. None should be appointed who had not mastered the language of that part of the country in which they might be engaged, or at least become well acquainted with the Hindostanee patois. To the seniors ought to be committed the power and authority of Deputy Magistrates, and the advancement of all to the higher grades of Superintendents, Chief Superintendents, and Inspectors General,

should depend upon their individual merit, determined by the state of their several districts, and the efficiency of their Corps.

The ranks of Superintendent, Chief Superintendent, and Inspector General, ought to have pay and allowances correspondent with those of the higher Army grades of Colonel and Major General, and the precedence should be regulated accordingly. This would make the Police branch of the service an object of greater ambition than even the staff and political offices, both of which will daily become less necessary, the former by reason of the altered character of the protective force of the country, the latter because of the gradual annihilation of the Native Chieftainships, near whose persons it was always considered necessary to place a political officer, under the denomination of a Resident, Envoy, or Commissioner.

The Police and Escort duties of the country being thus provided for, the defence of the country from external as well as internal foes would thus devolve upon our trustworthy European Troops and the Irregulars. To what extent the Europeans may ultimately become necessary must depend upon their distribution and the introduction of facilities for rapidly moving them about the country. An extensive railway system crossing India in various directions would not necessitate so large a force as the absence of those means of rapid movement and concentration. But, for the present, and until the railway system has made much further progress, and disaffection has been put down with a powerful and strong hand, nearly forty thousand Europeans would be required in excess of the fifty thousand which generally constitute the strength of Her Majesty's

and the Company's European Force. This may seem a large number to detach from this country, but we found during the war in the Crimea that many thousands above this strength could be raised with ease, and were always available for foreign service, without diminishing our capability of defending ourselves at home. It will not, I presume, be contended that it is less imperative to entertain 80,000 or 90,000 Englishmen in the maintenance of the peace and integrity of the brightest gem in the British Crown than in fighting the battles of European diplomacy on the shores of the Black Sea or the Mediterranean.

Moreover, there is this advantage in the maintenance of such an Anglo-Indian Army; that, owing to the ease with which Troops can be transported from India to Europe, to China, to the Cape, &c., it can always be made immediately available in any war in which we may find ourselves engaged. India would thus become to us what Algeria has been to France—at once a nursery and a camp of instruction, turning out British Zouaves as dashing and enduring as the Soldiers who carried the Malakhoff. It was a reproach to Great Britain that during the late war with Russia we had a standing Army of some 300,000 men in India which could not be employed in aid of the cause in which we were embarked. The moral force of such an Army as I now suggest in substitution of the Native Army, would be immense in the determination of all future quarrels in Europe as well as in the East. And it is no slight additional recommendation of its establishment that it would be comparatively economical — one hundred thousand

Europeans costing less than double the number of Sepoys, and fulfilling the purposes of treble the number! *

In regard to the control of the Army in India a very few words are necessary. We have seen the mischievous results of a divided authority. Commanders-in-Chief, in matters of Military discipline and organization, ruled by Governors General, and these, in their turn, checked by the Court of Directors, or the Board of Control, have originated an inconceivable amount of damage and of danger. All this may be averted by placing the whole of the Indian Army in the hands of the Crown, the Commander-in-Chief in India being supreme, excepting in his responsibility to the Commander-in-Chief in England. To the latter functionary he should be responsible for the discipline and efficiency of the Army, only recognising the authority of the Governor General in respect to meeting his requirements for offensive and defensive operations, and the preservation of internal order. I attribute much of the evil condition of our Native Army to the humiliating position of the Commander-in-Chief, as a mere instrument of a Governor General's will. All the good which Sir Charles Napier might have wrought was checked by the interference of the Marquis of Dalhousie, who, in his turn, was little else than a puppet in the hands of the Military Secretary to the Government of India. In like manner Lord Combermere was thwarted by Lord Amherst, Sir Edward Barnes by Lord W. Bentinck, and Sir

* As an instance, among hundreds, of the immense superiority of Europeans, I may cite the fact mentioned in one of the recent accounts of the Mutiny, that one hundred and eighty Europeans at Benares had resisted and driven out two Native Infantry Regiments and one Regiment of Cavalry.

H. Fane by Lord Auckland—and from the same causes—the influence of a local Military Secretary of the Company's Army, constitutionally jealous of the Royal Service, and of the power vested in the Royal Commander-in-Chief. In fact, the situation of the Commander-in-Chief and Army in India has been analogous to that of a Commander-in-Chief and Army in England under the orders and discipline of the House of Commons. Your Lordship may conceive what would come of such a system.

One simple code of Regulations would, under the arrangement here proposed, suffice for the whole Army of Great Britain, wherever it may be placed.

It may be supposed by those who are ignorant of the nature of the climate of India, that it would be difficult to recruit for service in that quarter and costly to supply death vacancies. It cannot, therefore, be too extensively promulgated that excepting in some few of the lower stations in the plains the climate of India is by no means hostile to the European constitution. Statistics recently compiled, with a view to establish a basis of Life Assurance, show that the per centage of mortality among the Europeans in India is very slightly in excess of the deaths in England. A few years ago Colonel Tulloch, assisted by (I believe) Dr. Balfour or Dr. Hume, shewed, as the result of a ten years' calculation (from 1837 to 1847) that out of 50,000 English Soldiers who had died in that interval *more than one-half* had fallen victims to diseases *in this country* alone. The remainder included the mortality in the West Indies, Gibraltar, the Mediterranean stations, India, Australia, the Cape, China, and Mauritius. But still more conclusive testimony of the innocuous character of the climate of India is to be found

in the fact that all the very old and healthy In and Out-Pensioners in H.M.'s Service have served in the tropics.

Since these statistics were accumulated the Anglo Indian Soldier's longevity has been still further promoted by the introduction of various sanitary measures. Barracks have been built for him on the Himalayas and other mountainous districts on our Northern frontier; habits of temperance inculcated and rewarded; mechanical contrivances introduced to make the Barracks cool and healthy; the clothing (especially the head gear) rendered lighter; and pursuits of a wholesome character facilitated and promoted. As a proof of this, I may quote a passage from a letter just received from the Punjaub—"H.M's 24th Foot is marching in the hottest month of the year, with only 17 sick out of 700 men! Europeans, when wanting, seem to pay little attention to the heat. This has surprised the Natives more than anything, They fancied that to move us in the hot winds was death."

The transfer of the control of the Indian Army to the authority of the Crown naturally raises the question as to whether it is desirable to continue the Civil Administration of the country in the hands in which it has hitherto been placed. On this important point I will, with your Lordship's permission, again address you. The practical results arising from the adoption of these suggestions would be strength, security, and economy, which, taken in connection with the charges equally necessary in the Civil Government of India, should be productive of a considerable annual surplus, instead of a deficiency as at present, and this, I think, I shall have no difficulty in

establishing in my next letter. In the meanwhile suffer me to implore you not to allow your consideration of the Military phase of the question to be biassed by the interested opinions of professionally interested parties, who have shown, by the fatal results of the system which they have administered, their incapacity to deal with the momentous question at issue, and the false estimate they have formed of the character of the Natives of India.

It is far from my wish to cast discredit upon the Officers of the Indian Army who have been the unwilling instruments of a dangerous course of Military administration. Among them there are and have been men greatly distinguished by their bravery, sagacity, and ability, and it will only be just that in any changes the British Government may deem advisable their vested interests should be respected. In my humble endeavours to trace the course of the mutinies and to suggest a corrective and a preventive, I trust your Lordship and the gentlemen of the East India Company's Service will believe that I have been solely influenced by a strong sense of public duty.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord,

Your most obedient servant,

R. J. R. CAMPBELL.

Woodvale House, Upper Norwood,
August 4th, 1857.

APPENDIX.

HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE BENGAL ARMY.

In order to show how gradual has been the progress of decay in the Native Army of India, and how natural the violent termination of its existence, a brief retrospect of the history of its organisation, and the various changes that have taken place, may be acceptable.

The seed of our Military establishment in India was sown at Armegon, on the Coromandel coast, in 1627. The factors defended the place with twenty-three Soldiers (or rather Sailors, who had been left behind by masters of trading ships with that view) and twelve guns. Similar small establishments of Troops were soon afterwards entertained at other factories.

In 1668 Bombay was ceded by the Portuguese to Charles II.; and a few years subsequently the Company engaged 500 *Rajpoots* for the defence of the place, which was threatened by the Dutch. This was *the first instance on record* of our employing the Natives of India by way of strengthening our power.

In 1671 the principle of adjusting the rank of Officers by seniority was adopted, and has never been departed from. It was not, however, until January, 1757 *(just one hundred years since)*, that the Native Military force, which, upon the same principle, had been adopted at other settlements, was divided into Regiments. At a later period, and as the force of Sepoys (or Sepahees) augmented, the Army was divided into three parts, and a part assigned to the Governments of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, respectively, in strength proportioned to the extent of territory placed under the government of those several Presidencies.

The costume of the Native Army was of a hybrid character, combining the scarlet jacket of the British Soldier, with breeches, and a cap of a form more correspondent with Oriental equipment. The arms were the musket and bayonet, after the Indian Army came into collision with the French, under De la Bourdonnais, in

1745. Previous to that period swords and spears had been their weapons, which it had been well for us if we had never changed. The system of drill and discipline introduced corresponded with that of the English Troops, so that the Sepoys might effectually act with their white brethren in the field. The Regiments were entirely officered by Englishmen.

But though the Sepoy adapted himself with remarkable intelligence to the system of European tactics, a much closer bond of union between himself and the Government he served was established through the agency of *affection for the Officers.*

To secure the fidelity and attachment of the Sepoys the Officers scrupulously regarded all the suggestions of Hindoo caste, or as we should rather say, the laws and prejudices of the religion of the Hindoo Sepoy, which are numerous and not always very broadly defined. Moreover the Officers discharged all the Company's pecuniary obligations to the men with punctuality, ruled them mildly, paid every attention to their appeals, and set them in the field and on the march examples of bravery, endurance and loyalty. If the Sepoy did well, a small gratuity to enable him to buy sweetmeats excited his gratitude and increased his emulation, but even this was rarely necessary. So devoted did he become to his Officer, in whom he recognised the fatherly protector, as well as the courageous leader, that a few syllables of approbation were treasured as ample recognition of his devotion. It must also be borne in mind that the comparison between his previous employment under native Rajahs with bad pay irregularly issued, and less attention to his feelings and wants, operated strongly in securing his cordial allegiance to the British Government.

Things went on in this way for half a century. Severe campaigns were undertaken, long and painful marches endured and desperate battles fought, yet the Sepoy's fidelity was not only not shaken but his attachment to the "salt he had eaten" increased. On very rare occasions did anything like a mutinous or discon-

tented spirit manifest itself. In 1764, the *Lal Pultun* or "Red Battalion" of Bengal mutinied, on the pretext of some promises which had been made to it having been broken."* The Regiment was soon reduced to obedience, but its commander, Major Munro, caused 28 mutineers to be tried by Court-Martial, and eight of them were blown away from guns at Chuprah. In 1782, the *Matthews Ka Pultun* or Matthews' Bengal Regiment (named after the Officer who had raised it) mutinied under an apprehension that it was to be embarked for foreign service. The Sepoys had a peculiar aversion to cross the sea, partly from that undefinable dread of the ocean which ignorant people have entertained from the days of Columbus and Da Gama, and partly because they feared, in the confinement of a ship, they would be unable to cook their food and perform their ablutions and the other ceremonies prescribed by their religion.†

In 1779 or 80 the 9th Madras Battalion mutinied when ordered to embark for Bombay, but the mutiny was quelled by the spirit and decision of the Commandant. A Madras Corps about the same time manifested the same aversion to the sea, and when it reached Vizagapatam, the port of departure, the men rose upon their Officers, and shot all but one or two. This last was the only instance on record in the course of fifty years in which a mutiny had taken a violent form. The mutinies up to that time and for some years afterwards, merely assumed the shape of inert resistance to authority.

Four isolated cases of mutiny in half a century, occurring among men of a different race, religion and complexion to that of their rulers, proved little against the spirit, discipline, and efficiency of Soldiers who had previously given a hundred proofs of their zeal and in-

* Captain Williams' History of the Army.

† "When we consider," writes Sir John Malcolm, "the great privations and hardships to which Hindoos of high caste are subject on a long voyage, during which some of them, from prejudices of caste, subsist solely on parched grain, we feel less surprise at the occasional mutinies which have been caused by orders for their embarkation than at the zeal and attachment they have often shewn on such trying occasions."

trepidity and their warm attachment to their Officers, to succour whom, when prisoners to Tippoo, some of them underwent great privations and ran serious risks. In fact, nothing but a threatened infraction of religious usage, or an outrage upon the honor of a proud *high-caste* (Brahmin) Sepoy—led them to acts of insubordination and violence.

They were the most docile and faithful of Soldiers when treated with consideration. Lord Lake, for instance, who knew them well, was adored by the Bengal Sepoys. Sir J. Malcolm says "he understood their character, attended to their prejudices, flattered their pride, and praised their valor."

The great mutiny in 1806 at Vellore, when the Sepoys of two Regiments united, and murdered in cold blood the greater part of Her Majesty's 69th Foot, originated in the attachment to *caste*. Changes had been made in their costume to assimilate them with the Europeans—a fancy of a Commander-in-Chief who, fresh from England, and ignorant of native prejudices, would have introduced his original notions, regardless of consequences. The terrible example which was made of the mutineers and the enforcement of a strict discipline thereafter, put an end to any further demonstration of a like character for nearly 20 years, and in the meanwhile the Sepoys steadily served the East India Company and eat their salt with gratitude. The only instance to the contrary was at Java in 1815, when several Native Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, and Sepoys, conspired to murder their Officers because they had been kept four and a half years on foreign service instead of three years, the usual period.

The wars with the Mahrattas, the Nepaulese, and the Pindarries, the expeditions to the Isle of France and the Persian Gulf, multiplied proofs of the entire dependence which might be placed upon the Native Army of India. The fact of England's holding in check one hundred millions of human beings by an Army composed for the most part of the natives of the subjugated country, was regarded by surrounding nations as a problem—a social

phenomenon,—but it excited no wonder among educated Englishmen, who knew that the development of the system had been gradual,—the result of a combination of events of which advantage had been wisely taken, and of a state of society composed of antagonistic materials, in which there was no principle of cohesion.

In 1824, however, a circumstance occurred which dislodged the corner stone of the whole system, and led by gradual steps to the state of things we have now so much reason to deplore.

The vast increase to the acquisitions of the East India Company, arising out of the successful wars with the Mahratta states, rendered necessary a considerable augmentation of the Indian Army.

This augmentation was effected by converting the Battalions of the Native Infantry into Regiments with different numbers, separate commandants, and a considerable addition to the strength of Officers. A great impetus was thus given to the promotion of European Officers, and that none might suffer from partiality, many transfers took place of old Captains and Lieutenants from their own Corps to others where they would occupy a better position in reference to their advancement by seniority. These transfers, by separating the Sepoys from the Officers with whom they had long been associated, broke the link which had hitherto united the European with the native. From that hour the general derangement may be dated.

In the same year, 1824, the British Government was at war with the Burman empire, and a large Force was despatched from Madras and Bengal to enter the territory of the King of Ava from Rangoon. Among the Regiments ordered from Bengal were the 26th, the 47th, and 62nd Native Infantry.

They were stationed at Barrackpore, a large Military cantonment, 16 miles from Calcutta, the port of embarkation. Towards the close of 1824, when the time for their departure had arrived, the 47th Native Infantry refused to move. Their minds had been disturbed by re-

ports that the Burmese were possessed of charms which rendered them invulnerable; by their habitual dislike to the sea; by the difficulty of procuring land carriage, and the supposed disinclination of the authorities to aid them in obtaining it; and by the refusal of the Government to yield to their demand for extra allowances in the shape of what is called *double batta*.

They were summoned to parade, and repeating their determination not to march, they were fired upon by European Troops drawn up to enforce their obedience.

Numbers were killed, but the mutinous spirit was, for the time, extinguished, and the rest of the Army marched to Burmah.

Had the Officers who formerly belonged to the Corps been still with the men, they might have been reasoned with. But only one Officer had remained, after the transfers arising out of the augmentation,—the rest were strangers to the Sepoys, and the NATIVE COMMISSIONED OFFICER had begun to assume a pernicious influence resulting from personal intercourse, caste fellowship, and official authority combined.

The position of the Native Officer has often been shewn to have a mischievous tendency. "From the necessary circumstance," writes Captain MacNaghten (a very experienced Officer) in a letter to the late General Sir Edward Paget, Commander-in-Chief in India, dated November, 1824, "of their rising from the ranks, the Native Officers are too familiar, and too nearly connected with the men to keep them at that respectful distance which the difference of rank and situation evidently points out as proper; and here we find the same intimacy subsisting between them and the majority of the Sepoys as was usual in those days when they were more on a level, and when it was very fitting that such an intercourse should be encouraged."

And again, "The Officers who ascend from the lowest stations have no higher sphere of society in which to enter; their religious habits and various other causes prevent their becoming the companions of their European

brethren; and the same causes attach them in continuation to their former fellow soldiers, among whom alone they can find their relations and their friends. Hence they continue to live in the Lines and in every situation of duty to mingle with the Sepoys upon equal terms, as far as *caste* (which is thus referred to rather than military rank) will admit of the close familiarity. Another principal reason of the inferiority of our Native Officers in that capacity is, that by the time a Sepoy attains the rank of Jemadar he is in a great measure worn out, and almost always lazy and careless about his own appearance and that of the men under his command."

Colonel Hodgson, an Officer of distinction and great experience, writes in a similar strain in 1850, shewing that *thirty years had elapsed* without producing *any change* in so important an element of the Army as the Native Commissioned Officers.

Their ignorance is, according to his account, supreme. "At present," says he, "a Court-Martial composed of Native Officers is a mere absurdity. They possess none of the qualifications requisite for the proper discharge of their important functions. They owe their promotion almost solely to *seniority*, and are entirely without education."

"Of late years the advantages of the Native Commissioned grade have been very much increased, both in an honorary and pecuniary degree, yet still without success in creating either a proper dignified conception of his position or of its responsibilities."

"It is a very painful fact forced upon attention by numerous circumstances that the benevolent consideration of Government for the condition of the Native Officer should have failed in animating him to a more zealous and *conscientious* execution of his professional obligations to the State. On all occasions of discontent and insubordinate caballing, how very rare is it to see a Native Officer *come forward in a firm and unequivocal manner to disclose what has come to his knowledge*, and thereby evince a becoming conscientiousness of the duty he owes

to his own rank and to the Government which conferred it."

"It would be the height of credulity to imagine the possibility of evil intentions existing in the Lines without his most entire cognition, and therefore, *by failing in moral energy*, HE VIRTUALLY BECOMES AN ACCOMPLICE, *shrinking from the manly performance of his duty as a Commissioned Officer*, WHICH IMPERATIVELY REQUIRES A PROMPT DISCLOSURE OF SUCH SEDITIOUS DESIGNS."

Fifty passages from the pens of other writers might be quoted to the same purport; enough has, however, been cited to show that the dependence upon Native Officers has been a great mistake—the first fatal result of the severance of old European Officers from the men with whom they served.

Possibly the lapse of time and a community of feeling arising out of common service would have created new affections and restored the bond of unity which made the Native Army at one time a reliable force. But events followed upon the heels of the occurrences of 1824 which had, if possible, a still greater tendency to estrange the Sepoy and render him independent of his commanders.

In 1826 Lord Combermere, as Commander-in-Chief, reduced the fortress of Bhurtpore. The Native Troops did the fatigue duty of the trenches well enough, but in the assault of the fortress their lamentable inefficiency was apparent. The 14th and 59th Royal Regiments had the exclusive honour of the attack, and there is on record the expression of disgust with which the Officers viewed the conduct of the natives, with the exception of the Goorkhas, on that occasion.

In 1827 it reached Lord Combermere that Courts-Martial had become very frequent in the Bengal Army, and that corporal punishment to a severe extent was inflicted at the discretion of the Commanding Officers of Regiments. To check what appeared to him inhuman, and calculated to produce a dissatisfied feeling in the Native Army, Lord Combermere issued a General Order limiting the jurisdiction of Courts-Martial to certain

crimes, and directing that dismissal from the Service should instantly follow the infliction of the sentence, provided that its execution had received the previous sanction of the General or other Officer commanding the Division.

A better intentioned, or better devised order could scarcely have been issued. Nevertheless, it had injurious effects on the discipline of the Service, and proved a shock to the kindly feeling which still subsisted in a degree between the Sepoys and the European Officers. According to the latter it made them responsible for the state of the men under them, whilst it took away a very essential part of their power. Their hands were tied up. "Human nature," wrote an able Officer in the *East India United Service Journal*, "is still human nature, whether black or white, and though our Sepoys have not, generally speaking, the same description of vices that Europeans have, yet they have their own, and are peculiarly cunning and observant; they, therefore, quickly discovered the want of authority in their own Officers, and as with the Natives, 'want of power is want of respectability,' they very shortly began to take liberties with their Officers, and to despise them accordingly." They felt themselves, in a measure, freed from restraint, for Commanding Officers, being naturally averse to making displays of their own want of authority, often passed over and winked hard at deeds that should never have been suffered to pass.

This feeling of indifference on the part of Commanding Officers, evinced in proportion to the frequency with which General Officers commanding Divisions remitted the punishments awarded by Courts-Martial, and the Sepoys observing that the penalty of their crimes depended on a *distant* and unseen authority, instead of an authority *on the spot*, rarely dreaded the consequences of a fault.

Grave indiscipline naturally arose out of this state of things, and at the end of five years the condition of the Native Army was a subject of such lively concern that

General Sir Edward Barnes, who had become the Commander-in-Chief in 1832, abrogated Lord Combermere's order, and restored to Commanding Officers the power of confirming the proceedings of Courts-Martial assembled by their own orders..

How far this return to the old state of things might have tended to restore the authority of the European Officers and reunite them to the Sepoy it is impossible to guess, for, in the beginning of the year 1835, Lord William Bentinck, in defiance of the opinions of all the experienced Officers whom he consulted, took upon himself, when Governor General and Commander-in-Chief in India, to *abolish corporal punishment in the Native Army altogether*, because it had ceased to be one of the punishments awarded by civil courts of justice, and because he believed it tended to dissuade Sepoys of respectable families from entering the Service! His Lordship quite forgot that the European Soldier was still liable to the punishment, and he repudiated any distinction between Civil and Military government. Fatal mistake! A sort of "speculative benevolence" was at the bottom of his ordinance; and, as might have been concluded, a still further relaxation of the bonds of discipline resulted from his misplaced humanity. The substituted punishment for flogging was *Discharge from the Company's Service*, so that when a Sepoy wished to discontinue serving the East India Company he had only to commit a crime of the most heinous nature, and he at once became a free man!

Lord Wm. Bentinck's "humanity" did not stop short at this piece of egregious folly. He allowed *desertion to pass unpunished;* he withdrew from Commanding Officers their Orderlies and Guards, and having previously reduced the batta of the Officers, he conveyed to the Native mind the impression that the Sepoys were the object of his most anxious solicitude, and the European Officers persons of no account; impressions which the native was only too ready to adopt.

While the Military acts of Lord William Bentinck were thus undermining authority in the Army, his civil

administration, though well intended, was operating, after a different manner, to produce the same results. The enlightenment of the Natives was one of his grand and most commendable theories. To carry this out he encouraged education and the dissemination of Gospel truth; he forbade Suttees (the cremation of Hindoo widows); he put an end to infanticide, and treated homicide and bloody rites of all kinds, however sanctioned by the sanguinary Hindoo code, as civil crimes of the deepest dye. All this struck at the root of the Hindoo religion.

The High Castes became alarmed; they fancied or pretended that it was intended to convert them all to Christianity. This alarm, diffused through the ranks of the Army, removed another link in the now slender chain which bound the Native to the European.

If the false humanity which spared the criminal Sepoy the infliction of the lash had tended to give him any confidence in the *benevolence* of Government, the interference with his religious usages shook his faith in the *tolerant spirit* of the State. With the Sepoy it were less an offence to flog him than to touch the rules of his caste.

The lamentable consequences of Lord William Bentinck's abolition of corporal punishment were not long in blossoming. The press teemed for two years with warnings and remonstrances: apprehension filled the hearts of Commanding Officers that the assurance of impunity would beget crime. They were no false prophets. By the month of August, 1835, the fruits of the order appeared. Three or four murders had been perpetrated by Sepoys on their Native Commissioned or Non-Commissioned Officers. Again, in 1838, a Sepoy of the 11th Bengal Native Infantry attempted to murder his Subaltern, first by firing at him, and then charging him with his bayonet; and in the same year a Sepoy of the 25th Bengal Native Infantry threatened to imitate the conduct of the Soldier of the 11th. The Sepoy of the 11th was tried and sentenced to be shot; but on the day fixed for his execution five of his comrades refused to be of the firing party, and the party itself fired over

the prisoner, so that the Provost Serjeant was obliged to put a pistol to the wretched man's head and blow out his brains. Thus murder, followed by mutiny, demonstrated the folly of a measure intended to be humane.

Lord William Bentinck left India in 1836, and was succeeded in the government by the Earl of Auckland.

Three years after Lord Auckland's assumption of power (1838) an expedition was ordered to Affghanistan. The Sepoy, like the French Soldier, delights in the excitement of a campaign, and in this instance his pride had been touched, for Lord Auckland's proclamations disseminated the idea that the Army was destined to cross bayonets with the hardy Russian.

Nevertheless, the Sepoy could not refrain from taking advantage of the demand for his services to stipulate for *increased allowances.* The Government resisted the exaction, but the Sepoy resorted to his old tactics and *mutinied.*

In Stocqueler's "Memoirs of Sir Wm. Nott" the following passage occurs:—"The Government decided to grant the batta from the day the Army should encamp on the right bank of the Indus. It was not, however, given to the Europeans, because, says Nott, '*they had not mutinied!*'"

Sir William Nott was a great believer in the Sepoy, and would not have penned the above had he not had personal experience of the mutinous spirit which sustained the mercenary exaction.

The partial dependence of the Government of India on the fealty of the Sepoy during the campaigns in Affghanistan led to his being petted in a variety of ways. The success of the investing Army in 1838, and of Lord Ellenborough's Army of retribution in 1842, was rewarded with medals; so was the triumph of the Troops who were led against the Rajah of Gwalior. Vanity is a ruling principle with weak minds, and nothing delighted the Sepoy more than the decorations earned at Ghuznee, and Cabul, and Maharajpore.

But if the wars of 1838-1842 kept down the spirit

of discontent, they had taught the Sepoy that he was necessary to the Government—an impression which increased his self-importance without augmenting his allegiance and affections. In fact, the latter feeling was nearly extinct. Accordingly, in 1844, we find symptoms manifesting themselves of a disposition to mutiny upon the old question of *extra pay*. The 34th Regiment refused to march to Scinde and was disbanded. The 64th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry mutinied on the march to Scinde, and their Colonel was cashiered. Sir H. (afterwards Lord) Hardinge became Governor General, and *corporal punishment was partially restored* in 1845 as an indispensible vehicle of discipline.

The war with the Sikhs in 1845—(a war in which the Sepoy was animated as much by the instinct of self-preservation as anything else—a war, too, followed by more medals and rewards)—again stifled, for a time, the discontented spirit which pervaded the Native Army, only that it might burst out in a state of peace, and threaten the safety of the Empire.

In 1849 the Government found it necessary to discontinue a certain amount of pay to the Sepoys in the Punjaub. They had been placed on that extra pay when they crossed the Sutlej to war with the Sikhs, but the Punjaub having, after a series of victories, become part and parcel of the British territories, the pay was stopped. Bound to the British Government by, unhappily, no other tie than pay and allowances, and believing themselves indispensible to the authorities, the 13th and 22nd Regiments of Native Infantry refused their pay and mutinied. General Sir Charles Napier now commanded, and his vigorous measures nipped that piece of insubordination in the bud. But it proved only the forerunner of other cases of disaffection. A few months subsequently the 41st Regiment of Native Infantry refused to enter the Punjaub with reduced pay, and it was discovered that the Corps was "in correspondence with *twenty-four other Regiments.*" * They were only pacified by a con-

* See Sir C. J. Napier's "Indian Misgovernment."

cession to their demands for furloughs and the threats of disbandment.

In February, 1850, the 66th Bengal Native Infantry refused the reduced pay; and the mutinous spirit assuming a serious complexion, the Commander-in-Chief marched the Regiment to Umballah, dismissed the men from the Service, and gave the colours to a body of Goorkhas, who thenceforward became the 66th Nusseree Battalion. The signal for the mutiny was the imprisonment of a Soldier for forcing a sentry and leading his comrades to seize the arms of the Regiment. "This wholesale mutiny," observed Sir C. Napier, "*could not be concerted without the aid, or, at least, without the knowledge, of the Native Officers*, yet no whisper of it was made to the European Officers!"

In the year 1852 war broke out with the Burmese after a peace of 26 years' duration. The order for the expedition was, as usual, attended by a mutiny. The 38th Regiment Bengal Native Infantry refused to march. This small revolt was put down—the Regiment went on—and the war continued to occupy the minds of the Soldiery for two years, when the Crimean campaign, by reviving the old bugbear of a Russian attack on India, put them on the *qui vive* in a new direction. That memorable war with Russia, terminated by the fall of Sevastopol, threw the Sepoy back upon his old habits of indifference to the Service, and dislike to his European masters, and it had become clear to every observant Officer that the most trivial excuse would serve to excite him to rebellion. That excuse came in 1857 in the shape of "Greased Cartridges." The story of the bloody massacre and the complete and sudden disruption of the Bengal Army, arising out of that excuse, is too fresh in the minds of the readers of this pamphlet to need recapitulation. In the short space of two months thirty thousand men have forsaken their colours—proclaimed open war—committed the most flagrant and revolting crimes—and disturbed the whole frame of Indian society.

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THE

LETTERS OF INDOPHILUS

ON THE

MUTINY OF VELLORE,—ITS PARALLELISMS AND ITS LESSONS.

by Sir Charles Trevelyan

REPRINTED, BY SPECIAL REQUEST, WITH A FEW EXPLANATORY NOTES, FROM THE "BENGAL HURKARU."



'Indophilus' is Sir Charles
Trevelyan. KCB. (1807-86)
afterwards Gov. of Madras

THE MUTINY OF VELLORE,—ITS PARALLELISMS AND ITS LESSONS.

No. I.—*The Mutiny.*

To the Editor of the Bengal Hurkaru.

SIR,—That we are in a crisis—and that too a grave one—is undoubted. But, at such a time, the sober citizen, not less than the idle alarmist, needs to be reminded that *a crisis is not a catastrophe.* Through how many crises had Rome to pass on her match to universal empire, ere she reached the climax of her greatness, or experienced the catastrophe of her fall! That was a crisis when the barbarian Gaul exalted, in the insolence of triumph, over her burning ashes. That was a crisis, when Hannibal, flushed with the proud trophies of Thrasymene and Cannæ, thundered at her very gates. Yet, the Imperial City, not only survived these and other equally serious crises, but buoyantly emerged out of them in statelier grandeur and strength than before. It required centuries more of abused wealth and luxury and power to ripen her for the final catastrophe; when the haughty mistress of the world, that had so relentlessly trodden down its cities and kingdoms, became herself the helpless prey of barbaric hordes that awfully revenged the countless wrongs of the bleeding nations.

British India, in like manner, has heretofore had its crises. The period of the Black Hole tragedy was a crisis. During the Vice-royalty of Warren Hastings, there was more than one crisis. The days of Hyder Ali and Tippoo witnessed their respective crises. Not to speak of more recent times, the year 1806, signalized by the famous mutiny of Vellore, was one of decided crisis. And since, amid passing discussions and alarms, no reference appears to have been made to it, I think it of some importance to draw general attention to its leading characteristics—its parallelisms with the present state of things and the lessons which it is fitted to impart.

Early in 1806, symptoms of disaffection began to manifest themselves in different quarters among the troops of the Madras Presidency. What was the *alleged* or *ostensible* cause? It was simply *a slight change in the dress of the troops.* In order to improve their soldierly appearance, orders, recom-

mended by two Officers of long Indian experience, had been issued, directing the men, *when on duty*, to take off the red marks from their foreheads—to trim their beards after a prescribed and uniform pattern—and to replace the old turban by one of a lighter and more convenient form.

The orders, relative to the caste marks and beards, had for some time been in partial operation in different Regiments, without apparently exciting any spirit of dissatisfaction or resistance. The order, relative to the turban, was not passed without seemingly careful and sufficient precaution—three specimens having been made and actually worn by individuals of the different sepoy races and castes, not only without any objection on their part, but with expressions of marked approbation.

By and bye, however, it began to be mooted, that these [illegible]—and particularly the change in the turban—were highly objectionable to the soldiery. And why? Because it began to be discovered that to interfere with the cut of the beard and the mark on the forehead, was to interfere with sacred and time-hallowed usage; while the new turban was imagined to bear some distant and suspicious resemblance to a European hat!—and what could all this indicate except some clandestine and sinister design, on the part of the British Government, to compel them to become Christians!

Accordingly, as the alleged result of offended religious prejudice and violated immemorial custom, acts of insubordination began to occur in different places; but more especially at Vellore and the neighbouring fortress of Wallajabad. But a few of the more disorderly having been speedily visited with slight chastisements, the Commmanding Officers, at these and other stations, were led glowingly to report that all was safe—that subordination and discipline had been completely restored—that the men were true and staunch to their colours—and that a feeling of cordial satisfaction was widely diffused through the ranks! The event, however, proved that the calm was altogether a deceitful one—the treacherous lull that precedes the earthquake and the hurricane!

At Vellore, at two o'clock on the morning of the 10th July, when the European soldiers and their officers—all-unsuspecting, all-unconscious, all-unprepared—were wrapt up in profoundest slumber, the mutineering conspirators suddenly rose upon them with demonaical fury—desperately resolved to butcher every one of them in cold blood. Though having to contend with every conceivable disadvantage,—the darkness of night, the confusion of surprize, and the blind-fold rage of

indiscriminate slaughter,—the spirit of the British soldier—the spirit of his heroic fathers—the redoubted spirit, which, against fearful odds, achieved deeds of undying glory on the fields of Blenheim, Crecy and Agincourt—rose to the height of daring and energy. Compelled to abandon the defenceless barracks, they rushed to the ramparts, and there, for hours after their ammunition had been exhausted and all the officers killed or wounded, defiantly maintained their perilous post. Assisted at length by a squadron of dragoons from Arcot, they charged the insurgent murderers—killing 350, and taking 500 prisoners. Of the Europeans, the number massacred was 113—including the Colonel and thirteen other officers.

Thus luridly fell the curtain, deeply crimsoned with British and Native blood, on the terrible tragedy of Vellore. All India was thrown into a panic; and when the news reached England, the alarm was every where sounded that our Indian Empire had evanished like the breath of an exhalation. It was known that the spirit of disaffection was rife in the Madras army; and who would tell but that the spark, which lighted up the combustible materials at Vellore, might, in a moment, ignite into similar explosions elsewhere, and drench every military station in the peninsula with a deluge of blood? It turned out, however, in the good Providence of God, that it was *a crisis and not a catastrophe*; and so, after a few minor disturbances in other places, which were easily suppressed, the crisis passed away; and then succeeded a great calm.

Intending, with your permission, to return to the subject to-morrow.

I remain, &c.,

INDOPHILUS.

Calcutta, May 28, 1857.

No. II.—*The Cause.*

To the Editor of the Bengal Hurkaru.

SIR,—Such was the far-famed mutiny of Vellore, I now come to point out some of its parallelisms with the present state of things, and the resulting lessons.

First.—Let us consider the *cause* of the murderous outbreak.

Here, it is at once to be noticed that the *immediate and ostensible cause* was NOT *the real originating cause*. Both before and after the terrible outrage, the Native Officers, as distinctly

stated by one of the historians of British India, emphatically declared that "there was nothing in the new turban inconsistent with the laws and usages of their religion, or in any way degrading to those who were required to wear it; and the chief conspirator at Vellore, a few days previously to the insurrection, being questioned by his Commanding Officer as to the existence of dissatisfaction, offered, in the presence of the other Native Officers, to place the *Koran* on his head, and swear that there was none, and that the whole Corps were prepared to wear the turban." The feeling against it, as the same historian remarks, "was certainly not universal; for, in many instances, much alacrity was shewn in adopting it, and, after the mutiny, some Corps requested permission to wear it as a testimony of their unshaken fidelity."

What, then, it may be asked, was the real originating cause of an explosion so disastrous? The searching scrutiny which followed, left no room to doubt that the *primary moving cause* was of an *essentially political character;* while the supposed violation of a sacred religious usage was merely seized on as a *plausible pretext* by designing intriguers who were inimical to British sway. And who were these? By the clearest and most cogent evidence it was proved, that these were none other than the *Mahommedan princes of the recently extinguished dynasty of Mysore!*—the sons of Tippoo Sultan who fell in the storming of Seringapatam. Royally accommodated in the fortress of Vellore, and replenished with princely revenues, they repaid the debt of gratitude by hatching dark conspiracies against the power that spared, and the hand that so bounteously fed them. Their hired emissaries, under every variety of caste and character and costume, swarmed in all directions, armed with the means of bribery and corruption. And these means were employed at once with oriental adroitness and Punic unscrupulousness. Working on the natural attachment of Mahommedan soldiers to rulers of their own faith; acting on the natural prejudices and bigotry of the Hindu; appealing to the covetousness of the human heart by large promises of pecuniary aggrandisement; and playing, by turns, on the ignorance and all-devouring credulity of all;—they succeeded in inspiring them with vague and indefinite fears of their own religion, on the one hand, and with vague and indefinite hopes of promotion and prosperity under a restored native dynasty on the other. The alleged purpose of the British Government to destroy their ancestral faith, and compel them to embrace the hated creed of their European conquerors, was the principal stalking

horse of the cunning intriguers; but the destruction of the British power and the re-establishment of a Mahommedan despotism instead, was their real object. There were thus, at the outset, the crafty deceivers and the simply deceived—the dupers and the duped. The originators of the anti-turban agitation, for the accomplishment of their own dark designs, assiduously propagated what they knew to be an infamous lie; the silly victims of the agitation were cozened to believe the artfully contrived lie for a truth;—though doubtless, in the onward progress of events, many of the subordinates became principals—many of the misled, misleaders—many of the deceived, deceivers themselves.

And are not some of the leading circumstances of the recent disaffection and wide spread mutiny precisely parallel? Instead of a new turban, we have a new cartridge. The approximation of the former to the appearance and shape of the European hat was cunningly laid hold of by designing men for raising the suspicion of a scheme of forcible proselytism. The unctuous composition, or glazed shiny look of the latter was seized on as an excuse or pretext for similar unfounded suspicions. The immediate occasion of the Madras mutinies was an alleged repugnance to the caste-breaking turban; though numbers declared that it had no such caste-breaking quality in it. The immediate occasion of our Bengal mutinies has been an alleged opposition to the caste-breaking cartridge; though numbers have declared their readiness to use the glazed sort on account of its harmlessness; while the other has, in point of fact, been made, without being issued, only *at three* out of the entire aggregate of our military stations.* But at Madras, it was proved beyond all debate, that the real cause was primarily a *political* one, which lay behind the scenes concealed in the bosoms of the Mysore

* For the sake of distant readers, the case of the cartridge may be more explicitly stated. The old musket carried ball effectively only 200 yards. The Enfield rifle carries it 800 yards. The Indian Government very naturally wished to introduce this greatly improved instrument into the native army. Now, in England, the peculiar cartridge for the new rifle has *tallow* in its composition. But *tallow*, which may be a compound of *cow's fat* and *hog's lard*, is the abomination of Hindus and Mussalmans. Accordingly, when their objection to the use of it came to be known, though ordered to be made at *three* stations, *not one of them was ever actually served out.* But suspicion, once awakened, flew like wild fire through the army. And it so happened that the *usual* paper for the *old* cartridge had a more than ordinary tinge of blue in it; while from its being better pressed, it had a glazed shiny look that made it appear like some *new* kind of paper. This deepened the suspicion already excited, as it was maliciously represented as some new device for the breaking of caste, and forcing the men to become Christians!!

princes and their traitorous emissaries. And many amongst us, who know the natives well, more than shrewdly suspect that the real cause of our Bengal mutinies, will, as regards the originators behind the scenes, be found *mainly of a political* character—the concoction of influential parties who are known to be hostile to British rule, and of whose subtile artifices, the majority of the poor ignorant sepoys have become the pitiable dupes. Who the ringleaders among these traitors may be, we dare not as yet venture positively to suggest. But assuredly, no means ought to be spared in dragging them from their dark secresies, and a notable example ought to be made of them—otherwise the prestige of our power and empire is for ever ended. The disaffected classes, among which designs of treason and sedition most abound are the Mahommedan Maulavis, and ex-princes, with their greed[illegible] bands of discontented satellites; and astute Brahmans,* [illegible] pine under the loss of their exclusive monopoly of spiritual and civil despotism as secured to them in the Institutes of Menu. The poor vapouring ingrates, worthily or unworthily belonging to the party of "Young Bengal," whose delight is to spout treason in private and be eloquent for loyalty in public, may perhaps be overlooked for the present;—it is enough that they are now well known, and will in future be more narrowly watched.†

* Already has one Brahman been caught in the very act of stiring up sedition and inciting to massacre. The case is thus related in the *Harkaru* of June 8—"An attempt was made a few days since, at Midnapore, by a Police Chowkidar, a *Brahman*, attached to the thanna there, to induce the sepoys of the Shekawati Brigade to swerve from their allegiance to the British Government. The course adopted by the scoundrel was the common one,—an appeal to the religious feelings and prejudices of the men, and to the necessity that now exists for immediate exertions on the part of the natives, as the Government had determined, by all possible means, to convert its Hindu and Mahommedan subjects to Christianity. As a proof of the sincerity of the appeal, the Brigade were informed, that the prisoners in jail were subjected to all kinds of privations; that they were forced by the civil authorities to eat hog's flesh and other abominations repugnant alike to the Moslem and the Hindu; and that, if the Brigade were willing, as they ought to be, to fight for religious freedom, the prisoners in the jail, nearly one thousand in number, were ready, if set free, to co-operate and massacre every European at Midnapore. The improbable and highly seasoned character of the appeal excited general suspicion. Two men of the Brigade, following the sower of strife and sedition, arrested him though armed, as he crossed the boundary that separates the civil from the military lines. He was taken before the magistrate, who proceeded immediately to an investigation, the result of which was, that the offender was convicted on the clearest evidence."

† It is notorious that leading men among the Mahommedans are everywhere in a state of *chronic* rebellion against the British Government—so far as their *wishes, intentions*, and *words*, are concerned. Nor is it to be disguised that, among Hindus, who have been educated in Government Institutions, and many of whom

On what particular individuals, connected with any or all of these classes, rests the guilt of having converted the cartridge into an instrument of treason and rebellion among the deluded sepoys, in order to work out their own sinister political designs, remains to be discovered. Doubtless, there may have been an antecedently dissatisfied state of mind, of which traitors of different grades have taken base advantage. The causes of such previous discontent—whether alleged to be connected with low pay, diminution of comfort, increased difficulties in correspondence, the vexatiousness of tollbars, harder duty than before, the ignorance, apathy and superciliousness of European officers, or any other of the hundred and one suggested theories on the subject—ought to be sifted to the very bottom, and judiciously modified or removed. But nothing, nothing ought to be allowed to divert attention from the search for the original instigators of those treasonable thoughts and purposes, which have already burst forth over the land in tempests of fire and blood. And in searching for these miscreant disturbers of social order, and in bringing them to speedy and condign punishment, let our noble Governor General, in the exercise of his plenary and extraordinary power, assume the responsiblity of disdainfully flinging aside all the formalities of redtapism and all the trammels of legal technicality—all the irrelevant wise saws about the liberty of the subject and the inviolableness of the Post Office and of home. No, no; the artificial rules for ordinary navigation would be plainly ridiculous when the vessel was already among the breakers; and if the vessel actually perished, would it not be a poor consolation to be able to add, that she perished according to rigidly established rules? Let our Chief Ruler, therefore, in the present desperate crisis of Empire, only come forth, Roman-like, in the true Dictator style; and no bill of indemnity to justify his conduct, will be needed. The success of his measures in saving and consolidating an empire, will be their own best and most triumphant vindica-

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are now in Government employ, a similar disaffected and treasonable spirit very largely and widely prevails—smiting, with contagious influences, all who come in contact with them. It redounds very little to the honor or good sense of high Government officials, that by them, such a state of Anti-British feeling is either ignorantly discredited or contemptuously disregarded. It redounds as little to the credit of the British authorities, that the dangerous working of the native press—alike Hindu and Mahommedan—has been so shamefully overlooked. We have been credibly assured that not even half of the native presses of Calcutta are registered by the Police, though the Act absolutely insists on such registration.

tion in the eyes of the Imperial Parliament and the mighty British people.

Yours, &c.,
INDOPHILUS.

No. III.—*The accompanying delusions, and the power of native combination.*

To the Editor of the Bengal Hurkaru.

SIR,—In my last I considered the pretended cause of the Vellore mutiny; and now proceed, *next*, to remark, that, when once that cause, however unreal in itself, under skilful managment, fairly awoke the demon of suspicion, distrust, and alarm, there immediately followed in its train whole shoals of extravagant and even monstrous fictions, which, chiming in with the popular delusion, tended to exasperate into a frenzy, the prevalent feelings of discontent and fear. This is a kind of evil that is inseparable from a state of ignorance and superstition; but, in India, it ever and anon swells out into forms of portentous magnitude. Here, in the 19th century, the mental condition of the masses very much resembles that of the Greeks during their earliest mythical period, a thousand years before the Christian era. Fictions, fables, legends, myths —essences of the strange, and quintessences of the prodigious —all spring up, one knows not how or whence, with a mushroom rapidity and multitudinousness, that outstrip the utmost flights of the imagination and the utmost bounds of the credible in our northern climes. And these, blending in, by some secret affinity of feeling, with the absorbing topic of interest for the day, serve additionally to agitate, bewilder, and perplex. Men's minds become temporarily distracted and unbalanced; and, to all ordinary intents and purposes, practically insane. Then it is that the most trivial or casual incident may smite with quailing and panic; and, under commingled influences of fear, hatred, revenge, fanaticism—the lust of plunder and the lust of power—may goad on whole myriads to the commission of deeds that make one's blood curdle in the veins.

It was so, in the case of the Madras mutinies. In the allegation that a change of turban was the first act of agressive policy, on the part of the British Government, against the religions of India, there was, to every sane northern mind,

intrinsic improbability and transparent absurdity. It was an allegation glaringly contradictory to all the past actings of a Government, which, if guilty at all, was only guilty in the converse direction—guilty of ostentatious indifference to its own holy heaven-derived faith, and of ostentatious reverence for systems of religion which had made the land to groan under their debasing rites and sanguinary cruelties. And yet, such an allegation, so astoundingly absurd, so violently improbable—had been so coloured, as to be greedily caught up, and every where eagerly credited. Yea, and around it, as in a mystic dance of delusion, revolved other rumours, differing from each other only in the degree of their preposterous extravagance, and mischievous fitness and power to exulcerate the feelings of a fanatical multitude;—rumours, among others, of human victims to be sacrificed in holocausts by the British Government for the consecration of certain edifices, and of the projected massacre of all who refused to exhibit the sacred symbol of the cross on the doors of their houses!—while the whole was interwoven with astrological predictions of the downfall of the British power, and the resurrection of the Hindu and Mahommedan, in meridian glory, out of its ruins!

And what is all this, but a manifest prefiguration of recent experiences? In spite of the earnest and solemnly reiterated asseverations of Government—in spite of a continuous series of acts that have given a substantial embodiment to these asseverations,—the old fable has been revived, circulated, and extensively believed, that the sepoys and the people, were to be coerced into a profession of Christianity, and that the use of the glazed or unctuous cartridges was but the first part of an organized system for the accomplishment of this dreaded end. And to this resuscitated old fable has been superadded the usual attendant crop of outrageous rumours and astrological vaticinations—rumours, among others, of Government purchasing rice and wheat wholesale for flour and mingling it with dead men's ground down bones—rumours, too, of malign aspects of certain stars, of ill-boding conjunctions of planets and of revolutionary astronomical cycles! And, as if all this, and much more of like sort, were not enough for the omnivorous credulity of this non-descript race, the whole must be crowned by a wickedly imagined compact, in which, with consummate audacity, her Majesty Queen Victoria, and her Viceroy, Lord Canning, are made to appear as the chief actors in a new three years' crusade of exterminating violence

against the creeds and the temples of India!* Beyond this, surely, the force of absurdity and credulity cannot possibly go!—What decisive evidence have we in all this, of the slow progress that has been made, during a whole half century, in enlightening and elevating the sunken masses of the people! With what resistless force ought the cry of "*educate, educate, educate them*; diffuse amongst them the seeds of high intelligence and moral virtue"—to ring in the ears of our Rulers and all the real lovers of India's welfare? And how ought those who are entrusted with the treasury of "unsearchable riches" to be more bounteous than ever in dispensing these among the intellectually and spiritually impoverished millions of this great land? A profoundly ignorant people like the ocean in a calm, may proudly bear upon its bosom the vessel of state; but like the ocean in a storm, the same people, moved by some sudden gust or hurricane of senseless delusion, may, in blindfold fury, dash the noble vessel to pieces amid the surging billows, that strew themselves along with it like shattered wrecks upon the shore!

Third. *The wide spread influence* of the delusions already referred to—delusions of which Vellore was only the active central crater—and of the seditious and mutinous spirit to which they gave rise throughout the Madras presidency, is a feature that merits and demands attention. It has often been repeated that the power of organised combination is utterly wanting in the natives of India; and, to a considerable extent, this may be true, as regards the past. But it were the mere folly of infatuation to build much upon this in future. Even as regards the past,—when there were no railways, no telegraphs, no newspapers as the organs of public opinion,—is it not clear that the natives had their own ways of secret counsel and distant confidential communication which entirely escaped the vigilance of the British authorities? Is it not clear that, in the arrangements connected with the Vellore mutiny, there was a manifestation of the capacity to devise, and a possession of the means to execute, however imperfectly, very extensive schemes of combi-

* However monstrously incredible, a story to this effect, with the alleged colloquy between the Queen and Lord Canning, on the occasion of his receiving his appointment as Governor General of India, has been actually fabricated by some designing knave, universally circulated, and almost universally believed by the credulous masses of the people! Indeed, as the story has it, Lord Canning received his appointment on the express condition, that, within three years, he would, by compulsory or other equally objectionable measures, enforce the reception of Christianity on all classes of people in India!

nation? Partly, through the action of hired emissaries, who, the more readily to elude suspicion, assumed the varied guise of wandering devotees; and partly, by clandestine correspondence conveyed through special messengers, an insurrectionary spirit, under the pretext of violent interference with their religion, was simultaneously fomented at far distant and widely scattered stations—Palamcottah and Bangalore, Nandydroog and Bellary, Wallajabad and Hyderabad.

And has not something identical with this been discovered in the wide spread ramifications of the recent mutinous spirit—extending for sixteen hundred miles from Calcutta to Peshawur—and leavening, more or less, with the treasonable poison, every intervening station? We have now, moreover, railways, and telegraphs and public journals in abundance. But, besides all these, the natives have their own peculiar ways of communication. And every one knows how swift and sure these are when their own interests are to be specially served. Now, during months past, have not Mahommedan and Brahmanical strangers—men of suspicious port and mien—been noticed prowling about the cantonment bazars, and entering the sepoy lines, at Barrackpore and all the other principal stations? And why have not these been looked after more sharply—unceremoniously laid hold of—and subjected to searching examinations? Again, has not correspondence of a treasonable kind been actually intercepted? And why should not a system of more watchful surveillance be instituted in this department? The time for misplaced delicacy and misconstrued confidence ought now and for ever to be at an end. The time for Arguss-eyed watchfulness in every direction is surely now come. Do not the gory beds of our poor slaughtered countrymen and country-women too, among the shambles of Meerut and Delhi, emphatically affix the brand of eternal reprobation to the old routine of easy over-laxity? And does not the ruin, which, through such over-laxity, has of late hung so threateningly over our glorious Indian empire, vehemently demand some precautionary measures of a more stringent kind than had been deemed necessary in the times that are past? The time for sleepy, drowsy, half measures, is over and gone. Let us, therefore, take warning, while it is yet in our power. And let us not, by supineness, apathy, and negligence, in the time to come, provoke the realization of the adage—*Quem Deus vult perdere, prius dementat.*

Yours, &c.,

INDOPHILUS.

No. IV.—*The want of confidence between European and native officers, and its disastrous results.*

To the Editor of the Bengal Hurkaru.

SIR,—A *fourth* point in connection with the Madras mutinies which stood out with painful conspicuousness was the *total want of confidence and kindly feeling between the European and native officers.*

And what was the result of such an unnatural and impolitic state of things? That the former were kept in total ignorance of the treason and murder which was hatching for months in the very midst of them—and that the latter were as ready to rise against their superiors as the more ignorant privates.

Full well did the native officers know the utter falsity of the allegations about the design of the turban and the intentions of the British Government. Full well did they know the whole extent of the plottings and conspiracies carried on in the secret conclaves. And yet so alienated were they in feeling and interest from their British commanders, that none of them any where gave a clew to the plots that were forming against their very lives! On the contrary, wherever the spirit of mutiny broke out—as it actually did at most of the principal stations—the native officers were found uniformly to join in the seditious and murderous projects of their more ignorant and deluded men. Now had not a strong feeling of personal aversion and alienation existed in their minds, this could not have been. Even if, under mixed influences of a political and religious kind, they had desired the overthrow of the British Government, some of them at least could not but contrive to save the lives of their officers, had they been drawn towards them by the strong bonds of personal attachment, gratitude, and good will. But no; the spirit of estrangement seemed universal, and the fatal effects of it were universal too.

From this unbroken reticence—the unmistakeable result of personal estrangement—the British officers were kept in a state of hallucination which cost many of them the penalty of their lives. They saw nothing with their own eyes, and hence concluded, there was nothing to be seen. They heard nothing with their own ears, and hence concluded, there was nothing to be heard. They knew nothing of what was going on in secret, and hence concluded, there was nothing to be known. They were thus sleeping in blind security on the brink of the volcano, at the very time, when, if wide awake, they might have

discerned, at the bottom of the yawning crater, all the premonitory signs of an immediate irruption.

True, that long previous to the actual outbreak, there were symptoms of a somewhat ugly and suspicious character. But such was the ignorance of the British officers, and the blinded confidence which that ignorance inspired, that all such symptoms were either overlooked or regarded with apathy, or *pugh-pughed* with the contempt of utter incredulity. Yea, when one of the sepoys proffered to unmask the murderous plot, he was disdainfully handed over to the native officers—the very ringleaders of the conspiracy—who, in order to discredit his testimony, calumniously charged him with habitual drunkenness and occasional fits of madness! And thus did they infatuatedly slumber on, in total ignorance of the real feelings and dispositions of the native troops, and in the firmest persuasion of their unshaken fidelity and loyalty, until aroused from their state of fatal unconsciousness by the midnight yells of massacre and blood.

Now, what is all this but a vivid picture, *mutatis mutandis*, of the actual state of things brought to light in our recent deplorable mutinies? Has there not appeared a singular spirit of distrust and estrangement on the part of native officers as well native privates, towards their European commanders? Does it not look as if there had been a chasm—an impassable gulf between the two? As if they seemed to know nothing of each other, care nothing for each other? Yea, as if they looked askance at each other, from a distance, like so many strangers and natural enemies? And has not the effect of this spirit of alienation shewn itself in the guilty complicity of the native officers as well as the private men? Has it not shewn itself in the profound ignorance in which the British officers were kept as to the storm that was silently brewing in the native ranks, and in their consequent false confidence and fatal security*—a confidence and security out of which, in some cases, they have been roused only by the terrible outburst of incendiarism, mutiny and murder? That there are kind and sensible Officers who know and love their men; and worthy and sensible men who know

* The Colonel of one of the regiments in the North West that had shewn a decidedly disaffected spirit, could not bring himself to believe, that *his* men would prove false. Yea, so staunch did they appear to him to remain, that he exultingly wrote to a friend in Calcutta, that they had even offered their services as volunteers against the mutineers at Delhi! But within a few hours after this letter had been received, a telegraphic massage reached Government, announcing that that very regiment had openly mutinied, and were dispersed by the artillery!! The blind-fold confidence and security of many of our commanding officers amount to downright infatuation.

and respect their Officers, is undoubted. But, looking fairly and honestly at the average of the army at large, is not the above the substantially true representation of the case? And if so, is it not high time to search out for the *causes* of an estrangement so injurious to the best interests of both? Is it not time to devise some commensurate remedy?

As regards the Native Officer, is there not much need of an ameliorated system of promotion? A system which, frowning on all that is low and mean, vulgar and debasing, would encourage self-improvement of every kind, physical, mental, and moral? A system, which pointing to the noble and magnanimous, would furnish a stimulus to the acquisition and exemplification of those principles of honor, and the formation of those habits of correct thinking and elevated feeling, the coexistence of which in the aggregate and in a considerable degree, cannot fail to constitute the true Bayard of any army—"without fear and without reproach?"

As regards the British Officer, we cannot but heartily sympathise with him in his difficulties. Already, at the very threshold of his career, the barrier between himself and the native soldier is formidable enough in the difference of country, of race, of complexion, of language, of social habits, and religious faith. Let not, then, this formidable barrier be deepened, broadened, and heightened by distance or cold reserve, churlish arrogance or cruel contempt. On the contrary,—without any childish pettling or petting, any lowering of personal dignity, any weak or unworthy concession, any compromise of high principle, any relaxation of military discipline—let manly frankness, courtesy, and civility be the habit and the rule. Let their national weaknesses and hereditary foibles be generously overlooked. In private, let their hearts be won by frequent and kind enquiries after their comfort and welfare: in public, let the homage of their soldierly natures be gained by promptness, decision and energy of conduct. Let confidence be inspired, not by a studied cowardly suppression of moral and religious sentiments or speculative opinions, but, on proper occasions and in proper ways, by the open, honest, and hearty avowal of them, while righteous deference and patient forbearance should ever be extended to their own.* And in order to

* This is not the time, when men's minds are unusually excited by passing events, coolly and dispassionately to consider such a subject. There is surely a vast difference between a public, formal, ostentatious harangue, and a private, quiet, familiar conversation—between rudely obtruding one's religious and other views on reluctant minds, without consideration of time or place, and calmly inviting them, at convenient seasons, to a friendly colloquy on themes, which, in

insure the possibility of all this, or something of all this, let *a knowledge of the native soldier's language—the grand and only effective medium of kindly and profitable intercourse—be wisely encouraged in all, and held absolutely indispensable for regimental command.* In a word, let there be exhibited to-

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importance, transcend all others here below. The former method, if ever pursued by any one, cannot but prove offensive; the latter, however often resorted to, never can offend. And it would be well for the Sepoys—well for the country, and the stability of British power—were officers, generally, pious enough, discreet enough, and zealous enough, to deal with their men in a way so rational, so humane, and so Christian. There would not, then, be that stolid ignorance respecting *the true nature of Christianity*, which, at present, is the fruitful parent of such fatal misconceptions. If sepoys, for example, only knew something of what *genuine* Christianity means, it is not possible that they could swallow so monstrous an absurdity, as that Government intended forcibly or clandestinely to proselytise them by means of *cow's fat* and *hog's lard!* We honor, therefore, General Hearsey, for the explicitness, wisdom, and seasonableness of the statements in his address to the Barrackpore sepoys:—"You have heard lies without number regarding the wish of the Government to take your caste and *force you, the Hindus of this army, to be Christians, &c.* No, the British Government has never interfered with your caste notions, has *never forced the Hindu to turn from the religion of his fathers.* The Mahommedan sovereigns of Delhi used to do so in former times, &c. I once more tell you, *we*, the Government of India and the officers you serve under, *are Christians of the Book;* we do *not* adore idols or pictures, we read *the Book;* we do *not* adore idols or pictures, *we read the words of our Saviour, and worship the God who sent him to lead us from the paths of sin.* I tell you, *no adult person can become a Christian of the Book*, without he has *studied and become proficient in the tenets of that Book;* and then he must go before a Clergyman, and be strictly examined as to his knowledge of those tenets, ere the clergyman will dare to baptize him. If the clergyman so far forgot his duty, he, (the clergyman), would be scoffed at and turned out of his calling. But again, I tell you, that no person is permitted to *force you to become Christians.* If any person *annoys* you by *(forcibly)* interfering with your religious prejudices, or meddling with your notions of caste, or in your offerings or worship, complain to me, &c."

Now this, or something still more cordial and explicit, is *the sort* of statement which the British Government ought always to have put in the forefront of its proclamations to the people of India. It ought openly and frankly to avow its own faith in Christianity, distinctly acknowledge how much Britain and the whole civilized world owes to it, and candidly express its conviction, that by *intelligently and spontaneously* embracing it, all people would be incalculably benefitted. At the same time, it could truly be added, that, from its very nature, it, on the one hand, *demands knowledge and enlightenment of the understanding and conscience*, and, on the other, *abjures violence, compulsion, or any other carnal or unworthy means of proselytism*—and that, from the use of all such sinister means, the British Government itself will not only sacredly abstain, but, at the same time, employ its great power in constraining others to abstain also. But, by unhappily all along adopting a totally different course,—by practically ignoring, or even often repudiating Christianity in its proclamations,—the Government has actually filled the native mind with vague fears and undefined suspicions. From the natives' peculiar caste of mind and modes of thinking on such subjects, their usual inference is, that, behind this strange ignoring or repudiating of their own faith by the British Government, there must lurk some secret clandestine purpose of, some day, tricking or entrapping them, somehow or other, into a forced profession of Christianity. And hence, we verily believe, one real cause of the rapid growth and spread of the fanatical delusion respecting the alleged proselytising design of the cartridge.

wards the native soldier, the sternness of the Disciplinarian and Commander, in happy combination with the tenderness of the Father and the Friend, and the British officer will not be long in reaping a general harvest of gratitude towards himself, and devoted loyalty towards the State.

This is no mere speculation or theory. We know that even now, there are individual officers who are fairly up to the mark; men, high-minded right-hearted men, who have so thoroughly gained the attachment of their soldiers, that these would be ready, in a crisis of danger, to interpose their own bodies at the risk of life to save them.* Only let the number of such

* In the North West, between seven and eight years ago, we witnessed a spectacle which left an indelible impression on the memory. Brigadier* *—a man of an open, frank, generous and chivalrous nature,—well acquainted with the *Urdu* language—and withal a warm-hearted, zealous, consistent, Christian—[illegible] commissioned to raise, and form a Sikh regiment out of the debris of the army, that was finally annihilated at *Gujurat*. He succeeded to the admiration of all competent judges. *In private*, he was wont freely to converse with the men, making all manner of kind inquiries respecting their condition and welfare. On such occasions, he also often spoke to them, in a simple and friendly way, on the subject of their souls' salvation. So far from being offended at being spoken to, in this rational and unobjectionable way, the men liked their superior all the better for it—regarding it as a token of the interest which he felt in their temporal and eternal well being. *In public*, his conduct and bearing were soldierly in the highest degree. The discipline and evolutions of his men on parade were pronounced to be perfect. Such was the singular combination in him of the *Commander* and *the Friend*, that he found no difficulty in moulding the men, who had been trained to quite another regime, into any shape or form he chose. Their own national turban—so awkward and unmilitary-like—he persuaded them cheerfully to exchange for a gigantic Glengary bonnet adorned with the Scotch thistle!

Having been appointed to a high command elsewhere, the Brigadier, after putting his men through the ordinary evolutions, drew them up in close companies, for the purpose of delivering to them a farewell address. First of all, he slowly marched along the whole; and, stopping at each company, and patting the native officer at the head of it with friendly familiarity on the shoulder, he addressed to each a few kind and appropriate words. Then calling out all the officers to the front, he delivered, in Hindustani, and in a clear ringing tone of voice, his farewell speech. When, towards the close, he announced that this was his last meeting with them, as duty summoned him elsewhere, and, pronouncing a fresh eulogy on the excellence of their past conduct, with earnestly expressed hopes for the future, commended them to the guardian care of the great God, the tears were seen copiously trickling down the weather-beaten cheeks of many a veteran who had fought against the British, with no unequal prowess, on the bloody fields of Mudki and Ferozshah, Aliwal and Sobraon! The Brigadier himself, greatly affected at the unwonted spectacle, abruptly bade them farewell, and, turning round remarked:—"Ah, these are brave fellows! well do I know them; they would follow me through fire and water; yea, they would throw their very bodies before me, to be hacked in pieces to save mine."

"Well, well," remarked we, in return, "here, this morning, have we learnt a grand lesson. In the proper conduct and bearing towards them of a kind, skilful and gallant commander, lies the true secret of the sepoys' devoted personal attachment even to Christian British Officers, as well as unshaken loyalty towards the British Power. Only let officers of this description be multiplied, and our sway in India will for ages be securely and beneficially perpetuated.

officers be indefinitely multiplied, and we shall not soon again hear of wide-spread disaffection among the sepoys ripening into a reign of terror. Our magnificent Indian Empire, the envy and admiration of the world, secure from the ranklings of private discontent and the corrosions of internal intrigue, so far from disappearing before the first centenary of the battle of Plassey, will be sure to survive the second, with greater credit to the Rulers and greater benefit to their subjects.

Yours, &c.,
INDOPHILUS.

No. V.—*The inadequate punishment; with concluding warnings and encouragements.*

To the Editor of the Bengal Hurkaru

SIR,—I come now, *lastly*, to consider the mode of dealing with the Vellore mutineers.

Though it was at Vellore alone that the mutinous spirit broke out into a cataract of violence and blood, the same spirit, as already indicated, had shewn itself in highly indecorous language, and minor acts of insubordination, in many and far distant stations throughout the Madras presidency. This, of necessity, made the task of dealing with the culprits all the more difficult. And the difficulty was still farther enhanced by the fact, that, in the higher councils of Government, there were two parties—the one, for measures of leniency, and the other, for measures of severity. The first subject that came up for decision was, whether the orders respecting the turban, the caste marks, and the beard, ought to be enforced or abolished? The conciliation party carried it; the obnoxious orders were abolished; and we think wisely. For, though concession, apparently extorted by bloody insurrection, be of evil precedent, it is less evil, than to risk the peace and safety of a nation, by persisting in orders, which, with considerate reference to native ignorance, bigotry and superstition, ought never to have been framed. In our case, the difficulty, in this respect, is vastly less. Our Government, as such, has really nothing to revoke. The objectionable cartridges do not appear to have been ever actually served out. Orders for *the preparation* of them had only been issued to *three* stations, where there are schools of musketry. So soon as the true nature of the prescription for the manufacture

of them came to be known, the prosecution of the work was at once relinquished. And the cartridges in actual use, differed in no way from the old ones, except in the somewhat glazed, glistening, bluish appearance of the paper. So far as the Supreme Government, therefore, is concerned, all that is really needed is, merely such a plain, simple, intelligible statement of the facts of the past, as has recently been given, coupled with some such palpable exhibition of the process of preparing cartridges in future, as shall assure the dark narrow mind of the cowering superstitious sepoy, that into the composition of them enters neither of the hated ingredients—hog's lard or cow's fat!

In the disposal of the Vellore murderers, the party for lenient measures prevailed to an extent which called forth general reprobation. A few only of the more notorious where condemned to death; the greater part were merely dismissed; while some of the disbanded officers actually received small pensions!—A course of procedure, which, outraging all sense of justice, and breaking down the barriers between guilt and innocence, treason and loyalty, virtually held out a bounty for fresh mutiny and massacre! It is to be hoped that our Government, while ever ready to temper severity with mercy, will rise superior to all the promptings of a spurious sentimentalism, and all the mawkish suggestions of a false charity. Let the excessive, and consequently mistaken and unrighteous leniency of the Madras authorities prove a beacon of warning and not an example for imitation.

When the question arose respecting the retention of the mutinous regiments in the army list, the Governor, Lord William Bentinck, who belonged to the conciliation party, took it upon himself to decide against his council in the affirmative—a decision, however, which was speedily and summarily reversed by the Supreme Government.

The Court of Directors disapproving, in this, and other particulars, of the conduct of the Madras authorities, recalled the Governor and removed the Commander-in-Chief; while the Adjutant General and his Deputy, by whose advice the obnoxious orders had been originally sanctioned, were ordered forthwith to return to Europe! Whether in this part of the business, our case is to become a parallelism or a contrast, it were presumptuous for us to venture to prognosticate.

That serious blame of some kind lies at the door of one or more of the heads of our military department, is patent on the face of things. The English cartridges for the Enfield rifle, as is notorious, contain *tallow* in their composition.

Was this fact known to our military authorities or not? If not, such ignorance, in such a case, must be adjudged to involve no small degree of culpability. But, if otherwise, so much the worse. And that it could not but be known, must be held as demonstrable from the fact, that the prescription, forwarded for the guidance of the native manufacturers, explicitly specified *tallow* as one of the composite ingredients! And if they did not know that "tallow" was among the abominations of Hindus and Mahommedans, such ignorance must imply an entire incompetency for the high offices which they dishonor. But if, knowing the obnoxiousness of this abomination to the Hindu and Mahommedan, they still forwarded the prescription containing it, to the places of manufacture in this land, such conduct must be accounted to involve a recklessness that cannot be too much reprobated. All this, assuredly, ought to be made matter of searching inquiry; and, as an emphatic warning for the future, the culpably ignorant, or the still more culpably reckless, ought to be visited with some memorable tokens of vice-regal displeasure.

Even as regards the intrinsically harmless cartridges, there is reason to apprehend that heavy blame must be attachable to some quarter or other. These, though devoid of the greasy or unctuous offence, were, it is admitted, somewhat *novel* in their external appearance; and any innovation, however slight, in the outward, the tangible, the visible, to which the ignorant native has been, from time immemorial, accustomed, is what is sure instantly to arrest attention and excite suspicion. What pains, then, were taken *at the outset*, and *previous to use*, to explain to the men the real nature of the slight change in the colour, and its perfect innocence? If none; then, such ignorance of native feeling and such indifference to native prejudice must be denounced as highly criminal, on the part of their European superiors, and ought to be followed by some signal marks of official disapprobation. It is even dreadful to think how soon ignorance, indifference, or carelessness in such inherently insignificant but relatively important matters, might involve the decline and downfall of one of the noblest empires under the sun!

Meanwhile it is some compensation to think that, amongst us, there are at least *three** men, who have deserved well of

* The author confesses that, in the letter as originally written, the name of a *fourth* gentleman was included; because, up to that time, his measures seemed to be distinguished by wisdom, energy, and success. But just before it was sent to press, the proclamation—offering free pardon to all mutineers who laid down their arms, though at the very moment, their hands might still be reeking with

their country in her hour of jeopardy and trial. There is the head of the Punjab administration, Sir John Lawrence—the cool, the reflecting, the long-headed, the far-seeing. There is the Chief Commissioner of Oude, Sir Henry Lawrence—the bold, the prompt, the chivalrous, the heroic. And there is her Most Gracious Majesty's Representative and Head of the British Indian Government—the Lord Viscount Canning—who, in a high degree, has drawn towards himself the sympathies, the respect, and the good will of the more intelligent and loyal portion of this great community. A stranger in this strange land—laden with the responsibilities of the mightiest viceroyalty on earth—and suddenly and unexpectedly plunged into the vortices of a crisis that would have shaken the nerves of a Clive or Warren Hastings—what could he do, in the first instance, but take counsel of those veterans who had grown grey amid the chequered experiences of Indian official life? But when he found their counsels timid, or wavering, or indiscreet,—advising promptitude, when inquiry ought to precede it, and delay, when promptitude was more than half the victory,—inciting to leniency, when severity should be the law, and to severity when leniency ought to bear away the palm;—what could he do wiser or better, than virtually to fling them all aside, and be guided by the instincts of hereditary British Statesmanship, and the suggestions of his own masculine British good sense? This is what he gets credit for doing; and, for the doing of which, has earned the grateful homage of all loyal subjects, and twined another wreath into the chaplet of glory already woven around the immortal name of CANNING.

We began by acknowledging that we are in a *crisis*—and a very grave one too—but that things are not yet ripe for a *catastrophe*. And we now conclude by remarking, that, if we are wise to give heed to the trumpet-peal of warning that has now sounded so loudly in our ears, *the catastrophe may never come!* but, instead of it, a glorious triumph and consummation. India, as we firmly believe, has been given, in a way the most unprecedented, by the God of Providence, to Great Britain *in trust*, for the accomplishment of a glorious mission. That mission is none other than the raising up of its teeming my-

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the blood of our poor butchered country men and country women,—came opportunely to hand. And such a proclamation, in the very midst of so terrible a crisis, did appear to the author to be a political blunder of so grave a kind, that he felt very sorrowfully constrained to erase the name of its author, with the encomium which had been sincerely pronounced upon it.

riads from the "Slough of Despond," in which, for thirty centuries, they have been sunk. To the varied characteristics of the appointed means and contemplated end, we shall not, in the present excited state of the native mind, more particularly advert. But as the accomplishment of the designs of Providence is sure, until the end be nearer its culmination, our tenure of India is secure. We may, indeed, be slow and sluggish in our onward movements; we may expend our energies on our own selfish objects, instead of lavishing them in furthering the purposes of the Eternal. If so, crises like the present, or like those of by-gone generations, are permitted to warn and admonish us to awake and arise—to be up and doing in the improvement of our day of golden opportunity. If we take the warning in time; if we understand aright the monitory voice that speaks to us through these appalling events, as they ever and anon recur,—we may be privileged to bring our high mission of beneficence to a peaceful and glorious close. Then, India, resuscitated from the accumulating rust and rubbish of ages; India, renovated by the breath of a new and holy life; India, basking in the sunshine of earth and heaven's richest blessings;—in a word, India, regenerated, purified, beautified, ennobled, may part with her foster guardian, "the Queen of many isles," as a loving daughter, after the period of parental training and tutelage is ended, often parts with a fond mother,—the mother, rejoicing in the independence, prosperity, and increase of the daughter as mistress of her own house,—and the daughter gratefully rendering to the mother, that caressed and nurtured her from the feebleness of infancy up to the full vigor of maturity, an everlasting homage of reverence and love.

I am, &c.,

INDOPHILUS.

P. S.—The question, raised a twelve months ago, ought to be put with peculiar emphasis now;—*Why, when Oude was annexed, was not the population disarmed?* Why, because, though the measure was strongly urged by the Lucknow authorities, it is commonly understood that one or two members of the Supreme Council, in the genuine redtapist spirit, were pleased to raise some *quibbling, technical, legal, objections against it!!* And what is the result? Why this;—that, when the province is now ripe for revolt, our poor beleaguered isolated countrymen have to contend with an *armed*, instead of a

disarmed, multitude on all sides. Truly, their being allowed to retain their arms, was a virtual encouragement to insurrection ;—and should insurrection unhappily break out, much of the bloodshed will be owing to the dilettante zeal of some of our redtapists, in upholding the inviolable honor of a wretched legal quibble, in the face of the united dictates of reason, experience, and common sense ! Is there not a loud warning in all this for the future? Surely counsels, prompting to the adoption of weak, timid, and unwise half-measures that tend to jeopardise the safety of an empire, out of respect to some antiquated legal cabbalism, might be purchased at a less cost than lakhs of rupees annually ! Surely, henceforward, justice and humanity imperetively demand, that we should, by deliberate choice, and on the ground of special fitness and merit, have " the right men in the right places," and not the wrong men tossed up into the wrong places by the breath of aristocratic favouritism, or the hap-hazard contingencies of a system of soul-less routine !

SANDERS, CONES AND CO., TYPS., NO. 23, LOLL BAZAR.

THE

THOUGHTS

OF A

NATIVE OF NORTHERN INDIA

ON

THE REBELLION,

ITS

CAUSES AND REMEDIES.

WITH A PREFACE.

LONDON:

W. H. DALTON, 29, COCKSPUR STREET.

1858.

[*Price One Shilling.*]

PREFACE.

THE following paper was prepared at the request of a well known officer in the North-Western Provinces, and is published, with the consent of the writer, at the request of several others who are well qualified to judge of its value. It was not written by any member of that race of Bengali Baboos, whose convictions constantly condemn their conduct, and to whom the friends of India look in vain for an example and for efforts calculated to elevate their countrymen; but by a man of a very different stamp in the North-Western Provinces, a native gentleman of the highest character, who has long been distinguished by well directed zeal for the public welfare. It is published precisely as he wrote it, without any correction of grammar or style, or the erasure of any objectionable expression. The writer is a man of loyalty, benevolence, and ability, and represents a class who are fairly entitled to be heard at a time when their country is attracting so much attention, and when so many other classes, both in India and in England, are submitting their views to the consideration of Parliament.

Unfortunately it has hitherto been customary to legislate for India without due enquiry. Once in twenty years, prior to the renewal of a Charter, each House of Parliament has been wont to appoint a Committee on Indian affairs, and much important information has thus been obtained. But, for the most part, no cognizance has been taken of the sentiments of the population of India; or, some general, and probably totally erroneous conclusions have been formed from the petitions of bodies like the British Indian Association, which represent the mind of the people as much the Chamber of Commerce in Liverpool represents the feelings of the Agricultural interest, or the Smithfield Cattle Club represents the opinions of the Factory men of Manchester. To the only practicable mode of ascertaining, fairly and fully, the real condition and the sentiments of the people at large, (the appointment of a Royal Commission,) there has always been a firm and unconquerable opposition. Even so lately as the end of 1856, when the Calcutta Missionaries represented the anomalous and lamentable condition of the peasantry of Bengal, and prayed for a Commission of Enquiry, the Government of India rejected the prayer, and in June, 1857 the House of Commons, on the debate on Mr. Kinnaird's motion in support of the Missionaries' petition, plainly indicated its aversion to this necessary measure. But now, when it may be fairly assumed that the British Parliament will no longer believe that all is known that need be known, and that all has been

done that need be done, there is good reason to hope that the necessity for full enquiry will be acknowledged, and that the necessity for a Royal Commission will be acknowledged too.

There are many points in the following Dialogue which deserve much consideration. Among these is the notice of the peculiarities of the Oriental mind. If these be overlooked, measures will be adopted that are altogether unsuited to India; and other measures will be condemned, simply because they are unsuited to England, while they may be precisely the sort of measures requisite for this population. Much ridicule, for instance, was cast on the pomp with which Lord Ellenborough reviewed the Cabul Army—the triumphal arch, the sweetmeats, and the like—and yet, there can be no doubt that this kind of child's play is exactly the sort of thing which the native understands, and which secures his attachment. In like manner with the Proclamation respecting the Gates of Somnath. Perhaps there are few persons who will now deny, that party-spirit rather than religious zeal detected patronage of idolatry in that "song of triumph" on the restoration of the symbols of former grandeur, which for so many centuries had remained the trophies of the invader's victory in a foreign land. Judging by our plain English taste, which admires, most of all, the Dispatch which narrated the destruction of so many ships "as per margin," the inflated address to Brothers and Friends, seemed diffuse and extravagant; but in dealing with a people among whom there are hereditary feuds based on some trifling personal indignity, a century or more ago; in which a large part of life is spent in the ceremonies and refinements of caste; and whose languages teem with lofty terms of flattery and courtesy, our severe taste must be out of place, as truly as our winter clothing in India's month of May.

We have also to remember that we are dealing with a people who are not yet released from patriarchal habits; who look for summary justice to him that sitteth in the gate; and who are wholly unprepared for representative institutions. They require a paternal government.

On the other hand, we have to consider the claims and the interests of the European community in India, as the supporters of our power, and the necessary agents of civilization.

The writer of this Dialogue thinks that the European must mix more freely with the people, as Tod did, and others of the past generation. Others will doubt the possibility, at present, of this junction. The Englishman in India in 1857, has advanced in many things beyond the Englishman of seventy years ago; and there are few natives of India who have advanced at all. There is little community of ideas; none of family habits, or of domestic arrangements; there can be no ties of kindred; and the friendship between men who are thus severed cannot be really intimate and confidential. There is also another and wider difference. The Englishman is a Christian, and in many cases is an earnest Christian, or hopes to become so. The Native worships Kali and Krishna, or receives with reverence the

bloody and cruel traditions of the Mussulman Elders. If there be community of feeling between such an Englishman and such a Native, it cannot extend far, unless the Englishman is dragged down to the lower level, or the native is raised to the higher. The more closely they are associated, the keener must be the consciousness of imperfect sympathy.

Nor is the case much better with the educated Native, whose confidence in his religion is destroyed. He no longer believes, he cannot believe, either its false science or its mythology, but he will not advance onwards to a positive and influential belief in the One true God and Jesus Christ whom He has sent. If he learns any truth, he holds that truth in unrighteousness. He will not submit to its power. He will persist in maintaining Caste, supporting Brahmans, and maintaining licentious or foolish festivals of idolatrous worship. In morals he exhibits no higher standard than many of the more stedfast Hindus.

There must then be a change on the one side or the other, before there can be really a satisfactory affinity between the Englishman and the Native; and the expectation of securing the affections of the people by this intimacy and alliance, while each remains as he is, must be abandoned.

This writer is equally mistaken as to Caste. It is true that it ramifies and permeates Native Society, and that it constitutes a large part of the religion of the Hindu population. It is said that we must maintain it; that the people are more sensitive on this point than on any other; that they will resent encroachments and indignities at all hazards, and so on. Still, the path of duty is here sufficiently obvious. Caste is based on a palpably false theory of the Creation of Man. It is a system manifestly repugnant to British jurisprudence. It is hostile to the interests of the great body of the people. What then? Is its maintenance, by our recognition of it, an essential condition of our security? Must we indeed perpetuate it or lose the Empire? It is believed that no apprehension of danger need attend a calm and tolerant policy, which simply leaves Caste to be dealt with by the people among themselves, voluntarily, like Freemasonry, but denies it all support, encouragement, or countenance. The plain duty of England, before all things, is Faithfulness to Truth. We cannot, as Christian men, admit that God did create four distinct races of human beings, and that the highest are divine and the lowest are impure. Nor can we, with common self-respect or fidelity to God's revelation, admit that we ourselves are not made "of one blood" with the Brahmans.

What then remains? Is India to be placed in peril? Certainly not. No real Christian will believe that it is impossible to frame a policy which shall combine with a complete non-recognition of Caste, such wisdom, justice, firmness, strength, and material benefits, as will secure the attachment of the people, increase and develope the energy of the European community, and bring down alike on the rulers and the country, the Divine blessing.

Let the Christian obligation to treat Caste as a thing which we can no more recognize than we can recognize the worship of Krishna, be plainly acknowledged. Let us educate in earnest: not, as hitherto, in a partial inadequate manner. Let our power be known and seen, for the assurance of the well affected, and the discouragement of the lawless and disobedient. Let us have cheap justice with a natural system of procedure, and a public administration of simple form and speedy action, including the development of the resources of the country; let the Christian Church give herself to the great task of evangelizing India with the energy of faith and hope; and the result will be, the establishment of British authority on firm foundations, and the gradual amelioration of the condition of the people, the overthrow of error, and spread of light and truth. Any other policy will end in speedy disappointment. God will not bless it; "the root will be rottenness and the blossom will fly up as dust." We may purpose to keep people in ignorance; we may discourage railways and trade; we may establish a military despotism; we may fetter the Press, patronize Caste, and discountenance Christian Missions. This policy has been avowed by Lord Ellenborough and others, and in a great measure it has been the traditionary Indian policy. But it cannot prosper. We may not discover precisely the spot where trouble will arise, but come it will, and at last we shall either lose the country, or be driven to govern it on Christian principles for the glory of God in its final conversion to Christianity.

Calcutta, January 12th 1858.

M. Wylie
Macleod

To H. C. T. Esq. late Govr. Genl's Agent & Com. Benares.

Carre Tucker

Dear Sir,

3 Upper Portland Place W

I beg to enclose herewith the Memo. which I had promised yesterday. I hope you will be kind enough to keep it quite secret, because if it falls into any other hand, it may do me a deal of harm, and throw me into scrape. You will find there, I dare say, many nonsensical thoughts, foolish ideas, harsh words, audacious sentences, and opinions quite contrary to yours; but you know, Sir, that I wrote it for Mr. ———, and from him I expect forgiveness for every fault except falsehood, which is unpardonable.—He was anxious to know my impression, and I wrote only to let him know it.

As to your question of yesterday's that "what is now to be done," it is difficult to answer without knowing the man through whom it is to be done. In this country much depends on the disposition and qualification of the person who is to do, than on the nature of the work to be done. In England you have only to pass good acts and draw good rules, and people will take upon themselves to see that they are worked in right way and for their benefit by the local authorities; but here the case is otherwise, the best regulations can be turned into a source of worst oppression by an unscrupulous and careless magistrate; and if you give us a good magistrate, he can keep us happy without any regulation at all: Panjab owes its happiness more to Sir J. Lawrence and Messrs. Montgomery and McLeod than to any system or regulation. Oudh was placed under the same system, but not under the same officers, and it did not succeed. Remove them from the Panjab and fill up their places by the gentlemen whom I name, none of them receive at present less

than 2,000 Rupees per mensem, and hang me, Sir, if Panjab does not go to pieces before the earth has completed its annual circuit, and another Guru Gobind Sing does not appear among the Sikhs before long. Colonel Sutherland asked the Government if they wanted the assistance of a Lakh of Rajputs, which he could easily furnish, at the time of the Cabul disaster, and now they cannot suppress the little Jodhpur rebellion without more European soldiers. I do not know how it is that General Outram—the acknowledged Hero of the "True Heroism," who reconciled the Bheels, could not keep Mán Sing to his faith; either he is changed or some inexplicable blunder has been committed. But does the Government know why the Azimgurh Regiment got suspicious, why it allowed the treasure to depart and then changed its mind and retook it; why the Palwárs became exasperated, and why they are now so desperately fighting; and a hundred other things—though appearing trifles but pregnant with mighty consequences—natives have naturally no moral courage to speak the truth, their religion allows them to speak lies, but at the same time, I am afraid, there are very few men in the world who are always prepared to hear and love the truth. A man may get Khilluts for speaking lies, but may lose his life if he speaks the truth.

The natives have lost confidence, and England is wrathful, the country will shortly be deluged with European soldiers, and the Government has already assumed the sternest tone possible, the disaffection will increase and the country will doubtless suffer. —Though for a time India may become again tranquil, like some Volcano to heave its sighs only in its bosom and burst again with redoubled fury.

Can a Government be considered safe or strong when its subjects are discontented and not happy?

I had many a time thought of the possibility of a mutiny in the army—a foreign European invasion and internal disaffection and combination. though I had never for a moment expected such a catastrophe in my lifetime. The first of these, however,

we have already borne, and it is the duty of the Government to provide against the latter.

If the Government are determined to irritate the people and turn every hand and heart desperately against them, I do not think that even three hundred thousand European soldiers will ever be able to keep India *quiet;* though fifty thousand of them are quite sufficient to turn it into a perfect desert.

But man proposes and God disposes; nothing yet is impossible; England may yet be able to send out some statesman, who would make the whole native population again a set of most loyal subjects by one stroke of his pen. Sir C. Napier a mere soldier when appointed Governor of Sindh was petitioned by the Balúchis against the officers shooting peacocks, his order was this: If officers will shoot peacocks, Balúchis will shoot officers; and Balúchis remained as loyal to him as English. He fought like a hero and he governed also like a hero. We do not want acts and legislators but a *just* and energetic man of an independent mind like the hero of Mianee.—Let a magistrate be dismissed for his notorious unpopularity with the people and the whole thing will mend of itself. Sir J. Lawrence would never promote a magistrate whom he knows to be unpopular with his people.

As for education I beg to inform you that it is my determined decision that if any thing is to benefit this country—people as well as the Government—it is education, I mean education carried on upon religious principles. Whether I live on the bounty of the Government or my private resources, whether I have large districts under me or only a few boys of my relations, I have made it the work of my life and hope assistance from above.

They may abolish education, the prospects of India may become gloomy for a time, but I am quite sure that it is all for its good and for the God's glory. When the Mahrattás devastated the country, no one could foresee that it would end in the establishment of such a beneficent Government as the British. Nor when the barbarians sacked Rome any one could foretell

that the death of that empire will give birth to so many noble powers who hold now Europe.

Though it is difficult to answer that question "what is now to be done?" but I may venture to say so much, that if any thing is to be done the first of all ought to be to let the people FEEL that Government will protect the innocent as certainly as they will punish the guilty, and no single innocent person will be allowed to suffer even if the safety of the empire be at stake; had this point been kept in view from the first, the revolt which was purely military would not have assumed such an aspect.

I have the honour to be,

Dear Sir,

Your most humble and obedt. Servant,

MEMO.

ON THE CAUSES

AND

REMEDIES OF THE REBELLION.

In the form of a Dialogue between an European and a Native.

European.—What do you think of the rebellion and its causes? do you think that Russians or Persians had any thing to do with it?

Native.—What a strange idea! How on earth the Russians and Persians could communicate and concert plans with such a vast number of natives, as they are, without the fact being brought to the notice of the Government. Had Russians or Persians any hand in the matter they would have marched their army by this time in Affghanistan. The Europeans never like to part with their own peculiar ideas—ideas formed in Europe—by which they want to govern this country, and decide every question howsoever grave or of whatsoever nature it may be—they see and know so little of the natives that it is no wonder if they have no notion of the ideas of the natives. They think that the natives will do the same here, what they would do in England.

E.—Did not those "Chapátees" mean something?

N.—They were mere "Chalawás" to stop the progress of some disease, as Captain Erskine wrote, and never a political move as many of your countrymen think.

E.—But surely the king of Dĕlhi is implicated in the matter.

N.—He may be—He is a king and he might have extended

his hand or his mind to grasp the kingdom. The wish to become an independent king is a natural one. But was it ever really in the power of the pauper king of Delhi to alienate the Bengal army from the British Government? If it was, could he get a better opportunity to realize his wishes than at the time of Cabul disaster or the Mudhki and Pheru Battles?

E.—But then was he not a passive observer of all this mischief which happened to us in Delhi?

N.—And what else he could be; but for that you cannot lay the cause of rebellion to his doors. He had no moral courage to risk his life in trying his best to stop the horrid cruelties perpetrated by the mutineers in the precincts of his palace and under his very eyes, and perhaps most likely the goddess Hope gave him a gleam at that time of the restoration of his lost empire, but I can never for a moment acknowledge him to be the cause or the original instigator and plotter of this rebellion.

E.—And are you then an advocate of the continuance of the pension to that miscreant?

N.—By no means—It was a folly from the first to allow him a place in the same Dewánkhás from which his forefathers had ruled an Empire—and to allow the Mahárájas to strike coins in his name up to this period. I do not object to pension, but he ought to have received it in Australia or New Zealand. To allow him to remain in Delhi was just as to allow a man to play with fire-arms in the powder Magazine. The sooner the name of Timur is now forgotten the better.

E.—But the Ex-King of Lucknow?

N.—And do you think Sir, seriously that a man would plot against the Government when his mother, brother and son are in England; a man who left voluntarily his own kingdom, and preferred to live as a common subject in the heart of Calcutta? It is possible that he began to stir himself when he heard of the disaffection of the army so as not to let this golden opportunity slip from his hand to retake his kingdom, or perhaps his courtiers

to show their zeal and anxiety, might have been trying since the first, one foolish act or the other to secure his restoration; but to alienate the whole Bengal army from the British Government, I think, was as much out of his power as to alienate that of Great Britain is out of mine?

E.—They say papers have been seized which throw great suspicions on the Ex-King of Oudh.

N.—That I do not know, but I have very little faith in the papers. They have not however yet been made public.

E.—Well then, what is the cause of this national rebellion and of the revolt of the people? The Government cannot find it, nor the people in England can find it.

N.—Nor they will ever find it, no one can see the defects of his own face with his own eyes. The Government have searched for the cause of the rebellion in the heavens and the earth, but never in themselves, or most likely having found it in themselves now, do not like to confess it. The gagging Act has perhaps been passed to prevent the discovery and leave the Home authorities in quite darkness about it. But please, Sir, do not call it a "national rebellion," it is a pure military revolt.

E.—But have not the villagers of many districts taken themselves to plunder and murder, and have not the Nawábs of Bareli and Fatahgarh and this vile Nanhá and treacherous Mansing raised the standard of rebellion against us?

N.—Yes; but only when they found the Government weak and without an army, in fact ceasing to exist. If there be no army, no police, in fact no Government in England, what will be the consequence? will there be no riot? will the people not act on the proverb "might is right," and will they not take law in their own hands? and here when the Government cannot control its own army, when they are let loose like so many wild wolves and the people are left at their mercy, what else can you expect from a people strongly suspicious of the intentions of the Government to take their caste. The Government, which though the best we can have, has made itself notoriously unpopular

again laid them down when they were ordered to do so by the commanding officer. The Bengal Army could not believe that a Regiment of Native Infantry will take up arms against the East India Company on any other ground less than the fear of losing caste, nor they could believe that the Government should acquiesce in losing such a fine Regiment unless they are determined to take the caste of the sepoys at whatever cost it may be. The Sowars in Meerut could not bear to see their comrades laid in irons for a fault which was rather a virtue or binding duty in their eyes. They released the other prisoners with their comrades only to create a confusion and facilitate their escape, and thus it became a signal for all the Regiments and Risalas to mutiny.

E. But why some of them waited so long and did not throw off the mask till so late as even September or October?

N.—I told you, Sir, that it was not a concerted plan. Many of them had till late hopes that the Government would feel fully satisfied by disbanding the Regiments already gone, but now they are daily convinced that the Government only waits the arrival of the European soldiers to annihilate and get rid of the Bengal army by disarming them or blowing them up by the cannons; it is out of my power to give you all the local causes or the blunders of the authorities which actuated each Regiment to rebel at its own way and its own time.

E.—But what on earth could induce the sepoys to murder their officers and the innocent women and children?

N.—Ay! that was the binding cord between the ringleaders and the whole Regiment, as soon as a few men consulted and agreed to rebel, they shot their officers to make the whole Regiment proclaimed by the Government as that of mutineers, and thereby secure the services of all their comrades without the least fear of any of them betraying their ringleaders and going over to the Government or dispersing and taking the road to their homes. Besides that to kill their officers, to plunder treasuries, and to burn Cutcherries, was in their opinion a sure

passport and the best certificate to procure them employment with much higher salaries in the services of the king of Delhi or Lucknow. The fools also thought it possible to exterminate the English race, and hoped that when there would be no English, the rájás will rise simultaneously and take possession of the country and engage their services on the highest salaries imaginable.

E.—You said "suspicious." I do not think the people have any reason to suspect the motives of the Government. The Government never wishes to interfere in the least way with their caste or prejudices, proclamations after proclamations have been issued to that effect and why the people do not read them?

N.—They read them, but do not believe them, simply because they find the acts of the Government contrary to their words. I know it is not the intention of the Government, yet the mischief is done, through the ignorance of their officers. Do you not, Sir, remember the row, which I hear, was made in Benares, the seat of Hindú religion, the resort of the pilgrims from the four quarters of India, at the time of introducing the messing system in the jail of Benares, and yet it was introduced. The people of the town met publicly and secretly to discuss the question, they insulted the magistrate openly and contemned the police, yet the system was introduced. The sowars were brought down from Sultanpoor and hundreds of the citizens of Benares were sent to jail. What would have been the consequence, had the same system been introduced at the time by the commanding officers in their regiments? nothing more or less than brought by these infernal cartridges. It is a fact worthy of being sifted by a historian. Was it not a straw to show the course of the wind? Yet the Government did not heed it. Hundreds of other acts, too numerous to relate, have been committed in this way by the officers of the Government which convinced the people beyond doubt that it was the intention of the Government to take their caste. Many of these acts were totally un-

called for, and without the least gain to the Government or anybody.

E.—And are you an advocate of re-establishment of the rites of "suttee" and infanticide?

N.—This is the way, Sir, that the Editors of the Newspapers blend the matters together. The abolishment of "Suttee" and Infanticide, was a deed in which even a boy clearly saw the advantage to be gained, without any loss to anybody, and every one applauded the Government, but in messing system and the works like that, no one can see what gain could be derived, except the loss of caste (if it can be called any gain), which is so dear and valuable to the natives.

E.— I thought from the first that it was very foolish in the Government to give even a pretence to the people to suspect its motive, as far as it was concerned with the interference in their religion: unbounded toleration to the Missionaries, unchecked distribution of religious tracts, indiscriminate zeal of many of the Government officers in promoting the cause of Missions and openly assisting the Missionaries, and the Government connection with the Missionary Schools, are no doubt much to be deplored.

N.—Here you and many of your countrymen, Sir, commit a serious mistake. No European can form, though they ought to form, a correct idea of the difference between the prejudices of caste and those of religion. Give a couple of Goldmohurs to a Pandit, and he will cheerfully compose a book in refutation of his own religion; but give him a glass of water, openly touched by you, even through the medium of a stick, hundred feet long, and he will not drink it, though you offer him a thousand Goldmohurs! I say "openly" because secretly perhaps he may not have objection to do any thing either to please you or satiate his own passions. Few nations on earth are so indifferent to religion as the Hindús are. Their religion has undergone mightier and more numerous changes than that of Europe. It is absurd to think that the English are hated by the Hindús on account

of their religion: for the Mahomedans believe the shortest way to go to Heaven, to be, to cut the throat of a Hindu, to demolish a sacred temple, or kill a cow in the day of "Id," yet they are worshipped by the Hindús. Look to Gházi Myán and a hundred other Pírs and Fakírs. The Mahomedans too do not hate the English solely for their religion, because the Bible is more honoured in the Korán than the Korán itself, and Moses and Jesus not less than Mahomed, yet their hatred towards Christians (the people of the book) is more inveterate than towards the idolatrous and Mushrik Hindús. If the English believe in the mission of Mahomed or the sacredness of the Vedas without any change in their manners, do you think that they would acquire any popularity among the natives? It is not religion but the want of religion which has brought so much evil to this country. The people know that the Government is a Christian one, let it act openly as a true Christian: the people will never feel themselves disappointed, they will only admire it. Who can detest "religion?" It is the order of their own 'Shástars' that every man is to revere his own religion. You may have a thousand Missionaries to preach, and another thousand as masters of the schools at the expense of the Government, or distribute a thousand Bibles at the hands of the Governor General. The people will not murmur out a single syllable, though they may laugh and jeer; but take care that you do not interfere with their caste, you do not force them to eat the food cooked by another in the jails; or thrust grease down their throats with the cartridges made by Europeans. I do not think such acts have any thing to do with the Christian religion.

E.—But would you like to perpetuate the system of caste which is such a great curse to India?

N.—By no means—But the teeth fall off themselves in old age though it is painful to extract them in youth. Difference of caste must vanish with many other offsprings of folly and ignorance when its proper time comes. To try to exterminate it now, must end in bloodshed.

E.—What bloodshed! the sooner such a nation is exterminated the better, the cruelties of Nánhá have made the Indians an everlasting stain on the human character, let them be gone and make room for a better race as you know the English are; to talk of civilization to natives is to throw pearls before swine.

N.—Are you, Sir, serious? Would you, Sir, exterminate a hundred and fifty millions of human beings, one-sixth of the population of the world; perhaps equal in number to them who were destroyed in the flood by the Almighty wrath, you cannot make them slaves even, and keep them under the yoke of servitude. The Moguls tried to do that for seven hundred years, but the moment they grew weak to hold their sceptre, the Marathás, the Játs and the Sikhs, whom they had never dreamt of before, sprung to wrest it from their hands, you may not even allow the natives to surpass the English, as long as they are English, in the science of war and especially in the practice of Artillery, but you cannot exclude from the pale of possibility a foreign invasion. I mean an invasion of some European power. In what a jeopardy will not the Government of India fall with a strong enemy out and a disaffected people in. Even if you exterminate the natives and colonize the country with your countrymen, it may become another America, another rival, and another source of trouble, nay a perfect thorn to Great Britain; but it can no longer remain the brightest gem in the British crown, or a garden—a granary—a purse to England. Sir, do not make of India what Turks have made of the Roman Empire; but be to them what Romans have been to you; they carried civilization wherever they went, but never interfered directly with the manners and customs of the people. The Jews enjoyed perfectly their own rights under their Roman masters.

E.—But your countrymen have refused civilization; I again say, we have thrown pearls before swine.

N.—But, Sir, pardon me, and tell me if you have ever tried to civilize them, have you ever done any thing for them purely in that respect? Take a Division, and let us see what you have

done for the civilization of its population. Take that of Benares for instance, one of the finest divisions in India, having a population of about ten millions of human beings, and yielding about a million of sterling pounds per annum to Government, it has been in the hands of the English since 1775, and now let us see what has been done to civilize the people who form a fifteenth part of those of India.

E.—Is there not a Government College in Benares, a magnificent College?

N.—Yes, there is one, but do you not know that the Rájá of Benares had paid a lakh of rupees for its establishment, and do you think that it can civilize ten millions of souls scattered over six districts, with such a scanty means of communication as this country possesses; but look to the adjoining division of Allahabad, almost equal to that of Benares, there you will not be able to point out even a school of any kind established by the Government.

E.—Surely, they have done something for the village schools, and the education of the mass of the people since the memorable Despatch of the Court of Directors.

N.—Yes, *since* that despatch; but what did they do during the last almost a whole century. Did they ever think of educating the sepoys? Could they not learn the Hindi alphabet in a month or two, and then spend their weary hours in reading useful and interesting books prepared for the purpose, and collecting a store of general information. Would they have thought for a moment of mutinying in this way, had they even a gleam of the resources of England? Would they have thought for a moment the cartridges as a means to get them converted to Christianity, had they possessed the least knowledge of the commonest principles of that religion? From the sepoys, and the people too, so grossly ignorant as to think Company Máí now too old a lady to hold the reins of Government, can you expect any thing else than the present confusion and havoc? I hope if ever a native corps is again to be raised, whether for police

or for the field, let it be raised on this condition that 4 annas per mensem will be deducted from the salary of each sepoy and one rupee from that of sowar, to defray towards the expenses of a Regimental School and library until he passes an examination in reading and writing Hindi alphabet fluently and correctly. Intelligent enemies are far less dangerous than the foolish and ignorant friends. Let them have a correct idea of the resources of England, a gleaming of the past history of India, a notion of the benefits which this country derives from its connection with England, and the knowledge of the kind of relation which the latter maintains with the former, even if their officers do that, I shall make myself responsible, if such a thing ever occurs again as it has now. The rise and fall of a nation depend on the kind of education it receives. The fate of a nation, at least for some generations, can be easily foretold by knowing the nature and the amount of education that it receives. Even now with all the despatches and orders of the Court only some thirty thousand rupees could be got from the Government for the Benares division, and with the full operation of the new Government educational system including the whole missionary and private institutions, only one boy in 48 of school-going age,* or one boy in four hundred souls of its inhabitants could be counted under tuition! Education cannot be expected to produce that effect, which is so desirable, until the Government does not attach to it that importance which is so undoubtedly due to its rank. Bonaparte perused and answered a college report from the field of battle; but our Governor-General cannot do that sometimes for years. All the zeal and labour of individuals are lost by the apathy shewn in the Head Quarters.

E.—But the people ought to look themselves after the education of their own children, ought they not? In England they have their own schools and pay for the education of their children.

N.—Here is the same error which you, Sir, so seriously commit

* In Prussia nine-tenths of *this portion* of the population is stated to be under instruction.

every where, you blend the ideas of England so confoundedly with this country, that it is very difficult for me to explain to you the wants of India. However, let me try it, first let us consider a few points in which the two countries so materially differ, and on the consideration of which points the Government ought to form its policy. The state of society in England, at the time of William the Conqueror, may be compared in many respects to some of the hilly and jungly parts of India. He having found himself sole master of the land by the right of conquest, divided it among his vassals like Maafee Jághirs in this country; the law of premogeniture secured perpetuity to a set of nobility who have in all ages been thought as pillars of state; and the income tax has brought high and low so equally under the burden that no one can complain or even pretend to have a complaint. The people tax themselves from year to year, or in other words pay only so much to the ministers that they think requisite to secure internal peace, and protect themselves from foreign invasion. The other works of general interest and public utility they take upon themselves, they meet, they consult, they subscribe and they act like true patriots for the benefit of their country. In fact, the king and ministers in England are nothing more than the servants of the people and responsible to them in every sense of the word, servant. Here in India the case is quite different. The Rájás and Bádshahs assumed the position of a father, that is master of person and property both, they left to their subjects, from the fruits of their labour, only as much as they thought proper to meet their individual wants and expenses. If any one of their subjects built a Serai or a bridge, or dug a well or a tank, it was only to perpetuate his own name and not to aggrandise the nation, for *that* the Rájás and Bádshahs only were to be looked at. They took from the Zemidárs as much as the latter could afford, they levied duties on merchandise as much as the commodities may not be driven out of market and whenever a servant of state amassed wealth beyond the limit assigned to him according to the caprice of these

self-elected "fathers," a portion of it was easily brought to the Royal Treasury under the name of Dand, or forced contribution; thus agriculture, trade and service, the three grand portals of income in the world, were all subjected to taxation; and the Rájás and Bádshahs did every thing which was required for the benefit of the country and the prosperity of the nation, they dug canals, they made roads, they built bridges, they established alm-houses, hospitals, and colleges. Hundreds and thousands of charitable institutions were established and hundreds and thousands of them received support in cash or rent free lands from the Emperors. The people thought this as their right and as a binding duty of their rulers. Whenever they failed to perform it satisfactorily and sunk in self-indulgence and luxury, the people groaned, complained and shook off the yoke of obedience; and so a kind of balance was always kept. You take more from the Zemindars (and I can prove it if you want) than the Rájás or Bádshahs took. The demand on account of land revenue in Bengal has, if my memory does not fail, more than doubled since the time of Alivardi Khan—you monopolize opium and salt—you sell stamps and levy fees—you give contracts for drugs and liquors—you collect chowkidaree, yet do not fulfil those fatherly duties for which the names of Rájás like Bhoja and Vikram, and the Bádshahs like Feroze and Akbar will long remain engraved on the memory of generations to come. The people of this country accustomed in this way to look to their rulers for the work of charity and public utility are quite astonished, and not a little annoyed to find the Government officers constantly begging for subscriptions on one pretence or the other. England sent an army to assist Turkey against Russia, the natives of India were made to subscribe for the Patriotic Fund. A Magistrate fancies to establish a hospital, the natives are called upon to subscribe; another comes and fancies to have a Ghat, the natives are called upon to subscribe—a third comes and fancies an Asylum or Dharamsálá, or library, or school, or tank, or well, or picture, or statue or any thing, and the people are called upon to subscribe.

Though the amount does not come very hard upon the subscribers, yet it being against the customs of this country is very obnoxious and unpalatable to the people, and lowers the Government in their estimation. Let the Government officers cease to have any thing to do with Chándás and subscriptions, and let the Government lay a crore of rupees or so per annum apart for charitable purposes.

E.—Bápre! where the money is to come from, the Government is already bankrupt.

N.—Thirty crores, which never came to the coffers of any Mogul, is quite sufficient to govern India, and if it does not suffice it is your fault, Sir, and not ours. Make sweeping reductions, reduce superfluous work, reduce superfluous establishments, and reduce extravagant expenditure and make people happy—the resources of the country are inexhaustible, with a little help the natives will be able to pay you even as much more as you want.

E.—Was it not our Government which abolished the transit duty—the people must be thankful at least for that.

N.—No one thinks about it—and in my opinion it was impolitic—the class which has directly gained by that is very small compared to that of agriculturist, and is composed entirely of bankers-merchants and shopkeepers. They are the wealthiest part of the population and best off under the British rule. They do not pay a single cowrie in the shape of taxation, and derive all the benefits of the best Government in the world; when the agriculturists groan overtaxed, these Mahájans fatten upon their ruin. I do not know how far it is possible to regulate and levy an income tax, but a moderate duty levied on all kinds of merchandise will not be felt by the people in this country, though if it is levied on just principles, it may be felt in England. But of whatever kind and of whatever amount the new tax may be deemed advisable for this country, let it be fixed in rate for *ever*, and let it have as its preliminary, a promise from Government that this is a final demand and no more will ever be asked

for. I know you will never approve this promise of "for ever," but remember that your ideas are formed in England where people have a voice in administration, a sure guarantee to protect their own interest and regulate the amount of taxation from year to year, as they find the calls of the state to meet with. But the natives of this country are still living under a despotic Government, cannot dare to open their mouth in the state affairs and find their refuge only in the word "Sudámad Ḳadím (law of precedence); once that barrier is broken and there is no limit to stop at, for the extortions of the Government. The people feel it. They argue it thus—"if the Government has passed an act to levy 5 per cent. on our income, what on earth can prevent it from passing another act the next year to augment it to 10—it may ultimately ruin us, so it is better as far as we can to oppose it now."

N.—No doubt the Government of India requires great reforms. Its fiscal, judicial and political—all administrations are based on false principles, it requires great statesmanship and genius to reform them—I hope the Parliament will take up the matter and do something for this country to which we owe so much.

N.—This is, Sir, another mistake of your countrymen, they take up every matter so elaborately and make it so grand that it becomes almost impracticable and useless. If they fancy it requires to give a code to the natives—they labor for years and years, and spend lakhs of rupees, and after all when the code is ready, they find it too difficult to be translated in Vernacular, and beyond the comprehension of the natives of this country. They never think for a moment, that first of all they ought to make themselves acquainted with the ideas of the natives for whom they have to legislate: when I told this to a gentleman—he said, "Keep your native ideas, we expect natives to imbibe *ours*." Just as if Jesus Christ instead of coming down in the form of a man and mixing with the humblest class and delivering the word of God in the language of the country, had waited in the heavens for men to go up and hear his lectures in the lan-

guage of Angels! Asia is a land of trifles, a word, a move, a courtesy, an insult, an hour's conversation, a letter, nay a look, decides here the fate of empires. Mahomed Sháh was brushing his teeth when Jay Sing went first to pay his respect after the death of his father, the king to have a fun tried to frighten the boy by taking hold of his both hands, and asking, "Well boy, how shall I treat you now?" Jay Sing answered unhesitatingly that, "O the refuge of the world, if a man takes hold of another's hand, he supports him through his life, when you have taken hold of both of mine what more have I to ask for," the king made him "Savái" that is one fourth more than the greatest Rájás of the time, and so he was called all along Jay Sing'Savái. You know, Sir, how much the British Government is obliged to the Maháráját of Patiálá for his valuable assistance in the Sutlej Campaign. He asked Lord Hardinge as a favor to give his Highness' hand in that of Colonel Mackeson then Agent Umbállá, the Lord did so immediately, but I hardly think that the Colonel ever understood its meaning. The Ladies and Gentlemen present at the Darbár were observed to smile at what they thought a mere piece of nonsense. Such is the land of Asia and such her people, whom you wish to govern by the laws and ideas of England. To expect reforms in revenue and judicial matters from Parliament is just to expect (don't laugh at me, Sir,) your dinner from the moon. To us it is of no consequence whether the Court remains or is abolished, whether the destinies of India remain in the hands of the Chairman of the Court, or the Colonial Secretary of the Queen, whether it is ruled by Mr. Mangles or V. Smith. We never take any interest in the discussions of Parliment, they show only how sadly the members are ignorant of the affairs of this country, they fight only for patronage and what is that to us, if in place of Grants and Colvins the country is deluged with Earls and Marquises. The natives may be delighted to hear the talk of having the sons and relations of Lords and Dukes as their magistrates, because they think Amírs of England must live somewhat in the

style of the Amírs of this country, namely, the Nawábs and the Rájás: will buy plenty of jewels for their ladies, employ many servants and give large Bakhsish. But they will feel themselves sadly disappointed when they find them, exceed in no other respect the present Hákimlogs, but in the ignorance of the country and its people. If the people of this country ever vote for the Queen, it will be only with an impression what they have of the difference between a king and a contractor in India. The king lavishes his wealth in gifts and khilluts and gives large Jágirs, when a contractor tries only to fill his own coffers. It was this false impression, or rather ignorance of English and England which took the Queen Mother of Lucknow to England, she thought that the Queen of England perhaps, taking compassion on a creature of her own class, and being pleased with a high valued present, may pass a word from her mouth to give back Oudh to Vagídalí Shah. Poor woman! she did not know that our gracious Queen has as little power to give an inch of land in this world as Janáb Áliya (the Queen of Oudh) has to give in the other. She perhaps had also calculated on procuring a recommendation of Pasha of Egypt in her way to England, and never thought that the recommendation of the Pasha of Egypt in such matters cannot be treated in England in any other respect than her recommendation in France to restore the house of Bourbons. If you intend seriously to reform the fiscal and judicial systems of India, why don't you have a run by dâk through the length and breadth of the country. See at each stage a Tahsíldár, and many respectable and intelligent Zamíndárs and Mahájans, but none of those who have the least imbibement of English ideas and talk over the matter with them; note down their hints and remarks, and in six months a man having a common sense can prepare codes which will fully supply the wants of these people. How strange it is that you do discuss such matters at the house of Lords for years and years, and never ask a question from the people of this country.

E.—When Government pass an act in this country do they not publish a draft in the Calcutta Gazette three months before?

N.—Yes, they do, but who reads it? except a few Bábus of Calcutta fit only to be employed as attorneys or teachers of Milton and Shakespear in England, they have become so imbued with English ideas and strangers to their own country, without getting rid of that want of true patriotism the wish of self-aggrandisement, and other defects so peculiar to an Asiatic, that they even think in English language, being unable to talk in their mother-tongue, are now teaching their wives English, they do not know the correct spellings of their Hindú names, and consequently have now adopted the mode of English short signatures as A. Ghose or B. Chackerbatty. They cannot walk without wearing high healed boots and puzzle the Hidustánees by offering them their hands to shake, who do not know what to do with that extended hand. The Gazettes are very expensive, and the mass of the people do not yet understand the object of publishing drafts; neither they are able to write petitions to Counsel about them. Why the judges are not ordered immediately on the receipt of a draft in the Gazette to convoke a meeting of the respectable natives in their districts, note down their remarks and opinions and send the paper up to Government?

E.—Have your Bengálís not formed a British India Association?

N.—Yes, but can India expect for a moment a reform from this Bengalí (par excellence called British India) Association. An Association which could not get any other person to represent its petition before the Parliament than an Englishman, an Association, the members of which shudder from putting their steps on board a steamer, though perhaps many of them would not hesitate to indulge themselves in beef and sherry.

E.—But tell me what has made the Government so unpopular with the people, what is the real cause of that?

N.—I can sum up the whole cause, or the real cause, in two words, namely, the reluctance of the English to *mix* with the

natives on equal and social terms. The Government did not become unpopular when officers like Tod and Malcolm, Augustus Brooke or Sir T. Munro were appointed to govern the country; reluctance in Englishmen to mix with the people increased with the increase of their power. Colonel Tod sat down for hours by the pallet of the Udaipur Ráná in his sickness to beguile his time by showing him pictures and mirrors; but in 1851, when the last native independent state, I mean the Punjab, had fallen in the hands of the British, and their power attained its zemith, a very renowned functionary invites one of the great Mahárájás to meet him from 12 miles and yet cannot spare of a few minutes to see him from his Cutcherry works. If the members of the Parliament were sincere well-wishers of their Indian possessions they would have made Tod's travels, and Rajasthan, as a text Book for the Indian Civil Service examination instead of History of Greece and Rome, where they could have found in almost the first page written "that no European can be an acceptable or useful functionary amongst the Hindus who is not familiar with their language, manners and institutions, and disposed to *mix* them upon equal and social terms." So the real cause of the unpopularity of the Government, and consequently of all the miseries under which the country labors is the reluctance of your countrymen to mix with the natives, because without mixing with the people they cannot acquire a thorough knowledge of their ideas, sentiments, notions, capabilities, social and moral conditions, internal economy, wants and prejudices, which is so necessary to govern successfully an empire, and through this ignorance and ignorance only, what a vast amount of money, labor, genius and energy is thrown away quite uselessly. The Government has become bankrupt, the people are oppressed and plundered by the very police which has been appointed to protect them. The debt cannot be recovered on account of the same laws which were passed to facilitate its recovery, the gentry and nobility are becoming daily scarce. The Zemindars had in my life time horses and elephants, have now become cultivators and plough

another's land, the Mahájans who could lend lakhs of rupees are now obliged to borrow in hundreds. The discontent and disaffection is spreading and increasing fast through the length and breadth of the country. The Government will feel no doubt stronger after the suppression of the mutiny than they ever were; if the hatred of their countrymen towards the natives increases in ratio to the increase of power as hitherto, the disaffection of the people and unpopularity of the Government, will increase also proportionally. The consequences are obvious and be assured the country will be ruined and desolated.

E.—But surely there are officers still in India who should eclipse the names of Tods and Malcolms.

N.—There are, Sir, but how few they are. It is owing to these few officers who come now and then to the lot of some districts that people have not yet despaired and risen in body against the Government.

E.—Look to the Punjab how admirably and energetically peace has been preserved there, and how contented the people are.

N.—Yes! but at the same time our North Western Provinces owe all this rebellion and anarchy to the very Punjab for which Sir J. Lawrence has so repeatedly been thanked.

E.—What you mean by this?

N.—Why, Sir, Lord Dalhousie annexed Punjab, but did not increase the European army—he poured the whole European army of the Bengal Presidency into the Punjab and took from Mr. Thomason, the best Civil officers that the North Western Provinces did possess. It is no wonder if peace has been preserved in the Punjab with such an amount of European soldiers and such a kind of Civilians untied with the acts of the Government or the Circulars and constructions of the Sudder Adawlut, but at the same time it is no wonder if the North Western Provinces are suffering proportionally for the absence of the very materials which helped Sir J. Lawrence in preserving peace in his satrapy. The great mistakes that I find in Lord Dalhousie's administration are first, his not increasing the European army,

and the 2nd, his converting the 5 per cents. to 4 per cent. loans. The plan of the Punjab did not succeed in Oude because an adequate number of European troops could not be spared for it—nor there was time or man to select officers for it, every thing was done in hurry and in a slovenly manner. Now the consequences are to be borne. The very peasants for whose protection as an ostensible pretension, the Government took the odium of annexing Oude, have raised their hands against the Government. The "*Friend of India*" wrote that 2 Companies would suffice to depose the king, and now three Regiments of European soldiers cannot restore order, such are the delusions of mankind at the time of success.

E.—But how is this rebellion now to be suppressed?

N.—Had proper care been taken at *first*, it had not given us so much trouble, but now *as it is*, and perhaps may be a little more troublesome, the rebellion must be suppressed with a strong hand, no mercy is to be shewn to the rebels, they must be hunted down like wild beasts wherever they go, even for years to come. The troops are coming from England and they ought to be poured in and pushed on as fast as practicable, let the man who has dared to oppose the British authority whether he is a King or a Mahárájá meet the extreme penalty of law. Let the people be convinced, by whatsoever means it may be possible, of the resources of England and the power of the English, but be careful that you, at the same time, convince the people of the cool and calm judgment and impartial justice of the British Government and the influence of the Christian religion. Do not condemn the whole nation if a handful of Badmáshes or certain delinquents disaffected for the loss of political power or the power of plunder, or suffering from the hands of the police and the Court officials, have raised the standard of rebellion, or your own army has mutinied against you through your mistakes. Do not hang an innocent man because the real culprit cannot be found, or the man possesses an immense wealth or a prodigious state or a large pension, or is obnoxious to the police or magis-

trate strike terror by all means, by hanging the guilty, but never alienate from you and irritate the people by punishing the innocent. If a man commits a crime, do not burn or plunder his whole village. Till a man is not proved guilty, do not let him feel that you are suspicious or have no trust in him. It is a time that the wants of the army must be supplied in carriage, &c., by force and impressment, but see that every thing is paid fairly and liberally. Delhi is taken and Lucknow relieved. Mánsing will soon be killed or arrested, and I am quite sure that before cold season is over the rebellion will be suppressed and order restored. However I deplore the fate of my country. It was a day when Lord Lake entered Delhi to save it from the depredations of the Marathás and to raise it to a first class city from a perfect desolation, and now it is a day after more than half a century that General Wilson enters it to massacre and plunder the innocent inhabitants indiscriminately, with the mutineers, and convert it from a first rate city of the British India to a "perfect desolation!"

E.—And what reforms would you propose immediately after the suppression of the rebellion?

N.—For that, Sir, do not ask me because you, Sir, want some elaborate logically deduced theoretical reform which is utterly beyond the conception of a native, we live in the lands of trifles, and the reforms which we want are also very trifling; but first of all, let us have a Royal commission. Unless India is so fortunate that Sir J. Lawrence is appointed Governor-General with the powers of the President of the Board of Control, or her own Council or the Court of Directors take it into their heads to select at once Commissioners from men who may be found even better than Sir John. The Commissioners must be experienced men, well acquainted with the languages of the country, not very old, active, sharp, stout and bold, who can bear the fatigues of long journey and are unreservedly disposed to mix with the people. They must not travel like the Governors-General to cut the Burs and Peepuls which give such a cool shade to the weary

traveller, to consume the wood, grass and earthen pots which take the poor peasants months to prepare and to fill the coffers of the Burkandázes who invariably pocket the price of all such things for themselves, nor remain shut up in the big tents surrounded by Secretaries like the Governor-General, nor content themselves merely with, or waste their much time in, inspecting the records, be prepared to travel by Dâk with one or two Secretaries through the length and breadth of the country and collect their information from the people, and the people only, corroborated of course by the records of the offices. They must not put up with the local authorities, for by so doing the people will be overawed to give any correct information; though the Commissioners must see and hear also the local authorities and have many references to adjust with them. The party which is against the Royal Commission, and wants to keep the public of England in perpetual darkness about this country, may object and say that such a commission will put the Indian Government in a great jeopardy, and the people will set at naught its authority, but ask them if the annual tours of the Commissioners of Revenue or the Governors put the magistrates in jeopardy and do the people set at naught their authority. All the other reforms must depend on the result of the enquiries of these Commissioners, but I can name a few subjects towards which the attention of the Commissioners may be drawn most prominently, viz.: 1st, reduction in expenditure by reducing superfluous works like hundreds of references and statements, innumerable appeals and huge appendages of law and Court formalities, by abolishing superfluous establishments and stopping the extravagancies of the Government. If I be allowed to see all the bills for one year which are submitted to the Auditor's office for the whole of India, I dare say I can suggest a reduction of at least of five crores of rupees per annum; 2nd, attaching greatest possible importance to the education of the mass of the people and appointing an educational Secretary to the Government of India, the education must be carried on a sounder principle, and religion must be

fostered. Don't turn India from idolatry to atheism; 3rd, centralizing authority in the district officers as they have done in the Punjab, I mean do away with judges. Make the magistrates, Deputy Commissioners, convert the Deputy Collectors into extra assistants. Those cases only where the punishment is to be hanging or transportation are to be tried by the Commissioners, the rest by the Deputy Commissioners; appeal of course lying to the Commissioner and his decision to be final, reduce the number of Commissioners, give them each a good personal assistant or Secretary, abolish the useless Board of Revenue and the burthensome Sudder Adawlut, give three or four more Secretaries to the Lieutenant Governors and the Chief Commissioners. Give them both more powers and give plenty of European assistants and native extra assistants to the Deputy Commissioners. Each Tahsil ought to have a European assistant. 4th. Stopping all the native newspapers. Let one and only one be issued in each presidency under the immediate superintendence and control of the Director of Public Instruction, if you go through the file of only Chashmaifaiz for the last year, you shall be surprized to find that the rebellion is yet so circumscribed. 5th. Preparation of very short and most simple codes for Civil, Criminal and Revenue cases. They ought to be published in all the languages and alphabets current in the country. 6th. Disallowing the Vakeels and Mukhtárs who are not lawyers but professional liars; had I been king I had made a lie as punishable as murder. Arbitration ought to be made compulsory in civil cases, but the arbitrators to be appointed by the parties themselves. 7th. Making the Cutcherries in the hearts of the cities and a little more respectable, so that the natives may not think it as a long journey or a Pluto's realm, but as a Government office, to enter which is, by no means, disgraceful. This cannot be done as long as the peons of the Court are allowed to treat insolently and disgracefully the persons who are compelled to attend the Court. Let the authorities treat the persons who go to them in the Cutcherries, and give them seats according to their ranks, as

they do in their houses. The custom of receiving visitors at home only has made the Cutcherries very contemptible, no one likes to go there as far as possible either as a plaintiff or a witness. Let the public officers furnish their Cutcherries with carpets and chairs and receive the visitors there as the natives receive in their Durbars; the objection which the respectable natives now have to go to the Cutcherries will soon vanish, and the cases with the parties themselves present with respectable witnesses without any Vakeel to advise them to speak nothing but falsehood, will soon be decided without much time and trouble, nearer to truth and generally speaking satisfactorily to the people, a little courtesy and the commonest attention on the part of the authorities will achieve wonders. 8th. Making a provision in your revenue code against the great Zamindars being reduced in a short time to mere cultivators and their lands passing in the hands of some Mahajan: at such a settled state of the country which it enjoys under the British Government, and when there is no fresh grant of land from the state, the law of division to infinity is very injurious to the existence of great Zamindars and nobility. 9th. Electing the Thanadars by the people like the Lord Mayor of London, though the power of dismissal is to remain with the magistrate. The appointments of the Tahsildars and Saristadars ought to be gazetted like those of Munsiffs. The Tahsildars should have powers of Munsiffs and Deputy Magistrates. 10th. Increasing number of European troops by 10 or 20 thousand; local corps must be raised in different localities, never confine them to one caste or to the inhabitants of one part of the country, never import foreigners like Africans, &c., more than necessary, otherwise men of India will starve for the want of employment, 4 or 5 officers are quite sufficient for a corps, but they must think it the work for life and set their whole heart and soul in their corps without the faintest hope of ever getting a civil employment, it is not the quantity but the quality of the officers which has been the cause of our losing the Bengal army, for as soon as an officer made himself a little acquainted with

the languages of the country and showed himself conspicuously and knew a little of the people he was drafted out for the Civil Service and the Regiment left in their hands of mere boys who if failed in other things did not fail in imitating the arrogance of the Civilians and treating their sepoys with the same contempt and hatred as the Jemadars and Thanadars and sometimes Mahárájás and Nawabs also are treated by their brother Hazúrs of the Civil Service. 11th. Having the keeper of Jail always a European to protect the prisoners from the tortures of the native Daroghas, I would never allow the prisoners to increase so much, and have recourse to fine and flogging—flogging is the best punishment, felt, as the wise Chinese say,—equally by every man of whatsoever position he may be. 12th. Giving free passage at least to 10 natives of this country selected by the different Governments through their Commissioners every year to go to England, arrange for the Hindús about water and cooking places in Egypt and the board steamers. This is a very important thing equal to 10 European Regiments. 13th. Making grain cheap, put a check on its exportation. 14th. Expediting railways and increasing facility of communication in the interior. But remember that to mix with the people and to make yourself perfectly acquainted with the country is of the *first importance*, without that, no reform can be of any use, and if you do that, you will never be wanting any hint or advise from the others. Let the Governors at the time of their tours examine the district officers like Mr. Thomason by putting a few pertinent questions in their knowledge of the country and the people and let their promotion depend on the amount of that knowledge and popularity with the people, and not with the amount of favoritism in certain quarters.

CALCUTTA:

PRINTED BY J. THOMAS, AT THE BAPTIST MISSION PRESS.

1858.

LETTERS

BRIEFLY DESCRIBING THE PROBABLE CAUSES OF THE

INDIAN OUTBREAK:

THE NECESSITY OF DEALING WITH IT WITH DISCRIMINATING SEVERITY; THE DANGER OF ATTEMPTING RECONSTRUCTION IN THE ABSENCE OF FULL INFORMATION; AND THE STILL GREATER PERIL OF RENDERING LEGISLATION FOR INDIA DEPENDENT ON ENGLISH POLITICAL AND PARTY FEELING.

BY AN

INDIAN OFFICER.

LIBRARY OF THE BOMBAY BRANCH OF THE ROYAL ASIATIC

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BOMBAY:
PRINTED AT L. M. D'SOUZA'S PRESS.

1858.

Letters published in the *Daily News* between October and December 1857, and now collected and dedicated to The Right Honble W. E. Gladstone, by an admirer of the public spirit and far seeing statesmanship which have directed his endeavours to arrest hurried legislation threatening as one of its consequences the gradual abandonment of that policy of toleration which is as essential to the maintenance, as it has been to the acquisition of our Indian Empire.

SUBJECTS.

1. Causes of the Outbreak.
2. Traditional Policy.
3. The Indian Press.
4. The Double Government.
5. The Annexation of Oude.
6. Causes of the Outbreak.
7. The Bengal Army.
8. European Settlers in India.
9. Treatment of the Mutineers.
10. Caste.
11. Educated Natives.
12. Religious Intolerance.
13. Compulsory Religious Tuition.
14. Progressive Policy.
15. Enquiry should precede radical change.
16. Objectionable tone of "the Times."

No. 1.

It is to be hoped that the English people may profit by the homily read them in the *Times* of Tuesday last, but it is yet more desirable that the real matter at present at issue should not be kept out of sight by bringing forward and discussing home reforms, which, however required, are so little likely of realisation within any reasonable period that they must be numbered among the things which practically have, and can have, no bearing whatever upon the Indian question. The people of this country require just now to be informed, not that their own social institutions and relations are susceptible of vast improvement, but how

govt. and progressive improvement will require some statesmanship and high moral courage. It is here that the press, properly directed, may afford invaluable assistance; and it is here that the free press of England may again prove its sources of information to be only equalled by its power of rendering that information available in the hands of the people for all purposes of national honour and advancement. It is well prominently to invite attention to the opinion lately expressed at a public meeting by Sir E. Bulwer Lytton, an opinion to the correctness of which, borne out by all already known, each succeeding month will assuredly furnish additional testimony. "Revolutions or revolts are never sudden; those which appear to us to have been so, had always given long previous, though it might be neglected, warnings. Revolts and revolutions are like the springing of mines—the ground must be hollowed, the barrels filled, the train laid, and the match fired, before we can be startled by the explosion; and, therefore, the man who tells us that a revolt which must have taken months, if not years, to organise, no prudence could have foreseen, or no energy prevented, simply asks us to believe that policy is an accident and government a farce." Passing from what has been to what is, look at the description of the public administration given by Dr. Duff, a portion of whose communication has just been published. If the value of evidence is at all deducible from the known character and ability of the person giving it, then assuredly should Dr. Duff's statement that Calcutta still groans under official incapacity, red tapeism, and want of foresight, command the anxious attention of the home authorities; and yet our present difficulties are merely military ones, which a few months hence will doubtless have disappeared, though only to give place to others immeasurably greater, for with the work of reconstruction will our real difficulties commence. And to whom is this to be entrusted? If for such a task long personal experience and thorough knowledge of India and its people are not just as requisite as any other qualifications, where and when can they be needed? Can the equal of Sir John Lawrence be found for a duty the perfunctory and inefficient performance of which must result in national calamity for which no amount of honest intention can offer any compensation whatever? If not, it will be for the government to explain, in the event of failure hereafter, whether against the appointment of Sir John Lawrence there was anything beyond the fact of his present prominent and honourable position being due to ability and exertion, and not to birth.

No. 2.

A Letter from Colonel Sykes, a director of the East India Company, published in the *Times* of Tuesday last, deserves something more than a passing notice, bringing, as it does, fairly to an issue a question which, according as it may be handled, is likely to be the bane or blessing of our Indian empire. On this question, which has reference to the means to be adopted for the spread of Christianity in India, opinions have always differed; but those in supreme authority, and responsible for the well government of India, have hitherto never wavered. They have always held that interference, whether for the purpose of extinguishing that which we deem a false religion, or for propagating that religion which we hold to be the only true one, must be scrupulously avoided; and to this line of policy has the British government, on more than one important occasion, solemnly and clearly pledged itself. This course has never received the sanction of a tolerably strong party, chiefly composed of men more remarkable for their piety and exemplary conduct than for a correct appreciation of the policy by which alone our gigantic and extraordinary empire in the East could have sprung up and can possibly be preserved. To the urgent and repeated representations of this party the government of the day have always listened with attention and respect, and they have from time to time conceded to these representations all that in safety and good faith could be conceded. There are, and there for some time past have been, visible indications of the re-agitation of this question with more energy than ever, and it is now argued that the soundness of the views hitherto rejected has been placed almost beyond the pale of controversy, certainly beyond that of doubt, by the recent horrible outbreak, which seems, for a time, to have deprived England of the power of calm reflection. But if there can be a period at which, more than at any other, those entrusted with the administration of India are bound rigidly to refrain from, and firmly to prevent, any deviation whatever from the traditionary policy of non-interference and perfect toleration in all matters of religion, it is assuredly the present. As yet the religious war cry has been raised by the Sepoys only, and even in their case we maintain, and with truth, that no just grounds of complaint have been afforded by the government. Are we going now to stultify ourselves, give the lie to all our assertions, and break through every engagement, by coming forward and proclaiming to India's millions that it is our deliberate intention to force upon them measures which, when thrown in our teeth by a mutinous army, we at once publicly and emphatically disclaimed? And should we be sufficiently blinded to make such an attempt, can it reasonably be sup-

posed that the reestablishment of our authority and of effective civil administration will be possible, or that the lives of Europeans will be safe away from the shelter of their guns and bayonets? It is singularly unfortunate that in a matter of such moment the *Times* should head rather than stem the movement. Its article of the 2nd instant must do immense mischief, and it is very remarkable that such an article, calculated in the highest degree to inflame the native mind and to embarrass the Indian authorities, should have appeared side by side with a condemnation, in no measured terms, of Mr. Disraeli's conduct in having, at a public meeting, expressed an opinion of the magnitude and nature of the difficulties to be faced and overcome, so exaggerated and ill-timed as to show "how the subjection of all a man's faculties to party spirit prevents him from rising to the level of patriotic feeling." The argument of the *Times* apparently admits of easy refutation, based as it is entirely on the erroneous assumption that the present outbreak has had its origin solely in religious feeling or prejudice, and that its magnitude could not have been exceeded, let our previous policy have been what it might. But that these premises are wholly incorrect, has nowhere been more fully and clearly exposed than in the columns of the *Times*, in which for weeks and weeks past it has been shown beyond doubt that the religious question has been merely put forward by the real authors of the outbreak, as one of the best means of winning over the native army, and that the outbreak itself has been mainly confined to the military classes, formidable enough under the existing circumstances, but as nothing when compared with that which must have been the case had the people of India risen against us. We have, owing to our own gross neglect and incredible blindness, permitted a military mutiny to be for a time successful, and to entail a series of the most loathsome atrocities; yet black as the picture has been, it has had its redeeming features. Not only have the people, generally speaking, remained quiet, but they have in very many instances afforded active assistance, and have saved many lives dear to those who are now instructed by the *Times* to insist upon the adoption of the very measures, to our consistent abstinence from which and to nothing else, we owe under Providence that we have not had to deal with the revolt of an empire. The *Times* thinks that "the one great fact protruding itself through all these horrors is that a century of 'traditionary policy' has not sufficed to preserve us from those very disasters against which it was designed to guard." If it has not, then may religious interference be recommended with some show of reason. But how really stands the question? Have our present difficulties been caused by religious into-

lerance? Certainly not. They are the inevitable results of having neglected the discipline of a large army of uneducated mercenaries, of having simultaneously deprived ourselves of the means of controlling it, and of having for months and for years obstinately refused to recognize any one of the constantly recurring symptons of the approach of the storm that has at last burst upon us unprepared and almost helpless for a time. Admitting for a moment our policy in matters of religion to have fulfilled the desire of the most zealous enthusiast, could it have averted the result of the administration (?) just described? Is it not, on the contrary, certain that it must have added immeasurably to the difficulty of a crisis, as it is sufficiently embarrassing? But in reality, the correctness of these views is in a great measure admitted by the *Times* itself, which tells us—"Above all, let it be known and felt that we hold India less by sufferance and more by strength. This very crisis will show how impotent is even the mightiest military insurrection againt the power of England, and a little more wisdom would have saved us from the miseries of the trial. The peril has been created, not by the presence of Christian missionaries, but the absence of Christian soldiers." To complete this sentence it should be added that the presence of Christian missionaries has hitherto been looked upon with indifference by the people of India, and has not been a bar to the administration of the empire, because, and only because, the neutrality of the government has been scrupulously preserved. Let those very missionaries who have hitherto commanded respect now go forth under the auspices of a government avowedly encouraging and supporting their efforts, and our troops would not in the present state of India, and until the condition of her masses shall have materially altered, suffice for their protection alone. It is, however, observable that the *Times*, as well as its several correspondents, have as yet dealt in generalities only. It has been broadly asserted that we have not done enough, that we are guilty of most serious and sinful omissions, and that our future policy must be a very altered one; but the precise matters with which we are to deal, and the precise method of their disposal, remain to be brought forward. When this may be done it will probably not be difficult to show that with regard to each and all of them our "traditionary policy" must be preserved if we mean to retain India. As Colonel Sykes has well and truly observed that traditionary policy has gained us an empire so vast and so valuable that the East India Company may be well "entitled to the last gratitude of their countrymen for such a marvellous result of their administration."

No 3.

Each succeeding week has more and more clearly demonstrated the folly of the measures regarding the press lately adopted in India, and that those measures have not merely been inoperative and ineffectual, but to a great extent productive of the very evil they were intended and expected to meet. That the native press has for years published matter generally objectionable and often seditious is undeniable ; but it seems at the present period of excitement to have been entirely overlooked that to suppress this channel of communication is, in India, simply to open others quite as effectual, entirely beyond the cognisance and control of the government, and possessing, therefore, every bad quality attributable to the press, while failing to render, as the press always rendered, the disseminated matter at least as accessible to the Government as to the people. Surely a great error has been committed here. With our intelligence department and our means of obtaining information notoriously defective, we have by our own act substituted for published sedition, the far more effective and dangerous intrigues of the newswriters and messengers, who at this moment are undoubtedly traversing India without our knowing, or possessing the means of knowing, anything whatever of their movements. The system which in India has always existed, and which the restrictions placed upon the press have called into full operation, has been well described in the *Spectator* of the 20th September last, and is capable of effecting more mischief than need be apprehended from the most ill-directed native press. But has not the native press been almost invited to become that for which it is now condemned, by the total absence of that supervision on the part of government which in common fairness and prudence ought to have been afforded? It might have been expected that with a press of this description in full operation, the Government would, at least, have kept themselves acquainted with the matter published. It is, however, now clear that they did nothing of the sort, and that their cognisance of the native press has been pretty much confined to its liberation twenty years ago, and to its present restriction. During the whole of the intermediate period the several Governments do not appear to have made any attempt whatever to improve the tone of the native press. They have encouraged schemes ending in failures innumerable ; they have written and received folio upon folio regarding the duty of enlightening and improving the morals of the people ; they have latterly attempted to set in motion a general system of education ; and their time has very lately been taken up in establishing Universities. Yet while thus employed they have

entirely neglected one of the most powerful means of improvement, have for years permitted its gross abuse, and now, in a moment of thorough alarm, expect to cure the deeply-seated disease by simple cautery. This is a policy which will, it is to be hoped, be of short duration.

Passing now to the English Press, how stands the question? It has been included in the general restriction; and with what results? Scarcely those expected, or, at any rate, desired by the framers of the measure. A spirit of opposition and feeling of dissatisfaction far stronger and more embarrassing than any previously existing have been excited, and for one objectionable article which would have appeared as matters at first stood, 20 now return to India strengthened by the comments of the English Press. There has been little gain here; and even had it been otherwise, and had it been possible completely to extinguish the expression of Indian opinion, the victory would have been an useless one so long as it left untouched the English press and English Publications. Probably, since the commencement of the outbreak, no single mail has left for India not conveying numerous papers and publications infringing the conditions on which the existence of an Indian newspaper is permitted. But even more to be deprecated is the folly of an enactment which the Authorities are not prepared to enforce. One main object in view avowedly was to prevent the publication of anything calculated to bring the Government or their officers into contempt; yet several weeks afterwards we find the *Madras Athenæum* thus commenting on a case of alleged official incompetency:—"We cannot, of course, comment on this affair, because it is impossible to commend the conduct of any of the parties who have had it before them for investigation, except the Sudr; and we have the fear of pains and penalties before us if we were to express any natural reflections which the affair suggests. We might be making the people dissatisfied with the administration of justice, as it prevails, and so be exciting disaffection—a course highly seditious and altogether indefensible, because it requires only a moment's reflection to convince any man of 'common sense' that it is not the mal-administration of justice which gives rise to discontent, or ought to; but its being known may lead to consequences which otherwise need not have been apprehended. Thus it is clear that not the acts of a government but the comments of a press are the real source of rebellion.—Q.E.D."

Remark here seems superfluous. How strangely, too, does the "warning" given to the *Friend of India* on account of an article expressing

a hope that a century hence India may be a Christian country, contrast with the unrestricted circulation throughout India of the *Times'* daily denunciation of our past religious policy, and daily recommendation that we should at once supersede it and publicly declare the "rule by sufferance" (the term applied to our policy hitherto) to have terminated, and to have been superseded by the "rule by strength." Apply to these discussions the opinion of the Government of India set forth in support of their late foolish and feeble measure: "The quarter of a century which has passed since the Press Law of 1835 was enacted has made a remarkable change in respect, not only of the number of native newspapers published, but also in the effect, direct and indirect, upon natives of matter published in the English papers. When the subject interests their passions they make little or no distinction between sentiments affecting them published by independent Englishmen in English papers and the sentiments of the English Governors of their country. Where their fears are excited or their feelings offended by such publication the hatred thereby excited turns upon the English Government." Perhaps the *Times*, which has defended the measure declared by the Government of India necessary on these grounds, would exempt from its operation its own opinions and articles. Let this, however, be as it may, the remedy for the evil complained of lies not in stifling comment and discussion, but in rectifying error and abuse, from whatever quarter and by whomsoever brought to light; in giving publicity to the intentions of Government and to the grounds on which their measures are based; and in adopting the means legitimately open to every Government of correcting mischievous misrepresentation and punishing seditious writing. It is absurd to suppose that the millions of India can be civilised and enlightened by some fireside process, and that all free discussion can be prevented until education shall have made them as able as their instructors to appreciate its real advantages, and as little likely to abuse them. This is clearly impossible. The transition state must necessarily be a troublesome one, requiring careful watching, judicious treatment, and able direction. Few will argue that it will be possible satisfactorily to govern the educated masses, and at the same time to withhold from them freedom of discussion and communication of thought, or that they will not be ready to suspect and denounce the most elaborate and carefully devised measure they can neither understand nor discuss. In this lies the whole question. It would have been well for India had her rulers paid more attention to the sound public axiom that there is no greater mistake than to assume that publicity is injurious, and that the governed classes of a country should be

kept systematically in the dark. Of the many mistakes committed, there are probably few which have contributed more than this one to the present wretched state of things. The wholesome policy of publicity has been, from first to last, systematically ignored, and too completely has the result verified the saying that what is unknown is always great applies with as much force to demerits as to merits. Year after year, moreover, has increasing publicity been allowed to nearly everything calculated to inflame and lead astray the native mind and to excite discontent among all the governed classes—Europeans not excepted,—in India. The people have been left to believe every omission intentional, and to attribute to deep and sinister design error really the offspring of ignorance alone; and Government have, as a matter of course, remained profoundly unconscious of the real effect and working of many of their most important measures, and of the real feelings of the people in regard to them. It were, however, incorrect to describe as secret the deliberations of the authorities, it being notorious that the minutes and opinions of the Government, and the orders of the Home Authorities, most carefully withheld from the public and the people interested, have always been accessible to those able and willing to induce Secretariat subordinates to betray their trust. Surely it may be hoped that the stupendous folly of all this will at length be recognised. Our Political Department has long been in these respects a by-word, but few would have believed it possible that it would be at length tested by the unchecked organisation and eventual breaking out of a vast conspiracy throughout the length and breadth of Hindostan. Assuredly, no amount of publicity could have produced anything at all equalling this. For the well-being of India, and for the credit of England, it is to be hoped that the restoration of order and authority will be followed, not by continuing to restrict the free discussion of public men and public measures, but by correcting the mistaken notion that publicity is injurious, by ceasing to keep the governed classes systematically in the dark, and by affording to those classes the means of appreciating, not merely the measures and intentions of their rulers, but also the crafty mis-statements of a large class seeking only to serve their own purposes at the expense of order and good government. As well observed by the *Saturday Review* (October 3,), "A free European press in India is a great safeguard. What we ought to do is to raise the character of that press. If government or private enterprise made it worth the while of really honest and able men to go out to manage the journals of India, they would make the best *haute police* which could possibly be invented."

No. 4.

A pamphlet recently published under the title of "India, the Revolt and the Home Government," has clearly placed before the public much useful information regarding the method of controlling the Indian Governments, and has shown how exceedingly rabid and senseless is in many respects the outcry attempted to be raised against the system under which, during the long period of a century, India has been saved from the political whirlpool into which in England everything is drawn, and from that jobbery which sufficiently disfigures and embarrasses our home administration, but would speedily render that of India impossible. Even as it is, parliamentary interference has of late years constituted about the greatest difficulty against which the Indian authorities have had to contend. It is not to be for a moment argued that Indian matters should be excluded from notice and consideration, but it is certain that, whether from the peculiar constitution of the House of Commons, or from any other cause, the notice and consideration heretofore accorded to them have in too many instances been as nearly as possible the precise reverse of that from which any beneficial results, or indeed anything but embarrassment, could accrue. Up to the commencement of the present outbreak the general indifference evinced in regard to everything Indian was equalled only by the ignorance prevailing on these matters, though both have always been exceeded by the self-sufficiency and positiveness of those who at various times, from motives assuredly anything but public ones, have succeeded in subjecting Acts of the Indian Government to Parliamentary scrutiny and interference. The scandalous history of some of these cases—that of Meer Jaffir Ali of Surat is a remarkable one—from the date of their being taken up in this country is sufficiently known, but not so the irremediable mischief thereby occasioned in India. Of all Tribunals the House of Commons is about the very last to which such appeals should be made, and there should be no appeal whatever in any political matter emanating from or approved by the Board of Control. The House of Commons may turn out a set of ministers, but cannot reverse important acts of the Indian Government without embarrassing and weakening it to an extent for which no benefit possibly derivable from Parliamentary interference can compensate in any degree whatever.

Many will stand aghast at the bare idea of such an unconstitutional doctrine; nevertheless, certain it is that at present, and for many years to come, to describe a measure or principle as constitutional and in accor-

dance with the spirit of British Institutions must be to declare it utterly inapplicable to India. Can it, in short, in the nature of things, be otherwise? Can any reasoning person suppose it possible that did the state and wants of India at all assimilate to those of our own country, we should be holding the empire as we are now doing? That there is much of the Indian administration susceptible of improvement, that there has been more or less error, and that there has been no small amount of neglect, all this may readily be conceded, and yet the remedy may be further from nothing than from any measure or measures emanating from those who make everything subservient to party views, the attainment of political power, the gratification of personal antipathy, or the instructions of a legal brief, and withal possessing no personal knowledge or experience whatever of matters thoroughly to understand and appreciate which without such knowledge is generally impossible. The remedy for nearly every one of the shortcomings of the Indian Government and of the errors which have been committed, is to be found not in Parliamentary interference, nor yet in the abolition of a court of qualified advisers of the Crown, but in the appointment to the highest Indian posts of the best qualified men, and in placing Indian affairs in the hands of one of the most able and experienced members of the Cabinet.

For years the supreme posts, military and civil, at the several Presidencies have been frequently filled by men whose unfitness has been notorious, sometimes scandalously so, and many of the appointments made by these men have, of course, been just what was to be expected, while the power nominally wielded by them has generally been contended for by their Councillors, Secretaries, and Staff, and exercised just as power always is under similar circumstances. And now to remedy the mischief to which all this has given rise, it is proposed not to place the responsibility and blame where alone they can properly rest,—upon the Minister of the Crown who made these appointments,—but to abolish the Court of Directors, who in many cases remonstrated against them. The trash talked and written regarding the Court of Directors is astonishing. They are called a commercial body, which they are not. They are said to have a personal interest in the affairs they administer, whereas they have not a fraction. They are described as possessing absolute power, the truth being that they can order nothing not concurred in by the Board of Control. They are charged with acts committed by that Board sometimes in spite of them. They are, on the one hand, denounced as infamous for having brought misgoverned native States within the civilising and Christian influence of British rule; and, on the other,

stigmatised as worse than heathens in having steadily opposed every obstacle to the propagation of Christianity in India. All this, and much more of a similar nature, has for some time past been put forward from various, many of them influential, quarters; and those who are in a position really to understand the enormous difficulties inseparable from the Indian question, may well view with dismay a state of things so calculated to render its satisfactory solution impossible. Inquiry would probably prove the heaviest charges justly preferable against the Court of Directors to be those of having acted as a shield to the unfitness of successive Presidents of the Board of Control, and of having failed sufficiently to assert their own views and to resist measures felt and understood by them to be wrong and inexpedient. Would abolishing altogether the power hitherto too feebly asserted tend to mend matters? Scarcely.

Nor is it more probable that to substitute for a separate Court an associated Council of men of Indian experience, would more efficiently assist, or more effectively restrain, the Minister. On the contrary, all analogy must tell us that such a Council would be still more likely than the Court, as at present constituted, to succumb to the influence and power of the Minister, and gradually to become imbued with that spirit of cabal and intrigue long ago pointed out by Burke as seldom, if ever, "united with a capacity of a sound and manly policy." That the East India Company, moreover, does possess considerable power is thus explained by the writer of the pamphlet already alluded to: "But is command over the purse nothing? Does the duty of initiating every despatch and every instruction to the Government involve no practical influence? And is the power of recalling a Governor-General so slight a matter that the party who possesses it may be called a sham? But besides these separate and distinct powers, the influence which knowledge and experience invariably exercise must remain with the Court, and it is notorious that on several occasions, to the credit of the Government be it said, the Board of Control have, upon the representations of the Court, reversed instructions upon which they originally insisted." The Writer then admits that in the transaction of business unnecessary delay takes place, and hints rather than asserts that this is attributable, not to the Court of Directors, but to the Board of Control. This, of course, is a point readily ascertainable by any member of Parliament who chooses to move for a return showing for some time past the date of receipt in Leadenhall-street of each Indian despatch, of its transmission to the Board, of its return therefrom, and of the orders finally sent out.

Another of the pamphleteer's statements deserves careful attention

and inquiry. He tells us that the measures against which so loud an outcry has been raised from certain not very disinterested quarters, have been specially those of the Minister, and that in other respects the Board of Control will be found to have been the "obstructive," the Court of Directors the "progressive" body. The following description of the effects to be anticipated from the Parliamentary advocacy of the assertions of every person desirious of upsetting the orders of the Indian Governments, correctly sets forth that which during some years past has taken place, and has contributed, directly or indirectly, to the present outbreak far more than the casual or inexperienced inquirer can believe possible :—"Is India ripe for it?—would the people comprehend it? A few agitators would understand it, and reap a harvest by the perpetual preparation of cases for the consideratron of the House. The native mind would be kept in a continual ferment; and the Government would be despised for its supposed impotence." This is not the occasion on which the opinions expressed in the pamphlet regarding the causes of the outbreak and the possibility of foreseeing and preventing it can be discussed. This is a subject which must hereafter be separately brought forward. One thing is certain—"If men of ability, activity, and wisdom had been appointed to the exalted positions of Commanders-in-Chief, the army might not have been in the state in which it is now found." And it will be necessary to ascertain whether "the Directors have been greatly disappointed at many of the appointments made, and have urged upon the Government the necessity of securing the services of men not only of experience, but in the strength and vigour of life." The gross unfitness of several officers appointed to these posts has been painfully notorious; and even at this time the scandal is permitted to exist. For this the East India Company are, apparently, in part, responsible, though they may not have been so for the original selection. The Indian outbreak is doubtless treaceable to the incredible folly which denuded the country of European troops while carrying out measures rendering the necessity of a greatly increased force self-evident. The explanation given on this point is most important, and if correct, while absolving the Court of Directors, proves that to her Majesty's Government are we indebted for the calamity which has overtaken us. The author states—"It is said, however, that precautionary measures were proposed by Lord Dalhousie in the shape of an additional European force to the Indian army, and that the proposition was pressed by Lord Canning and approved by the Court. Why it was not carried out remains to be explained; but it appeared by Mr. Vernon Smith's answer to General Evans's inquiry regarding an increase to the permanent European troops

of the East India Company that the Government objected to the increase." How this statement can be reconciled with that contained in paragraph 3 of the Government of India Despatch of the 19th May last, to be found at page 9 of the Blue-book, is not apparent. Parliamentary inquiry will by-and-by probably disclose the truth. For the present the subject of the double government may be dismissed with the well-expressed sentiment of the *Saturday Review* of the 3rd inst., that "the agreement of all rational men in resisting the attempt of sciolists to make the present emergency the occasion of revolutionising the entire frame of Indian Government must not be construed as a determination to protect a particular Corporation from justifiable interference," and that the East India Company "is at present a symbol for every form of polity which brings special and personal knowledge to bear on India as opposed to schemes for consigning it to the ignorant empiricism of political projectors; and in this sense the East India Company deserves the support of every man with a grain of common prudence in his composition."

No. 5.

The Oude Blue-book contains matter which those connected with the administration of India, and those desirous of controlling and improving that administration, will do well to master; affording, as it does, a most remarkable illustration of the one great error which for years past has pervaded our Indian policy, and has mainly, if not solely, given rise to that deeply seated feeling of distrust of our proceedings and detestation of our want of faith which, whether groundless or well-founded, are nevertheless entertained, not merely by the holders of native States, but equally by the inhabitants of British territory. This error is to be found in the system of half-measures and expediency which has been followed during the last forty years, and in the inconsistency, truckling concession, and quibbling which have characterised too many of our measures during that period.

While it would, on the one hand, be next to impossible to find a case in which more than in that of Oude, annexation became the imperative duty of the British Government, it would, on the other, be just as difficult to select any one in which the means taken to carry out a necessary measure have been more utterly unjustificable and objectionable. For present purposes it will suffice to go back as far as A.D. 1801, when the Governor-General, Lord Wellesley, considered interference necessary,

and forced upon the Nawab of Oude one of two measures placed before him. He was to cede his country (p. 200) "on condition of receiving a magnificent personal hereditary revenue, and retaining his titular rank;" or he was to cede a portion of it in lieu of subsidy and all other dues, expressly binding himself (p. 201) "to secure a just and good government to the people of the territory that remained to him, and always to consult with, and follow the advice of the British Government." The Nawab, of course, adopted the latter alternative, or rather it was forced upon him, for (p. 201) when all modes of persuading him to agree to it had failed, the Resident, acting with the Governor-General's authority, himself issued orders to the Nawab's officers in the districts required to be transferred, prohibiting them from remitting any more revenue to the Nawab's Government. Upon this extreme and open measure of compulsion, the Nawab, by way of saving his dignity, yielded and signed the treaty. Such was the document over which, in 1855, Governor-General, councillors, lawyers, secretaries, and residents, minuted and counterminuted, quibbled and quirked, quoted Vattel and quoted the Court of Directors, to establish and determine its real and precise force meaning, intent, scope, and power, having one and all previously made up their minds to assume the administration of the remaining half of the Oude territory.

The glaring inconsistency of the foregoing proceeding of Lord Wellesley has been exposed by Mill, the historian, who has pointed out that supposing the Nawab's Government to have been incorrigibly bad, it was unjustifiable to leave a great part of the country under such a Government, while supposing the Government not to have been of such a character, the forcible seizure of the rest of the country was just as little capable of justification, based, as it avowedly was, mainly on the ground of consideration for the people. The historian's concluding remark is worthy of every attention, comprising, as it does, in a single sentence, all that need, or profitably can, be urged in support of the introduction of British rule into misgoverned dependent native states:—"The truth ought never to be forgotten which the Governor-General here so eagerly brings forward, that the misery produced by those native Governments which the Company upholds, is misery produced by the Company, and sheds disgrace upon the British name." That Lord Wellesley never expected that the half of the territory which the treaty of 1801 left to the Nawab would be properly administered without the intervention of the British Government is certain, from his despatch to the Court of Directors, written nearly a year afterwards, in which he informed them (p. 219): "It is my intention, as soon as the state of public affairs may

admit, to prepare a detailed plan for the administration of the Vizier's dominions, founded on that which shall be established within the Ceded Provinces."

Lord Wellesley, however, quitted India without carrying out this intention. The treaty of 1801 was, in regard to any proper administration by the Nawab of the territory left to him, from first to last a dead letter. In 1812 the Governor-General drew (p. 154) attention to this. In 1813 another warning was given (p. 154). In 1819 the Nawab conferred on himself the title of King, and this was recognised (p. 213) by the Indian Government, though the state of Oude had been steadily becoming worse and worse, British troops having been (p. 154) constantly employed to uphold the authority thus abused. So things went on till 1826, when the Governor-General for a third time remonstrated. In 1831 a fourth remonstrance was made by the Governor-General, Lord W. Bentinck, who, with the approval of the home authorities, told the King that, failing reform, his country would be administered by British officers. This warning was as ineffectual as the previous ones. In 1837 the Government of India (p. 216) "set aside by force a son of the late King," and declared him illegitimate. In the same year a treaty amending that of 1801 was concluded by the Government of India with the King of Oude, but was shortly afterwards annulled by the home authorities—a fact never made known to the King, who, on the contrary, was informed (p. 239) that certain of its provisions "respecting an increased military force, would not be carried into effect." Besides this, the annulled treaty was "included in a volume of treaties which was published in 1845 by the authority of Government." (P. 239.) In 1845 an Oude frontier police was established, and ever afterwards most efficiently maintained—a fact "to be attributed to its being placed under British officers, independent of the Durbar, and under the immediate control of the Resident." (P. 31.) At the close of 1847, the Governor-General, at an interview held at Lucknow, addressed to the King a "solemn and final warning," and "a period of two years was allowed him to enter fully on the reform required at his hands."

During the succeeding seven years nothing was mended and nothing was interfered with, and so matters stood, when, on the 18th of June, 1855, Lord Dalhousie, after recapitulating the past history of the Oude State, recorded an opinion (p. 184), that the King should be required to abdicate, and to make over his territory to the British Government; or thus to make over the territory, retaining his royal title and position; or that his territory should be managed by the British Government for a time; or that it should be placed in the hands of the Resi-

dent, and carried on under his directions by officers of the King and of the British Government conjointly. The first plan the Governor-General rejected, on the score of the rulers of Oude having "ever been faithful and true in their adherence to the British power," and of having, to the best of their ability, aided that Power in the hour of its "utmost need." The third and fourth plans were likewise set aside as insufficient, and shown by experience elsewhere to be certain to fail. The second plan was recommended to be carried out, by declaring the treaty of 1801 at an end, and giving the King the option of signing a treaty to the desired effect, or of braving the consequences of the withdrawal of the British Resident and British Subsidiary Force. Lord Dalhousie's colleagues, while fully admitting the necessity of relieving Oude from its native administration, did not agree with the Governor-General in believing it either desirable or necessary to go through the farce of obtaining the King's consent thereto, or his signature to a document depriving himself of his territory; neither did they think it fair to the Oude people to incur the risk of leaving the country, for however short a time, deprived of the protection of British troops, and, consequently, exposed to evils greater than any yet inflicted on it. The home authorities, on receiving these opinions, authorised (pp. 235-6) the adoption of Lord Dalhousie's proposed measure only in the event of its being clear to the Resident that of the courses placed before him the King would be certain to reject that involving the withdrawal of all British troops. In the event of this being doubtful, the measure recommended by the Governor-General's colleagues was to be carried out. On receiving these orders the Government of India instructed the Resident, General Outram, to carry them into effect, by first of all (p. 238), "in order that the King may not be taken by surprise and that the unwelcome communication he is to receive may not appear to be made to him unnecessarily abrupt," rerquiring the attendance of the Minister, and promising him the favour and consideration of the British government in the event of his giving his hearty aid to the conclusion of the desired treaty, and by then requesting an audience of the King, intimating the decision arrived at, inviting him to sign the treaty, impressing upon him "the wisdom of submitting himself to inevitable necessity," urging the advantages of nominal title and of stipend derivable from a ready assent, giving him, if necessary, three days for consideration, but no more, and in the event of his objecting to the amount of annual stipend proposed for himself, adding thereto three lacs of rupees, "rather than lose the treaty" (p. 239). On the King's refusal to sign the treaty, the Resident was to

"proceed forthwith to assume the administration of Oude." He was further instructed, in the event of any allusion by the King to the treaty of 1837, to intimate its non-existence, owing to its annulment by the home authorities, and to express the "regret" of the Government of India that the communication of this fact to the court of Oude should have been neglected. The result of these proceedings was precisely that which ought to have been foreseen. The Resident was obliged to proclaim the incorporation of Oude into the British territories. The Minister so far from entering into the scheme and appreciating the pension and title offered to the King, at once declared (p. 280.) "that if the country was to be taken, there was little occasion to make any stipulation of the kind, and that the Government had the power to resume that which they had conferred." On the interview with the King the same thing took place. "His Majesty's brother exclaimed that there was no occasion for a treaty. His Majesty was no longer independent and in a position to be one of the contracting powers." (P. 288.) The King followed this up by placing "his turban in the hands of the Resident, declaring that now his titles, rank, and position were all gone, it was not for him to sign a treaty or to enter into any negotiation." On the 13th of February, 1856, the Resident communicated to the Government of India the refusal of the King to execute the desired treaty, and the measures adopted consequent on that refusal. At the same time General Outram stated that he had not offered to raise the stipend proposed for the King from twelve to fifteen lacs, the King having at no one of the interviews objected, or indeed alluded to the allowance. Convinced, therefore, that no offer of any sum of money would have induced the King to sign the treaty, "I thought it (wrote the Resident) unworthy of the Government whose representative I am to make any proposition to raise the proposed personal stipend by a lac or two per annum."

Thus was completed a measure based on grounds of policy and justice which may well be defended, but carried out in a manner and in a spirit which can scarcely be too severely condemned. The simple annexation of Oude on the ground of gross and continued misgovernment, in direct breach of treaty, would have been intelligible to all. To a number comparatively small it might have been distasteful, but to none could it have afforded the means of calling into question the fair and open dealing of the British Government with subordinate native states. If the annexation of Oude was necessary and justifiable on the highest grounds of public policy, it was surely far worse than useless to endeavour to extort from the King a written consent to the measure. What

must have been the impression created by the Governor-General's extraordinary anxiety to do nothing not authorised by a treaty (that of 1801) which had become null and void, interference at all having become justifiable owing to this and to this alone? But no such anxiety or scruples were displayed in respect to the treaty of 1837, and to the King's having been during the twenty years following allowed to believe it operative and in existence. This difficulty was disposed of by a simple expression of the "regret" of the Government of India, and so on up to the close of the affair. The desire to guard against the possible effect of too sudden an announcement of approaching dethronement on a prince allowed three days, and no more, to consider the propriety of ratifying the act under his own hand and seal, can scarcely have been estimated at any but its real value by a race proverbially intelligent in such matters. Nor can they have failed to contrast the delicacy of the inculcation that the first shock of the announcement should fall on the Minister, with the injunction immediately following, that the Resident should at the same time spare no endeavour, or promise of substantial benefit to win the Minister's thorough co-operation in carrying out the views of the British Government. And lastly, mark the result of the ill-considered attempt to bribe the King into affixing his signature by an annual payment of three lacs of rupees. The Resident's reply renders comment on this unnecessary. Such have been the errors allowed to difigure a great and salutary public measure which carried out on the one broad ground on which alone it was in reality determined on, would have commanded at any rate general respect, while it would have been intelligible to every native of India. That it had become imperative on the British Government is most clearly and fully established. To the miserable state of Oude Mr. Mill's remark had too long been painfully and disgracefully applicable, and thoroughly did it justify the home Government in stating (p. 233), when conveying their sanction to the annexation, "The doubt which is raised by a survey of these facts is not whether it is incumbent on us now to free ourselves from the responsibility of upholding such a government, but whether we have been excusable in not fulfilling that duty at an earlier period."

No. 6.

A speech made to his constituents by Mr. Willoughby, the member for Leominster, and also a Director of the East India Company, is taken exception to by the *Times* of the 20th inst., in an article open, apparently, in many respects to the very objection urged against the speech of Mr. Willoughby—that it does not sufficiently enlighten us in regard to the causes of the recent Indian outbreak. In both cases "the oracle has spoken, but oracularly." "The question which Mr. Willoughby fails to answer" is thus put by the *Times* : "Why did these troops rise themselves and make the gaol-birds join them?"—and the reply afforded is that "the proximate cause of the revolt was the general laxity and want of tone which marked the rule of the East India Company." Here is an assertion which may be very safely made, for it is one obviously impossible to meet with anything but a simple admission or denial. It perhaps merely means that the revolt took place because there was something wrong; but, after all, the material question remains as far from solution as ever, inasmuch as practically it is only of importance to determine the precise nature and extent of that something, and the parties justly responsible for it. How is the rule of the East India Company to be judged—Arbitrarily, or by comparison, or how? If by the second method can it be shown that any other of our governing bodies, with anything like the same difficulties and responsibilities to deal with, have managed better? According to the *Times*, India has been left to "functionaries, military and civil," and these have been "active, intelligent and zealous," yet, strange to say withal," the system has not been the less sluggish, stationary, and every day more unfitted to the condition of the country." It surely would have been well to specify at least one or two of the most remarkable instances in which such efficient agency has produced such miserable results. Indeed this information becomes more desirable as we go on, for immediately afterwards we find a catalogue of successes achieved by this Government of "general laxity and want of tone;" "the Mussulmans and the Hindoos have been governed as they were never governed before, —life and property have been made secure, inhuman laws abolished, infamous rites discouraged or suppressed. The few Asiatics who think, and have the materials of thinking rightly, will do the Company justice and even the people will naturally cling to the shelter of their rule." This is a satisfactory result, it will be said. That may be; but it is far from satisfying the *Times*, which considers it sufficient merely to prove that the system producing it "has had its day," because now "the

country is too vast, too completely subjected, and, we believe, too completely informed, for the old style of government to be safe." It would be exceedingly unsafe to venture to pronounce an opinion as to the correctness, or otherwise, of this excessively comprehensive and elastic sentence. What is "the old style of government?" How have the vastness, the complete subjection, and the complete information of the country, severally or in combination, rendered this old style unsafe? With what modifications and alterations is it convertible into a new and safe one? With these questions answered, the public may be relieved from the state of doubt or of blind belief, into one or the other of which they have necessarily been thrown, though even then not a few may demur to accepting the present state of India as evidence of its "complete subjection." A few lines further on, the Company, the author of the successful innovations just described, is blamed because it has not made innovations for the better. "Peace and a post-office have strengththened the natives against the Government because the Government has neglected to strengthen itself." Now all this is exceedingly puzzling, and the only clue afforded consists of the statement that "general weakness is the complaint under which East Indian Government is suffering; laxity of military discipline, confusion in the civil service, and pandering to idolatrous usages, are only the outward effects of the disease. To no one of these singly may we owe the mutiny, but we owe it to the system out of which they have grown during a long course of years." To what conclusions this extraordinary article may have brought the thousand and one readers of the *Times* it is impossible to say; indeed, it is scarcely an easier matter to conjecture what impression it was intended to convey. Let this, however, be as it may, an attempt shall be made to afford the information wanting, and to state clearly the causes to which the outbreak and its temporary success will, it is believed, prove on inquiry to have been mainly attributable. The proximate cause was unquestionably the presence of a bad and mutinous spirit in the Native Army, and the absence of the only means—European troops—of repressing and extinguishing it. So much is, of course, self-evident. How these two great dangers could possible co-exist, may well be asked. This, indeed, embraces the whole question. The explanation is to be found in the system, of which the following defects have long, some of them always, formed part and portion.

1. Inefficiency and want of experience at the Board of Control.

2. The appointment of grossly unfit men to the highest civil and military posts in India.

3. The encouragement given in England to appeal, agitation, and

intrigue against orders of the Indian Governments confirmed by the home authorities.

4. The defective constitution of the Governments of the minor Presidencies, sometimes still further weakened by the appointment of most unfit men as Councillors.

5. The appointment to, and retention in, divisional, brigade, and regimental commands of men notoriously and scandalously unfit.

6. Similar appointments in the civil branch of the administration, with the additional evil of constant change, often to suit private convenience and interest.

7. The absence of discipline, subordination, and effective control throughout the civil service.

8. Neglect of measures for the improvement of the native agency of the Government.

9. Long indifference to educational matters; followed by well-conceived measures so carried out as to have produced little else than a profuse and ill-directed public expenditure, and much dissatisfaction among the natives.

10. A judicial system as unexceptionable in theory as oppressive and corrupt in practice.

11. The absence of that intercourse between European and native public servants, and between the former and the people generally, essential to any real improvement in the administration and condition of the country.

12. A great want of consistency and intelligible firmness in the acts and orders of the Governments, which has created among the people generally, and the natives employed in and connected with the public service particularly, much distrust, and belief in the efficacy of intrigue.

Let the *Times* apply to the fair and full discussion of each and all of these matters the ability and information at its command, and more will have been done towards the future improvement and reformation of India than can for many years to come be possibly effected by direct interference with religion and social customs, which must yield to the influences of civilisation and education before they can be exchanged for a purer faith.

No. 7.

Great are the efforts now being made to persuade the public that the present wretched state of India is altogether and solely due to the one undeniable fact of our having created and kept up a large native army. Nobody is to blame, or if we must have a victim, it must be sought for amongst the founders of the empire. A remarkably comfortable doctrine this for practical men to swallow. To commence with the line of argument followed by a correspondent of the *Times*, who writes under the signature "Indophilus," and who tells us that our ancestors alone are responsible for the "constitution of the Bengal army," and for the construction of the "wonderful fabric of the British Indian Empire," but that "in the progress of events we are all accomplices." Without any inquiry regarding the precise meaning and force of this statement, or of the inferences assumed to be deducible therefrom, it will suffice to remark that the real question is whether we have or have not been guilty of neglect and folly not more fatal to the "constitution" of the army raised by our ancestors, than opposed to the principles and policy productive in their hands of such marvellous results. Have we maintained the discipline of that army, and have we continued to observe every precaution with regard to it originally deemed indispensable? It will probably be found that we have done neither of these things; and that simultaneous with the relaxation of discipline and the constant indications of a mutinous and dangerous spirit, has been our neglect of the means—European troops—of enforcing the one and resisting the other. Should this have really occurred, it must surely be a great waste of ability and valuable time to attempt, not to expose the system to which, and to which alone, the calamitous result is due, but to determine the precise act, error, or omission which immediately produced an explosion, sooner or later under such a system inevitable. Greased cartridges, or Mahomedan intrigue, or annexation, or all of these together, may have done it. Our present concern, however, is not with causes which always have been, and always must be, present, but with the system and state of things admitting, from these or any similar causes, of any such results as those with which we have now to deal. "Indophilus" has referred to the description given by a native officer of the 34th Regiment of the state of mind of the Sepoys on the night of the 5th February, 1857. It was, we are told, "a panic terror for their religion." Even supposing this to have been the whole and sole cause of disturbance, is it the more remarkable that such a feeling should have manifested itself, or that several thousand troops should thus have

assembled on their parade ground, their responsible superiors remaining up to the last in utter ignorance of their proceedings? Whether "Indophilus" is or is not correct in his assumption that "the manner in which the Bengal army has melted away is inconsistent with the hypothesis of a previously existing organised conspiracy," it can scarcely be argued that its having so melted to our destruction is consistent with the hypothesis of a sound system of administration. And in judging "how far the event itself was capable of being foreseen," those "whose utmost aim is the simple truth" will, it is to be hoped, eschewing the greased-cartridge and all other controversies calculated simply to mislead, steadily keep in view the main question, and inquire whether the dangerously defective condition of the native army has long been matter of notoriety, and whether, instead of any attempt having been made to remedy such a state of things, and to reform the system which gave birth to it, there has been gross neglect of even the precautions previously considered necessary. It requires little peculiarity or bias of mind to believe that the inevitable result of such proceedings "was capable of being foreseen." Much stress has been laid on the great alteration alleged to have gradually, but necessarily, taken place in the position formerly held by the European officers of native regiments. This assumption, even if correct, would go but a very little way towards accounting for what has occurred; but it is not correct. Inevitable changes and alterations there have been, but among those not one tending to disorganisation and mutiny. But other changes, anything but inevitable or necessary, have taken place, and these have mainly contributed to the catastrophe we are now deploring. These changes are traceable, not to the inferior, but to the superior grades of European officers. In former days officers commanding regiments, brigades, and divisions, were vested with considerable power, for the proper exercise of which they were responsible, such responsibility tending, no doubt, more than anything else, to promote the efficiency desired. Year by year, however, has a fatal change taken place, until the native army, gradually released from nearly every rule save a paper one, and even that too often notoriously faulty, has yielded to temptation and evil influence, to which from several serious defects in its own constitution it had become more than ever susceptible. The efficiency of the regimental officers has long admitted of great improvement, but this has arisen not from paucity of numbers, but from the incapacity and neglect of superiors highly paid to detect and rectify the very defects of which they themselves have proverbially too often constituted the most glaring examples. The inefficiency, physical

and intellectual, of many of the superior officers at the head of divisions, brigades, and regiments has for a length of time been matter of notorious scandal, and to suppose that under such a system regimental efficiency could have been preserved is simply absurd. Take the case of Colonel Wheler, recently made public. Is not its most remarkable feature not that such military incapacity and unfitness should have existed, but that in an army abounding in highly salaried offices of control and inspection, they should have so long been tolerated? Here lies the evil which has chiefly brought about the dissolution of the Bengal army, in which it had long been the practice not to remove an incapable from command, but to deprive the office of authority there, and there alone, capable of being properly exercised, and to transfer it to headquarters—in other words, to render commanding officers powerless, and to substitute for prompt and vigorous local action a system of interference and correspondence as ineffectual as vexatious and mischievous. During all this period the command and control of the army have been vested in men many of them quite unequal to the efficient administration of a perfect system, much less to the reform of one radically defective. The *Times* of the 24th inst., in discussing the cause of the recent outbreak, has not adverted to this one. Its existence has long been painfully notorious, though even now it may not, and perhaps never will be, officially established. It is to be hoped, however, that when the re-organisation of a native army (for one we shall assuredly continue to require) and the re-establishment of our authority shall come under deliberate discussion, the foregoing facts will receive the attention due to them, for certain it is that until inquiry shall have gone far beyond the greased cartridges and the many other matters of comparatively trivial importance to which public attention has hitherto been so much directed, there can be little prospect of any real reform or improvement, as until then there can be no possibility of a correct appreciation of the nature and extent of an evil pervading, as in this case, the civil just as much as the military branches of the Indian administration.

No. 8.

In the *Examiner* of Saturday last the Indian administration is found fault with, and the Court of Directors blamed in no measured terms, for having up to this time debarred Europeans from settling or holding land throughout the greater part of India. The whole of the premises on which the *Examiner's* censure is based are incorrect, the fact being precisely the reverse of the statement put forward. Up to 1833 no European could hold land in India; in that year the new charter enabled Europeans to hold land on lease, and all restrictions whatever were withdrawn by the following enactment, No. 4, passed by the Legislative Council of India on the 17th April, 1837:

1. It is hereby enacted that, after the 1st day of May next, is shall be lawful for any subject of his Majesty to acquire and hold in perpetuity, or for any term of years, property in land, or in any emoluments issuing out of land, in any part of the territories of the East India Company.

2. And it is hereby enacted that all rules which prescribe the manner in which such property as is aforesaid may now be acquired and held by natives of the said territories, shall extend to all persons who shall, under the authority of this act, acquire or hold such property.

No. 9.

Of the many important matters with which the Indian authorities have to deal, the measures to be taken towards the murderous rebels who six months ago composed the Bengal army, may justly claim precedence. It is not too much to say that on the manner in which these measures are conceived and carried out will greatly depend the future of our Indian Empire. Well will it be for England, for her children whose future lot will be cast in India, for India's millions, and for everything upon which their improvement and welfare depend, should the British nation adopt the wise and humane sentiments expressed in the *Times* of Wednesday last, the 28th inst., by "Indophilus"—a correspondent in whom official experience and ability are evidently combined with that practical knowledge of the condition and wants of India, in which Englishmen generally are necessarily deficient. "I have always been (says "Indophilus") opposed to wholesale and sanguinary punishment after the life-and-death struggle is over, but I distinctly place this warning on record, that if, relying upon our having crushed the head of

the insurrection, we indulge in indiscriminate mercy, our tenure of the country will be attended with such a degree of insecurity as will be intolerable both to ourselves and to the natives, and it must end in another and greater slaughter. All the mutineers and the perpetrators of the atrocities ought to be searched out by commissioners, acting on the anti-thuggee principle, and when the whole has been laid bare the offenders should be dealt with as righteousness and justice—which are inseparable from real mercy—demand."

As regards our own countrymen alone, fearful will be the responsibility incurred by any neglect of this warning, and still more frightful will be the consequences, albeit, perhaps, not in this generation. The visitation may descend on our children, or on our children's children, but that it must sooner or later do so, and with violence and horrors far surpassing those which have now curdled the blood of the nation, is certain, should due punishment not be meted out to every one of those who have been directly or indirectly engaged in, or criminally cognisant of the slaughter and torture of unoffending English men, women, and children. This, indeed, is far from a complete catalogue of their crimes. To them is chargeable the destruction of tens of thousands of innocent natives of India, whose wives and children, should they escape death, do so only to face ruin and starvation; to them is chargeable much of the fearful slaughter which, with an army of European soldiers excited to frenzy, cannot be prevented; and to them is chargeable the hatred and distrust between the Europeans and the natives, engendered by that which has taken place, and certain for some time to constitute one of the greatest difficulties of our future administration. Should those who have causelessly brought upon an empire calamities such as these escape punishment the most exemplary? Does not every principle of Christianity and of civilisation proclaim retribution here to be a sacred duty to ourselves, to the millions placed by Providence under our control, and to all posterity? A great deal has been put forth regarding the impropriety and folly of indiscriminate punishment. No sensible man will for a moment question this doctrine. Here, however, it is irrelevant and inapplicable. To whom is due the indiscriminate slaughter by European troops, which, deplorable as it is, cannot for a time be prevented? But neither here nor elsewhere is indiscriminate punishment desired or recommended. It is about the last thing calculated to secure that which ought to be the object of all our efforts and measures—security for the future. It is indiscriminate mercy against which the public voice should be raised, and, to be effectual, should be

raised sternly and at once; it is this against which "Indophilus" has protested; it is this with which India is threatened by those entrusted with the supreme local authority; and it is this which, if not checked and prevented, must render future murders and massacres, and perhaps the disruption of the empire itself, merely a question of time. The change which four short months has effected in India can be fully appreciated only by those Europeans whose lot has for many years past been cast in a country throughout the length and breadth of which the person of an Englishman, and much more so that of an Englishwoman or an English child, has heretofore been sacred. It is for the sake of India that this should be so, for on no other condition can its government be possible, or can it be other than one vast field of anarchy and bloodshed. If British rule is to be maintained at all, this prestige must be vindicated in a manner and placed on a footing, intelligible not merely to Europeans, nor yet to the better and more cultivated of the natives of India—to these the necessity is self-evident; but it is with millions of semi-barbarians that we have really to deal, and these, to a man, are able to recognise in mercy to the mutineers no motive save that of fear, or a recognition of the justice of the grounds on which our own men, women, and children by hundreds, and those of India by thousands, have been slain, maltreated, or ruined. It must also be borne in mind that of the mutineers who have already reached their homes, or may hereafter escape to them, there can be few not in the possession of plunder obtained solely by means of the crimes committed. Neither Indian experience nor any extraordinary amount of knowledge can be required to understand the effect of this hereafter in remote districts, and on an ignorant people, should the recollection of the ease and affluence thus acquired carry with it only the knowledge that they were gained by a general slaughter of the Europeans, most of those concerned in which the British Government was afraid, unable, or unwilling to bring to justice.

Should there be truth in the several statements made in the public prints, and in private letters, regarding measures of the most fatal and culpable leniency in contemplation, and even already partially carried out at Calcutta, those in England vested with the power of control cannot too speedily denounce such proceedings in terms, and in a manner not to be mistaken. In good time has "Indophilus" raised the warning voice of experience. With such tremendous interests at stake, it should be the nation's care that he has not done so in vain.

No. 10.

In a letter from "One who knows India," published in your issue of the 31st ultimo, the Bombay Government are asserted to have in educational matters "pampered" caste just as much as it has been pampered in the Bengal army, and to have "emulated the miserable policy of the Indian Government in yielding to its absurd demands." A more erroneous statement could scarcely have been put forward. "Nothing (says your correspondent) but unmixed evil can result from the encouragement of caste." This nobody questions, but it is equally certain that nothing but failure still more disastrous can result from any attempt prematurely to interfere with caste, or to force upon the natives of India measures for which the way has yet to be paved. The difference of opinion between your correspondent and the Bombay Government is this. He holds that at all risks and at every hazard, State interference with caste should precede education. They have wisely determined that education should first of all be encouraged and diffused, well aware that to its enlightening and civilising influence must, of necessity, be mainly left the removal of a great social evil, certain to be immeasurably increased by any coercion which the Christian Government of Great Britain could for a moment dream of applying. Over the greater part of India, caste is religion and religion is caste. With this staring them in the face in every direction, criminal indeed would be the Government, if it allowed itself to be influenced by any persons, or class of persons, urging, with whatever sincerity and earnestness, views utterly opposed to every requirement of State policy and common sense. If the persuasions of your correspondent were frankly and plainly rendered, they would be couched in these words.—"Trample on the religion of the miscreant Mahomedans and Hindoos." But first, let any man out of Bedlam try the experiment of treading on hot ploughshares—for trampling on the faith of a couple of hundred millions of people is not more feasible, and the ordeal is not made more easy by the hideousness and perversity of the religion.

"England of course believes, in her simplicity, that all the people of India are welcome, and more than welcome, to the Government schools, but such is not the case." This sentence is calculated seriously to mislead. As regards the Government such is the case. The Government have been as desirous as "One who knows India" can be that all should be welcome; but with the people it is otherwise. They are just as willing to associate at school or elsewhere with "Mhars and similar classes" as Eton boys would be to admit hangmen and nightmen (these are the

corresponding classes here) to their forms, and yet such toleration in this country might be upheld as consistent with the Christian's first duty—charity—while in India it would be not more repugnant to the feelings and social habits of the people than to their religion, according to which it is strictly prohibited and penal. Because the missionary schools already contain "a fair proportion of the very highest castes mingling, if not very heartily (abhorrently ?), yet at all events mingling with the very lowest," Government have, it is assumed, been guilty of great folly in not exercising equal compulsion in every State school and educational institution. For the Christian Government of Hindostan to ensure to the Christian missionary all protection in the exercise of his noble vocation is one thing; for such a Government to attempt to exercise missionary calling is, however, quite another. That which to the missionary must be a sacred duty, may in a Government be a crime, the consequences of which would assuredly leave neither to Government nor to missionary any field for future exertion. It is astonishing how completely this is ignored or lost sight of by those who in their eagerness to diffuse the blessings of Christianity, incessantly urge upon the Government measures calculated from their intolerance to defeat, nay to render absolutely unattainable, the object in view. This remark is to nothing more applicable than to the proposal recently put forward, to deny admission to the Government schools to every native of India not consenting to receive tuition in the Scriptures.

Is "One who knows India" aware that at Poona, one of the largest towns in the Western Presidency, several educated and high-minded natives (Brahmins and others) have for some years past been engaged in endeavours to impart instruction to children of the lowest castes, and that their success has been practically *nil*, owing not to active opposition from any quarter, for there has been none; not to want of encouragement from Europeans and educated natives, for these have come forward; nor yet to lukewarmness on the part of the Government, for the Government have afforded direct pecuniary assistance; but to the impossibility of effecting at present a change, not merely opposed to the general feeling of the country and the customs of the community at large, but utterly beyond the appreciation even of the class sought to be raised from a condition which they are not able to entertain the idea of quitting.

"The elevation of the lower castes of India" is doubtless one of the duties of the Government. "Christianity demands it—humanity demands it—for the sake of those who are deaf to such considerations, it may be added, policy demands it." All this may be conceded to "One

who knows India;" but for the sake of those who are not deaf to any one of these considerations, it must be added that common sense, which is inseparable from all true Christianity, all real humanity, and all sound policy, renders it imperative on the Government rigidly to abstain from, and firmly to repress everything calculated to render the fulfilment of that duty impossible.

No. 11.

In the excellent letter from "Indophilus" advocating a free press in India, published in the *Times* of the 9th inst., occurs the following passage: "Our ancestors did not more sincerly deprecate the removal of that (the Roman) power, under the shadow of which they were learning to take their place with safety and credit among the nations of the earth, than those natives of India who have had their minds open to our civilisation would be filled with dismay at the prospect of the destruction of our Government. No class has more uniformly stood by us in these troubles than the Anglicised Bengalees, and other natives; and well they might, for they could expect no mercy from a pure Brahminical or Mahomedan *régime*."

Right well is the opinion of "Indophilus" borne out by the sentiments expressed in the subjoined extracts from letters received by the last mail from two natives (Hindoos) who have received a sound English education, and who are both men of more than ordinary intelligence and ability. The one says—"All intelligent educated patriots are weeping over the direful calamities which the rebellion has produced. A lac (100,000) of innocent widows and orphans starving and without homes; the hundreds of innocent men murdered every day by the soldiery; the burnt villages; the destroyed memorable edifices; the deep shock to the silent progress of civilisation and to the cause of education; the deep hatred and distrust planted between the all-powerful governors and the weak poor governed—all this makes a picture miserable enough for them to contemplate."

And the other thus expresses himself—"I continued that I had made every inquiry and found that the kind of speeches (seditious) alluded to in the newspaper were never uttered within the library (an English library subscribed to and attended by natives) walls; that those who attended the library were far too educated to express any admiration for Nana Sahib's rule; and that it was not even their interest that British rule should cease to exist in India, for then men who had cast

away all prejudices would be looked upon by Nana Sahib and his party as so many renegades and apostates whom it was their duty to exterminate. I had prepared a pretty long speech calculated to show how unreasonable it was to suspect that the sympathies of the really educated natives would be with Nana Sahib. B— D— spoke something, B—, too ; all in the same strain."

No. 12.

To suppose that the extraordinary and objectionable proposals for Christianising India, which have within the last few weeks been made public in this country, can fail to exite the utmost alarm and hatred throughout India, is to suppose that the natives of India either remain profoundly ignorant of everything emanating from the English Press, or else set it down as meaningless, worthless, and powerless. They do however neither of these things. How keenly alive they are to statements made in the public prints has been strongly impressed upon the Home authorities by the Government of India in their despatch explaining the grounds upon which interference with the Indian Press was lately deemed necessary. "The quarter of a century(say the Government of India) which has passed since the Press Law of 1835 was enacted, has made a remarkable change, in respect not only of the number of native newspapers published, but also in the effect, direct and indirect, upon natives of matter published in the English papers. When the subject interests their passions they make little or no distinction between sentiments affecting them published by independent Englishmen in English papers, and the sentiments of the English governors of their country. When their fears are excited or their feelings offended by such publication, the hatred thereby excited turns upon the English Government."

On the subject of Christianity in India the *Times* has, since the commencement of the Indian outbreak, published much which must have had the worst effect upon the natives of that country. But the mischief, as might have been expected, has not ceased here. The outcry has continued to increase, has spread, and has at length actually found expression in the person of one of her Majesty's Under-Secretaries of State. On the 11th inst. a letter singned "S. G. O." appeared in the *Times*, containing the following remarkable passage—"The Christian mind of England declares the religion of Christ shall be developed

in all its entirety, no matter the millions whose prejudices it may shock; no heed is to be given to the storms which will surely beat about that great eastern mission." The effect of such writing as this upon the native mind remains to develop itself. But the *Times*, and the *Times* correspondent equally give way to the Government official, Mr. Massey, whose speech to his constituents, at Salford, has been reported in the *Times* of the 14th instant. Mr. Massey warned his audience that "he was going to make a proposition which would perhaps startle them," and well indeed it might, though were they the only persons likely to be startled, little more need be said. But it is otherwise. A month hence the speech will startle the natives of India, and will leave upon their minds impressions which fifty Government proclamations will neither efface nor weaken. They have now to learn that a high official of the English Government has emphatically warned Englishmen not to "abuse that precious word toleration by applying it or admitting it to be applicable to the religion or the religious liberties" of India; has proclaimed his belief that toleration can and should be extended only to "all sects and denominations of Christians who believe in the one mediation:" and has denounced the toleration hereafore practised and pledged solemnly and repeatedly by the Government of India and of Great Britain, as having "had the effect of retarding the ascendancy of the British name."

The Minister of State for India, through the Court of Directors, on the 8th July last thus instructed the Indian Government: "It is peculiarly our duty to take the first opportunity of adopting as our own both the purport and the tone of your proclamation of May 16, repelling, in a manner calculated to impress even the most prejudiced, the imputation, so completely at variance with the whole tenor of our past administration of British India, that the British Government entertain hostile designs against the religious feelings or practices of the people. We cannot but anticipate the most salutary effect from this proclamation, and from the terms in which it was made." It now remains for her Majesty's Government to consider in how far their acts and intentions can be other than compromised and nullified by language such as that of Mr. Massey, and whether the mischief which the whole of the Indian press has been supposed capable of effecting can be equalled by that inevitably arising from the dissemination of sentiments such as those which the next mail will convey to friends as well as to foes in India.

No. 13

In a letter published in the *Times* of the 27th ultimo, Mr. J. F. Thomas, formerly a member of the Madras Government, strongly advocates compulsory instruction in the Scriptures in all Government schools in India. We must either, Mr. Thomas is of opinion, do this, or else, as the only alternative, practically disavow and deny our faith, and place it in abeyance, at the pleasure of Hindoo or Mahomedan. Those entrusted with the control of the Indian administration have, up to the present time, simply prohibited any act or order on the part of Indian Government calculated or intended in effect to force any one, whether Christian or Hindoo, to disavow or deny his religious faith, or place it in abeyance at any person's bidding or pleasure. That in thus acting, British statesmen have either disavowed or placed in abeyance their own, will scarcely be apparent to any who believe forcible proselytism not less repugnant than Hindooism to the tenets of the Christian religion.

In the United Kingdom, "the Bible, owing to the differences of our various sects," cannot be introduced in every State school. This Mr. Thomas approves and considers toleration, but yet recommends that in our Eastern empire, in every one of these institutions, the Bible should be introduced, in defiance not of mere sectarian differences, but of differences of religion and creed irreconcileably hostile. We are at the close of a century in the possession of an enormous empire, containing nearly two hundred millions of people, to whom we have, over and over again, pledged our faith to abstain from attempting anything like forcible religious conversion, and this pledge we have kept—secular education we have promised, and are commencing to afford them, believing it to be the best, indeed, humanly speaking, the only means of undermining barbarous superstitions and social customs, which must give way before the native mind can be prepared to receive, willingly and on conviction, any purer faith. We have at the same time demanded and exacted from the natives of India toleration of Christian missionaries, and of all other persons not employed by the state, desirous of endeavouring to propagate the Christian religion by the only means that religion recognises. So at present the case stands. Such has been our policy hitherto; such, indeed, is the "traditional policy," described by Mr. Thomas as "the product of the irreligion and laxity of morals of a former generation," but really the offspring of common sense and obvious necessity regulated by Christian principles. Now, however, Mr.

Thomas, and those who think with him, demand the abandonment of this policy; the *Times* has denounced it as "cowardly," and has inculcated (October 9) the substitution of the "rule by strength," for the "rule by sufferance;" and Mr. Thomas now argues that the millions of India require "moral training;" that this is to be found only in the Bible of the Protestant Christian; and that, therefore, the Bible, or, in other words, the Protestant faith, should be forced upon the acceptance of every native of India desirous of obtaining that secular instruction, which the State is bound and pledged to afford, and of enjoying at the same time that religious toleration which the State is equally pledged to secure.

Mr. Thomas believes "it to be capable of demonstration, as well as proved by the statistics of the attendance of heathen at mission schools, that the great mass of the general population entertain no insuperable objection to be taught in the Scripture." This, if correct, can prove no more than the absence of any insuperable objection, so long as Government refrain from anything approaching to coercion or compulsion. The existing state of things is not, however, completely stated. The omission has been supplied by Mr. Hodgson Pratt, one of the chief educational officers of the Indian Government, in a letter recently addressed to the Rev. J. Scott Porter, of Belfast, in a portion of which, published in the *Daily News* of the 27th October, it is explained: "The only natives who send their children to missionary schools are those who cannot afford to pay school fees. No man who is tolerably well off will send his child to a missionary school, and I have scores of times been applied to (unsuccessfully) by the sons of poor men for a small allowance, to save them from the hardship of attending the missionary school, and to enable them to go to the Government institution instead." It remains to be stated that the scholars who in the mission school are obliged to receive scriptural instruction, leave them, with rare exceptions, really just as far from Christianity as those brought up and educated in the Government institutions and elsewhere.

It is supposed by Mr. Thomas that "the unsophisticated Brahmin youth from the provinces" would read the scriptures in the Government schools with little or no objection. But is it at all probable that an unsophisticated or any other Brahmin, or indeed, any Hindoo, would regard with any thing but hatred a Government measure avowedly intended to deprive him of his religion; certainly calculated from the very outset to hold up to scorn and abhorrence everything from his youth upwards most venerated and regarded as sacred; and, withal, forced upon him as the price of being allowed to qualify himself for the

public service, repeatedly proclaimed by Government open, without reference to caste or creed, to all possessed of an amount of secular knowledge, which he now finds placed out of the reach of all not consenting to receive instruction in the Christian Scriptures? It is surely most erroneous to suppose that "sound policy dictates this course as that which alone will gain for us the respect of our subjects, and relieve us from the imputation either of being utterly without religion or of acting with a duplicity unworthy the British name." We must gain such respect and escape such imputations not by any sort of coercion, but by example and by ourselves placing unmistakeably before Mohomedan and Hindoo, by act and deed, the superior purity of the religion we profess, and to avoid being justly charged with duplicity, we must above all things preserve unbroken, in letter and in spirit, the pledge of perfect religious toleration so unqualifiedly given and so often renewed.

But any attempt to force, however indirectly, upon an unwilling people a religion subversive of that which they profess and practise, would fail from other causes the removal of which at an early date is obviously impossible. Those really acquainted with the social habits and relations of the people of India well know the deplorably trifling effect of religious instruction upon those daily returning to the home which most native houses present, and to the society in which natives generally move. Is compulsory religious tuition for an hour or two daily at all likely to result in conviction of strength sufficient not merely to resist the influence of home and of every social tie, but to bring about the voluntary abandonment of parents, wife, children, friends —everything, in short, which natives of India, just as much as Europeans, hold most dear? Here is the great difficulty with which the earnest and able missionary has to contend. Is it likely to be diminished or immeasurably increased by the substitution of State coercion for friendly and unauthoritative argument and persuasion?

Again, supposing a course of State religious instructions to have been commenced throughout India, what would be its progress and where would it end? It would never do to reward proficiency and punish idleness and neglect in every branch of study save in this one, and yet in it how could the one be stimulated and the other discouraged? What would be the prizes successively awarded to the just-awakened, the half-convinced, and the throughly-converted student, and on leaving college would his profession of Christianity obtain for him preferential employment at the hands of a Government professing only the purest toleration? Have the advocates of State interference attempted to work

out their theory thus far; if so, how do they dispose of the difficulty?

How completely the measures advocated by those of whose views Mr. Thomas is the exponent would fail to effect the object which they, in common with all Christians, have at heart, has been forcibly shown in a letter from "A Hertfordshire Incumbent," published in the *Times* of the 13th October last. "The practical rule" (says the writer) "of doing as we would be done by—not as others would do by us, which is a very different thing—will I suspect be a much safer guide in the Government of India than any theories about the special duties of Christian rulers. We are bound to render to Cæsar the things which are Cæsar's, to establish and maintain a secure and just Government which shall be a guarantee of life, property, and rational freedom to every member of the community, but let us beware of the temptation to set Cæsar about doing God's work. Political economists tell us that the material interests of a country can only be furthered by a government confining its operation to opening communications, allowing traffic its natural course; very much the same is the case with its moral and spiritual welfare. Let the Government open roads for this kind of commerce, giving every facility for the interchange of ideas. Let the ways of science, literature, and religion be kept clear and free from all impediments, except such as are a necessary condition of maintaining civil order; but let us be very careful how we attempt to advance 'the kingdom which is not of this world,' by an appeal, direct or indirect, to anything else than reason and conscience. With such a policy the conversion of the Hindoo may proceed slowly, but it will at any rate be sure, and its progress will not weaken the bond of confidence between the governors and the governed, which must be maintained if it is to proceed at all."

No. 14.

According to the *Times* of Thursday, the 19th Nov, the suppression, so far, of the Indian outbreak has been "achieved without, instead of by means of reinforcements," and this has satisfactorily shown that the "ordinary Indian army (i. e., the number of European troops in India at the commencement of the outbreak) can keep India." Were such really the case, and had events, as far as they have progressed, warranted any such interference, well might we one and all cry out with the *Times*, "This is a great discovery." Looking, however, at the facts

of the case, we find that strong reinforcements, some of which no[t] rison Lucknow, long ago reached India; that to this material assi[st] has been already added the powerful effect produced by the desp[atch] a very large army from these shores; and that even now fearful in[deed] would be our position in India were that army (nearly equal in number to the whole British force previously maintained there) not on the spot or close at hand. The facts being notorious, the erroneous statement of the *Times* would scarcely have called for notice had it not immediately afterwards been adduced as proof of the impossibility of raising any of the natives of India "to a civil level in every respect" with the Europeans scattered throughout the country. First of all the *Times* quotes the opinion of its Calcutta corespondent, that the Government of India has for some years considered "that Europeans should be placed exactly on a par with natives, should be tried by native judges, and be reduced, in fact, to a powerless,and, from their small numbers, insignificant section." Having assumed this to be "the official theory in India," the *Times* next proceeds to demolish it. But the actual official theory is believed to be a widely different one. The Government have certainly advocated one code of laws and one administration of justice for all persons in India, whether Europeans or natives, but that they have ever desired to lower Europeans to the native level, or to reduce them to a powerless and insignificant section of the community, has yet to be demonstrated. The proposals of the Government are understood to have been based on the impracticability of thus lowering or reducing the European, and the consequent necessity of endeavouring to raise the native to the higher level. Regarding the precise method of best attaining this object opinions may fairly differ, but to repudiate the theory is to declare that India must be governed according to the lights and civilision of past centuries, and that the continued degradation tion of its people is essential to the prolongation of the British rule.

That the Government of India "would have India governed exactly as an English county is" is an assertion surely little likely to command credence. Such folly would be preposterous. But there is a wide difference between any such visionary scheme, and proposed reforms and improvements having for their one great object the creation of habits, tastes, and wants calculated gradually to fit India for a form of government in accordance with "that great rule of English justice of which we so properly boast," and to render unnecessary arbitrary distinctions and restrictions incompatible either with the goodwill or the elevation of the millions whom centuries of oppression and degradation have placed under our control. Our future task in the East is,

e to accept the *Times*' definition, "to scatter a few thousand ns over the vast Indian continent and tell them that they must hundred millions." Were this the object of our mission, nt and discussion would, indeed, be superfluous. Such an object once fairly avowed by those entrusted with the administration of India, and such a system once introduced, it would simply remain fearlessly to await the explosion which would be sooner or later inevitable. And how does this last proposal of the *Times* contrast with others put forward by it but very recently? First, as regards the nature of the outbreak, which from first to last the *Times* has vehemently declared to be a military mutiny, unconnected with and unsympathised in by the mass of the population. Is the absence, then, of everything like general disaffection to be now recognised and rewarded by proclaiming the policy steadily pursued during our century of possession to have been abandoned in favour of persons basing all legislation and public measures on the "natural inferiority the Hindoo," and the impossibility of raising him to the European tion?

But the doctrine of the *Times* involves much more even than this. Are the natives, however thoroughly informed and educated, to remain for ever debarred from any but the most subordinate employment? Are they to become our improved tools, and nothing more? Is every native, no matter how highly qualified, to feel that all his information, all his unexceptionable conduct, all his approved service, all his educated notions of civilized justice and equality of rights, are to weigh but as a feather in the scale against his "natural inferiority?" Verily, upon the advocates of such a system should devolve the duty of administering and testing it.

Next, as regards the maintenance of native States throughout India, which has very recently been advocated, though always previously strongly deprecated by the *Times* supposing such maintenance to be consistent with sound policy, is the security of our own rule likely to be increased or enhanced by the preservation in the midst of our territory of numerous native governments offering place, power, and every other worldly advancement to those who under British rule find themselves ostracised on the ground of "natural inferiority" of race?

And lastly, how would such a distinction affect the propagation of Christianity?—a measure which, during the last three months, the *Times* has advocated with unquestionable zeal, though with, perhaps, doubtful discretion. Should the profession of Christianity be proclaimed sufficient to bring the native convert to the European level? or should it be concealed from those exhorted to embrace a religion breath-

ing nothing but charity, toleration, and equality, that even after their conversion no such equality can be possible? or should the missionary go forth confident of converting the Hindoo not only to Christianity, but also to a recognition of his own irreclaimable and unalterable "natural inferiority?"

The foregoing certainly appear to be startling difficulties in the way of administering our Indian Empire on the principle most recently ly nunciated by the *Times*, perhaps in the absence of sufficient information any egarding the share in the administration really, though not nominally, Eu aken by the men whose natural inferiority is alleged to be such as to renquo ler their Government practicable by simply telling a few thousand Eu- of Tn peans "that they must cow two hundred millions" of them.

exact There can be few, very few, who will not declare, with the *Times*, educa every Englishman should be proud of the manner in which the and fame of Great Britain have been maintained during the last fo nths in India, by those who have added to their nation's history one d s brightest pages; who, against no odds, and under no circumst ces, have ever lost heart; and who have shown to all India that on the battle-field, be.ween the Sepoy and the British soldier equality, or anyth g approaching to it, does not exist. But for all this, it by no means follows that the policy to which we owe the existence of our Indian empire is one which cannot too soon be repudiated; or that at the close of a century, we must now, for the first time, declare India held for ourselves, and not for its people; or that we should, in either civil or religious matters, exchange (to borrow from the *Times*) the "rule by sufferance" for the "rule by strength."

No. 15.

The leading article in the *Daily News* of Monday last (Nov. 23) well and forcibly expresses the views of all those who, possessing Indian experience, removed from the influence of party, and not blinded by narrow and shortsighted personal considerations, look forward with dismay to the bare possibility of any hurried legislation regarding India, or any measures calculated to remove the only existing barrier between the administration of India and the English hustings. Weighty indeed are the reasons which should lead our countrymen, not merely "to pause before they emancipate the Queen's ministers from the surveillance of a council not elected by themselves," but firmly to reject

and every proposal calculated, in effect, to place India at the uncontrolled disposal of the minister or the ministry of the day.

The two great defects in the Indian home administration, which it should be the care of Parliament to remedy as far as practicable, are ministerial want of information and experience, and the anomalous constitution of the Court of Directors. It cannot be in the power of Parliament to ensure the invariable selection of a thoroughly qualified Indian minister, but this renders doubly necessary the existence—and this it must be fully within the power of Parliament to ensure—of an independent body of men, of proved character, experience, and ability, vested with ample power to check, and, if necessary, expose to parliamentary scrutiny, any ministerial proceedings appearing to them decidedly erroneous or dangerous. These, however, are matters for consideration hereafter. The first step must obviously be that of collecting, recording, and considering the evidence of all classes of persons connected with India, and, above all, of the natives of the country. They alone can fully appreciate the working of our administration in many most important respects. To them must its defects be, of necessity, most painfully apparent, because by them must they be most accurately felt; and among them are many able to describe and account for their feelings and impressions on these subjects quite as clearly and correctly as any European. Any parliamentary inquiry ignoring this evidence must be incomplete, and a most unsafe basis of future legislation. It is not necessary here to discuss the best method of obtaining such evidence; sufficient for the present is it to invite attention to the general subject, and submit for the consideration of our administrators the absolute impossibility of any satisfactory, or indeed safe legislation, and the folly and danger of attempting to introduce any remedial measures, until the completion of inquiry which must be prolonged and laborious. It would also be well to consider whether the time for even commencing such an inquiry has yet arrived, and whether it must not be desirable on every score to defer its commencement until order shall have been thoroughly restored throughout India, and until the Indian Government shall have regained a position enabling them to devote to the subject the time and calm attention which its importance demands.

It seems, therefore, clear that Indian matters ought not to be allowed to interfere with or prevent the discussion of a Reform or any other English bill, and that one or more Sessions must elapse before Parliament can have before them information without which it would be inexpedient to introduce any important measure affecting the administration

of India. It appears equally certain that the evidence of natives must be taken with great care and judgment, and by persons fully competent, as on no other conditions can any one of them be reasonably expected to brave the consequences of coming forward; and it should be especially borne in mind that those who do so will be placed in the position described in the concluding paragraph of the Report of the Madras Torture Commissioners, and that, should the abuses brought to light not be really and effectually dealt with, gloomy indeed will be the future of those whose boldness in coming forward will have "aroused a vengeance which we shall not have taken care to render impotent, and thus the native population may be worse off than before."

No. 16.

Bad indeed are the days in store for India should the articles in the *Times* of Saturday last (Nov. 28) indicate in the smallest degree the views of those by whom the Empire is henceforth to be administered. The first of these articles affects to be a treatise on the duties, power, and beauty of Christianity, under "a reformed organisation in all departments of our Eastern Empire." After lauding the Bishop of Oxford as "a true officer of the church militant," and declaring him, in a speech published a day or two previously, to have "applied to the mission of his own profession the maxims of military science," the *Times* informs us that for the future throughout India our "principle of action will be essentially changed," and that "our attitude as a Christian Government will be entirely altered, and our position in regard to the native superstitions rendered altogether new." Pending something like specific information, of which not a particle is vouchsafed, it is impossible to deal with these generalities further than by exposing their mischievous effect. They are probably intended to produce excitement among English classes profoundly ignorant of everything connected with India, but they are unfortunately still better calculated to arouse the alarm and hatred of natives of India quite as ignorant of everything connected with this country. Can they be blamed for attaching to these assertions undue importance? Are they likely, more than nine-tenths of the English readers, to understand that these statements are, as indications of the intentions and policy of the British Government, not worth the paper on which they are printed? Knowing, as they do, from one end of India to the other, that Christian Mis-

naries have heretofore enjoyed perfect toleration and protection, what are they to believe when they are told that in future "the field will be opened to missionary exertions with the sanction, instead of the disfavour of the Government? According to the *Times*, all this will relieve them (the natives) "of the only apprehension they have ever entertained—that of forcible proselytism." According to common sense, is it not more likely to render a second and more disastrous outbreak a question simply of time? The *Times*' assertion that during the past century we have failed to convince the natives of our sincere intention to observe and enforce perfect religious toleration, is best met by the fact that we still hold the country. Whether they are likely to retain this conviction, and to believe that we "never can have" any other intention, is, however, a very different thing. Those of whose views the *Times* appears to be the exponent and mouthpiece are certainly labouring hard to prevent such a possibility. That, whatever we might have done "we could not possibly have fared worse," is an assertion which contrasts strangely with the fact, on which the *Times* more than any other journal has strongly dwelt, that the outbreak has been, and is, simply a military mutiny and not a popular insurrection. It would, indeed, be well were the *Times* to specify with precision that which it recommends. Articles such as those at present under consideration cannot by any possibility answer any legitimate or useful purpose, though they may delude the majority of the English public, entirely without correct information on Indian subjects, into a belief to attempt to act upon which would, in all human probability, solve the question of missionary enterprise with terrible distinctness.

Every one of the foregoing objections applies with yet greater force to the next article, in which the public are treated to an elaborate dissertation on Indian "lust and cruelty." Lord Shaftesbury, it appears, considers that the atrocities committed at Delhi and elsewhere have not yet been published in sufficiently perfect detail. The *Times* thought, and still thinks, otherwise; but, nevertheless, proceeds to give, "under the disguise of generalities," the details "connected with the atrocities of the mutiny;" and these generalities the readers of the *Times* are requested to accept as "a useful piece of knowledge for them," and as "a guide to them in forming a right estimate of what Hindoo heathenism is, and the difference of human nature with and human nature without Christianity." In other words, they are told to believe the natives of India incarnations of abominations conceivable and inconceivable, and thus instructed, they are exhorted to "pause to reflect how far

we may trust such specimens of moral character, place them in responsible and powerful positions, and put arms into their hands." How we are to govern India without doing any one of these things is not stated. But what is the real state of the case? In what category should we place the atrocities of the Inquisition, the Scottish Star Chamber, the French Revolution, and many others, perpetrated not by heathens, but by men professedly Christians, and are these to be accepted as average samples of human nature with Christianity? Yet with no greater propriety or truth are Englishmen now asked to believe every native of India naturally prone to vice and atrocity, and to acts such as those which have been perpetrated, certainly for the most part, and perhaps entirely, by released convicts and others, the very scum and refuse of many millions of people. To follow the *Times* into the field of "lust" is out of the question; suffice it to ask whether a full and minute account of the vice and iniquity disgracing the two centres of civilisation, London and Paris, would leave to the most prurient and foul imagination much to describe or conceive?

There must be scores and scores of Englishmen the experience of whose life-time has been at utter variance with the assertions put forward by the *Times*, and among them must be many who owe much of their worldly success and advancement to the exertions and good qualities of men whom the *Times* has thus stigmatised and included in one sweeping condemnation. For the sake of the national honour and character, it is to be hoped that some one of these Englishmen who may now be in a position to command attention in this country, will at a suitable time and place expose and correct the unjust and impolitic denunciations which the *Times*, for some purpose or other, has thought fit to publish.

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